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Abstract 
The major aim of this thesis is to investigate corporate finance practices, as well as 
the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance and 
information leakage in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a major state among 
developing and Middle Eastern countries, characterised by certain economic and 
financial differences in contrast with other advanced and developing countries. Little 
consensus exists with regard to the means through which firms should come to 
corporate financial decisions. Therefore, a scant number of studies have conducted 
comprehensive surveys into corporate finance practices, covering capital budgeting, 
cost of capital, capital structure and dividends. These studies have indicated that 
firm practices are not always in accordance with academic rules and theories. 
Regardless of such evidence, no research has been undertaken to explore the 
discrepancy between financial theories developed in western markets and the 
corporate financial practices of Saudi firms. Therefore, as far as I am aware, this 
thesis is the first study seeking to fill this literature gap, providing a contribution to 
the literature in the form of a comprehensive investigation of corporate finance 
decision making in Saudi Arabia. To execute this investigation, a draft survey was 
devised and distributed to the CFOs of all Saudi listed firms. Analysis of the 
responses indicated that popular techniques were IRR and NPV, for capital 
budgeting and earnings yield assessments of equity costs. The Zakat rate is the tax 
rate utilised by 94.2% of Saudi firms, with support present for the pecking-order 
theory and the trade-off theory. Furthermore, Saudi firms have a long-term target 
pay-out ratio, while strong support is indicated for the bird in hand theory and 
signalling mechanism. Moreover, one of the major issues relating to the Saudi 
market has been the emergence of insider trading and information leakage. 
Additionally, in 2006 the Saudi stock market crashed, producing a negative influence 
on investor confidence. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Authority 
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(CMA) issued corporate governance regulations; in 2009, the CMA began enforcing 
these regulations on all Saudi listed firms, as a means of enhancing market 
transparency and credibility. Despite the significance of these regulations, no 
existing research has assessed the effect of these regulations on the information 
leakage phenomenon, or the impact of regulations on firm performance post-2009. 
Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study investigating the effect 
of these governance mechanisms on information leakage, in addition to firm 
performance for the post-2009 period. To undertake this examination, information 
leakage was identified on the basis of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), prior to 
quarterly and annual earnings announcements. Three models were utilised to 
calculate abnormal returns, namely the constant mean return model, market 
adjusted model and market model. Three measures were applied for firm 
performance: return on assets (ROA); return on equity (ROE), alongside Tobin’s Q. 
Additionally, for the regression analysis, the System Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) was adopted as a control for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. The findings indicated that significant information 
leakage and CARs was present prior to the official quarterly and annual earnings 
announcements. Besides, the information leakage level before quarterly earnings 
announcements for the period 2006-2008 were greater than for 2009-2014. 
Additionally, the results indicated the negative effect of ownership concentration, 
government ownership and board subcommittees’ presence on firm performance. 
Institutional ownership, director ownership, managerial ownership, board size and 
audit committee size were positively correlated to firm performance. Moreover, the 
results confirmed that ownership concentration, board size and frequency of board 
meetings have a positive influence effect on information leakage, whereas 
institutional ownership, director ownership, board subcommittees’ presence and 
audit committee size all have a negative impact on information leakage.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation  
This research presents the outcomes of an examination of corporate finance 
practices, alongside the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and 
information leakage in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a major country in the 
developing and Islamic world, while also being an important country in the Middle 
East. Saudi Arabia represents a different and unique context compared with other 
countries. Moreover, the relationship between corporate governance, firm financial 
performance and information leakage has been a fundamental concern in corporate 
governance research. This study is the first to comprehensively investigate 
corporate finance practices, in addition to the impact of corporate governance 
components on firm information leakage in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, this is the 
first investigation examining the effect of corporate governance components on firm 
performance for the period following the corporate governance codes becoming 
obligatory for all listed firms in the Saudi market.   
A specific emphasis has been placed on investigating the optimal corporate 
finance decisions that firms should formulate and implement. Although corporate 
finance theories have been subjected to empirical testing, little consensus exists in 
terms of the way in which firms should decide on corporate financial decisions. Very 
few studies have provided a comprehensive survey into corporate finance practices 
covering an array of areas of corporate finance practice, for example capital 
budgeting, capital costs, capital structure and dividend. One of the few studies that 
has is the ground-breaking investigation by Graham and Harvey (2001), providing 
a comprehensive survey of corporate finance practices in the U.S. market. Graham 
and Harvey (2001) hoped: 
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“that researchers will use our results to develop new theories and potentially 
modify or abandon existing views. We also hope that practitioners will learn 
from our analysis by noting how other firms operate and by identifying areas 
where academic recommendations have not been fully implemented” 
(p.188).  
Furthermore, Graham and Harvey's (2001) research indicated that the financial 
decision-making process of firms is not inevitably in line with academic rules and 
theories, a proposition that stimulated other researchers to replicate the survey in 
other contexts and countries. Adopting similar surveys to Graham and Harvey 
(2001), Anand (2002) revealed the corporate finance practices of Indian firms, while 
Brounen et al. (2004) studied the corporate finance practices of European firms. 
Furthermore, Maquieira et al. (2012) implemented the same survey in order to 
examine corporate finance practices in South America. All of the survey outcomes 
indicated that little understanding exists of the relationship between the theory and 
practice behind corporate financial decision-making, with results suggesting that 
firms’ financial decision-making processes are not always in accordance with 
academic theories and explanations. 
Nevertheless, regardless of such evidence, few investigations have focused 
on listed companies in developed countries, for example the USA European 
countries, South American countries or India. Furthermore, restricted research has 
been conducted on developing countries, particularly in the Middle East. 
Specifically, no research has been dedicated to corporate financial decision making 
practices in the Saudi Arabian market, despite Saudi Arabia representing a 
distinctive business and financial system and environment, compared with, for 
example, India the USA or European countries. Therefore, this PhD thesis seeks to 
contribute to filling this literature gap, through a comprehensive investigation of 
corporate finance decision making practices, in order to determine whether theories 
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and polices extracted from the western market are aligned with the decisions and 
practices of financial managers in Saudi Arabia.  
Saudi Arabia has a distinctive environment and characteristics, compared 
with other countries. One such unique characteristic is the absence of a tax system, 
meaning that there is no individual or corporation taxed on their salary or investment 
earnings. A tax system is essential in the majority of countries, while also being 
associated with several theories and tenets of corporate finance. For example, the 
tax effect theory proposes that shareholders do not prefer to receive dividends, if 
the tax on dividends is higher than the tax on the capital gains, because the firms 
can invest the difference in other investments (Brennan, 1970). Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia is characterised by the bond market still being at a nascent stage compared 
with other countries, while the financial system is dominated by Islamic finance. The 
provision of Islamic financing services and products is not reliant upon the interest 
rate, as well as being distinct from the popular financing methods offered in other 
countries. This has resulted in Saudi firms adjusting their policies and practices, in 
order to deal with these differences. As mentioned, Saudi Arabia is a major country 
in the Islamic and Arab world, the sole Arab country in the G20 and is positioned as 
one of the largest oil producing countries internationally. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is 
one of the largest economies and stock markets in the Gulf region, comprising 47% 
of Arab Gulf States’ GDP (Ali, 2013). Globally, Saudi GDP is the 19th largest (Ali, 
2013).  
Although Mutairi et al. (2009) undertook survey-based research into the 
corporate finance practices of Kuwaiti firms, which are based in the Gulf Region, the 
results cannot be considered transferrable to the Saudi market and firm context, as 
a result of the substantial differences between the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian 
economies, business environments and regulations. Brounen et al.'s (2004) 
research indicated the differences between the corporate finance practices of 
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European countries, regardless of certain similarities in their economic 
environments. Additionally, Dahel and Laabas (1998) confirmed several 
discrepancies between the GCC stock markets. As noted, Saudi Arabia is the Gulf 
region’s largest economy and stock market, with 47% of Arab Gulf States’ GDP 
(DeAngelis, 2011). Therefore, the Kuwaiti economy is evidently much smaller 
compared with the Saudi economy (Ali, 2013). Besides, Saudi Arabia is the sole 
Arab country in the G20, while also being one of the world’s largest oil producing 
countries. Thus, it is crucial for this research to determine the corporate finance 
practices in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the financial crises and scandals occurring in developed 
countries during the last decade have drawn greater attention to corporate 
governance at both the local and international level, with a focus on the need to 
increase transparency and protect all shareholders’ rights (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Moreover, in 2006 there was the Saudi stock market crash, which prompted by the 
loss of investor confidence. Resultantly, Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) initiated reform and development of the market by issuing corporate 
governance regulations to interested parties, as a means of enhancing market 
transparency, credibility and accountability (Samba Financial Group, 2009). A major 
issue within the Saudi market was the emergence of activities such as insider 
trading, alongside information leakage in the market prior to a firm’s public 
announcement. Alzahrani and Gregoriou (2010) undertook research into the Saudi 
market that indicated there was a significant amount of asymmetrical information 
present before the official earnings announcement date, confirming that private 
acquisition of information had occurred.  
In an efficient market, all shareholders would simultaneously obtain all 
information and announcements concerning the listed firms. However, in reality 
certain investors can acquire crucial, leaked information relating to the firm prior to 
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the information’s public release (Brunnermeier 2005). Consequently, transparency 
in the market and firms’ announcements is a principal aspect of efficient corporate 
governance regulations, because shareholders and investors in financial markets 
anticipate receiving precise and complete firm disclosures,  thus enabling them to 
make appropriate decisions based on a basic assessment of a firm (Heggen and 
Gannon, 2008; Tsai, 2014). The OECD (2004) proposed that efficient corporate 
governance regulations should result in greater reliability and transparency 
concerning firms’ disclosures, which should help to preserve stockholders’ interests. 
Therefore, the important objectives of corporate governance include protecting 
financial disclosures, alongside encouraging firms to generate a transparent 
environment through control and monitoring systems (Koh et al., 2007). 
The Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs), which were 
legislated for in 2006, aim to enhance the responsibility and transparency of both 
Saudi firms and the overall market. Initially, the CGRs were released solely as a 
guideline, although from 2009, the CGRs became obligatory for all Saudi listed 
firms. The Saudi Capital Market Law prohibited the leaking of inside information for 
insider trading, deeming it an illegal act (CMA 2009). Nevertheless, the Saudi 
authorities need to continuously assess the situation, as a means of examining the 
extent of information leakage in the market and to assess the efficiency of the 
existing CGRs in terms of diminishing the degree of information leakage. Despite 
there being several studies exploring the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and information leakage, no evidence or research to date 
has considered whether or not such corporate governance mechanisms have 
affected and diminished the degree of information leakage in the Saudi market. 
Consequently, this research provides a valuable contribution, being the first 
research to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and information leakage in such a context. Additionally, Klapper and Love (2004) 
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proposed that optimal corporate governance has a positive impact on firm 
performance, as it can be perceived as an obligation that firms are obliged to adhere 
to, in order to undertake the necessary procedures for effective capital investment. 
Moreover, Morey et al. (2009) indicated that effective corporate governance will 
maximise investors’ wealth in emerging markets. Even though few studies examined 
the relationship between CGRs and performance in the Saudi market such as the 
study of Al-Matari et al. (2012) and Ezzine (2011), these studies have several 
limitations and did not cover the period from 2009 when the CGRs became 
mandatory on all Saudi listed firms. Therefore, this thesis also seeks to investigate 
the effect of existing corporate governance regulations on Saudi firms’ performance, 
being the first study investigating the relationship between CGRs and firm 
performance prior to and after 2009, when the CGRs began to become obligatory 
for all Saudi listed firms. 
 
1.2 Initial Methodological Considerations 
As a means of investigating corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia, this 
research devised a draft survey that is similar to that developed by Anand (2002). 
However, certain modifications were introduced in order to make the questionnaire 
more relevant to the Saudi market. Moreover, the research adopted one question 
from Graham and Harvey's (2001) survey concerning capital structure practices. 
The draft survey concerns the practices of cost of capital, capital budgeting, capital 
structure and dividend. As the chief financial officers (CFOs) play an essential role 
in shaping Saudi companies’ financial decisions, the sample included all CFOs of 
Saudi listed firms until the end of May 2015, totalling 165 listed firms. 52 completed 
responses were obtained, providing a response rate of almost 31.51%. The survey 
results indicated interesting outcomes. For example, IRR and NPV are popular 
capital budgeting techniques, with earnings yield being a common approach for 
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assessing equity costs. Additionally, the Zakat rate is the tax rate adopted by 94.2% 
of the Saudi listed firms. The outcomes of capital structure questions provide clear 
evidence in terms of the pecking-order theory and the trade-off theory. Saudi firms 
have a long-term pay-out ratio, while strong support exists for the bird-in-the-hand 
theory and signalling mechanism. The results showed also that the corporate 
finance practices of Saudi firms are not always the same as Kuwaiti firms.    
In addition, in order to examine the impact of Saudi CGRs on firm 
performance and information leakage, this thesis utilised a sample that included all 
Saudi listed firms up until the end of 2014. By that time, there were 163 listed firms. 
The research was based on two types of data, namely the firms from every sector 
and non-financial firms, as well as two time period, between 2006 and 2014 and 
from 2009 to 2014. The years between 2006 and 2014 enabled the research to 
investigate the firms prior to and following the period when CGRs became obligatory 
for all firms. Additionally, the period between 2009 and 2014 saw an increased in 
listed firms in the Saudi market. Furthermore, the research undertook a 
comprehensive literature review, in order to build the research hypotheses for the 
anticipated relationship between the corporate governance variables, firm 
performance and information leakage. As a means of testing these hypotheses, the 
research adopted the multivariate regression model, examining the effect of 
corporate governance components on firm financial performance and information 
leakage. The balanced panel data was applied, permitting the research to utilise 
time series and cross-sectional data. An array of statistical tests have to be 
conducted in order to confirm the presence of the ordinary least square (OLS) 
assumptions, enabling a determination of whether any of these assumptions have 
been violated. The statistical tests concluded that the research models are 
influenced by the problem of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. 
Consequently, the simple OLS are not valid and are inappropriate for this research, 
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because biased and unreliable results will be obtained. Therefore, the Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator is adopted, because it is designed 
specifically for data comprising of endogeneity variables, unobserved heterogeneity, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation between individuals.  
 
1.3 Research Aims 
This thesis aims to reveal the corporate finance and governance decisions of Saudi 
firms and to what extent the governance decisions affect the firm performance and 
information leakage.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
To achieve the research aims, the research set the following objectives: 
- To reveal the corporate finance decisions of Saudi Arabian firms.  
- To examine the effects of corporate governance decisions of Saudi Arabian firms 
on their performance. 
- To determine the extent of information leakage in the Saudi Stock Exchange 
market.  
- To investigate the effects of corporate governance decisions of Saudi Arabian 
firms on their information leakage. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
Based on the defined major objectives of this thesis, the main thesis questions that 
the research seeks to answer are:   
- What are the corporate finance practices of Saudi firms? 
- To what extent do CGRs affect firms’ performances in Saudi Arabia? 
- To what degree is information leakage extant within the Saudi Stock Exchange? 
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- To what degree does corporate governance impact upon information leakage in 
Saudi Arabia? 
 
1.6 Research Contributions 
Saudi Arabia is the major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world, and the 
sole Arab country in the G20. Moreover, it has a different financial system and 
business environment compared to the west and other developing countries for 
example it is characterised by the absence of tax systems, an undeveloped bond 
market, and intensive Islamic financial products and services. Therefore, the 
research findings will provide valuable contributions to the researchers, 
practitioners, and participants. The research contributions to the various literatures 
and academicians, practitioners, and firms can be summarised as follows: 
- This research is the first study that conducts a comprehensive investigation into 
the corporate financial decisions and practices that includes capital budgeting, 
cost of capital, capital structure, and dividend practices in Saudi firms. Therefore, 
this research offers a valuable contribution to the literatures by showing the gap 
between the theories and models that were developed in western world and the 
corporate financial practices in a country which greatly differs from western and 
developing countries. It is hoped that the thesis findings will be used by 
investigators to evaluate, develop, or modify the current corporate financial 
theories and models. In addition, firms can use the findings to compare their 
practices with other firms’ practices which may enhance their financial decisions. 
Besides, the research will provide to the Saudi business schools how Saudi firms 
utilise and practice the corporate finance theories and models that are taught at 
the school. 
- From 2009, the CMA started to make several governance codes obligatory for 
all Saudi listed firms in an attempt to improve the firm and the market. This 
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research is the first study that examines the effect of Saudi corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance in the period before and after the 
year 2009. In addition, according to my current knowledge, it is the first study 
that investigates the effect of institutional ownership, government ownership, 
and managerial ownership on firm performance in the Saudi market. In addition, 
this study will provide to literatures new findings determining the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance which were 
analysed by applying the dynamic model, the System GMM model, three 
measures of firm performance, two types of data, and the context of Saudi Arabia 
that consists of several differences in comparison to other developed and 
developing countries. In addition, as this research covers the period before and 
after governance codes became obligatory for Saudi’s listed firms. Therefore, 
the findings would help the CMA to assess and review the market reform and 
improve the current governance mechanisms. 
- This research is the first study that investigates the extent and presence of 
information leakage incidents and cumulative abnormal returns prior to the 
quarterly and annual earnings announcements during the period before and after 
2009. Therefore, the findings of this research would provide the Saudi CMA with 
the necessary evidence and proof of the effect of their market reform and the 
application of CGRs on the market and firm transparency as well as the level of 
information leakage before and after 2009.  
- This research is the first study that examines the influence of corporate 
governance components on information leakage in the Saudi market. Examining 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
information leakage is fairly limited in the literatures; therefore, this research 
would significantly contribute to researchers’ knowledge, especially since this 
research adopted two types of data to compare the results and applied the 
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System GMM model to control autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, 
heterogeneity, and endogeneity. This enabled the research to provide valid and 
accurate results. In addition, the findings provided the firms with a greater 
understanding of which corporate governance mechanisms are likely to reduce 
the level of information leakage and which ones have a positive influence on the 
level of information leakage. Besides, this findings will enable the CMA to assess 
the current market reform and lead the CMA to reform, change, or improve the 
current codes which show a positive or non-significant influence on the firm 
information leakage and information asymmetry.   
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters, investigating corporate finance practices 
and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on Saudi Arabian firms’ 
performance and information leakage prior to earnings announcements. Chapter 1 
discusses the research background and motivations, as well as introducing the 
research objectives and questions. Furthermore, it presents the thesis’ major 
research contributions and the organisation of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents the 
literature review and theoretical background for the major areas of corporate 
finance, including capital budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure and dividends. 
Following this, it reviews previous survey studies pertaining to corporate finance 
practices. Additionally, the chapter provides an assessment of the literature 
concerning corporate governance mechanisms, market efficiency and 
transparency, as well as information leakage and insider trading. Chapter 3 
evaluates and reviews the literature and prior empirical studies pertinent to 
investigating the anticipated relationship between each corporate governance 
component, firm performance and information leakage. Subsequently, a research 
hypothesis is constructed for each relationship. The chapter is divided into two main 
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sections. The first concerns the research hypotheses relating to the board of 
directors’ characteristics, while the second part presents the research hypotheses 
for ownership structure characteristics. Chapter 4 outlines the research 
methodology for exploring corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia. It presents 
the survey design, sample identification and the methods utilised to deliver and 
receive the responses. This chapter also provides an interpretation and discussion 
of the survey results. Chapter 5 explains the research methodology for determining 
the association between corporate governance components, firm performance and 
information leakage, prior to official earnings announcements. The discussion 
illustrates the assumptions based on the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model and 
the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. Subsequently, the sample 
and variables are outlined, with the descriptive statistics outlined pertaining to the 
independent and control variables, which are utilised to perform the regression 
analysis of the relationship between corporate governance, performance and 
information leakage. Chapter 6 initially discusses the dependent and control 
variables, alongside the regression analysis adopted for selecting the model for 
determining the impact of corporate governance components on firm performance. 
Subsequently, a justification is provided for the selection of the System GMM model. 
Finally, chapter 6 illustrates and discusses the regression results and results. 
Chapter 7 investigates the degree of information leakage in the Saudi exchange 
market, prior to official earnings announcements. An explanation is offered for the 
event study methodology, the sample and the models adopted to calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Lastly, an explication of the event study 
analysis outcomes is presented. Chapter 8 investigates the effect of CGRs on 
information leakage prior to annual public earnings announcements. The dependent 
variables and control variables are demonstrated for this relationship, with a 
discussion of the regression analysis and the model selected to comprehend the 
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relationship. Finally, the chapter presents and reveals the regression results for the 
association between the corporate governance and information leakage. Chapter 9 
summarises the research findings and explains the suggested implications from the 
findings. Finally, it illustrated the research limitations and the suggested subjects for 
future studies. Table 1-1 shows the research structure and the relationship between 
the research chapters.  
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Table 1-1: Research structure and the relationship between the research chapters 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Chapter 3 
Corporate governance, performance, 
and leakage: Research Hypotheses 
  
Chapter 4 
Survey Method and results: 
Corporate finance decisions and 
practices 
 
Chapter 5 
Regression method: corporate 
governance decisions, performance, 
and leakage 
 
Chapter 6 
Analysis and Results: Corporate 
governance and performance 
Chapter 7 
The extent of information leakage 
before earnings announcements 
Chapter 8 
Analysis and Results: Corporate 
governance and information leakage 
Chapter 9 
Summary of the findings, implications and suggestions, research contributions, and 
limitations and future research  
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Chapter 2:  
Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the overall structure of this thesis, comprising the 
research background and motivations, study aims and objectives, research 
questions, in addition to the thesis structure. As explained previously, the 
fundamental goal and objective of this research is to investigate corporate finance 
practices, and to assess the effect of CGRs on firm performance and information 
leakage in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this chapter’s purpose is to present a review 
of the literature and theoretical background associated with the main subjects of 
corporate finance, namely capital structure, capital costs, capital budgeting and 
dividends, while also reviewing the previous survey studies focusing on corporate 
finance practices. Additionally, the chapter reviews the literatures and theories 
pertinent to corporate governance mechanisms and their effects, market efficiency 
and information leakage. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 assesses 
the theories, literature and previous survey research concerning corporate finance 
practice. Section 2.3 presents the basic information and theoretical background 
relating to corporate governance components, analysing the literature to determine 
its significance. Section 2.4 reviews the literature associated with the subject of 
market efficiency and transparency, as well as information leakage. 2.5 provides a 
conclusion for the chapter. 
 
 2.2 Corporate Finance Practices 
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Corporate finance is concerned with the efficiency of financial methods and 
techniques that are adopted by company managers, in order to fulfil the objectives 
of that company (Watson, 2016). The sub-sections below provide an appraisal of 
the literature focusing on the theoretical background of corporate finance, in addition 
to previous surveys of corporate finance practices.  
      
2.2.1 Theoretical Background  
Corporate finance covers several topics and themes focusing on firms’ financial 
decisions. Following the seminal survey research of Graham and Harvey (2001), as 
well as later survey investigations by Anand (2002), Brounen et al. (2004) and 
Maquieira et al. (2012), this research concentrates on the four principal areas of 
corporate finance, namely the capital structure, cost of capital, capital budgeting and 
dividends.  
 
2.2.1.1 Capital Structure 
Capital structure includes equity and debt that are used by firms to finance their 
projects. The financial manager can decide to issue more debt than equity or can 
alter the mix by issuing more equity than debt. The aim of financial managers is to 
choose the proportion of equity and debt that maximises the firm’s value (Ross et 
al., 2002). Many theories discuss the optimal financial policy and capital structure 
for firms. Modigliani and Miller (1958) developed the leading theory in this area.  
The irrelevance theory put forward by Modigliani and Miller (1958) claims 
that, in a perfect capital market, no connection exists between financial policy and 
a firm's value. Given that a perfect capital market is questionable, it has led 
researchers to focus more on factors that may affect capital structure and the 
influence of the level of leverage on a firm's performance. After almost 50 years, 
Cole (2013; p 780) stated that ‘the seemingly simple question as to how firms should 
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best finance their fixed assets remains a contentious issue’. Two competing 
theories, static trade-off theory and pecking-order theory, have been employed 
extensively by researchers to explain capital structure decisions.   
The static trade-off theory relies on an optimal capital structure and describes 
the optimal capital structure as the exchange between the cost of debt, such as 
bankruptcy and agency costs, and the advantages of debt including interest tax 
deductions (Brigham and Houston, 2004). When a firm increases its debt it will 
benefit from interest tax deductions resulting from the debt because the income 
derived from equity financing is subject to corporate tax; but, alternatively, by 
increasing the firm's debt the firm will risk financial distress and incur costs 
associated with this risk.  
The pecking-order theory also investigates capital structure behaviour by 
focusing on the cost of information asymmetry and signalling impact. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) showed that when firms want to finance their projects they follow a 
hierarchy of financial steps. First, they attempt to find internal resources (retained 
earnings) because this type of financing does not have information asymmetry 
costs, as the management controls more information for the firm than new 
shareholders do. When internal recourse is unavailable, the firm can finance its 
project using debt because it is less sensitive to information issues. Finally, when 
all previous recourses are exhausted, the firm can release new shares to new 
shareholders but this choice can prove more costly because of the information 
asymmetry risk between the management and new shareholders (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). The pecking-order theory does not rely on optimal capital structure in the 
same manner as the trade-off theory because there is no trade-off between the cost 
and the benefit of debt.  
Moreover, some other literatures focus on other determinants of capital 
structure such as the agency cost theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) outlined that 
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agency cost remains a significant factor affecting a firm’s capital structure because 
of the discrepancy that may exist between stock and debt holders. According to the 
agency cost theory, the optimal structure of capital decreases the cost of the 
discrepancy between these groups.  
 
2.2.1.2 Cost of Capital 
Pratt and Grabowski (2008; p3) defined the cost of capital as “the expected rate of 
return that the market participants require in order to attract funds to a particular 
investment” and, in economic terms, the “cost of forgoing the next best alternative 
investment”. The cost of capital relays on the market value rather than the book 
value and on the investment itself not the investor. Firms invest new funds if they 
can afford the required rate of return, which can be earned if investors use the same 
funds in alternative investments at specific risk. Firms estimate the cost of equity 
capital by using celebrated models such as Sharpe’s (1964) capital asset pricing 
model, Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing model, and the Fama-French (1995) three 
factor model. 
 The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was developed by Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965). For over 30 years, financial researchers have preferred the 
CAPM as the favoured model to calculate the cost of capital (Pratt and Grabowski, 
2008). The CAPM assumes that there is a positive linear relation between the 
predicted return of a security and its beta which compares the risk of the security to 
the market as a whole, so the cost of capital can be anticipated depending on the 
project beta and the market risk premium (Ross et al., 2002).  The CAPM received 
support in the early studies of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama and 
MacBeth (1973), and Blume and Friend (1973). However, the CAPM and the 
accuracy of beta as the only measure for risk, were put under scrutiny by many 
scholars during the 1980s. Banz (1981) suggested in his study that the CAPM is 
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misspecified. The study investigated NYSE firms over a forty years period and 
concluded that small stocks gain higher returns than the returns anticipated by the 
CAPM. Basu (1977) studied 753 firms on the NYSE and found that stocks with high 
price-earnings ratios had higher returns than anticipated by beta, and stocks with 
low P/E ratios had lower returns than anticipated by beta. Despite these criticisms, 
the CAPM is still the model favoured in business schools. 
There are other models that draw upon multiple factors as opposed to the 
single factor CAPM uses, such as the arbitrage pricing model (APM) and Fama and 
French’s three factor models. The APM was developed by Ross (1976) and in this 
model the cost of capital depends on the sensitiveness of an investment to different 
risk factors. The limitation of arbitrage pricing theory is that it does not assign 
particular risk factors but most researchers have observed the macroeconomic risk 
factors such as inflation risk, interest rate risk, business environment risk, and yield 
spread (Pratt and Grabowski, 2008).  
The studies of Fama and French (1992, 1993 and 1996) announced the end 
of beta as the only factor for estimating the cost of capital and, instead, they 
developed the three factor model. Fama and French (1992) found that the cost of 
equity anticipated by the CAPM for high beta was higher than the actual returns and 
for low beta was lower than the actual returns. Furthermore, they found that the cost 
of equity anticipated by the CAPM for high book/market value was very low 
comparative to the actual return and for low book/market value was very high 
comparative to the actual return. Therefore, Fama and French added value and size 
factors to the market risk factor of the CAPM to create the three factor model as 
value and small cap securities typically exceed market performance.  
In addition, there is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) model, 
which is used by financial managers to estimate the overall cost of capital of a firm.  
The WACC model is particularly suitable for projects chosen in capital budgeting to 
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see if the project is worthwhile and will maximise the firm’s wealth. The WACC model 
estimates the cost of capital by taking into consideration the proportional weight of 
each type of capital structure.  
 
2.2.1.3 Capital Budgeting 
Capital budgeting is defined as the method of analysing and choosing long- term 
investment asset or assets anticipated offering value returns over more than one 
year (Peterson and Fabozzi, 2002). Firms are in constant need to analyse and 
evaluate new opportunities and investments so capital budgeting is a continuous 
practice in most firms. Capital budgeting is an important element of the financial 
decision process because it affects the success of a firm and its growth outlook. 
When a firm decides to analyse proposed projects it must define the cash flow that 
each project expects to provide and, evaluate the uncertainty that comes with future 
cash flows. The main techniques used in evaluating the projects are the payback 
period, internal rate of return, profitability index and net present value.       
The net present value (NPV) and payback period are the most frequently 
used techniques but, historically, the payback period was the first technique chosen 
and was defined as the period of time required on the project to return the invested 
funds from the project cash flow (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2011). Payback period and 
accounting rate of return are popular non-discounted cash flow methods used in 
evaluating projects (Ross et al., 2002). The payback period is an easy tool and the 
decisions are based on which project has the shorter payback period regardless of 
which one is better value. However, the payback period techniques have received 
some criticism, for example, their disregard of the time effect of cash flows, doesn’t 
look at cash flows beyond the payback period and, finally, it focuses only on the 
recovery period without incorporating information on investor wealth (Brigham and 
Ehrhardt, 2011). Therefore, the discounted payback period has been suggested. 
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This is the period of time that the discounted future cash flows of a project needs to 
return the original fund (Peterson and Fabozzi, 2002). The cash flows are 
discounted by the cost of capital at commencement to take into account the time 
value and uncertainty that comes with future cash flows. 
One of the leading techniques in capital budgeting is the net present value. 
Financial literature indicates that the net present value (NPV) is the best technique 
for analysing fund investment projects and is defined as the difference between the 
investment value and cost or the variance between the current value of the expected 
cash flows of the project and its initial outflow (Bennouna et al., 2010). To maximise 
the wealth of shareholders, a firm should invest in projects that offer positive NPV 
and reject those offering negative NPV because positive NPV offers sufficient 
returns to cover the required return of the project. The distinction of the NPV 
technique is that it covers all future additional cash flows, considering the timing 
value of cash flows and differentiating between projects that have different cash flow 
risks (Peterson and Fabozzi, 2002). 
Another technique is internal rate of return (IRR) or the discounted cash flow 
rate of return. The IRR technique is widely employed in analysing future cash flows 
and is defined as the discount rate that causes the net present value to be equal to 
zero (Brealey et al., 2011). Financial literature deems net present value as superior 
to IRR, but in practice firms, particularly large firms, favour the use of the IRR 
technique because it is simpler and requires no specified cost of capital (Cheng et. 
al., 1994). Firms maximise the wealth of shareholders by accepting projects whose 
IRR is greater than the cost of capital. A problem can occur with the IRR technique 
when a project has abnormal cash flows that produce multiply possible IRR 
solutions and lead to confusion in making financial decisions. To remedy this 
problem, the modified internal rate of return (MIRR) is suggested. MIRR is the return 
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on the project supposing a specific return on the reinvestment of cash flows 
(Peterson and Fabozzi, 2002).  
Finally, the profitability index (PI) technique is used to analyse investment. PI 
is “the ratio of the present value of future expected cash flows after initial investment 
divided by the amount of the initial investment” (Ross et al., 2002). PI shows the 
amount of profit that each one pound can create so the investment maximises the 
firm’s wealth when the PI is greater than one. Firms do not utilize all capital 
budgeting techniques and, according to the survey conducted by Graham and 
Harvey (2001) on 392 U.S. firms, the most frequently used technique was either IRR 
or NPV and the least used technique was PI. 
 
2.2.1.4 Dividend 
The study conducted by Miller and Modigliani (1961) concerning optimal dividend 
policy showed that, in a perfect market, the dividend policy does not influence the 
value of a firm. They indicated that preferring one specific dividend policy over 
another is irrelevant for a firm’s shareholders. To increase the firm’s and shareholder 
wealth, a firm should focus on valuable investments. M&M believed that dividend 
policy has no effect on firms’ value because shareholders can make a homemade 
dividend by selling some shares equivalent to the value of cash that the firm could 
pay. However, Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) theory does not hold up in real world 
financial markets. As a result, several other theories explaining dividend policies 
have put forward. These include bird in the hand theory, tax effect theory, signalling 
effect theory and agency cost theory. 
Graham and Dodd (2009), Lintner (1962) and Gordon (1963) supported the 
bird in the hand theory which indicates that the required returns on capital decrease 
when cash dividends are increased because, in this situation of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, investors favour receiving dividends over retained 
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earnings. This is because cash received from dividends is lower risk than cash 
received from future cash flows and the cost of capital is positively related to risk. 
Therefore, dividend payments lead to an increase in a firm’s value as the lower cost 
of capital enhances the firm’s performance. The theory demonstrates that when 
firms want to maximise the price of their stock, the firms set a high level of payout 
ratio to reflect investors’ preferences (Baker and Powell, 1999).  
Signal or asymmetric information theory states that managers, as insiders, 
use the modification of the dividend payout ratio as a signal of the delivery of good 
information about the firm to investors as outsiders (Denis et al., 1994). The theory 
was developed by Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985), and it shows 
that because managers usually have more accurate information about a firm than 
external investors, especially about its expected investments and future cash flows, 
managers increase the dividends ratio to send a good signal to investors about the 
firm’s future cash flows and profits in order to increase the demand for firm stock 
and thereby affecting the value and wealth of the firm.  
Agency cost theory, which is suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Jensen (1986), relies on the assumption that manager interests are not always in 
line with shareholder interests and as a result, shareholders may use dividend policy 
as a way to control managers’ decisions. As it is difficult for shareholders to monitor 
every manager’s performance and decisions, which may not be in line with 
shareholder interests, shareholders prefer to use external parties such as a debtor 
as a controller by setting a high dividend payout ratio to prompt managers to use 
external financing. In addition, the tax effect theory indicates that shareholders 
prefer firms that do not send any cash dividends to shareholders if the tax on profits 
less than the tax on dividends because firms can use the difference for future 
investments (Brennan, 1970). The tax effect theory is not applicable to the Saudi 
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Arabian market because there is no tax on cash dividends so this theory is not 
relevant to this research.      
 
2.2.2 Survey Studies on Corporate Finance Practices 
Most of the studies on financial decision practices have focused on a specific 
financial decision practice, such as capital structure, capital budgeting or dividends 
policy, while few researchers have performed comprehensive surveys on corporate 
financial practices. Most studies were conducted on listed firms in advanced 
countries such as the U.S. and the United Kingdom, while other studies focused on 
cross-country financial decision practices such as in Europe and Latin countries. 
There are few surveys conducted on developing markets, especially the Middle 
East, and, no comprehensive surveys about corporate finance practices has yet 
been conducted with regards to Saudi Arabia.   
Few researchers conduct comprehensive surveys that involve a variety of 
aspects of corporate finance practices and in the literatures there are four 
comprehensive surveys which are the study of Graham and Harvey (2001), Anand 
(2002), Brounen, Jong and Koedijk (2004), and Maquieira, Preve and Sarria-Allende 
(2012).The most well-known survey of corporate finance practice is the survey 
completed by Graham and Harvey (2001) on a cross section of large publicly listed 
U.S. firms. The survey was about capital structure, capital budgeting and cost of 
capital practices, and the sample included 329 responses from financial officers a 
with response rate of 9%. The results indicated that financial practices differ based 
on a firm’s size and managers used mainly the academic techniques of NPV and 
CAPM but were less likely to follow capital determinants and theories when deciding 
on capital structure.  
In addition, Anand (2002) investigated corporate financial practices of a cross 
section of Indian firms. The sample included 81 responses from private and public 
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firms with a response rate of 15.43%. The survey focused on capital budgeting, cost 
of capital, dividends policy and capital structure practices. Thus the survey of Anand 
(2002) is more comprehensive survey compared with the other three surveys as it 
covers the four main topics of corporate finance. Therefore, this research used 
survey questions similar to the survey of Anand (2002) because this comprehensive 
survey would be able to give clear answer to the research question. The results of 
Anand (2002) showed that a firm’s size has an important influence on corporate 
finance practice and firms use the basic techniques that are taught in business 
schools such as CAPM and NPV techniques in regards to the cost of capital and 
capital budgeting and they follow the pecking-order theory for capital structure 
decisions. Brounen, Jong and Koedijk (2004) used Graham and Harvey’s (2001) 
questions to perform a survey about corporate finance practices in Europe. The 
sample was selected from the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands and 
included 131 firms with a response rate of 5%. They indicated that the static trade-
off theory found some acceptance by managers and the gap between theories and 
practice appeared to be the same in the U.S. and Europe.  
Additionally, Maquieira, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2012) studied corporate 
finance practice in Latin America. The survey used the questions devised by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) with some modifications to reflect the differences of the 
Latin American market. The questions were about capital structure, capital 
budgeting and the cost of capital practices in Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, 
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela.  The sample included 290 responses from a small 
percentage of public firms. The results showed that the major difference, compared 
with U.S. firms, was in the practice of cost of capital because most firms do not use 
financial techniques to evaluate the cost of capital but simply rely on shareholders 
request. 
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 Furthermore, Mutairi et al. (2009) conducted a survey study about corporate 
finance practices in Kuwaiti-listed firms and they concluded that not all corporate 
finance practices in Kuwait are consistent with what is taught in business schools. 
For example, Kuwaiti firms have widely used the IRR technique, despite its 
limitations and the CAMP model despite the WACC model is more popular. 
Furthermore, firms do not have any specific preferences about financing types as is 
the case in the United States. However, even though this study was conducted in 
Kuwait, which is in the Gulf Region, it cannot represent the status of the Saudi 
market and firms due to the substantial differences between Kuwaiti and Saudi 
Arabian economies, business environments and regulations. Saudi Arabia is the 
largest economy and stock market in the Gulf region with 47% of Arab Gulf States' 
GDP so the Kuwaiti economy is deemed relatively small compared with the Saudi 
economy (Ali, 2013). What is more, Saudi Arabia is the sole Arab country in the G20 
and one of the largest oil producing countries in the world. The study of Brounen et 
al. (2004) showed the differences of corporate finance practices between European 
countries despite the similarities of economic environments in these countries. In 
addition, the study of Dahel and Laabas (1998) confirmed some differences in the 
GCC stock markets. Therefore, it is important for this research to reveal corporate 
finance practices in Saudi Arabia which represent the largest economy in the GCC 
and the Middle East and having 25% of the Arab countries’ GDP (DeAngelis, 2011). 
Saudi Arabia is also characterised by the absence of income tax. 
Further studies focus only on one specific issue of corporate finance practice 
such as capital structure or cost of capital. Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2006) 
performed a survey about capital structure decisions in the UK. The sample included 
198 responses from UK listed firms. The results suggested that country’s 
institutional differences have an important influence on financial decisions. They 
showed that financial managers’ decisions do not fully adhere to the major theories. 
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Additionally, managers do not agree with the balance trade-off theory between 
interest tax shields and bankruptcy and do not agree with the assumption that 
issuing new shares sends a bad signal to the market.  
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) conducted a survey on firms from sixteen European 
countries to investigate the gap between the theory and practice of capital structure 
in Europe. The sample contained 87 responses with a response rate of 12% and it 
indicated that the determinants of capital structure are similar in the U.S. and 
Europe. The survey showed that chief financial officers gave weak preference to 
agency cost theory and pecking-order theory. In addition, Fan and So (2000), 
examined the capital structure decisions of Hong Kong firms. They conducted a 
survey of firms from the Hong Kong Exchange Market and the sample included 259 
responses with a response rate of 46.17%. The survey’s results showed support for 
the pecking-order theory more than optimal capital structure and the signaling effect 
did not play a role in managers’ financial decisions. 
For capital budgeting, Gitman and Forrester (1977) conducted a survey of 
U.S. public firms. The sample comprised 103 firms’ responses and showed that 
firms apply many techniques presented in financial theories. Most firms prefer firstly 
the IRR and secondly the payback period technique. The study entitled ‘The Theory-
Practice Gap in Capital Budgeting’ by Arnold and Hatzopoulos (2000) investigated 
296 UK firms and received 96 responses making a response rate of 32.4%. The 
survey confirmed that the majority of UK firms used the financial techniques stated 
in textbooks. Additionally, Kester and others (1999) conducted a survey about 
capital budgeting practice in the Asia-Pacific region, that is, Australia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong and Malaysia. The sample comprised of 226 
firms from the various stock markets with a response rate of 16.3%. The results 
indicated that the analysis techniques used in the Asia-Pacific region in general are 
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similar to those used in the U.S. and Europe. The study showed that firms prefer 
NPV and IRR than non-DCF techniques for selecting investments.  
Hermes, Smid and Yao (2007) compared the capital budgeting practices of 
the Netherlands and China to examine the differences between developed and 
undeveloped countries. The survey was sent to listed and unlisted firms and the 
sample comprised 87 responses (45 from Chinese firms and 42 from Dutch firms) 
with a response rate of 15% for the Chinese firms and 17% for Dutch firms. The 
results found that, on average, Dutch financial managers apply advanced capital 
budgeting techniques more than Chinese financial managers do.  
Some other surveys focus on the practice of cost of capital. Gitman and 
Mercurio (1982) surveyed the cost of capital practices of U.S. firms. The sample 
contained 177 leading industrial firms from the Fortune 1000 list. The study 
confirmed that there is a significant gap between the theory and practice of the cost 
of capital and firms’ practice does not reflect the implications of financial theory. 
Black and others (2002) performed a survey in New Zealand to investigate the 
practice of the cost of capital and capital budgeting in New Zealand in comparison 
to the U.S. The sample included 26 responses from listed firms with a response rate 
of 19%. The results showed that the differences in financial decision practices reflect 
variations in size and between countries.  Truong, Partington, and Peat (2008) 
examined the cost of capital and capital budgeting practice in Australia. The sample 
comprised 87 responses from stock market firms with a response rate of 24.4%. 
The popular techniques in Australian firms are NPV and IRR for capital budgeting 
and the WACC model and the CAPM for cost of capital.     
Some studies have investigated dividend policy and practice. Brav and others 
(2005) examined the dividend policies of 384 firms, 256 firms listed on the NYSE 
market and 128 private firms. They concluded that financial managers gave weak 
support to signalling, agency and clientele theories and believed that tax shield 
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benefits are not an important factor. Dhanani (2005), examined how dividend policy 
theories are significant for UK firms.  The sample included 164 responses with a 
response rate of 16.4%. The results confirmed that managers support signalling 
theories and ownership structure more than agency cost theory and that a firm’s 
characteristics have an influence on dividend policy. Chazi, Boubakri and Zanella 
(2011) surveyed listed UAE firms about their dividend policy practices. The sample 
comprised of 36 responses from firms listed on the Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock 
markets with a response rate of 34.6%. They confirmed that owner structure plays 
an important role in setting dividend policy and managers gave weak support to 
signalling theory.   
 From the above, it is clear that there are few comprehensive studies 
investigating the gap between theory and practice in corporate finance. Most 
previous studies were focused on the U.S., Europe, Australia, India and China and, 
to the researcher’s knowledge, no survey has been conducted on Saudi Arabian 
firms, despite the unique economic environment of Saudi Arabia compared to other 
countries. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance  
Two main perspectives and theories underpin explanations of the nature of the 
relationship between firm management and shareholders, namely agency theory 
and stewardship theory. Firm’s corporate governance mechanisms are often 
constructed on the basis of agency theory. Additionally, corporate governance 
mechanisms concern the firm’s board of directors, board committees and the 
ownership structure.    
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2.3.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory is the overwhelmingly predominant theoretical perspective studied in 
corporate governance literatures (Daily, et al., 2003). The separation between 
corporate ownership and corporate control leads to the creation of an agency 
relationship between the shareholders and the executives so the executives work 
as an agent to represent the principals, i.e. the shareholders (Bagley, 1999). In fact, 
the debate regarding the separation between ownership and control of a corporation 
began with the famous economist Adam Smith. Smith (1776) who stated that “the 
directors of such firms, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the 
same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own”. This separation between ownership and control was 
discussed by Berle and Means (1932) in which they referenced the United States. 
However, the agency issue was first examined in Ross (1973), while Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) being the first works which gave detailed theoretical presentations 
regarding agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the agency 
relationship as an agreement between one or more individuals, the principals, with 
another individual, the agent, to conduct services and make decisions on their 
behalf. The principals may believe that the agent will not always work in line with 
their interests, therefore, in this situation, the principals will set in place proper 
incentives to encourage agents to act in the best interests of the principals, including 
payment of monitoring costs to minimise agent acts which are not aligned with the 
interests of the principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, conflict of goals 
between the principals and agents is one of the major assumptions of agency theory 
(Solomon, 2013).  
One clear characteristic of listed firms is the widespread between ownership 
and control amongst shareholders and managers, so shareholders may believe that 
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the agents are only interested in their own gains over the interests of the 
shareholders (Anderson, et al., 2007). This belief creates a conflict of interest 
between the owners (shareholders) and the agent (executive directors). Executive 
directors may work in their own interests rather than the interest of shareholders, by 
setting high bonus rates or unreasonably high salaries for themselves (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003). Additionally, executive directors may take advantage of valuable 
internal information which could require shareholders to pay monitoring costs in 
order to observe the executives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In addition to the conflict between shareholders and executives, there could 
be a difference in the interests of larger shareholders acting as agent and the 
interests of the smaller shareholders as principals (Armour, et al., 2009). Large 
shareholders have far more influence on the management decisions of their firms 
than do small shareholders, so if their interests differ from those of the small 
shareholders, it could lead to a situation where a firm targets its benefit towards the 
larger shareholders. Research taken from developing markets showed that large 
shareholders may exploit firm resources for their benefit at the expense of the 
smaller shareholders (Chalevas, 2011). Therefore, firms require a governing 
mechanism which determines the firms' resources and which could essentially 
diffuse and resolve any conflict of interest amongst the myriad participants within a 
firm (Daily, et al., 2003). Corporate governance suggests different mechanisms 
which can reduce agency problems and the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and firm management. These measures can include splitting the role 
of chairman and chief executive and presenting independent non-executive 
directors to sit on the board (Donald and Davies, 1994; Solomon, 2013).  
In Saudi Arabia, the agency problem for listed firms may come from the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers due to the separation 
between ownership and control. In addition, even though the Saudi authorities have 
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made reforms to improve the market, Saudi listed firms have substantial 
concentration of ownership which is dominated by government and family ownership 
(Al-Harkan, 2005; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Soliman, 2013). This 
concentration of ownership may lead to the expropriation of small shareholder 
interests by larger controlling shareholders thereby increasing the conflict of interest 
between large and small shareholders (Soliman, 2013). Therefore, expected 
agency problems within Saudi firms and their potential effect on commercial 
transparency and performance make the agency theory a significant factor in the 
context of Saudi Arabia.   
 
2.3.2. Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory has its origin in psychology and sociology and was positioned 
for investigators to research situations in which managers, acting as stewards are 
encouraged to work in the best interests of shareholders (Davis, et al., 1997). 
Stewardship theory is perceived by researchers as a complementary contrast to the 
agency theory and while agency theory sees executives as a self-interested and 
pragmatic, stewardship theory views executives’ interest as being aligned with the 
interests of the shareholders (Daily, et al., 2003). This is not because the 
stewardship theory views executives as unselfish individuals, but because 
stewardship theory recognised that there are managers who believe they are acting 
for the interests of shareholders as well as also serving their own self-interests 
(Lane, et al., 1998). Under this theory, executives are seen as stewards of a firm 
who will seek to maximize the wealth of shareholders even though there is some 
conflict of interest, but will not allow this conflict to affect the executives’ task.  
The diversity of a firm’s owners, all with different goals, may create an unclear 
vision for the firm, so the group who can work together in the best interests of the 
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owners, are the firm’s managers, who can create an efficient way to increase 
benefits for all the owners. This is due to managers having access to explicit and 
accurate insider information regarding the firm and the business arena which 
qualifies them to make correct decisions in order to maximise the value of the firm 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Based on stewardship theory, the assumption is that the 
board of directors will not work as a monitor or controller of the CEO’s activities; 
instead they will work as an assistant and consultant board for the CEO (Albrecht, 
et al., 2004). Whilst agency theory emphasises the importance of role separation 
between the CEO and chairman of the board to ensure the efficient monitoring of 
the CEO by the board, stewardship theory posits that managers acting as both CEO 
and chairman of the board simultaneously may be the most suitable way for 
managing firms as long as the executives are trusted by the shareholders (Siebels 
and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012).  
However, this trust-based relationship between shareholders and executives 
depends on the stewardship theory which may not represent the intentions of all 
managers. Those managers who have different skills and intentions may not adhere 
to the stewardship theory of a more constant and even long-term growth and 
performance cycle; rather they may prefer the option of high profit, short term 
performance benefits and salaries. Additionally, combining the management roles 
of the CEO and chairman based on the stewardship theory will lead to managers 
having the ability to control more of the internal firm information which in turn 
increases the problematic issue of information asymmetry and decreases the 
transparency within the firm environment (Cheung, et al., 2010). Moreover, the trust 
relationship between owners and executives under the stewardship theory may 
tempt executives to take advantage of a firm’s resources and information for their 
own benefit, thereby deceiving owners as to the true condition of the firm (Albrecht 
et al., 2004). Davis et al. (1997) stated that empirical studies have attempted to 
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confirm either the stewardship or agency theory as the singular method for corporate 
governance when based on the assumption that all executives are either agents or 
stewards. However, the outcome of these empirical studies concluded with varying 
outcomes, indicating the need for the re-interpretation of both stewardship and 
agency theories regarding the relationship between the principals and management.  
In Saudi Arabia, the current corporate governance regulations which were 
enacted in 2006 in order to reform the market are based on agency theory 
assumptions. For example, Articles 12c and 12d of the regulations state that “the 
majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non-executive members” 
and “it is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
with any other executive position in the firm, such as the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) or the managing director or the general manager” (CMA, 2011). The aim of 
the regulations and market reforms in the Saudi market is to strengthen the function 
of the firm boards which monitor and supervise the executives’ activities in order to 
ensure the benefits and wealth is targeted towards the owners. In addition, these 
regulations seek to build the accountability and transparency for the business 
environment within Saudi firms and with the market.  
 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance Overview 
One clear feature of listed firms and corporations is the widespread ownership and 
control amongst the different participants. Monks and Minow (2001: p6) defined a 
corporation as “a mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute 
capital, expertise, and labour, for the maximum benefit of all of them”. Shareholders 
share the profits and benefits of the firm without any management responsibility, 
and on the managerial side, the directors actively operate the firm without bearing 
any of the financial risk. Under the agency theory, if the shareholders do not see the 
agent and executives working in line with their interests, they will put in place 
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incentive mechanisms and pay additional oversight costs to encourage the agent to 
better oversee the activities of the corporation in order to ensure compliance with 
the interests of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency relationships 
may lead to a conflict of interest between shareholders and executives and also 
between large and small shareholders. Therefore, the corporate governance system 
works as “ex ante command-and-control approach, constraining the authority of 
managers and inculcating more direct shareholder oversight of managerial conduct 
early on” (Talley and Johnsen, 2004: p2).  
Corporate governance is seen as a mechanism which is useful to minimize 
agency issues between different participants within a firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Corporate governance is seen as being in the 
public interest because of the significance of its role regarding the development and 
growth of corporations and financial markets, especially after the events of the most 
recent financial crisis. That crisis which overran the financial markets and most 
national economies led to the banking crash and subsequent worldwide recession 
and has made corporate governance a hot topic on the public agendas of most 
nations. The failure of corporate governance, resulting in weak internal control and 
monitoring systems and the lack of independent directors on firm boards, was 
investigated and identified by academics and practitioners as one of the reasons for 
the breakdown of firms and the global financial crisis (Solomon, 2013).  
In fact, there is no consensus on the exact definition and meaning of 
corporate governance as it includes numerous mechanisms and rules that vary from 
country to country and depend on the corporate model which has been applied by 
that country’s lawmakers. For example, countries which follow the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate model would concentrate on the shareholders rights and interests for their 
corporate governance definitions whilst countries which follow the European-
Japanese model would concentrate on stakeholders’ interests for definition in their 
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corporate governance. One of the earliest and most famous definitions was 
presented by the Cadbury Report (1992) which defined corporate governance as 
“the system by which firms are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992: p14). 
Moreover, Gregory (2001: p2) defined corporate governance as “it refers to that 
blend of law, regulation, and appropriate voluntary private-sector practices which 
enables the corporation to attract financial and human capital, perform efficiently, 
and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long-term economic value for its 
shareholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole”. 
Monks and Minow (2001: p1) however, defined corporate governance as the 
“relationship among various participants in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the shareholders, (2) 
the management and (3) the board of directors”. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into two main categories 
being external and internal mechanisms. The external corporate governance 
mechanisms contain the rules for controlling matters such as takeovers and market 
regulations (Easterbook and Fishel, 1996; Cremers and Nair, 2005). The internal 
corporate governance mechanisms comprise the rules governing ownership and 
board structure and deals with such matters as CEO duality and the percentage of 
independents directors (Weir, et al., 2002; Cremers and Nair, 2005). The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004: p 11) 
indicated that “good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the 
board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the firm and 
its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring”. Thus the efficient internal 
corporate governance mechanisms should solve any conflict of interest between 
participants and assist both executives and the board of directors in fulfilling their 
obligations, thereby attaining better firm performance. Klapper and Love (2004) 
indicated that optimal corporate governance has a positive effect on the 
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performance of a firm and it can be seen as an obligation to which firms need to 
adhere in order to carry out the necessary procedures to effectively invest capital. 
Furthermore, Morey et al. (2009) stated that effective corporate governance will 
maximise investors’ wealth in emerging markets. 
Good internal corporate governance should enhance the transparency and 
accountability of the corporate environment as it should set out an effective internal 
control and monitoring process. The main aims of corporate governance include 
safeguarding financial reporting and supporting corporations to create value by 
offering accountability and monitoring systems (Koh et al., 2007). Therefore 
safeguarding financial reporting will help to decrease the asymmetry of information 
between executives, shareholders and other investors as the financial report is one 
of the main sources of information that is used by investors to evaluate the 
performance of both firm executives and the firm itself. Asymmetrical information 
therefore prevents shareholders and investors from making precise and correct 
decisions or effectively monitoring managers. The OECD (2004) stated that effective 
corporate governance mechanisms should lead to accuracy and transparency in 
firm announcements in order to protect shareholders’ interests. 
 
2.3.4 Board of Directors, Subcommittees, and Ownership Structure 
A board of directors is at the heart of internal corporate governance mechanisms 
and governance effectiveness. Aguilera (2005: p1) defined a board of directors as 
“the internal governing mechanism that shapes firm governance, given their direct 
access to the two other axes in the corporate governance triangle: managers and 
shareholders (owners)”. A board of directors is the link between the shareholders, 
who offer the capital and who are dispersed around the world, and the managers, a 
group of individuals who employ the capital and operate the firm. The board also 
provides the balance between the conflict of interest between the managers and 
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shareholders to ensure that the firm works towards the long term interests of the 
shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2011).  
The board has diverse duties such as overseeing the hiring and/or firing of 
the CEO, standing in for the interests of the firm shareholders, offering advice to 
and consultations with, the highest level of managers, monitoring of managerial 
activities and firm performance and confirming their approval of important decisions 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zahra and Pearce II, 1989). Because of the assumptions 
of agency theory and the separation between ownership and control, shareholders 
depend on the board of directors to represent their interests by monitoring and 
controlling the firm executives’ actions and decisions. OECD (2004) stated that 
“board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence and care, and in the best interest of the firm and the shareholders” and 
“should have access to accurate, relevant and timely information”. Aguilera (2005) 
indicated that a board of directors can be criticised for a firm’s failure and can also 
be seen as a significant mechanism for improving corporate governance practices.  
There are two models of board, a unitary board and a two tier board. The 
unitary board contains executive and non-executive directors and this model is 
popular in countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model (i.e. 
Saudi Arabia). The two tier board includes two different boards which are the 
management board which is comprised purely of executives who deal with the day 
to day operational issues, and the supervisory board which comprises the non-
executive directors and deals only with strategic firm decisions (Solomon, 2013). 
There are various different types of directors who sit on a board: executive directors 
who work also as executive managers in the firm, the chief executive officer (the 
CEO), non-executive directors who do not work in managerial positions, but who 
have a connection with the firm, and finally the independent director who does not 
hold any position in or have any relationship with, the firm (Tricker, 2012).  
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The independent director of the board has been identified as a significant 
aspect of the corporate governance mechanisms (Monks and Minow, 2011). There 
is increasing interest in academic literature regarding the role of independent board 
members and their effect on building good corporate governance. To date, there is 
no consensus in the literature as to whether independent directors improve the 
board roles and shareholders wealth (Monks and Minow, 2011; Solomon, 2013). 
Clarke (2007) stated that independent board members can enhance the 
effectiveness of corporate governance by monitoring related party transactions to 
see whether there is a conflict of interest, thereby protecting the rights of small 
shareholders by acting as a “brain trust or consultant” and forcing the board to apply 
the external standards and regulations which increases their level of compliance.   
In addition, almost all listed firm internal corporate governance regulations 
around the world require the board of directors to form three standing 
subcommittees; the audit committee, the remuneration committee and the 
nomination committee (Tricker, 2012). Research shows that a relationship between 
the activities of these subcommittees and the value of the firm exists (Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2007). The board subcommittees are a method by which 
shareholders can lessen any agency issues and enhance the internal control 
processes by monitoring the acts and decisions of the firm executives (Harrison, 
1987; Klein, 1998). The audit committee is comprised mainly of independent 
directors and is the link between the external auditor and the firm’s board which 
reviews the financial reports and assesses the efficiency of the internal audit system 
(Tricker, 2012). It is one of the most significant corporate governance techniques by 
which shareholders can constrain any opportunistic explorations or detours from the 
agreed path by managers (Gendron and Bédard, 2006). The remuneration 
committee also includes mainly independent directors who are responsible for 
setting the policies for the remuneration packages of the board members, especially 
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executives and senior members of management (Tricker, 2012). This committee will 
assist shareholders to minimise the influence of executives when setting firms’ 
remuneration packages to prevent executives using these packages to take 
advantage of shareholders and to steer profits away from the shareholders’ and 
towards the executives. The committee therefore ensures the activities of the 
executives are in line with the firm’s objectives. Due to the financial scandals that 
surfaced in the United States, at the start of the new century, market regulators 
deemed the remuneration committee to be an essential part of any firm making 
significant business decisions (Vafeas, 2003). Finally, the nomination committee is 
again created mainly from independent members who are responsible for 
recommending changes to board members and providing a check and balance 
mechanism in order to reduce the influence of dominant board members (especially 
CEOs) who would prefer to add their favoured candidates to a firm’s board (Tricker, 
2012). 
Ownership structure is considered to be a crucial component of corporate 
governance mechanisms, as it provides the structure for corporate governance 
regulation in every country (Darko et al., 2016). Large shareholders and a high 
degree of ownership concentration can provide an effective controller and 
monitoring tool with regard to management activities, thus diminishing the agency 
problem, otherwise large shareholders may dominate the firm’s decision making, 
exploiting the firm’s resources for their own advantage at the expense of smaller 
shareholders (Darko et al., 2016). Additionally, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) have 
indicated that institutional ownership can diminish the agency issue, because 
institutions have greater professionalism, therefore they can more easily and 
effectively monitor management actions and decisions. Furthermore, the higher 
directors can help to resolve the agency issue if they become shareholders, 
because their interests would be in greater alignment with the other shareholders’ 
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interests (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Nevertheless, as explained in the 
research hypotheses chapter, no consensus exists in the literature with regard to 
the effect of ownership structure on firm performance and information leakage.     
 
2.4 Information Leakage and Market Efficiency 
The information leakage in the stock market is a sign for the weaknesses of the 
market efficiency and transparency. The leaked information would increases the 
problem of information asymmetry between the firm and investors and this leaked 
information would be used by few investors for insider trading. The following 
sections review the literatures about the market efficiency and transparency and 
information leakage. 
      
2.4.1 The Market Efficiency and Transparency 
The efficiency of the market decrees that share prices should be instantly and totally 
available and reflect all pertinent information (Blake, 2000). This means that stock 
prices should represent the results of all the available information about a firm. The 
term “efficient” first appeared in the pioneering and influential study of Fama (1965). 
Fama (1970a: p383) defined the efficiency of the market as “a market in which prices 
always fully reflect all available information is called efficient”. In addition, Fama 
(1970b: p76) wrote that “an "efficient" market is defined as a market where there are 
large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to 
predict future market values of individual securities, and where important current 
information is almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, 
competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at 
any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, 
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as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an 
efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good 
estimate of its intrinsic value”. Based on this meaning, stock price changes should 
be unanticipated and an investor should not have any opportunity to gain abnormal 
returns. If the stock price change can be anticipated, the market is not sufficiently 
efficient and the stock prices do not reflect all available information. Thus, in an 
efficient market, the movement of stock prices would be based on the release of 
new information about the firm.   
Fama (1970a) classified the Efficient Market Hypothesis (“EMH”) into three 
sets which are termed the weak form, semi strong form, and strong form. The weak 
form set of the EMH suggests that the share price fully reflects the historical 
information and return on shares but has no influence on future returns, resulting in 
knowledgeable investors being unable to anticipate the future movements of the 
stock (Blake, 2000). Based on this form of the EMH, investors should not be able to 
gain abnormally high returns by depending solely on the analysis of the share price 
historical data. The semi strong form set of the EMH indicates that the share price 
reflects not only the historical data of the shares, but also includes current 
information available within the public domain thereby allowing share prices to be 
swiftly adjusted to reflect the impact of the new public information (Black, 2000). 
Therefore, the release of any new public information about the firm such as “stock 
splits, announcements of financial reports by firms, new security issues” (Fama, 
1970a) would influence the movement of the stock price. This would result in 
investors being unable to earn consistently high abnormal returns through the 
release of the public information. The strong form set of the EMH would show a 
stock price which would reflect all information relating to the firm, both public and 
private including historical data, and an investor would not be able to acquire any 
additional benefits or earning above average returns (Blake, 2000).  
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Efficiency in the market is a significant aspect for all investors which can build 
a healthy environment for competitors and protects the rights of all investors. 
Despite this, the Efficient Market Hypothesis has received criticism when alternative 
evidence has been measured against the hypothesis. Jensen (1978: p95) stated 
that “we seem to be entering a stage where widely scattered and as yet incohesive 
evidence is arising which seems to be inconsistent with the theory” and “it is 
evidence which we will not be able to ignore”. Shleifer (2000: p2) reported that “in 
the last twenty years, both the theoretical foundations of the EMH and the empirical 
evidence purporting to support it have been challenged”. For example, the influence 
of a small firm was proved to work against the general context of the EMH. Banz 
(1981) studied the long term returns of U.S. stocks and concluded with that those 
firms with small caps resorted to offering higher returns more often than those firms 
with larger caps. Thus, there was a long term, clear trend that continued to distort 
the general context of EMH. In addition, the calendar effect indicates that share 
returns can be regularly higher or lower on specific days of the week, in the month 
or in a specific month of the year. These implied profit opportunities proved market 
inefficiency and stood against the semi strong form of the EMH. Cross (1973) 
investigated U.S. stocks from 1953 to 1970 and found that the raise rate on Friday 
was significantly higher than the raise rate on Monday. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) 
researched the shares in the U.S. from 1904 to 1974 and reported that an average 
return was 3.48% in January, contrasting with 0.42% in other months.  
In addition, Jaffe (1974) stated that some researchers investigating insiders, 
such as firm’s officers, directors, and large shareholders, concluded that the 
insiders, by collecting insider information, could predict the price movement of 
shares up to six months prior to the trading date. Blake (2000) pointed out that the 
insider activities were taking advantage of both lawful and unlawful insider trading 
and was proof against the strong form of the EMH. Executives and board directors, 
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being able to access sensitive, significant and private information regarding their 
firm established the ability (in the absence of any transparency within the business 
environment), to use this insider information to gain abnormally high returns on the 
stock market. Wong (2002) stated that the majority of prior studies regarding insider 
trading concentrated on the U.S. financial markets and these studies confirmed the 
ability of insiders to earning abnormally high profits. This research rejected the 
strong form of the EMH, as the strong form asserts that stock prices reflect both 
insider and public information. Therefore, investors in the financial markets, even in 
the developed markets such as the U.S., may have the chance to use insider and 
private information to gain an advantage over other investors to profit from 
abnormally high returns.   
 
2.4.2 Information Leakage and Trading 
Market transparency and firm announcements are the main features of effective 
corporate governance practices and the role of financial markets as investors in 
these markets is to seek out accurate, complete, and timely announcements of 
firms’ information so they can make correct decisions regarding the essential value 
of a firm (Heggen and Gannon, 2008; Tsai, 2014). The OECD (2003a: p 35) stated 
that “without access to regular, timely, reliable and comparable information, 
investors will not be able to evaluate corporate prospects and make informed 
investment and voting decisions” and “this will result in a higher cost of capital and 
a poorer allocation of resources”. Additionally OECD stated that, “good systemic 
disclosure generates confidence in market integrity” and “as a result, capital flowing 
to equity and debt markets will fully and fairly reflect the underlying value of the 
national economy” (OECD, 2003b: p36). Thus, the effects of asymmetrical 
information and transparency not only influence investors and firms individually, but 
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can also influence the ability of whole countries to attract capital investment and 
investors. 
 The strong form of the EMH specifies that all public and inside information 
related to a firm are completely reflected in the stock prices (Fama, 1965). In 
addition, in a perfect market, all types of investors would instantly and 
simultaneously receive all information relevant to the value of the shares, however 
in reality, some firms and market participants including directors, executives and 
their analysts can receive leaked indications of significant stock information before 
it is released to the public (Brunnermeier, 2005). Betzer and Theissen (2009) 
indicated that weak transparency and ineffective protective regulations in the 
financial markets may extend information asymmetries between firms, insider 
information and investors. Heidle and Li (2005) stated that some stock markets 
modified their stock quotes before a firm’s announcement as they were advised by 
analysts who had relationships with the trading department within the firm. 
Additionally, prior to the publication of literature for investors, those who obtain 
inside information before it is made public, display their ability to gain the abnormally 
high returns by acting on their expectations of the public announcements (Tsai, 
2014). However, these events disprove the strong form of the EMH. The results 
show that information leakage is a significant event when a firm’s announcements 
such as annual reports, takeover information and acquisition notifications are 
received by some investors in the market before it is officially announced to the 
public.  
Mac (2002) showed two types of information leakages in the market, the first 
one containing trading which relied on insider information, happening mostly with 
small investors, and the second type includes the leaking of special communications 
made between firms and their analysts, and this is the focal point for analysts. In 
addition, Brunnermeier (2005) reported that investors who trade via insider 
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information leakage display three specific features. Firstly, they trade depending on 
the inside information two times, once before and once after the official 
announcement. Secondly, they may take the decision to “unwind partially” after the 
official public announcement as they expect that “the market will overreact” to the 
announcement and thirdly, their trading before the announcement makes it difficult 
for other investors in the market to“learn from the past price movement” 
(Brunnermeier, 2005: p4). Moreover, some firms leak insider information to their 
analysts about the weak earnings before the public announcement, allowing these 
analysts and their customer to sell their shares before the fall in price (Mac, 2002), 
returning to repurchase their shares at the lower price after the public earnings 
announcement (Brunnermeier, 2005).  
Although in the market it is impossible to detect all insider trading activities, 
especially those which are motivated by possession of the information leakage, the 
influence of these trades can be observed by investigating share price movements 
directly before the public announcement takes place (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). 
The fact that some investors have the ability to obtain insider information thereby 
benefitting before other investors and the public provides evidence of the ethical 
problem of fairness which leads to increased wealth for well-connected investors 
not because of their efforts, but because of their close relationship with analysts and 
firm insiders (Mac, 2002). In addition, the study of Brunnermeier (2005) showed that 
the issue of information leakage and insider trading made stock prices less 
informative in the long term, and less efficient, both prior to or after, a firm’s public 
announcements, even if there is short run on earnings before the announcement.  
Authorities in different countries set regulations and sanctions to reduce the 
phenomenon of information leakage and insider trading. For example, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that “because insider trading 
undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities 
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markets, the SEC has treated the detection and prosecution of insider trading 
violations as one of its enforcement priorities” (SEC, 2001). Besides, the United 
Kingdom Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 indicates that “market abuse” “is 
where an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or related 
investment on the basis of inside information relating to the investment in question” 
(FSMA, 2000). In Saudi Arabia, Alzahrani and Gregoriou (2010) carried out a study 
on the Saudi Stock Exchange market which indicated that there was a significant 
level of asymmetrical information present before the official earnings announcement 
date, confirming that the private acquisition of information had taken place. Even 
though, there is no empirical study investigate the effect of corporate governance 
components on information leakage in context of Islamic, and Middle East countries 
therefore this research is the first research that examines the relationship between 
the corporate governance and information leakage in these contexts and Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudi Capital Market Law stated that “any person who obtains, through 
family, business or contractual relationship, inside information” “is prohibited from 
directly or indirectly trading in the Security related to such information, or to disclose 
such information to another person” (CMA, 2009). Reducing insider information 
leakage is an important step to minimise insider trading activities. There is also a 
need to continually assess the leakage of information within the market to evaluate 
the efficiency of the current corporate mechanisms and market regulations to reduce 
the information leakage.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed and assessed the theoretical background and existing 
literatures pertinent to the research focus. Firstly, it presented the theoretical context 
and crucial theories concerning the major areas of corporate finance, which are 
capital structure, capital expenditure, capital budgeting and dividends. The section 
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on capital structure discussed the irrelevance theory, static trade-off theory and 
pecking-order theory. Additionally, an array of methods and techniques were 
presented in relation to capital expenditure, namely the CAPM model, APM model, 
Fama and French’s three factor model, as well as WACC model. The section on 
capital budgeting illustrated the significant techniques for evaluating projects, which 
are the payback period, IRR, PI and NPV methods. The dividend section explained 
Miller and Modigliani’s theory, the bird-in-the-hand theory, signalling effect theory 
and agency cost theory. Secondly, the chapter appraised the previous survey-based 
research on corporate finance practice, which has been conducted in both 
developed and developing countries. The review illustrated that scant few 
comprehensive surveys have been performed in developing countries, particularly 
in the Middle East, while there has also been no comprehensive survey yet 
conducted in relation to Saudi Arabia. This indicates the importance of this research 
and its contributions to understanding. Table 2-1 provides the main theories and 
models from the literatures related to the corporate finance and shows how these 
relate to the research draft survey and questions. Thirdly, the section on corporate 
governance discussed agency theory and stewardship theory, which are the two 
major theories explaining the form of relationship between firm management and 
shareholders. It was revealed that corporate governance elements are constructed 
based on the principles and philosophy behind agency theory. Subsequently, the 
chapter explained the components of corporate governance, board of directors, 
subcommittees and ownership structure, reviewing the literature in terms of the 
anticipated effect on firm performance and transparency. Fourthly, the final section 
described the concept of market efficiency, in addition to the relationship between 
information and the stock market, investigating the central significance of protecting 
the rights of all investors. Furthermore, the section discussed information leakage 
and the impact of corporate governance on firm transparency. It was determined 
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that this research is the first study investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance and information leakage in the Islamic, Middle Easter, Arabic and Saudi 
Arabian context. Following this discussion, the upcoming chapter reviews the 
literature concerning the relationship between corporate governance components, 
firm performance and information leakage, with relevant research hypotheses 
devised. 
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Table 2-1: The connection between the literatures review of corporate finance and 
the research survey questions 
Corporate 
Finance topics 
Theories and models presented in the 
literatures review 
Survey 
Questions 
Capital 
budgeting 
The net present value (NPV) (Brigham and 
Ehrhardt, 2011). 
Payback period and accounting rate of return 
(Ross et al., 2002). 
Internal rate of return (IRR) (Cheng et. al., 1994). 
The profitability index (PI) (Ross et al., 2002). 
Q1 & Q2 
Cost of capital The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 
1964). 
The arbitrage pricing model (APM) (Ross, 1976). 
The three factor model (Fama and French, 1992, 
1993 and 1996). 
The weighted average cost of capital model 
(WACC). 
Q3, Q4, 
Q5, & Q6 
Capital structure The irrelevance theory (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). 
The static trade-off theory (Brigham and Houston, 
2004). 
The pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
 
Q7 & Q8 
Dividend Miller and Modigliani theory (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961). 
The bird in the hand theory (Lintner, 1962) and 
(Gordon, 1963). 
Signal or asymmetric information theory 
(Bhattacharya, 1979) and (Miller and Rock, 
1985). 
Agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
and (Jensen, 1986). 
Q9 
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Chapter 3:  
Corporate Governance Effect on Firm Performance and 
Information leakage: Research Hypotheses  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the literature review and theoretical context of 
corporate finance, reviewing the existing survey-based research into corporate 
finance practices. A review was also undertaken of the literature and theories 
focused on corporate governance mechanisms and their effects, market efficiency 
and information leakage. This chapter will critique the literatures relevant to 
exploring the anticipated relationship between corporate governance components, 
firm performance and information leakage. Following this comprehensive review of 
the research, the research hypothesis is devised in relation to the association 
between each component of corporate governance, firm performance and 
information leakage. The corporate governance components include the ownership 
structure, as well as the directors’ board aspects. The directors’ board issues 
concern the board size, board independence, board meetings, CEO duality, audit 
size, audit meetings and board subcommittees. Ownership structure pertains to 
issues of ownership concentration, government ownership, institutional ownership, 
directors’ ownership and managerial ownership. Thus, the chapter is organised as 
follows: Section 3.2 shows the research hypotheses discussion for the relationship 
between the board of directors’ components and firm performance and information 
leakage. Section 3.3 presents the research hypotheses discussion for the 
association between ownership structure and firm performance and information 
leakage. 3.4 is the conclusion  
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3.2 The Board of Directors and Firm Performance and Information Leakage 
The board of directors is a signifcant aspects in the corporate governance system 
and the composition, structure, and quality of the board of directors can influence 
firms’ performance and information asymmetry (Goodstein et al. 1994; Fooladi 
2012; Ajina et al. 2013; Elbadry et al. 2015; Khansalar et al. 2015). Corporate 
governance literature has investigated different characteristics of the board of 
directors that may have an effect on the board’s efficiency and effectiveness on 
monitoring firms for the benefit of the shareholders. The research studied and 
reviewed selected characteristics based on their importance, information availability 
and relationship to the Saudi corporate governance regulations and codes. These 
characteristics include the board size, the percentage of independent directors, the 
number of board meetings, CEO duality, and the availability of audit, nomination, 
and remuneration committees, as well as the audit committee’s size and frequency 
of meetings. 
 
3.2.1 Board Size 
The board’s size is defined as “the number of directors serving on the board” 
(Elbadry et al. 2015). Various literature has studied the board size and its effects on 
the performance of firms but the studies are still indecisive and offer inconsistent 
outcomes (Kumar and Singh 2012; Al-Matari et al. 2012). In the context of the 
agency theory, Jensen stated that a smaller board size is connected with the board’s 
efficiency in monitoring firms (Jensen 1993). Based on the agency theory 
assumption, a large board of directors encourages the dominance of firms’ leaders 
by creating coalitions and disagreement between group interests (Ajina et al. 2013). 
Additionally, bad communication between directors encourages and facilitates 
insider manipulations driving to decrease the quality of announced information to 
the public and increase the problem of information asymmetry (Ajina et al. 2013). 
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Lakhal (2005) stated that a smaller-sized board helps directors to extensively 
monitor the firms’ inside activities to confirm the transparency and quality of firms’ 
announcements disclosure. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) indicated that when the board 
size is raised, it may lead the board being less efficient in monitoring the firm’s 
activity and any advantages gained from extra board members will be substituted 
by the cost of delayed decision-making. Therefore,  it is suggested a positive 
relationship between the board size and information leakage and information 
asymmetry (Lakhal 2005; Lipton and Lorsch 1992). In addition, directors of large 
boards cause a bad coordination and cooperation environment between members, 
which wastes time in making important decisions. Thus their expertise will stay 
unutilised which creates a bad influence on the firms’ performance (Lin 2011; 
Dharmadasa et al. 2015). Moreover, a negative effect on performance will come 
from high expenditure on boards’ compensation, bonuses, tickets, hotels and other 
allowances (Vafeas 1999a).  
 Zabri et al. (2016) examined the top 100 public listed firms in Bursa, Malaysia 
and they found a significant negative relationship between the board size and return 
on investment (ROA) as a performance proxy. Rodríguez-Fernández (2015) studied 
47 European companies that were included in the EUROSTOXX50 Index in 2012 
to find the link between board size and ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q as a performance 
measure. The study concluded with a strong and negative link between variables. 
In addition, Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015) researched 23 listed investment banks 
in the US from 2000 till 2012 and found a significant negative relationship between 
board size and performance, which is in line with the agency cost hypothesis. De 
Andres et al. (2005) focused on 450 non-financial firms from ten countries in North 
America and Western Europe to test the role of the board size on firms’ value 
especially on the equity market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q. Their study reported a 
significant negative relationship. Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) used 240 non-
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financial firms listed on the Iranian Stock Market between 2005 and 2006 to examine 
the influence of board size on EPS, ROA, and ROE as performance variables. Their 
analysis revealed a strong negative association between size and performance. 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) investigated 130 non-financial firms in worldwide 
context from 2003 to 2009 and they concluded that there was a nonlinear 
relationship between the board size and the corporate governance ratings. 
  On the other hand, depending on the resource dependent theory, a large 
board has a good effect on the firms’ performance and information leakage. 
Goodstein et al. (1994), Fauzi and Locke (2012) and Ujunwa (2012) indicated that 
additional directors on the board will bring more expertise, ideas, suggestions and 
help offering critical resources and good investment opportunities to firms. In the 
end, this improves firms’ performance and benefits shareholders. Elbadry et al. 
(2015) pointed out that boards with more directors are more likely to assign more 
independent directors to the board and independent directors are more effective in 
observing the actions of top management. This is expected to increase the firms’ 
transparency and decrease the problem of information asymmetry. Anderson et al. 
(2004) discussed that, overall, a large-sized board offers more monitoring processes 
on the financial and accounting activities of a firm, which leads the firm to have a 
better transparency environment. Based on this argument, more directors on the 
board increase the firms’ performance and decrease the problem of information 
asymmetry. Moreover, Jiraporn et al. (2009), Ajina et al. (2013) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013) explained that large boards will give the firm the ability to form 
efficient and high quality board committees helping the board in the decision-making 
process. They will also make firms able to present different stakeholders on the 
board, which will build good relationships and communication between firms and 
stakeholders. Even though several studies confirmed the negative relationship 
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between board size and firms’ performance, some research found a positive or no 
relationship between size and performance.  
 Yasser et al. (2011) studied 30 firms listed on the Pakistani market and found 
a positive relation between the board size and ROE. Coles et al. (2008) examined 
8165 firms in the US from 1992 to 2005 to find the relationship between the board 
size and Tobin’s Q as a performance measure and the results indicated a positive 
relation. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) evaluated 103 companies collected from the 
stock exchanges of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa during five years from 
1997 to 2001 and the study showed that large board size had a positive influence 
on the firms’ value with ROA and Tobin’s Q (Kyereboah-Coleman 2007). Besides, 
Ajina et al. (2013) investigated a sample included 160 companies listed in the 
French market during 2008 to 2010 to reveal the association between the corporate 
governance and information asymmetry. The empirical study reports that the board 
size has a negative effect on the adverse selection and information asymmetry 
(Ajina et al. 2013). In addition, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) studied the effect of board 
size on ROA and Tobin’s Q in 347 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
between 1996 and 2000. The research reported mixed results, which are a positive 
effect on ROA and a negative effect on Tobin’s Q.  
However, Zhang (2012) investigated 1165 non-financial firms in the 
Shanghai stock exchange from 2004 to 2008 and found no relationship between the 
board size and performance and information leakage. Besides, The study of 
Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) on 24 life insurance firms in Thailand and the 
study of Beiner et al. (2004) on 165 non-financial public listed firms in the Swiss 
market showed that no significant relationship is available between the board size 
and the firms’ performance. Besides, Darko et al. (2016) analysed 20 companies 
publicly listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange over five years from 2008 to 2012 and 
the article concluded that there is no significant relationship between the board size 
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and the companies’ performance (Darko et al. 2016). Furthermore, Huang et al. 
(2012) examined 156 illegal insider trading cases in 78 listed companies in the 
Taiwan’s market to find the relation between the illegal insider trading and corporate 
governance components. Their empirical research reports that board size is not 
significantly related to illegal insider trading. 
The Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR) in Saudi Arabia does not 
encourage firms to increase or decrease the board size and it only states that the 
“number shall not be less than three and not more than eleven” (CMA 2010: p21). 
In fact, the literature showed very limited studies on the relationship between the 
board size and information leakage and no study has yet been performed on the 
Islamic or Middle Eastern regions. Therefore, the research gives a valued 
contribution to literature internationally, especially for studies in the context of the 
developing, Middle Eastern, and Saudi Arabian markets. For the relationship 
between board size and performance, Al-Matari et al. (2012) examined 135 non-
financial firms listed on the Saudi Stock Market at the end of 2010 and found an 
insignificant negative relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. Ghabayen 
(2012) researched 102 non-financial companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
in 2011 to find the link between board size and performance. The study reported 
that there is no significant link between the board size and ROA (Ghabayen 2012). 
 The studies of Al-Matari et al. (2012) and Ghabayen (2012) have several 
limitations. First, they used small samples covering a short period with a one-year 
observation. The small sample size can undermine the assumption of 
generalisability of their outcomes which make their results questionable (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003). Moreover, sampling errors are decreased when the sample size is 
increased so the larger the sample size, the fewer the errors of the sample. Also, 
the estimations derived from the results of a large sample would be more reliable 
and representative compared to a small sample size (Sobel and Shiraev 2015). 
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Second, as this research uses balanced panel data, the study of Al-Matari et al. 
(2012) and Ghabayen (2012) applied unbalanced data. The balanced panel data is 
associated with a higher degree of freedom and a low level of collinearity (Ntim, 
Opong & Danbolt 2012). Finally, they used only one proxy and measure for 
assessing the firms’ performance. In contrast, this research offers panel data with 
large samples and long periods with a nine-year period that cover the period before 
and after enforcing the Saudi corporate governance regulation (CGR) on listed 
firms. It also offers two types of data, with and without financial firms, and three 
measures of performance and information leakage. Using large and long panel data 
confirms that the outcomes are more likely to be protected from bias, which may 
come from specific time periods under examination. It also allows researchers to 
apply useful ways for controlling endogeneity (Guest 2009). In addition, this 
research applies the System generalised method of moments (GMM) method to 
control for heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and endogeneity.  Therefore, this 
research provides a valuable contribution to literature especially for research in the 
context of the developing, Islamic, Middle Eastern and Saudi market. Based on the 
previous literature reviews, most research showed a negative relationship between 
board size and firms’ performance and suggested a positive relationship between 
board size and information leakage (Jensen 1993; Lakhal 2005; Rodríguez-
Fernández 2015; Zabri et al. 2016) . Therefore, the following hypothesises are 
formed to be empirically tested. 
H1a: There is a significant and positive relationship between board size and firm 
information leakage. 
H1b: There is a significant and negative relationship between board size and firm 
financial performance. 
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3.2.2 Board Independence 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Saudi Arabia stated that the independent 
director is one who represents the complete independence and the CMA presents 
situations that violate such independence (CMA 2010). These situations are 
members who: 
 “hold five per cent or more of the issued shares of the company or any of its 
group 
  a representative of a legal person that holds five per cent or more of the 
issued shares of the company or any of its group 
 has been a senior executive of the company or of any other company within 
that company’s group during the preceding two years 
 is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company or of any other 
company within that company’s group 
 is a first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the company or of any 
other company within that company’s group 
 is a board member of any company within the group of the company which 
he is nominated to be a member of its board 
 has been an employee with an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any 
company of its group during the preceding two years such as external 
auditors or main suppliers 
 has a controlling interest in any such party during the preceding two years” 
 (CMA 2010: p5). 
According to the agency theory, managers work on their interests and 
benefits at the cost of firms’ shareholders because of the split between ownership 
and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The interests of shareholders would be 
saved in these firms by increasing the number of independent directors to the board 
(Rhoades et al. 2000; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn 2010). Independent directors are 
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an efficient monitoring tool in firms to direct managers’ activities in the shareholders’ 
interest (Elbadry et al. 2015). Independent members come with different and new 
skills, knowledge, contact and experience which will enhance the board’s decisions 
and performance (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Abdullah 2004). As independent 
directors are an effective system to monitor how the board works, this will develop 
the firms’ transparency by directing the board to follow and comply to the accurate 
processes in producing disclosure information (Chen and Jaggi 2000). 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) investigated 1170 quarterly earnings announcements 
on the U.S. Stock Market and found a significant negative relationship between the 
boards’ independence and information asymmetry. Elbadry et al. (2015) examined 
324 non-financial listed firms in the UK to test the relationship between board 
independence and information asymmetry and they concluded that there was a 
significant negative link between the variables. In terms of firms’ performance. 
  Dehaene et al. (2001) researched 122 Belgian firms and found a significant 
and positive relationship between the boards’ independence and ROE as a 
performance measure. Lefort and Urzua (2008) analysed the panel data of 160 
Chilean non-financial firms from 2000 to 2003 and concluded that an increase in the 
percentage of independent directors has a positive influence on firms’ Tobin’s Q. 
Liu et al. (2015) studied 16999 firms in the years from 1999 to 2012 on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange and revealed a significant and positive relationship 
between the boards’ independence and ROA and ROE. Yasser et al. (2011) studied 
30 firms listed in Pakistan during the 2008 and 2009 markets and found a positive 
relation between the boards’ independence and ROE and the net profit margin as a 
performance measure. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) examined 103 firms combined 
from the stock exchanges of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa during five 
years from 1997 to 2001 and the study showed that the boards’ independence had 
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a positive effect on the firms’ value with ROA and Tobin’s Q (Kyereboah-Coleman 
2007). 
On the other hand, Goodstein et al. (1994) stated that independent members 
increase diversity on the board which may create conflict in making decisions 
because they have different conceptions which, at the end, slow down the decision-
making on the board. Fernandes (2008) examined data from the Portuguese Stock 
Market to find the link between firm performance and board structure, especially 
concerning the independent directors. The results indicated that the independent 
directors played a weak role in monitoring firms and firms with more independent 
directors had higher wages than firms with fewer independent directors (Fernandes 
2008). The study also showed that firms with no independent directors had fewer 
agency problems and the interests of managers were likely to be in line with the 
interest of the shareholders (Fernandes 2008). In addition, Agrawal et al. (1996) 
analysed approximately 400 firms in the U.S. market in 1987 to test the relationship 
between the boards’ independence and their performance. They reported that there 
is a negative relationship between the board size and Tobin’s Q (Agrawal et al. 
1996). Darko et al. (2016) evaluated 20 companies listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange during five years from 2008 to 2012 and the research reported that there 
is a significant negative association between the number of independent directors 
on the board and the firms’ performance measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q 
(Darko et al. 2016). 
However, Zabri et al. (2016) studied the top 100 listed companies on the 
Malaysian Stock market to find a connection between the boards’ independence 
and performance. They showed that no relationship is available between board 
independence and ROA and ROE (Zabri et al. 2016). Zhang (2012) evaluated 1165 
non-financial companies on the Chinese Stock Market between the years 2004 and 
2008 and he pointed out that no relationship is available between the boards’ 
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independence and information leakage and ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as a 
performance measure. Moreover, Huang et al. (2012) examined 156 illegal insider 
trading cases in 78 listed companies in the Taiwan’s market to reveal the link 
between the illegal insider trading and corporate governance components. Their 
empirical study shows that board independence is not significantly associated with 
illegal insider trading. 
The Articles 12c and 12e of the Saudi CGRs, which are related to board 
independence, have become mandatory to all firms from 2009. These Articles stated 
that “the majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non-executive 
members” and “the independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less 
than two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater” (CMA 2010: 
p21). In addition, Article 13c said that “a sufficient number of the non-executive 
members of the Board of Directors shall be appointed in committees that are 
concerned with activities that might involve a conflict of interest” (CMA 2010: p22). 
Therefore, the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations believe that board 
independence has a negative influence on information leakage and a positive 
influence on firms’ performance. In fact, literature has revealed very limited studies 
on the relationship between board independence and information leakage and no 
study has yet been conducted on the Arabic, or Middle Eastern regions. For the 
relationship between board independence and performance, Al-Matari et al. (2012) 
examined 135 non-financial public companies in the Saudi Market at the end of 2010 
and found an insignificant positive link between board independence and Tobin’s Q. 
Ghabayen (2012) investigated 102 non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Stock 
Market at the end of 2011 to test the relationship between board independent and 
performance. The research concluded that there is a significant negative relation 
between board independence and ROA (Ghabayen 2012).  
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In addition, Ezzine (2011) studied 96 Saudi industrial listed firms from 2006 
to 2008 and showed that no relationship existed between board independence and 
firms’ share performance. The studies of Al-Matari et al. (2012), Ezzine (2011), and 
Ghabayen (2012) have several limitations. First, they used small samples covering 
a short period with one or three years’ observation. As discussed in detailes in the 
previous section (see section 3.2.1), a small sample size can undermine the 
assumption of generalisability and increase sampling errors and bias. Second, their 
study applied unbalanced data and one measure for assessing the firms’ 
performance. In contrast, this research uses panel data with large samples and long 
periods of time with a nine-year period that cover the period before and after 
enforcing the Saudi CGRs on listed firms and it also offers two types of data, with 
and without financial firms, and three measures of information leakage and 
performance. In addition, this research applies the System GMM method that can 
control for heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and endogeneity. Therefore, this 
research provides a valuable contribution to literature worldwide and especially for 
the research in the context of the developing, Islamic, Middle Eastern and Saudi 
market. Depending on the above review and following the assumptions of the 
agency theory and the recommendations of the Saudi corporate governance 
regulations, the following hypothesises would be empirically tested. 
H2a: There is a significant and negative relationship between board independence 
and firm information leakage. 
H2b: There is a significant and positive relationship between board independence 
and firm financial performance. 
 
3.2.3 CEO Duality 
CEO duality is the status that makes the chief executive officer (CEO) work as the 
board chairman at the same firm and at the same time. Relying on the agency 
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theory, when one person has two top roles in the firm simultaneously, the problem 
of interests between managers and shareholders will emerge as this type of power 
leads the plans, objectives, and strategies of firms and boards to be in line with the 
self-interest of top managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). 
If the role of the board chairman and CEO is split, this will offer an efficient system 
and environment to monitor managers’ activities and performance and prevent the 
firm from being dominated by one person (Rechner and Dalton 1991). Jensen 
(1993) stated that the absence of the separation role between the CEO and board 
chairman will weaken the monitoring tasks of the board. Moreover, it gives the CEO 
the ability to direct board meetings, choose closed board members and set the 
subjects that are discussed in board meetings (Haniffa and Cooke 2002). In 
addition, as the separation role enhances the monitoring process in firms, an 
effective monitoring system will minimise the benefits gained from inside 
information, which develops firms’ transparency and the quality of information 
disclosed (Forker 1992). CEO duality was proved by literature to decrease the 
information level of firms’ disclosure, which will worsen the problem of information 
asymmetry and transparency (Cai et al. 2006).  
 Tang (2016) investigated 82 public U.S. firms in the computer industry from 
1994 to 2001 and the results reported that CEO duality had a negative influence on 
total shareholder return (TSR) as a performance measure. Besides, Duru et al. 
(2016) used 950 firms with 6848 observations in the U.S. from 1997 to 2011 to test 
CEO duality and performance. They stated that CEO duality has a significant 
negative influence on ROA, ROE and return on sale (ROS) (Duru et al. 2016). 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) evaluated 103 companies collected from the stock 
exchanges of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa during five years from 1997 
to 2001 and the research stated that CEO duality had a negative influence on the 
firms’ value with ROA and Tobin’s Q (Kyereboah-Coleman 2007). Dahya et al. 
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(1996) explored 76 firms in the UK market from 1989 to the end of 1992 to find the 
influence of CEO duality on financial performance. The results indicated that the 
market showed a positive response when firms moved from CEO duality to a 
separate role, and the position between the CEO and the chairman showed an 
improved performance in these firms (Dahya et al. 1996). In addition, Hearn (2011) 
observed the West African markets and analysed 37 listed firms from 2002 to 2009. 
The research showed that the separation roles of CEO and chairman reduces 
information asymmetry and has a good influence on firms’ value (Hearn 2011). 
 In addition, Feng et al. (2005) examined 224 real estate investment trusts 
(REIT) in the U.S. during 1999 and 2000 to find the link between the board structure 
and the effectiveness of a monitoring system and its influence on performance. Their 
study indicated that the board structure, such as the separate roles of the CEO and 
the chairman is an important function in an efficient monitoring system and causes 
better financial performance (Feng et al. 2005). Cai et al. (2006) investigated UK 
firms from 1999 to 2003 to study the relationship between corporate governance 
and information efficiency. Their outcomes showed that separating the top roles 
between the CEO and the chairman develops the process of disclosing information 
to investors and the public, which will minimise the opportunity of insider information 
trading (Cai et al. 2006). In addition, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) used 51 public 
listed firms in the Irish market in June 2002 to empirically test the link between 
corporate governance and firms’ quality disclosure. The research reported that firms 
with a non-executive chairman provided more voluntary disclosures compared with 
other firms, which minimises the issue of information asymmetry and enhances 
firms’ transparency (Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008). 
In contrast, depending on the stewardship theory, top management is 
trustworthy and its interest would be in line with shareholders’ interests (Donaldson 
and Davis 1991). Therefore, the CEO will work to maximise shareholders’ wealth 
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and the CEO duality gives top executives the ability to be focused, flexible and 
effective in running firms in a challenging and changing business environment 
(Donaldson and Davis 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994). Lam and Lee (2008) 
examined 128 public firms in the Hong Kong market in 2003 to find the link between 
CEO duality and ROA, ROE, return on capital and market-to-book value of equity. 
The research indicated that neither the agency nor the stewardship theory would 
interpret the relationship by itself, as the results showed that CEO duality has a 
positive influence on non-family firms and non-duality has a positive effect on firms 
controlled by families (Lam and Lee 2008). In addition, Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
studied 321 firms in the U.S. market from 1985 to 1987 to find if the empirical results 
support the agency or stewardship theories. Their study indicated that the firms’ 
performance by ROE is superior in the availability of CEO duality (Donaldson and 
Davis 1991).  
The study of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) covered 167 firms publicly listed on 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) at the end of December 1995. The study 
explored the relationship between the corporate governance components and the 
quality of firms’ disclosure and it concluded that the extent of splitting the role 
between the chairperson and CEO had a high significant negative influence on the 
quality of firms’ information disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke 2002). This evidence 
disproves the agency theory assumptions, which states the importance of assigning 
a non-executive chairman to enhance the monitoring role of the board on 
executives’ activities. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examined 87 companies on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange during 2006 and 2007 to find the relationship between corporate 
governance components and voluntary disclosure. The empirical research reported 
that separating the position of CEO and chairman had a significant negative 
relationship with voluntary announcements, as firms with CEO duality announced 
more information than firms with a split position. This improves the firms’ 
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transparency (Al-Janadi et al. 2013). Besides, Huang et al. (2012) investigated 156 
illegal insider trading cases in 78 listed firms in the Taiwan’s stock market to find the 
association between the illegal insider trading and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Their study shows that firms with CEO duality are more likely to have 
less chance of illegal insider trading.  
However, Wan and Ong (2005) analysed 212 responses and 299 directors 
from listed firms in Singapore and there was no relationship between the CEO 
duality and board performance. Abdullah (2004) empirically researched public firms 
listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange during the years 1994 to 1996 and the 
study showed no relationship between the CEO duality and ROA, ROE, earnings 
per share (EPS) and profit margin. In addition, Zhang (2012) tested 1165 non-
financial companies on the Chinese Stock Market for the period 2004 to 2008. The 
results indicated that there was no relationship between CEO duality and ROA, ROE 
and Tobin’s Q and also the CEO duality has no effect on information leakage (Zhang 
2012). Ajina et al. (2013) examined a sample containing 160 firms listed on the Paris 
Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2010 to study the link between corporate governance 
and information asymmetry. The research found no significant connection between 
CEO duality and the adverse selection or information asymmetry (Ajina et al. 2013). 
Yasser et al. (2011) studied 30 firms listed in the Pakistani market during 2008 and 
2009 and found no significant relationship between CEO duality and ROE and the 
net profit margin. 
The Article 12d of the CGRs in Saudi recommends that “it is prohibited to 
conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with any other 
executive position in the company, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the 
managing director or the general manager” (CMA 2010: p22). Therefore, the 
Regulations assume that the separate position of CEO and chairman has a good 
effect on a firm in general and on the performance and information leakage 
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specifically. Actually, literature has reported very limited studies on the relationship 
between CEO duality and information leakage, and no study has yet been 
conducted on the Islamic, Arabic or Middle East regions. In terms of performance, 
Al-Matari et al. (2012) investigated 135 non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange at the end of 2010 and the study showed no significant relationship 
between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q. Ezzine (2011) analysed 96 industrial 
companies listed in the Saudi market from 2006 to 2008 and the results reported 
that there is a significant negative link between CEO duality and firms’ share 
performance.  
As discussed in detailes in the previous sections (see sections 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2), the studies of Al-Matari et al. (2012) and Ezzine (2011) have several 
limitations. In contrast, this research uses panel data with large samples, long 
periods, two types of data, three measures of information leakage and performance, 
and the System GMM method to control for heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity. Therefore, this research provides a valuable contribution to literature 
especially for research in the context of the developing, Islamic, Middle Eastern and 
Saudi regions. According to previous literature checks and following the 
assumptions of the agency theory and the suggestions provided by the Saudi 
corporate governance regulations, the next hypothesises can be empirically tested: 
H3a: There is a significant and positive relationship between CEO duality and firm 
information leakage. 
H3b: There is a significant and negative relationship between CEO duality and firm 
financial performance. 
 
3.2.4 Board Meetings 
The frequency of board meetings provides a signal to the level of board activities 
and productivity (Brick and Chidambaran 2010). The active board will be more 
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efficient in monitoring top executives’ activities to be aligned with shareholders’ 
objectives and interests which reduce the agency problems (Elbadry et al. 2015). 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) argued that the frequency of board meetings helps the 
board to conduct monitoring processes more closely with the top executives. In 
addition, regular meetings of the board improve the level of communication and the 
efficiency of the board and the published meeting reports to the public bring more 
confidence to investors and shareholders, decreasing the information asymmetry 
problems and enhancing firms’ transparency (Ajina et al. 2013). Moreover, 
minimising the agency problems and increasing the shareholders’ confidence will 
improve firms’ performance and trading volume and decrease shares’ volatility 
(Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 2013; Elbadry et al. 2015). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
argued that increased board meeting frequency is more likely to cause higher 
performance. Liang et al. (2013) used panel data contained within 50 banks in the 
Chinese market from 2003 to 2010 to examine the relationship between the board 
characteristics and firms’ performance. The research indicated that the number of 
board meetings has a significant positive influence on banks’ performance (Liang et 
al. 2013). 
  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) explored 275 non-financial and non-utilities 
firms in the U.S. market which included 1274 observations between 1995 and 2000. 
Their study showed that the number of board meetings developed the firms’ 
earnings forecasts, which enhances the firms’ decision-making processes 
(Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). In addition, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) explored 
5228 observations of firms in the U.S. market over six years from 1999 to 2005 to 
test the link between board monitoring activities and firms’ value. The article stated 
that the board activities measured by the log of the number of the board meetings, 
positively affected the firms’ value (Brick and Chidambaran 2010). Kanagaretnam 
et al. (2007) analysed 1170 quarterly earnings announcements listed on the U.S. 
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Stock Market to find the link between the quality of corporate governance and 
information asymmetry, measured by bid-asked spreads around quarterly earnings 
announcements. The study indicated that the frequency of board meetings improved 
the transparency environment in firms and had a significant negative relationship on 
information asymmetry (Kanagaretnam et al. 2007).  
Moreover, Elbadry et al. (2015) studied 324 non-financial listed companies in 
the UK market to find the influence of the corporate governance mechanisms on the 
information asymmetry of firms. Their study indicated that the number of board 
meetings had a significant negative relationship to the asymmetric information which 
means that the higher the number of board meetings, the lower the level of 
information asymmetry (Elbadry et al. 2015). Ajina et al. (2013) researched data that 
included 160 companies listed on the Paris Stock Market from the period 2008 to 
2010 to find the relationship between the corporate governance components and 
the information asymmetry problem. The research showed that there is a negative 
significant relationship between the number of board meetings and the adverse 
information asymmetry (Ajina et al. 2013). Xie et al. (2003) explored 282 listed firms 
from the S&P 500 index during the years 1992, 1994, and 1996 to find the 
relationship between the board of directors and preventing earnings management. 
The study stated that there is a relationship between the number of board meetings 
and the lower level of earnings management, which implies that board activity and 
productivity help members to perform their monitoring roles, enhance the firms’ 
transparency and reduce the issue of information asymmetry (Xie et al. 2003). 
On the other hand, the theory of stewardship implies that top management in 
firms is honest and works in line with shareholders’ benefits and interests 
(Donaldson and Davis 1991). Therefore, the board of directors does not need to 
increase its meetings to improve monitoring effectiveness as top management is 
trustworthy. Furthermore, there are different expenditures and costs that emerged 
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with an increase in board meetings, such as preparing times and expenses, travel 
costs and directors’ fees and compensation for attending meetings (Vafeas 1999b). 
All of these costs will have a negative influence on financial reports and reduce the 
firms’ profitability and performance. Christensen et al. (2015) examined 660 
Australian listed firms from 2000 to 2005 and the authors showed that the 
relationship between the board meetings and firms’ performance was significantly 
negative. The possible interpretation for this result is that the weak performance of 
firms is usually followed by extensive board meetings to solve the issues and 
improve firms’ operations (Christensen et al. 2015). Vafeas (1999a) investigated 
307 companies in the U.S. market from 1990 to 1994 to find the relationship between 
the frequency of board meetings and performance. He concluded that the annual 
number of board meetings negatively related to the firms’ value but this negativity 
disappeared when previous share performance was added to the model, indicating 
that operating performance increases after years of abnormal meetings’ frequency 
(Vafeas 1999b). 
However, Jackling and Johl (2009) studied 180 top listed non-financial firms 
on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) during 2005 and 2006. The study showed 
that the relationship between the frequency of board meetings was not significantly 
related to the firms’ performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q (Jackling and 
Johl 2009). Mehdi (2007) examined 24 listed companies on the Tunisian Stock 
Market during the years 2000 to 2005 to find the link between corporate governance 
and performance. The article indicated that there is no relationship between the 
number of board meetings and firms’ economic performance (Mehdi 2007). The 
author stated that the possible interpretation for this result is that mostly the 
decisions of board members are affected when there is a case of acquisition or a 
change in the CEO and the performance relies more on the daily management of 
activities and operations (Mehdi 2007). 
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The Article 16-2 of CGRs in Saudi said that “the Board shall convene its 
ordinary meetings regularly upon a request by the Chairman. The Chairman shall 
call the Board for an unforeseen meeting upon a written request by two of its 
members” (CMA 2010: p25). Thus, the authority of Saudi Arabia does not 
recommend or impose any specific number of board meetings and it depends on 
the inside procedure of each firm. In fact, the literature shows very limited studies 
on the relationship between the frequency of board meetings and the information 
leakage and no study uses the cumulative abnormal returns before earnings 
announcements as an information leakage measure to find the relationship between 
the frequency of board meetings and information leakage. Moreover, no study has 
yet been conducted on the developing countries especially the Islamic, Arabic, or 
Middle Eastern regions. In terms of performance, no study has been published 
about the effect of the number of board meetings on the performance of the Saudi 
listed firms. Furthermore, this study applies panel data with large samples, long 
periods, two types of data, three measures of information leakage and performance, 
and the System GMM method to control for heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity. Therefore, this research provides a valuable contribution to the 
literature especially for research in the context of the developing, Islamic, Middle 
Eastern and Saudi market. Referring to the previous literature review and following 
the assumptions of the agency theory, the next hypothesises can be empirically 
tested. 
H4a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the number of board 
meetings and firm information leakage. 
H4b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the number of board 
meetings and firm financial performance. 
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3.2.5 Board Subcommittees 
The board subcommittee is one of the most important corporate governance 
mechanisms that support board activities. Kesner (1988) argued that most 
significant board decisions are generated and made at subcommittee level, 
influencing firms’ plans and strategies. The Saudi CGR states that the board of 
directors should create a number of subcommittees to improve the effectiveness of 
its decisions and performance (CMA 2010). Based on the agency theory, the conflict 
of interests between shareholders and top executives can be mitigated by creating 
board committees and the main role of these committees is to work as a close 
independent monitor for the top executives’ activities. This is to ensure that they 
work in the best interests of shareholders to maximise their wealth and the firms’ 
performance (Klein 1998).  
The main role of committees in monitoring companies’ operations and 
activities is to ensure the transparency and accuracy of the quality of all companies’ 
announcements and disclosures to reduce the issue of information asymmetry (Al-
Janadi et al. 2013). The Saudi CGR indicates that the audit committee is responsible 
for monitoring the effectiveness of the procedures and reports of the internal audit 
system in the firm, as well as the work of external auditors, and the quarterly and 
annual financial reports before they can be confirmed by the board of directors (CMA 
2010). In addition, the Saudi CGR said that one of the main roles of the nomination 
and remuneration committee is to ensure that there is no conflict of interest among 
the board members (CMA 2010).  
 Zhang (2012) evaluated 1165 non-financial firms listed on the Chinese Stock 
Market during the years 2004 to 2008 to find the effects of board subcommittees on 
performance and information leakage. The study showed that the audit, nomination 
and remuneration committees had a positive effect on the firms’ ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q ratios (Zhang 2012). Moreover, these committees also had a negative 
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influence on information leakage which indicated that board subcommittees help 
firms to increase transparency and reduce the problem of information asymmetry 
between insider firms and investors (Zhang 2012). Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
examined 275 firms listed in the U.S. market between the year 1995 and 2000 to 
find the connection between the audit committee and management earnings 
forecasts. The study showed that the existence of the audit committee was related 
positively to the effectiveness of the corporate governance and the accuracy of 
earnings forecast which eventually improves the firms’ performance and reduce the 
issue of information leakage and information asymmetry (Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005). Anderson and Bizjak (2003) explored companies on the New York Stock 
Exchange during 1985 to 1995 to study the effect of the remuneration committee on 
executive excessive payments. The study indicated that the presence of the 
remuneration committee had a positive effect on the corporate governance quality 
and control over executives which leads to better performance and transparency 
(Anderson and Bizjak 2003).  
 Vafeas (1999c) evaluated 606 large companies listed in the U.S. market 
during 1994 to study the association between the presence of the nomination 
committee and corporate governance. The article indicated that the formation of the 
nomination committee positively influenced the independence and quality of the 
board of directors which enhances the firms’ performance and transparency (Vafeas 
1999c). Klein (1998) studied 486 companies from the S&P 500 in the U.S. market 
and the research showed that the board subcommittees had a positive influence on 
the firms’ performance. (McMullen 1996) explored 69 companies from the U.S. 
market between 1984 and 1988 to study the effect of the presence of the audit 
committee and firms’ transparency. The study reported that the presence of the 
audit committee was positively related to the accuracy and reliability of the 
companies’ financial reporting which reduces the information asymmetry problem 
74 
 
(McMullen 1996). Kaczmarek et al. (2012) assessed UK companies from 1999 to 
2008 to study the influence of the nomination committee on the board of directors. 
The research showed that the existence of the nomination committee had a positive 
influence on the board effectiveness and diversity (Kaczmarek et al. 2012). In 
addition, Ruigrok et al. (2006) studied 210 Swiss listed firms during 2001 to 2003 
and the study revealed that the presence of the nomination committee positively 
affected the independence of the board of directors which enhances the firms’ 
performance and monitoring system. 
 On the other hand, creating board subcommittees will add more costs to firms 
in the same manner as the costs of the board that are stated by Vafeas (1999a), 
such as travelling expenses, compensation, fees and meetings arranging costs and 
these costs may affect negatively the firms’ profitability and performance. Besides, 
Dalton et al. (1998) argued that most of the important decisions made by firms are 
not established and conducted at board subcommittee level but rather they are 
conducted by the board of directors itself. Hearn (2011) explored the West African 
stock markets and examined 37 listed companies from 2002 to 2009. The study 
reported that creating audit and remuneration committees in firms to monitor 
executives’ activities is unnecessary and may lead to an increase in the level of the 
information asymmetry and cause a bad effect on firms’ value and transparency 
(Hearn 2011). The possible explanation for this result is that West African investors 
believe that the board committees work as a committee controlled by executives 
rather than a committee established as a monitoring mechanism (Hearn 2011). 
Forker (1992) examined 182 companies in the UK market during the year 1987 and 
1988 to find the relationship between the corporate governance components and 
the quality of firms’ financial disclosures. The author found that the presence of the 
audit committee had a weak relationship with the quality of information disclosed in 
firms’ financial statement, which means that this study does not confirm the positive 
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effect of an audit committee on firms’ transparency (Forker 1992). Furthermore, 
Christensen et al. (2015) investigated 660 Australian public companies during 2000 
to 2005 and the study reported that there was no significant association between 
the audit committee and firms’ performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
The Article 14a of Saudi CGRs has to be applied, from the year 2009, by all 
listed companies and it states that “the Board of Directors shall set up a committee 
to be named the “Audit Committee” (CMA 2010). Article 15a is a compulsory code 
for all listed firms and says that “the Board of Directors shall set up a committee to 
be named “Nomination and Remuneration Committee” (CMA 2010: p25). In fact, the 
literature shows limited studies on the relationship between the presence of board 
subcommittees and the information leakage and no study uses the cumulative 
abnormal returns before earnings announcements as an information leakage 
measure, to discover the relationship between the presence of subcommittees and 
information leakage. Moreover, no study has yet been conducted on the developing 
countries especially the Islamic, Arabic, or Middle Eastern region. In the context of 
performance, no study has been published about the effect of the presence of 
subcommittees on the performance of the Saudi listed firms. Therefore, this 
research provides a valuable contribution to the literature worldwide and especially 
for research in the context of the developing, Islamic, Arabic and Saudi market. As 
the Saudi CGR sets and specifies only certain mandatory committees to be 
established by all firms, which are the audit, nomination, and remuneration 
committees, these committees would be the scope of this research to assess the 
effect of the presence of these subcommittees on information leakage and 
performance in Saudi Arabia. Regarding the above literature review and following 
the assumptions of the agency theory the next hypothesises can be empirically 
tested: 
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H5a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the presence of board 
subcommittees and firm information leakage. 
H5b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the presence of board 
subcommittees and firm financial performance. 
 
3.2.6 Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee size is deemed a related mechanism to help the audit 
committee perform its tasks (Cadbury-Committee 1992). Kalbers and Fogarty 
(1993) argued that committees with a high number of members would have more 
knowledge and confidence in making decisions and more organisational conditions 
compared with committees with fewer members so a large size has a positive 
influence on performance. Anderson et al. (2004) stated that, in general, large 
numbers give the opportunity to conduct more monitoring tasks on the financial and 
accounting processes of the companies, which encourages the companies to have 
better transparency and increase the quality of financial reports. 
 Xie et al. (2003) investigated 282 listed companies in the U.S. from the S&P 
500 index in 1992, 1994, and 1996 to study the link between the size of audit 
committees and the level of earnings management. The research showed that there 
is a significant and negative association between the audit committee size and the 
level of earnings management, which indicates that increased members within audit 
committees helps audit committees conduct their monitoring tasks (Xie et al. 2003). 
Bryce et al. (2015) studied 200 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange 
between 2003 and 2008 with 1200 observations to find the relationship between the 
audit committee size and accounting quality. The research reported that firms with 
a high number of audit committee members were more likely to have high 
accounting quality and less earnings management so more committee members 
give the firms the ability to monitor the accounting practices (Bryce et al. 2015). Al-
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abbas (2009) investigated the joint stock firms in Saudi Arabia during 2005, 2006, 
and 2007 and he found that the number of members in the audit committee had a 
significant negative relation with the abnormal accruals which showed the 
importance of audit committee size on improving the transparency and the quality 
of financial reporting of firms.  
Besides, Inaam and Khamoussi (2016) used the meta-analysis method to 
study 58 previous pieces of literature about audit committee characteristics. The 
meta-analysis showed that the size of the audit committee had a significant negative 
relationship with earnings management (Inaam and Khamoussi 2016). Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007) assessed 103 firms combined from the stock markets of Ghana, 
Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa over five years from 1997 to 2001 to find the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance. The research 
concluded that the audit committee size had a positive influence on ROA and 
Tobin’s Q as a performance measure (Kyereboah-Coleman 2007). Afza and Nazir 
(2014) investigated 127 companies in Pakistan throughout 2011 to study the 
association between the audit quality and firm value. The study revealed that there 
is a significant positive association between the audit committee size and the firms’ 
value measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q (Afza and Nazir 2014). 
On the other hand, Mir and Seboui (2008) indicated that audit committees 
with a high number of members may cause ineffective governance and a large 
committee size with frequent meetings would add more costs and expenses to firms’ 
budgets which affects their profitability and performance. Lin et al. (2008) argued 
that large-sized audit committees would reduce the cooperation between members. 
In addition, they stated that high numbers of members in the audit committee may 
produce unnecessary discussions and delays in making decision. Therefore, an 
increased number of audit committee members would have a negative influence on 
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firms’ performance and provide a weak response on critical issues such as 
monitoring firms’ management and transparency. 
 Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) investigated 275 companies listed on the 
U.S. Stock Market during the years 1995 to 2000 to study the relationship between 
the audit committee size and management earnings forecasts. The research 
reported that the number of audit committee members was linked negatively to the 
quality of the corporate governance and the accuracy of the earnings forecast 
(Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). Hamdan et al. (2013) examined 50 industrial 
Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Market over six years from 2004 
to 2009 to study the influence of audit committee characteristics on earnings quality. 
The research revealed that the size of the audit committee is inversely related to the 
earnings quality so it is not appropriate to increase the numbers of members of the 
audit committee in terms of performance (Hamdan et al. 2013). However, Darko et 
al. (2016) analysed 20 companies publicly listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange over 
five years from 2008 to 2012 to test the influence of corporate governance on 
performance. The article concluded that there is no significant relationship between 
the audit committee size and companies’ performance (Darko et al. 2016). 
The Article 14a of the Saudi CGR mentions the number of members in the 
audit committee, stating that “its members shall not be less than three, including a 
specialist in financial and accounting matters” (CMA 2010: p24). Article 14a become 
mandatory for all Saudi listed firms from the beginning of 2009 (CMA 2010). 
Therefore, the Saudi CGR sets only the minimum number for a committee and does 
not encourage Saudi firms to increase the number of committee members. Thus, 
the appropriate number of audit committee members is dependent on the system 
and procedures that are approved by the board of each firm. In fact, the literature 
shows limited studies on the relationship between the size of audit committees and 
information leakage and no study uses the cumulative abnormal returns before 
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earnings announcements as an information leakage measure, to find the 
relationship between the size of audit committee meetings and information leakage. 
Moreover, no study has yet been conducted on the developing countries especially 
in the Arabic or Middle Eastern regions.  
With regard to performance, Al-Matari et al. (2012) explored 135 non-
financial companies listed on the Saudi Stock Market at the end of 2010 and the 
study indicated that the audit committee size had a significant negative influence on 
the companies’ performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Ghabayen (2012) studied 102 
non-financial companies listed on the Saudi Stock Market at the end of 2011 to test 
the relationship between board characteristics and performance. The study reported 
that there is no association between the audit committee size and performance 
measured by ROA (Ghabayen 2012). The studies of Al-Matari et al. (2012) and 
Ghabayen (2012) have several limitations and discussed in detailes in the previous 
sections (see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). In contrast, , this researcm implements 
panel data with large samples, long periods, two types of data, three measures of 
information leakage and performance, and the System GMM method to control for 
heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and endogeneity. Therefore, this research 
provides a new valuable contribution to literature worldwide and especially for 
research in the context of the developing, Islamic, and Middle Eastern market. 
Referring to the previous literature reviews, the next hypothesises can be empirically 
tested: 
H6a: There is a significant and negative relationship between audit committee size 
and firm information leakage. 
H6b: There is a significant and positive relationship between audit committee size 
and firm financial performance. 
 
 
80 
 
3.2.7 Audit Committee Meetings 
The number of audit committee meetings is applied by previous literature to evaluate 
and test the audit committee’s effectiveness and its meetings (Xie et al. 2003; Darko 
et al. 2016). Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argued that a high number of audit 
committee meetings is essential to exchange critical information between the audit 
committee members and managers. Furthermore, the frequency of audit committee 
meetings is a significant signal that reveals the activities of the audit committee on 
conducting a monitoring role (Lin et al. 2006). Thus, firms with fewer audit committee 
meetings would be less active and not able to efficiently monitor top management 
to reduce the agency problem between management and shareholders (Menon and 
Williams 1994). Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) stated that an audit committee that 
meets more than others gives its members more opportunities to perform their 
monitoring responsibilities and it is more likely to have more efficient control on the 
transparency, accuracy and quality of financial information and announcements that 
are released to investors. Menon and Williams (1994) indicated that creating an 
audit committee does not always means that the board of directors depends on the 
audit committee to improve the board monitoring role and strength. In fact there are 
some signals that confirm the dependency on an audit committee for the monitoring 
system and one of these signals is the frequency of meetings of the audit committee.  
 Hamdan et al. (2013) investigated 50 industrial Jordanian firms listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange over six years from 2004 to 2009 to study the influence of 
audit committee meetings on earnings quality. The study showed that the number 
of audit committee meetings improved the earnings quality which indicates that the 
frequency of audit committee meetings helps the committee to be more active in a 
monitoring role (Hamdan et al. 2013). Beasley et al. (2000) analysed U.S companies 
over 11 years between 1987 and 1997 and the articles indicated that audit 
committees in companies charging for fraudulent financial disclosure had a lower 
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number of committee meetings compared with non-fraudulent companies which is 
associated with high frequency audit committee meetings (Beasley et al. 2000). 
Farber (2005) assessed 87 companies on the U.S. Stock Market during the period 
1982 to 2000 to study the importance of the corporate governance. The study 
indicated that companies who participated in fraudulent activities by manipulating 
their financial statements had characteristically less frequent audit committee 
meetings. This shows the importance of the frequency of audit committee meetings 
in decreasing the information leakage phenomenon. Xie et al. (2003) explored 282 
listed firms from the S&P 500 index during 1992, 1994, and 1996 to find the 
relationship between the corporate governance and preventing earnings 
management. The study stated that there is a relationship between the frequency 
of audit committee meetings and the lower level of earnings management, which 
indicates that a higher frequency of audit committee meetings helps members to 
conduct their monitoring tasks (Xie et al. 2003).  
 Bryce et al. (2015) analysed 200 companies listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange during the years 2003 and 2008 with 1200 observations to 
study the link between the frequency of audit committee meetings and accounting 
quality. The study indicated that the number of audit committee meetings had a 
significantly negative effect on the level of earnings management, which enhances 
the accounting quality of companies. Thus the higher frequency of audit committee 
meetings helps firms to monitor effectively the accounting processes and decrease 
the problem of information asymmetry to enhance transparency (Bryce et al. 2015). 
Inaam and Khamoussi (2016) applied the meta-analysis approach to evaluate 58 
prior studies about audit committee characteristics. The meta-analysis reported that 
the number of audit committee meetings had a significant negative association with 
earnings management (Inaam and Khamoussi 2016). Moreover, Elbadry et al. 
(2015) investigated 324 non-financial listed firms in the UK market to reveal the 
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effect of the corporate governance mechanisms on the information asymmetry of 
firms. Their research reports that the number of audit committee meetings had a 
significant negative association with the asymmetric information (Elbadry et al. 
2015). Anderson et al. (2004) examined 252 firms with 1052 observations listed in 
the U.S. market during the period 1993 to 1998 to study the relation between audit 
committee meetings and the cost of debt. The research reported that the frequency 
of audit committee meetings had a significant negative relation with the yield 
spreads, indicating that a firm with a better performance causes lower yield spreads 
(Anderson et al. 2004).  
 Menon and Williams (1994) explored 200 listed firms in the U.S. market 
during 1986 and 1987 to find the relationship between the audit committee and the 
monitoring role. The study reported that audit committees with a high number of 
meetings were likely to have independent directors and represent the shareholders 
to set an effective monitoring mechanism to control executives (Menon and Williams 
1994). In the end, this will enhance the firms’ performance and reduce the issue of 
information leakage. Hoque et al. (2013) investigated 118 limited firms listed on the 
stock market of Australia during 1999 and 2007 to find the relationship between the 
frequency of board subcommittees’ meetings and performance. The study reported 
that the number of audit meetings had a significant positive effect on the 
performance of firms especially on the ROE and ROA ratios (Hoque et al. 2013). 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) evaluated 103 companies collected from the stock 
exchanges of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa during five years from 1997 
to 2001 to study the connection between corporate governance and performance. 
The study indicated that the frequency of audit committee meetings had a positive 
effect on ROA and Tobin’s Q as a performance measure (Kyereboah-Coleman 
2007). 
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  On the other hand, the monitoring of the frequency of audit committee 
meetings only gives information about the number of meetings not about the efforts, 
achievements, and valuable decisions that are made during these meetings (Menon 
and Williams 1994). Bradbury (1990) stated that boards of directors often establish 
audit committees for the purpose of appearance to the public rather than to develop 
the monitoring and control of top executives for the benefits of shareholders. Ben 
Barka and Legendre (2016) investigated 43 firms with 215 observations listed in the 
French market between 2002 and 2006 to find the association between the 
frequency of meetings of audit committees and performance. The study showed that 
the frequency of meetings of audit committees had a significant negative influence 
on the firms’ performance measured by ROA and ROE ratios (Ben Barka and 
Legendre 2016). Darko et al. (2016) evaluated 20 companies listed on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange during five years from 2008 to 2012 to check the effect of corporate 
governance on performance. The research reported that there is a significant 
negative association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and 
performance measured by ROA and ROE and this may be because of the high cost 
and expenses associated with extensive audit committee meetings (Darko et al. 
2016). However, Afza and Nazir (2014) examined 127 firms in Pakistan during 2011 
and the study showed that there is no significant relation between the number of 
audit committee meetings and the firms’ value measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q 
(Afza and Nazir 2014). 
The CGR in Saudi Arabia does not set any recommendations regarding the 
appropriate audit committee meetings that should be conducted every year and the 
Saudi CGR only indiates that “the Board shall approve the by-laws of all committees 
of the Board, including, inter alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee” (CMA 2010:p22). Thus, the appropriate number of audit 
committee meetings is based on the system and procedures that are approved by 
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the board of each firm. In fact, the literature shows limited studies on the relationship 
between the frequency of audit committee meetings and the information leakage 
and no study uses the cumulative abnormal returns before earnings announcements 
as an information leakage measure, to find the relationship between the frequency 
of audit committee meetings and information leakage. Moreover, no study has yet 
been conducted on the developing countries especially the Islamic, Arabic, or 
Middle Eastern regions. In the context of performance, Al-Matari et al. (2012) 
examined 135 non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Stock Market at the end of 
2010 and the study reported an insignificant positive relationship between the 
frequency of audit committee meetings and Tobin’s Q.  
The study of Al-Matari et al. (2012) has several limitations and discussed in 
detailes in the previous sections (see sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). In contrast, , this 
study uses panel data with large samples, long periods, two types of data, three 
measures of information leakage and performance, and the System GMM method 
to control for heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and endogeneity. Therefore, this 
research provides a valuable contribution to the literature worldwide and especially 
for research in the context of the developing, Islamic, Middle Eastern and Saudi 
market. Based on the above discussion, we expect that the frequency of audit 
committee meetings has a negative relationship with information leakage and a 
positive relationship with performance. Thus, the next hypothesises can be 
empirically tested: 
H7a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the number of audit 
committee meetings and firm information leakage. 
H7b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the number of audit 
committee meetings and firm financial performance. 
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3.3 The Ownership Structure and Firm Performance and Information Leakage 
He and Rui (2014) indicated that the strict governance structure would decrease the 
insider trading activities and the unethical incidents and acts, something which will 
also lead to minimising the information asymmetry in the market. The ownership 
structure is an important factor in corporate governance as it is able to form the 
corporate governance system in every country (Darko et al., 2016). Whilst the effect 
of ownership structures on the performance, transparency and information leakage 
of firms is discussed in the literatures, the outcomes of these studies nevertheless 
reveal different and contrary results. Fauzi and Locke (2012) indicate that most 
studies pertaining to ownership structure were conducted in developed countries 
such as the U.S and the U.K., and as each country has diverse contexts that are 
characterised by distinct legal, institutional, and business environments, the 
ownership structure has different influences based on these diverse contexts. 
Baydoun et al. (2013) stated that even though several studies have investigated the 
effect of ownership structure, these studies have recommended the effects in 
different directions because the studied environments were various, and in addition, 
the new studies reveal that the sampled firms did not represent the worldwide 
markets as they mostly concerned the Anglo-Saxon markets (Reyna et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Mangena et al. (2012) investigated the effect of the political and 
economic environment on the relationship between the board and both ownership 
structure and the firm’s performance, and ultimately indicated that these 
environments have a strong influence on the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance. In addition, the research of Varcholova and 
Beslerova (2013) showed that the influence of ownership structure on firms and their 
performances is significant in Eastern European firms - in contrast to the more 
developed countries. These studies show clear evidence of the strong effect of a 
country’s context on corporate governance studies; this confirms the importance of 
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this research, which will investigate the corporate governance in Saudi Arabia that 
has a distinct environment compared to either Western or emerging countries. The 
ownership structure includes concentration ownership, institutional ownership, 
government ownership, director ownership, and managerial ownership.        
 
3.3.1 Ownership Concentration  
Ownership concentration and the block-holders are identified as the level of 
ownership of shareholders who own at least 5% of the firm’s issued shares (Konijn 
et al. 2011). Furthermore, the ownership concentration can provide a good 
regulatory system for controlling managers (Reyna et al., 2012). Darko et al. (2016) 
reported that the large shareholders are anticipated to have strong control and 
encouragement for observing and monitoring the management activities so that they 
will reduce the agency issue that exists between management and shareholders. 
However, if there is unsuitable concentration in the ownership, the large 
shareholders may dominate the firm’s leadership and use the resources for their 
benefit, against the interests of small shareholders (Darko et al., 2016). Zhuang 
(1999) stated that concentration ownership and the prevalence of large 
shareholders in firms results in negative influences on transparency which in turn 
increases the information asymmetry. Large shareholders are not likely to support 
the procedure of developing and increasing the firm’s transparency or disclosure 
quality, as this type of improvement will decrease their ability to control the firm 
(Zhuang, 1999).  
  Empirical studies into the effect of ownership structures have shown mixed 
results. Mehdi (2007) investigated twenty-four firms listed on the Tunisian shares 
market, between 2000 and 2005, in order to study the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. The study showed that ownership 
concentration and block-holders had a significantly negative influence on economic 
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performance (Mehdi, 2007). This result indicates that block-holders in Tunisia may 
use the firms’ resources for their benefit, thus causing a negative influence on the 
performance. In addition, Mura (2007) studied unbalanced panel data comprising 
673 firms from the UK’s market during 1991-2001 by applying the GMM model. The 
author found that the block-holders’ ownership has a significantly negative influence 
on the firms’ performances (Mura, 2007). Moreover, Fauzi and Locke (2012) 
investigated the New Zealand firms in the stock market during the period 2007-2011, 
a sample comprising seventy-nine firms. They stated that concentration ownership 
shows a significantly negative association with the performance measured by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q, and therefore high levels of concentration ownership will lower the 
performance (Fauzi and Locke, 2012). 
Regarding the effect on the information leakage, Lakhal (2005) investigated 
207 firms from the SBF 250’s index in the French stock market during the period 
1998-2001. The author found that the managers in firms with high levels of 
concentration ownership were less likely to offer greater voluntary disclosures of 
earnings which indicates that the higher the concentration ownership the lower the 
firms’ transparency (Lakhal, 2005). Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) examined seventy-
five South African listed companies from 2003 to 2009 to identify the connection 
between the ownership structure and the level of transparency and information 
disclosures. Their results showed that the block-holders’ ownership had a 
significantly negative association with the level of transparency and information 
disclosures. Furthermore, Samaha et al. (2012) examined one hundred listed firms 
on the Egyptian Stock Exchange during 2009. They showed that the level of 
concentration ownership had a significantly negative influence on the level of 
corporate voluntary disclosures, and therefore the outcomes indicate that block-
holder ownership deceases the firms’ transparency and increases the information 
asymmetry (Samaha et al., 2012).Moreover, Byun et al. (2011) investigated 1067 
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companies during the period 2001-2004 to identify the relationship between 
ownership concentration and information asymmetry. They reported that the 
ownership concentration is related significantly positively with the increase in the 
level of information asymmetry measured by the increase in the amount of informed 
trading (Byun et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, Reyna et al. (2012) studied ninety companies in the 
Mexican stock market from 2005 to 2009. The author found a positively significant 
relationship between the concentration of ownership and the companies’ 
performance, as identified by Tobin’s Q and the industry-adjusted Q (Reyna et al., 
2012). In addition, Darko et al. (2016) examined twenty firms listed on the Ghanaian 
Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012 in order to study the effect of corporate 
governance on performance. The research revealed that firms with higher 
ownership concentration had a better performance - especially in ROA and Tobin’s 
Q - compared with firms that had lower ownership concentration (Darko et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, Boussaada and Karmani (2015) examined thirty-eight banks from the 
MENA region during the period from 2004 to 2011. The researchers’ findings 
showed that there is a significant and positive relationship between the level of large 
shareholders in banks and the firms’ performances as measured by ROA and ROE 
(Boussaada and Karmani, 2015). Bos and Donker (2004) analysed 194 voluntary 
accounting modifications from 1990 to 1998 in the Netherlands’ market. The study 
found that the level of large shareholders decreased the opportunistic acts of 
executives trying to manipulate the accounting figures (Bos and Donker, 2004). 
However, He and Rui (2014) studied 17,320 transactions in the Chinese 
market from 2007 to 2011 to identify the effect of ownership structures on insider 
trading and information leakage as measured by the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). The research showed that there is a convex relationship between 
ownership concentrations and both the information leakage and insider trading. In 
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addition, Mangena et al. (2012) analysed 352 financial reports from the Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange during the period 2000-2005 in order to discover the effect of 
ownership structure on firms’ performances as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
They showed that the level of ownership concentration is not related to the firms’ 
performances. Moreover, Zhang (2012) assessed 1165 non-financial companies in 
the Chinese stock market for the period 2004 to 2008. The results demonstrated 
that there was no relationship existing between the ownership concentration and 
ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s Q, whilst also showing that ownership concentration had no 
influence on the information leakage (Zhang, 2012). 
The Article 45(a1) of the Listing Rule of the Saudi stock market states that a 
shareholder has to disclose his ownership and notify the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) if he is “becoming the owner of, or interested in, 5% or more of any class of 
voting shares or convertible debt instrument of the issuer” (CMA, 2004, p. 36). This 
Article indicates that the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia believes that large 
shareholders have a special influence on both the firm and the market more than 
small shareholders do; thus, they require them to disclose their level of ownership 
to the public so as to improve the market’s transparency. In fact, the literatures show 
limited research has been undertaken on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and information leakage using the cumulative abnormal returns 
before earnings announcements, as an information leakage measure. Moreover, no 
study has yet been conducted in Saudi Arabia, or even in the Arabic or Middle 
Eastern region. For the association between ownership concentration and 
performance in Saudi Arabia, Boussaada and Karmani (2015) examined thirty-eight 
banks from the MENA region - including Saudi Arabia - during the period from 2004 
to 2011, and utilised ROA and ROE for performance assessment. Nevertheless, this 
study has several limitations. Firstly, the research focuses only on one industry - 
banking - and therefore does not represent the whole market and cannot generalise 
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the findings of other companies. Secondly, the researchers used a small sample of 
thirty-eight banks and, as the previous discussion (section 3.2.1) alluded to, the 
small sample size can undermine the assumption of generalisability and increase 
sampling errors and biases. In contrast, this study applies panel data with large 
samples, long periods, two types of data, three measures of information leakage 
and performance, and the System GMM method to control for heteroscedasticity, 
heterogeneity, and endogeneity. Therefore, this research provides new and 
valuable contributions to the literatures worldwide, and especially for research in the 
context of the developing, Islamic, and Middle Eastern regions. Referring to the 
previous literature reviews, the following hypothesises can be empirically tested: 
H8a: There is a significant and positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm information leakage. 
H8b: There is a significant and negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm financial performances. 
 
3.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
As the board of directors plays an important role in monitoring the management to 
best serve shareholders’ interests and to minimise the agency problem and 
information asymmetry between the management and shareholders, the 
institutional shareholders can also play this role. The institutional ownership is seen 
as a special ownership compared to other types of ownership because the 
institutional shareholders can easily monitor the management activities. This owes 
to the fact that they are more professional and can therefore assess the 
management’s reports and decisions (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).Moreover, 
large institutional shareholders have incentives to monitor the managements’ 
activities and prevent their potentially self-serving and opportunistic behaviours that 
are not in line with the shareholders’ interests (Bos and Donker, 2004). Moreover, 
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the institutional shareholders have the financial knowhow to understand deeply the 
changes in the financial reports (Bos and Donker, 2004). On the contrary, there is a 
conflict of interest and the agency problem may occur between the institutional 
shareholders and the firm because the institutional shareholders might have a 
business relationship with the firm, and therefore their monitoring role and their 
ability to detect self-serving and opportunistic behaviours could be weakened 
(Mehdi, 2007). Overall, the empirical literatures concerning the influence of 
institutional ownership report mixed results. 
 Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) examined 130 non-financial firms worldwide 
from 2003 to 2009 demonstrating that institutional ownership is the main 
governance factor that influences the corporate governance rating. Zhang (2012) 
tested 1165 non-financial companies on the Chinese stock market during the period 
2004-2008. The results showed that the institutional ownership had a significantly 
positive influence on the firms’ ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q ratio (Zhang, 2012). 
Meanwhile, Henry (2008) examined 177 large listed companies on the Australian 
Stock Exchange from 1992 to 2002. The author showed that there is a significant 
and positive association between institutional ownership and the company’s 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q ratios (Henry, 2008). Regarding the 
influence on the firms’ transparency, Lakhal (2005) examined 207 companies from 
SBF 250’s index of the French stock market, covering the period from 1998 to 2001. 
The research reported that the managers in companies with high levels of 
institutional ownership are more likely to release voluntary earnings disclosures, and 
this implies that the level of institutional ownership has a positive effect on the 
companies’ transparency and would thus decrease information asymmetry (Lakhal, 
2005).Furthermore, Tsai (2014) examined 2751 earnings announcements on the 
Taiwanese stock market during the period from 2005 to 2010 in order to study the 
incidents of trading based on inside information. The research showed that the 
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investors’ trading based on inside information is restricted through the availability of 
high concentrations of ownership by foreign institutions, and therefore the 
institutions either take essential roles in lowering the agency and information 
asymmetry problems, or they focus on buying shares of companies who do not have 
transparency issues (Tsai, 2014). 
On the other hand, Mehdi (2007) explored twenty-four listed firms on the 
Tunisian stock market between 2000 and 2005 to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. The author stated that the increasing 
institutional ownership has had a negative effect on the economic performance of 
firms with the q measure, and this outcome implies that high institutional ownership 
may weaken the effectiveness of firms’ operations, in turn resulting in weak 
performances (Mehdi, 2007). In addition, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) studied 
seventy-five South African listed firms during the period 2003-2009 in order to 
discover the association between their ownership structures and the levels of 
transparency and information disclosure. The research outcomes reported that the 
level of institutional ownership has a significantly negative correlation with the level 
of transparency and information announcements. Moreover, Cai et al. (2006) 
studied nonfinancial UK companies outside the FTSE 350 from 1999 to 2003 in 
order to study the relationship between corporate governance and information 
efficiency. Their results demonstrated that in the presence of high institutional 
ownership, there exists a high chance of share trades based on inside information 
(Cai et al., 2006). Moreover, Elbadry et al. (2015) investigated 324 non-financial 
listed firms in the UK market to reveal the effect of the corporate governance 
mechanisms on the information asymmetry of firms. Their research reports that the 
institutional ownership had a significant positive association with the asymmetric 
information (Elbadry et al. 2015). 
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However, Zhang (2012) tested 1165 non-financial companies on the Chinese 
stock market during the period 2004-2008. The study concluded that institutional 
ownership has a weak effect on information leakage as the variables provided mixed 
results with negative and no relationships existing (Zhang, 2012). Additionally, Byun 
et al. (2011) investigated 1067 companies during the period 2001-2004 to identify 
the relationship between institutional ownership and information asymmetry, 
ultimately reporting that institutional ownership is not related to information 
asymmetry (Byun et al., 2011). In addition, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) 
investigated fifty-one listed companies on the Irish stock market in the year 2002 to 
study empirically the association between their ownership structures and the levels 
of transparency and voluntary information disclosure. The authors indicated that 
institutional ownership has no effect on the level of information disclosures, and will 
therefore not decrease the prevalence of information asymmetry or enhance firms’ 
transparency (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).   
The Article 6(D) of the Saudi CGRs states that the institutional shareholders 
“shall disclose in their annual reports their voting policies, actual voting, and ways 
of dealing with any material conflict of interests that may affect the practice of the 
fundamental rights in relation to their investments” (CMA, 2010, p. 10). This Article 
adds specific responsibilities to institutional shareholders in order to improve the 
corporate governance environments in Saudi Arabia, as well as to increase the level 
of transparency. Indeed, the literatures present limited studies on the association 
between institutional ownership and information leakage that uses the cumulative 
abnormal returns before earnings announcements, as an information leakage 
measure. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, no study has yet been conducted in Saudi 
Arabia or even in the wider Arabic or Middle Eastern region. In addition, no research 
has been conduct so far on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
performance. Therefore, this research presents valuable contributions to the 
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existing literature by offering the first study concerned with the effect of institutional 
ownership on information leakage and performance. Referring to the previous 
literature reviews’ argument that supports the good influence of institutional 
ownership and also by following the evidence of Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), 
Zhang (2012), Lakhal (2005), and Tsai (2014), the following hypothesises can be 
empirically tested: 
H9a: There is a significant and negative relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm information leakage. 
H9b: There is a significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm financial performances. 
 
3.3.3 Government Ownership 
Public and listed companies are distinguished by the ownership spread between 
shareholders but also the separation between the ownership and management. 
Therefore, this firm structure will cause an agency issue between the interests of 
shareholders and managers. Several listed firms in Saudi Arabia have high 
concentrations of ownership by family or government shareholders, and the 
prevalence of government ownership in some firms is as high as 74.3% of the issued 
shares. There is an argument in the literatures regarding the effect of government 
ownership on firms; the main objectives of governments owning shares in the 
market may be not to gain profits and economic goals but rather to have political 
influence and control (Darko et al., 2016). Therefore, the ownership benefits of 
government will be used for the advantage of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as 
seeing the government’s ownership weakening the firms’ performances by setting 
bureaucratic regulations and management (Tran et al., 2014). The study of Borisova 
et al. (2012) in the European Union market found that government ownership is 
related to the decrease in governance quality. In contrast, government ownership 
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can minimise the issue of information asymmetry caused by the incomplete 
disclosures and information pertaining to the value of the firm (Darko et al., 
2016).Moreover, it is argued that high government ownership will provide large 
support to firms, especially where the government can offer substantial financial 
subsidy to a firm for its future investments and growth (Tran et al., 2014).   
Empirically, Mrad and Hallara (2012) studied thirty-one companies in the 
French market between 1987 and 2009. The authors showed that the level of 
government ownership is related significantly and positively with the company’s 
performance, as identified by ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s Q (Mrad and Hallara, 2012). 
Besides, Ghazali (2010) examined the data of eight-seven non-financial firms listed 
on the Malaysian stock market in 2001. The author reported that the government 
ownership there is positively related to the firms’ performances, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q (Ghazali, 2010). Similarly, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) analysed 
seventy-five companies in the South African market during the period 2003-2009 in 
order to reveal the relationship between their ownership structure and the levels of 
transparency and information announced voluntarily. The research results indicated 
that there is a significantly positive relationship between the level of government 
ownership and the level of transparency and information announcements (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013).Furthermore, Zhang (2012) assessed 1165 non-financial 
companies in the Chinese stock market during the period 2004-2008. The study 
showed that government ownership has a significantly negative effect on 
information leakage (Zhang, 2012). In addition, He and Rui (2014) analysed 17,320 
transactions in the Chinese stock market during the period from 2007 to 2011 in 
order to examine the influence of ownership structure on firms’ information leakage, 
as measured by the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The authors indicated 
that the high level of government ownership decreases the information leakage 
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incidents and the CARs, which therefore shows a significantly negative effect (He 
and Rui, 2014).   
On the other hand, Darko et al. (2016) examined twenty companies listed on 
the Ghanaian Stock Exchange for five years from 2008 to 2012 in order to identify 
the influence of corporate governance on their performance. The study asserted that 
government ownership had a negative but insignificant effect on the Tobin’s Q, and 
therefore there is no relationship between government ownership and firms’ 
performances (Darko et al., 2016). Meanwhile, Cheung et al. (2010) studied panel 
data contained in Vietnamese companies during the period from 2004 to 2012. They 
reported that government ownership has a significantly negative effect on the 
companies’ profitability through using ROA and ROE and labour productivity 
(Cheung et al., 2010). Chen et al. (2005) analysed 145 companies’ yearly 
observations on the Chinese stock market from 2000-2001. The researchers 
reported that there is a negative and significant association between government 
ownership and company performance, as identified by ROA (Chen et al., 2005). In 
addition, Boussaada and Karmani (2015) examined thirty-eight banks from the 
MENA region during the period from 2004 to 2011. The investigators found that 
there is a significant and negative relationship between the levels of state ownership 
in banks and the firms’ performances, as measured by ROA and ROE (Boussaada 
and Karmani, 2015).Furthermore, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) studied eight-seven firms 
on the Saudi stock market from 2006 to 2007 in order to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance components and voluntary disclosure. The study 
revealed that government ownership had a significantly negative effect on the 
quality of firms’ reports and disclosures, an observation which indicates the 
importance of reducing the government’s ownership so as to enhance the firms’ 
transparency and performances (Al-Janadi et al., 2013). However, Zhang (2012) 
evaluated 1165 non-financial companies on the Chinese stock market for the period 
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2004-2008. The results indicated that there is no relationship between government 
ownership and ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s Q (Zhang, 2012). 
Indeed, the literatures report limited studies concerned with the association 
between government ownership and information leakage, through using the 
cumulative abnormal returns before earnings announcements, as an information 
leakage measure. Moreover, no study has yet been conducted in Saudi Arabia, or 
even in the wider Arabic or Middle Eastern region. In addition, there has been no 
research yet conducted on the relationship between government ownership and 
performance. Therefore, this research presents valuable contributions to the 
existing literature by offering the first study of the effect of government ownership 
on information leakage and performance. Referring to the previous literature reviews 
and arguments that support the negative effect of government ownership and 
interventions, as well as following the evidence of Darko et al. (2016), Cheung et al. 
(2010), Boussaada and Karmani (2015), Chen et al. (2005), and Al-Janadi et al. 
(2013), the following hypothesises can be empirically tested: 
H10a: There is a significant and positive relationship between government 
ownership and firm information leakage. 
H10b: There is a significant and negative relationship between government 
ownership and firm financial performances. 
 
3.3.4 Director Ownership  
Incentive theory indicates that the directors who own shareholders in the firm have 
large incentives to increase the firm’s performance, and therefore the agency cost 
would be reduced because the differences in the interests between shareholders 
and directors would be minimised (Mehdi, 2007). The directors with high levels of 
ownership would gain the benefits of the firm’s profits and growth, but in addition 
they would suffer the consequences of bad decisions and actions that may have 
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reduced the firm’s value and performance (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) examined 130 nonfinancial firms worldwide from 
2003 to 2009, indicating that director ownership negatively influences the corporate 
governance rating, and so director ownership is used as a substitute for the internal 
corporate governance mechanism to control the management and lower the agency 
issue. However, it is argued that increasing the directors’ ownership may cause a 
lowering of market firm monitoring (Mehdi, 2007). Jackson et al. (2008) argued that 
even when the directors’ ownership is found to improve the firm performance, there 
is evidence that the firm’s value drops when the level of director ownership is at a 
high level owing to the phenomenon of management entrenchment. Overall, 
therefore, the literatures present mixed empirical results of the relationship between 
directors’ ownership and firms’ transparency and performances.  
 Rose et al. (2013) conducted a survey of seventy-two board directors, finding 
that there is an interactive influence between director ownership and the 
transparency of their decisions. The directors who own shares are more likely to 
prevent management activities via manipulating the earnings reports when the 
transparency is high (Rose et al., 2013). Furthermore, Ju and Zhao (2014) 
investigated 1124 fund-year observations between 2002 and 2004 from the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT database, observing that the boards’ independent directors 
are more likely to lower the fund discounts when they have high levels of ownership. 
This result indicates that when the independent directors have high levels of 
ownership, they work efficiently in their monitoring roles (Ju and Zhao, 2014). In 
addition, Florackis et al. (2009) used 1010 nonfinancial firms from the UK market to 
investigate the effect of director ownership on the firms’ performances. The research 
showed that the effect of director ownership on the performance, as identified by 
Tobin’s Q, is supported only when the level of ownership is below 15% (Florackis et 
al., 2009). Moreover, Amer et al. (2014) analysed fifty listed firms on the Egyptian 
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stock market during 2004 to 2012. They argued that the research results indicate 
that the levels of director ownership are positively connected with the firms’ 
performances, as identified by ROE, but it is not significantly so (Amer et al., 2014). 
Likewise, Cosh et al. (2006) studied 363 takeovers in the UK’s market during 1986-
1996. The research reported that director ownership has a significantly positive 
influence on the long-run stock returns, but a weak influence on operating 
performance (Cosh et al., 2006). Furthermore, Farrer and Ramsay (1998) 
researched 180 listed firms on the Australian stock market, with the study showing 
that there is an association existing between the directors’ ownership and the firms’ 
performances, however, this relationship is influenced by different factors - such as 
the measurement of performance and ownership, and firms’ sizes. 
On the other hand, Vafeas (1999b) examined 307 firms in the U.S. market 
during the period from 1990 to 1994, arguing that the study’s results show that the 
level of director ownership has a significant and inverse relation with the boards’ 
activities (Vafeas, 1999b). Meanwhile, Reyna et al. (2012) investigated ninety 
Mexican firms during 2005-2009. They reported that the ownership of board 
directors has a negatively significant relationship with the firms’ performance, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q and the industry-adjusted Q. Similarly, Mura (2007) 
investigated unbalanced panel data contained in 673 companies from the UK’s 
market during the period from 1991 to 2001 by utilising the GMM model. The 
researcher found that the directors’ ownership, especially with the executive 
directors, has a cubic relationship with the firms’ performances (Mura 2007). In 
addition, Leung and Horwitz (2004) analysed 376 listed firms on the Hong Kong 
stock market during the year 1996 in order to identify the relationship between 
directors’ ownership and transparency. The research reported that the level of direct 
ownership has a negatively significant influence on the firm’s transparency, 
especially regarding voluntary segment disclosures (Leung and Horwitz, 
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2004).Moreover, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) investigated the transactions in the UK’s 
market from 1991 to 1998 in order to ascertain if the market reaction and abnormal 
returns depends on the ownership structure. The study found that the directors’ 
ownership has a strong and positive influence on the abnormal returns (Fidrmuc et 
al., 2006).    
However, Henry (2008) investigated 177 large listed firms on the Australian 
Stock Exchange from 1992 to 2002. The author argued that there is a weak 
relationship between the directors’ ownership and the firms’ performances, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Henry, 2008). In addition, Mehdi (2007) assessed twenty-
four listed firms on the Tunisian stock market between 2000 and 2005 in order to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and performance. The 
author reported that director ownership was not related to the economic 
performance, and that this result is therefore not in line with the argument that the 
directors’ ownership is a good incentive for them to reduce the agency issue 
between directors and shareholders, or to enhance directors’ and firms’ 
performances  (Mehdi, 2007). Additionally, Ghazali (2010) examined the data of 
eighty-seven nonfinancial firms listed on the Malaysian stock market in 2001. The 
author reported that director ownership is not associated with the firms’ 
performances, as measured by Tobin’s Q (Ghazali, 2010).Similarly, Cai et al. (2006) 
analysed nonfinancial British firms from outside the FTSE 350 from 1999 to 2003 in 
order to study the association between corporate governance and information 
efficiency in the stock markets. The results showed that there is a weak and 
significant association between the directors’ ownership and the share trades based 
on inside information (Cai et al., 2006). Moreover, Samaha et al. (2012) investigated 
one hundred companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in 2009, revealing 
that there is a weak relationship between the level of directors’ ownership and 
voluntary corporate disclosures; thus, the results indicate that the directors’ 
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ownership has no effect on the firms’ transparency or information asymmetry 
(Samaha et al., 2012).  
The Article 45(a-3) of the Listing Rule of the Saudi stock market states that 
shareholders have to disclose their ownership and notify the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) if he is “a director or senior executive of the issuer becoming the 
owner of, or interested in, any rights in the shares or convertible debt instruments of 
that issuer” (CMA, 2004, p. 36). In fact, the literatures demonstrate limited empirical 
researches on the relationship between director ownership and information leakage, 
using the cumulative abnormal returns before earnings announcements, as an 
information leakage measure. Moreover, no study has yet been conducted in Saudi 
Arabia, or even in the wider Arabic or Middle Eastern region. In addition, no research 
yet exists concerning the relationship between director ownership and performance. 
Therefore, this research offers valuable contributions to the existing literature by 
presenting the first study on the effect of government ownership on information 
leakage and performance. Based on the argument that director ownership 
decreases the agency issue and leads the interests of directors to match the 
shareholders’ interests in increasing their wealth, it is expected that director 
ownership has positive influences on performance. Moreover, several firms on the 
Saudi stock market are mainly dominated by families who would prefer to maintain 
strong control on the firm. The previous empirical studies also demonstrate that 
director ownership has a negative influence on a firm’s transparency, therefore it is 
expected that director ownership has positive effects on information leakage and 
information asymmetry. Referring to the previous literature reviews and arguments, 
and following the evidence of Vafeas (1999b), Cosh et al. (2006), Amer et al. (2014), 
Leung and Horwitz (2004), and Fidrmuc et al. (2006), the following hypothesises 
can be empirically tested: 
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H11a: There is a significant and positive relationship between director ownership 
and firm information leakage. 
H11b: There is a significant and positive relationship between director ownership 
and firm financial performances. 
 
3.3.5 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership is defined as the shares that are owned by the managers in 
the firm (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
managerial ownership causes the objectives and interests of stockholders and 
executives to match one another, which would decrease the agency cost and 
improve the company’s performance and value. In addition, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that when managerial ownership is low, the shareholders need to 
increase the monitoring aspects of the management’s activities. Based on this 
argument, when the level of managerial ownership is high, the level of shareholders 
monitoring would be low, which may, in turn, lower the frequency of voluntary 
disclosures (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Additionally, this lower level of 
shareholders monitoring may lead the management to increase their insider trading, 
opportunistic conduct, and/or information leakage. Overall, the empirical literatures 
present mixed outcomes regarding the effect of managerial ownership on firms’ 
transparency and performances.  
 Mehdi (2007) investigated twenty-four listed firms on the Tunisian shares 
market between 2000 and 2005 in order to study the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance. The study showed that when managerial ownership 
was raised the marginal q and performance also rose, and this supports the 
hypothesis which stated that increased managerial ownership in firms would reduce 
conflicts of interest and agency issues (Mehdi, 2007). Additionally, Mehran (1995)  
examined 153 manufacturing firms in the U.S. market from 1973 to 1983 in order to 
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study the relationship between managers’ ownership and firms’ performances. He 
concluded that the percentage of shares owned by managers has a positive effect 
on firms’ performances, as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA (Mehran, 
1995).Moreover, Cosh et al. (2006) studied 363 takeovers within the UK’s market 
from 1986-1996. The research indicated that CEO ownership has a significantly 
positive influence on the long-run stock returns and operating performances (Cosh 
et al., 2006). Similarly, Daraghma and Alsinawi (2010) analysed twenty-eight listed 
firms on the Palestine stock market between 2005 and 2008. The research reported 
that management ownership has positively significant effects on firms’ 
performances (Daraghma and Alsinawi, 2010). Likewise, Mueller and Spitz-Oener 
(2006) investigated the unbalanced data of 356 firms in the German service sector 
from 1977 to 2000. The research showed that managerial ownership increases 
firms’ performances (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006). Moreover, Fauzi and Locke 
(2012) studied New Zealand firms on the stock market from 2007 to 2011, using a 
sample of seventy-nine companies. The article revealed that managerial ownership 
has a significant and positive relationship with performance, as measured by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q, and thus high levels of managerial ownership increases performance 
(Fauzi and Locke, 2012). In addition, Mangena et al. (2012) assessed 352 financial 
reports from the Zimbabwean Stock Exchange from 2000 till 2005 in order to reveal 
the influence of managerial ownership on companies’ performances, as identified 
by ROA and Tobin’s Q. They reported that there is a significantly positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and companies’ performances.   
On the other hand, Vafeas (1999b) analysed 307 firms on the U.S. stock 
market from 1990-1994. The author indicated that the research outcomes reveal 
that the level of officer ownership has a significant and inverse relation with the 
boards’ activities (Vafeas, 1999b). Furthermore, Reyna et al. (2012) examined 
ninety Mexican companies from 2005 to 2009, stating that the ownership of 
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companies’ executives has a negatively significant influence on companies’ 
performances, especially regarding Tobin’s Q and an industry-adjusted Q. 
Furthermore, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) studied the effect of managerial ownership 
on both ROA and Tobin’s Q in 347 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
between 1996 and 2000. The research reported that managerial ownership has a 
negatively significant influence on the accounting performance, pertaining to ROA, 
but no influence on the marketing performance, as measured with Tobin’s Q (Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2006). Moreover, Kwansa et al. (2014) examined fourteen years’ worth 
of financial data related to thirty listed companies in the NASDAQ’s hospitality 
sector. The study reported that there is no significant relationship between the 
frequency of managerial ownership and the companies’ profits in the hotel segment, 
whilst identifying a significantly negative relationship between managerial ownership 
and companies’ profits in the restaurant segment.  
However, Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) used panel data related to 182 
Slovenian companies from 1995 to 1999 in order to identify the influence of 
managerial ownership on performance, concluding that there is no association 
between managerial ownership and performance. Additionally, Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) examined fifty-one listed firms in the Irish market in 2002 in order to 
reveal the relationship between their ownership structures and the level of 
transparency and voluntary information disclosures. Their study revealed that 
managerial ownership is not related to the prevalence of information disclosures, 
and therefore has no influence on enhancing firms’ transparency (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). Moreover, Baek et al. (2009) utilised a sample of 460 firms from 
the S&P 500 index in 2000 in order to reveal the effect of managerial ownership on 
the level of firms’ transparency and information disclosures. The research showed 
that managerial ownership is not related to either the level of firms' transparency or 
information asymmetry. Moreover, Laux and Laux (2009) indicated that there is no 
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relationship between rising managerial ownership and the level of earnings 
management or transparency in firms.  
As mentioned in the previous section, Article 45(a-3) of the Listing Rule of 
the Saudi stock market states that firms have to disclose their senior executives’ 
ownership in the boards’ annual reports (CMA, 2004, p. 36).Indeed, the literatures 
reported limited empirical studies concerned with the relationship between 
managerial ownership and information leakage, using the cumulative abnormal 
returns before earnings announcements, as an information leakage measure. 
Furthermore, as with the other topics, no study has yet been conducted in Saudi 
Arabia, or even in the wider Arabic or Middle Eastern region. Additionally, no 
research has yet been published regarding the relationship between managerial 
ownership and performance. Therefore, this research provides valuable 
contributions to the existing literature by introducing the first study pertaining to the 
effect of managerial ownership on information leakage and performance. However, 
based on the argument that managerial ownership leads the interests of directors 
to match shareholders’ interests, it is therefore expected that managerial ownership 
will have positive effects on the firms’ performance. Besides, the previous empirical 
studies have demonstrated that managerial ownership negatively influences firms’ 
transparency, and therefore it is anticipated that managerial ownership will positively 
influence both information leakage and information asymmetry. Referring to the 
previous literature reviews and arguments, and following the evidence of Donnelly 
and Mulcahy (2008), Cosh et al. (2006), Mehdi (2007), Mueller and Spitz-Oener 
(2006), and Fauzi and Locke (2012), the following hypothesises can be empirically 
tested: 
H12a: There is a significant and positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm information leakage. 
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H12b: There is a significant and positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm financial performances. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has critique the theoretical context and existing empirical evidence in 
relation to the impact of each corporate governance component on firm performance 
and information leakage. Based on this discussion, a research hypothesis for each 
relationship was formulated. The previous empirical research indicated that no 
consensus currently exists in the literature regarding the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms, firm performance and information leakage. This 
chapter also assessed variables related to the board of directors and ownership 
structure. The variables included board size, board independence, board meetings, 
CEO duality, audit size, audit meetings, board subcommittees, ownership 
concentration, government ownership, institutional ownership, directors’ ownership 
and managerial ownership. The research hypotheses illustrate that board size, CEO 
duality, ownership concentration and government ownership are all expected to 
have significant and negative influence on firms’ financial performance, whereas 
board independence, board meetings, the presence of board subcommittees, audit 
committee size and audit committee meetings are anticipated to have significant 
and positive impact on firms’ financial performance. Moreover, board independence, 
board meetings, the presence of board subcommittees, audit committee size, audit 
committee meetings and institutional ownership are anticipated to significantly and 
negatively affect information leakage, while board size, CEO duality, ownership 
concentration, government ownership, director ownership and managerial 
ownership are all expected to significantly and positively impact upon information 
leakage. The subsequent chapter will discuss the research methodology for 
investigating corporate finance practices, presenting the survey results concerning 
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corporate finance practices of Saudi listed firms. Table 3-1 provides a summary of 
the research hypotheses. 
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Table 3-1: Summary of the research hypotheses of the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance and information leakage  
Corporate 
governance 
variables 
The research hypotheses 
Board Size 
H1a: There is a significant and positive relationship between board 
size and firm information leakage. 
H1b: There is a significant and negative relationship between board 
size and firm financial performance. 
Board 
Independence 
H2a: There is a significant and negative relationship between board 
independence and firm information leakage. 
H2b: There is a significant and positive relationship between board 
independence and firm financial performance. 
CEO Duality 
H3a: There is a significant and positive relationship between CEO 
duality and firm information leakage. 
H3b: There is a significant and negative relationship between CEO 
duality and firm financial performance. 
Board Meetings 
H4a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the 
number of board meetings and firm information leakage. 
H4b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the 
number of board meetings and firm financial performance. 
Board 
Subcommittees 
H5a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the 
presence of board subcommittees and firm information leakage. 
H5b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the 
presence of board subcommittees and firm financial performance. 
Audit Committee 
Size 
H6a: There is a significant and negative relationship between audit 
committee size and firm information leakage. 
H6b: There is a significant and positive relationship between audit 
committee size and firm financial performance. 
Audit Committee 
Meetings 
H7a: There is a significant and negative relationship between the 
number of audit committee meetings and firm information leakage. 
H7b: There is a significant and positive relationship between the 
number of audit committee meetings and firm financial performance. 
Ownership 
Concentration 
H8a: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm information leakage. 
H8b: There is a significant and negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm financial performances. 
Institutional 
Ownership 
 
H9a: There is a significant and negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm information leakage. 
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H9b: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm financial performances. 
Government 
Ownership 
H10a: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
government ownership and firm information leakage. 
H10b: There is a significant and negative relationship between 
government ownership and firm financial performances. 
Director 
Ownership 
H11a: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
director ownership and firm information leakage. 
H11b: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
director ownership and firm financial performances. 
Managerial 
Ownership 
H12a: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm information leakage. 
H12b: There is a significant and positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm financial performances. 
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Chapter 4:  
Corporate Finance Practices in Saudi Arabia:  
Methodology and Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has reviewed the theoretical background and existing 
empirical research regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firms’ financial performance and information leakage, concluding 
with the devising of research hypotheses for the variables. Section 2.2 reviewed the 
previous literature and survey studies pertaining to corporate finance practices, 
revealing that there is a dearth of survey-based research relating to developing 
countries, particularly in the Middle East. Moreover, no survey has been undertaken 
into existing corporate finance practises in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this chapter 
discusses the thesis’ devised research methodology for investigating corporate 
finance practices in Saudi Arabia, including the survey sources and design, the 
selected sample, as well as the methods that were adopted to deliver the survey 
and obtain responses. Additionally, this chapter presents the survey results. Thus, 
the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 shows the research methodology 
that about the survey contents and design and the processes for the delivering the 
questionnaire. Section 4.3 presents and discusses the survey results and the Saudi 
listed firms practices in the main areas of corporate finance that include capital 
budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure, and dividend. Section 4.4 is the 
conclusion.  
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4.2 Methodology 
This research concerns corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia. A survey was 
conducted in order to meet the objectives of this study, and statistical techniques 
were used to analyse the responses and reveal the corporate finance practices used 
by Saudi listed firms. Survey research includes the collection of data from a sample 
of participants via responses to a set of survey questions. This is an effective and 
systematic way of collecting data from a wide spectrum of participants in different 
social settings (Schutt 2006). This research used a questionnaire to generate 
responses from employees of Saudi listed firms, offering a wide, clear image of their 
corporate finance practices. In general, large sample sizes with high levels of 
numerical data offer statistical strength, while smaller sample sizes and qualitative 
data offer clarity of interpretation. The survey method employed in this study 
comprised a mid-way approach in between numerical data analysis and qualitative 
analysis, as it employed a moderately sized sample and very particular questions 
were asked (Graham and Harvey 2001).  
 
4.2.1 Survey Design 
The survey of corporate finance practices covered four main areas: cost of 
capital, capital structure, capital budgeting, and dividend policy. Based on the 
comprehensive review of the current literature, the corporate finance theories and 
models includes four main topics which are capital structure, capital budgeting, cost 
of capital, and dividend. The survey of  Graham and Harvey (2001) about US firms 
was considered the first comprehensive survey about the corporate finance 
practices which was used latter by other researchers to investigate the corporate 
finance practices in different contexts such as the survey of Anand (2002) about 
Indian firms,  Brounen et al. (2004) about European firms, and Maquieira et al. 
(2012) about Latin American firms. All these surveys covered the three main topics 
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of corporate finance that are capital budgeting, cost of capital and capital structure. 
The survey of Anand (2002) added in his survey more questions related to  the 
theories of dividend. Because the survey of Anand (2002) covered the four main 
topics of corporate finance, this research developed a draft survey the same as 
those developed by Anand (2002) for the context of India, and official permission 
was obtained from that author to use his questions in this study. In addition, one 
main question was added related to the capital structure and factors that affect a 
firm’s decision over what constitutes a suitable amount of debt; the question 
included was similar to the question used by Graham and Harvey (2001). Moreover, 
the survey included a few additional questions about firm and participant 
characteristics which were also similar to some of the questions used by Graham 
and Harvey (2001). A number of the survey questions were amended to make them 
suitable for the financial system of the Saudi market. For example, for the question 
regarding the risk free rate used in the CAPM model, the bills rate from the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was included in the options. Moreover, with 
regards the tax rate used in the WACC model, the Zakat was included as an option 
because the Saudi authorities impose the Zakat as the main financial charge for 
firms instead of a tax.  
The survey aimed to investigate the corporate finance practices employed by 
Saudi listed firms, therefore the participants selected for the survey are chief 
financial officers (CFOs) in these firms. The CFOs are chosen because these 
individuals are responsible for planning their firms’ financial operations, procedures, 
and strategies so they have the knowledge more than others about what theories 
and models of corporate finance that are used in their firms. Moreover, the research 
focused on CFOs as it follows the methodology used in the study by Anand (2002). 
On limitation may be presented here is that, in some firms, the main decisions of 
corporate finance are belong to the chief executive officer (CEO) not the CFO. But 
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It can be responded to this limitation is that even the corporate finance decisions 
may be generated at the CEO level but at the end the CFO will the individual person 
who has the responsibility to implement and observe these decisions so the CFO 
would be able to answer the survey questions clearly. The draft survey contained 
two main sections. The first section included six questions from A to F about the 
firm’s and the CFO’s characteristics. The second section included nine questions 
from 1 to 9 about the firm’s financial practices related to the capital market, cost of 
capital, capital budgeting, and dividends policy. The survey was four pages long and 
comprised 62 subparts (see Appendix 1). In the first section, following Graham and 
Harvey's (2001) methodology, the questionnaire asked participants about their age, 
qualifications, and tenure, and also about their firm’s level of executive ownership, 
target debt ratio, and frequency of paying dividends. Additional questions were 
included to add firm size and sector to the characteristics covered; the data for these 
two variables were obtained from each firm’s annual financial report for 2015. The 
purpose of the first section was to investigate how firms’ corporate finance practices 
are different based on these characteristics. For example, Graham and Harvey's 
(2001) survey in the U.S. found that large firms are more likely than small firms to 
use the NPV method and the CAPM model for project assessment.   
In the second section, questions 1 and 2 were about capital budgeting 
practices and asked about the techniques used by firms to select new projects and 
assess project risk. The questionnaire comprised closed questions with a Likert 
scale of 1 to 5 for responses, in which 1 denoted never, 2 rarely, 3 sometimes, 4 
almost always, and 5 always. Questions 3 to 6 were related to cost of capital 
practices and the methods used by firms to estimate values for the cost of capital 
and the risk free rate, beta, and market risk premium used in the CAPM model. In 
addition, a question about the WACC was included. For these questions, a Likert 
scale of 1 to 5 was used, in which 1 denoted never, 2 rarely, 3 sometimes, 4 almost 
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always, and 5 always. Questions 7 and 8 were linked to the capital structure and 
debt policy practised by Saudi listed firms and responses were selected from a Likert 
scale of 1 to 5, in which 1 denoted not important, 2 of little importance, 3 moderately 
important, 4 important, and 5 very important. There was also a question which asked 
the CFOs to rank specific financing methods based on their importance; this 
question was linked to the pecking-order theory. The last question, question 9, was 
about dividend policies, and was related to the target payout ratio, bird in hand 
theory, and signalling theory. A Likert scale of 1 to 5 was provided for responses, in 
which 1 denoted strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 
agree, and 5 strongly agree. 
 
4.2.2 Sample and Delivery 
The sample for this survey was all the CFOs of the firms listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul). The study began in June 2015, and at the end of May 2015 
there were 165 firms listed on Tadawul. In order to deliver the survey to all of the 
relevant CFOs, the personal information such as name, telephone number, email 
address, and postal address for each of the CFOs was collected. All of this 
information was obtained from Tadawul and the firms’ websites. When there was 
insufficient information about a CFO available, an email was sent to their firm asking 
the firm to provide the required information. To increase the response rate, three 
versions of the survey were available: an online version, an electronic copy in Pdf 
or Word format, and a hard copy. All of these versions were attached to a cover 
letter stating that the data analysis would be strictly anonymous and employed only 
for the purposes of this research. In addition, the CFOs were informed that if they 
included their email address in their questionnaire responses, they would receive a 
summary of the results from the survey. Initially, the online version of the 
questionnaire was delivered to the CFOs of all the 165 firms listed on Tadawul via 
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email, if their email addresses were available or to the main email address for their 
firm. All CFOs were further contacted via email and/or phone during the period from 
August 2015 to December 2015 to encourage them to provide their responses. A 
few of the CFOs preferred to provide their responses via the Pdf/Word version of 
the questionnaire which was sent to them by email, because they had a technical 
issue when opening the online version. Due to a low response rate, the researcher 
visited several CFOs in their offices during the period from September 2015 to 
December 2015 to encourage them to participate in the survey by using a hard copy 
of the questionnaire. The majority of the participants provided responses after two 
to four visits.     
 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
4.3.1 Responses 
Fifty two (52) completed questionnaires were received of which sixteen (16) were 
received via the online version, five (5) were received in Pdf or Word format, and 
thirty one (31) were received as hard copies. The response rate was therefore 
almost 31.51%. The survey was four pages in length and contained 62 subparts. 
The response rate of 31.51% is considered to be good. For comparison, in America 
Graham and Harvey (2001) achieved a response rate of 9%, in India Anand (2002) 
obtained a response rate of 15%, and in Europe Brounen et al. (2004) achieved a 
response rate of 5%.  
 
4.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 4-1 shows a summary of the participating CFOs’ and their firms’ 
characteristics. From the table, the size of the firms who took part was between very 
small, with sales less than or equal to 199 million Riyals (1$ = 3.75 Saudi Riyals), 
and very large, with sales equal to 3 billion Riyals or above. For the analysis of 
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corporate finance practices, firms with sales equal to or above 1 billion riyals were 
considered to be large firms and those with sales less than 1 billion were classified 
as small firms. The sample of firms came from thirteen different sectors thus the 
results are rich in information. From table 4-1, it is clear that 23.1% of the firms which 
participated were from the insurance sector and 13.5% were from the retail and 
building and construction sectors. Other respondents’ firms were from the following 
sectors: petrochemicals (11.5%), cement (7.7%), energy (1.9%), agriculture (7.7%), 
telecommunications (1.9%), multi-investment (1.9%), real estate development 
(5.8%), transport (1.9%), hotel and tourism (1.9%), and industrial investment (7.7%). 
In the response analysis, the sectors were divided into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing following the methodology used by Graham and Harvey (2001).  
With regards the CFOs’ characteristics, 48.1% only have an undergraduate 
degree, while 51.9% also have a degree higher than an undergraduate degree. In 
addition, the analysis examined whether the CFOs’ tenure has a specific effect on 
their corporate finance practices. In line with the study by Graham and Harvey 
(2001), tenure was divided into short tenure, which was defined as equal to or less 
than 9 years, and long tenure, which was more than 9 years. The table shows that 
about 51.9% of the CFOs had been in their roles for 9 years or less and 48.1% of 
the CFOs had been in their roles for more than 9 years. With regards the CFOs’ 
ages, 16% were below the age of 40, 48.1% were aged between 40 and 50 and 
21.2% were more than 50 years old. In the results tables, the CFOs are only divided 
into two groups: those 50 years old and below, and those above 50 years.  
The results from the questions about techniques and strategies for setting a 
specific debt ratio indicated that 42.3% of the firms have a flexible target debt ratio 
depending on the firm’s operation, while 28.8% do not have a target debt ratio. The 
remaining firms reported that they have tight or somewhat tight target debt ratios. In 
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the analysis of the results, the sample is therefore categorised into two types: those 
with and those without a target debt ratio.  
The survey also asked participants whether their firms pay dividends; 42.3% 
of the CFOs indicated that their firms always pay dividends while 21.2% reported 
that they almost always offer dividends. A further 13.5% of the firms sometimes 
issued dividends, 5.8% flexibly issued dividends, and 17.3% never issued dividends. 
For the analysis, the firms were thus divided into two types: those which paid or 
those which did not pay dividends. The final characteristic of the firms that was 
investigated using the survey was the percentage of the firms’ stock owned by its 
executives. The results show that for 78.8% of the firms, the executives owned less 
than 5% of the issued shares while for 7.7% of the firms, the executives owned more 
than 20% of the issued shares. Furthermore, for 7.7% of the firms sampled, the 
executives owned between 10% and 20% of the issued shares while for 5.8% of the 
firms, the executives owned between 5% and 10% of the issued shares. The level 
of executive ownership is presented in the response tables as low and high 
ownership, where ownership is considered high when it accounts for more than 5% 
of the firm’s issued shares.  
In addition, table 4-2 shows the correlations between the demographic 
variables of the participating CFOs and firms. For example, the table indicates that 
firms which frequently pay dividends to their shareholders are more likely to be large 
firms in the manufacturing sector with a high level of executive ownership.  
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Table 4-1: Demographic variables  
Characteristics No of obs. % Characteristics No of obs. % 
      
Firm Sector   CFO Tenure (years)   
Petrochemicals 6 11.5 Short (≤ 9 years) 27 51.9 
Cement 4 7.7 Long (> 9 years) 25 48.1 
Retail 7 13.5 CFO Age (years)   
Energy & utilities 1 1.9 < 40 16 30.8 
Agriculture & Food 4 7.7 40 - 50 25 48.1 
Telecommunication 1 1.9 > 50 11 21.2 
Insurance 12 23.1 Target Debt Policy   
Multi-investment 1 1.9 None 15 28.8 
Building & construction 7 13.5 Flexible 22 42.3 
Real estate development 3 5.8 Somewhat tight 8 15.4 
Transport 1 1.9 Strict 7 13.5 
Hotel & tourism 1 1.9 Firm Paying Dividends  
Industrial Investment 4 7.7 Never 9 17.3 
Firm Size (Sales in Riyals as 1$ = 3.75 Riyals) Rarely 3 5.8 
≤ 199 millions 9 17.3 Sometimes 7 13.5 
200 - 499 millions 11 21.2 Almost always 11 21.2 
500 - 999 million 9 17.3 Always 22 42.3 
1 - 2.99 billions 12 23.1 Executive Ownership (%)   
≥ 3 billions 11 21.2 < 5% 41 78.8 
CFO Education   5 - < 10% 3 5.8 
Bach 25 48.1 10% - 20% 4 7.7 
Higher 27 51.9 > 20% 4 7.7 
Total 52 100 Total 52 100 
 
 
Table 4-2: Pearson and Spearman’s rank correlation of firm and CFOs characteristics 
 Firm 
Size(Sales) 
Firm 
Sectors 
CFO 
Age 
CFO 
Edu 
CFO 
Tenure 
Executives 
Ownership 
Target 
Debt 
Paying 
Dividends 
Firm 
Size 
(Sales) 
1 .142 .013 .194 .151 .108 .031 .354* 
Firm 
Sectors 
.142 1 .202 -.116 .228 -.082 .202 .435** 
CFO Age 
 
.013 .202 1 .047 .256 -.038 .086 .100 
CFO Edu 
 
.194 -.116 .047 1 .038 .047 .042 -.120 
CFO 
Tenure 
.151 .228 .256 .038 1 .067 .237 .091 
Executives 
Ownership 
.108 -.082 -.038 .047 .067 1 -.018 .295* 
Target  
Debt 
.031 .202 .086 .042 .237 -.018 1 -.046 
Paying 
Dividends 
.354* .435** .100 -.120 .091 .295* -.046 1 
**, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1% and 5% respectively 
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4.3.3 Results Related to Capital Budgeting Practices 
Table 4-3 examines the methods and techniques applied by Saudi listed firms for 
making capital budgeting decisions. The participants’ answers to questions in this 
area were based on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 correlated with never used and 
4 and 5 meant almost always used and always used respectively. Most participating 
CFOs indicated that IRR and NPV are the capital budgeting techniques used by 
their firms. 75% of participants rated the IRR method as almost always or always 
used by their firms with a mean score of 3.88, while 63.5% of respondents 
considered the NPV technique as almost always or always implemented by their 
management for selecting projects and making capital budgeting decisions with a 
mean score of 3.65. This preference for capital budgeting methods by Saudi listed 
firms is the same as the preferences of Indian firms as noted by Anand (2002), of 
American firms as noted by Graham and Harvey (2001), and of Kuwaiti firms as 
noted by Mutairi et al. (2009). The third choice was the payback period method with 
61.5% of the CFOs indicating that they used this method, with a mean score of 3.38. 
The most interesting outcomes were derived from investigating the results as they 
correlated with the firm and CFO characteristics. For example, large Saudi listed 
firms are significantly more likely to use IRR than small firms (score 4.39 versus 
3.48). In addition, large firms are likely to use the payback period technique more 
than small firms (score 3.91 versus 2.97) and firms in the manufacturing sectors are 
likely to implement the payback period method more than firms in the non-
manufacturing sectors (score 3.91 versus 2.58). Furthermore, firms that pay 
dividends are likely to use the payback period and IRR methods more than firms 
that do not pay dividends (score 3.85 versus 2.58, and score 4.21 versus 3.32, 
respectively). However, there are no differences in the capital budgeting methods 
used which correspond to the firm having or not having a target debt, the CFO’s 
age, tenure, and education, and the firm having high or low executive ownership.  
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CFOs were also asked to reveal the methods that are frequently used by their 
firms to assess project risk. Table 4-4 shows five methods: sensitivity analysis, 
scenario analysis, risk adjusted discount rate, decision tree analysis, and Monte 
Carlo simulation. The table shows that the most popular methods used by Saudi 
listed firms for evaluating project risk are scenario and sensitivity analyses. 63.5% 
of CFOs consider scenario analysis as the method almost always or always used 
by their firms for assessing project risk with a mean score of 3.65. 59.6% of CFOs 
reported that sensitivity analyses are almost always or always used by their firms 
with a mean score of 3.38. Thus, the Saudi firm practice is different from the Kuwaiti 
firm practice as Kuwaiti firms prefer to use sensitivity analyses more than scenario 
analyses as noted by Mutairi et al. (2009). Analysing the responses based on the 
firms’ characteristics shows that manufacturing firms are likely to use scenario 
analysis more than non-manufacturing firms (score 3.78 versus 3.59). However, 
there is no difference in the use of the various methods for project risk assessment 
between firms that are large or small, those having or not having a target debt, and 
firms having high or low executive ownership. Moreover, there is no difference in 
risk assessment practices which correlates with the CFOs age, tenure, or education.    
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Table 4-3: Survey responses to the question: How frequently does your firm use the 
following project choice criteria in your firm? 
  
% always 
or almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Payback Period 61.5 3.38 2.97 3.91** 2.97 3.91** 2.58 3.85*** 3.54 3.00 
2 ARR 38.5 2.90 2.69 3.17 2.71 3.17 2.58 3.10 3.08 2.47 
3 NPV 63.5 3.65 3.59 3.74 3.48 3.91 3.21 3.91 3.81 3.27 
4 IRR 75.0 3.88 3.48 4.39*** 3.62 4.22 3.32 4.21** 3.95 3.73 
5 PI 53.8 3.48 3.55 3.39 3.52 3.43 3.47 3.48 3.51 3.40 
6 Break-even 59.6 3.65 3.72 3.57 3.34 4.04* 3.58 3.70 3.62 3.73 
            
  
% always 
or almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Payback Period 61.5 3.38 3.44 3.18 3.26 3.52 3.50 3.27 3.54 2.82 
2 ARR 38.5 2.90 2.83 3.18 2.89 2.92 3.15 2.65 3.00 2.55 
3 NPV 63.5 3.65 3.76 3.27 3.81 3.48 3.81 3.50 3.66 3.64 
4 IRR 75.0 3.88 4.07 3.18 3.85 3.92 3.85 3.92 3.88 3.91 
5 PI 53.8 3.48 3.37 3.91 3.30 3.68 3.50 3.46 3.51 3.36 
6 Break-even 59.6 3.65 3.63 3.73 3.44 3.88 3.77 3.54 3.78 3.18 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
Table 4-4: Survey responses to the question: How frequently does your firm use the 
following methodology to assess the project risk in your firm? 
  
% always or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Sensitivity  59.6 3.38 3.31 3.65 3.41 3.52 3.47 3.45 3.46 3.47 
2 Scenario  63.5 2.90 3.55 3.83 3.59 3.78** 3.37 3.85 3.70 3.60 
3 Risk adjusted 
rate 
25.0 3.65 2.48 2.87 2.48 2.91 2.53 2.73 2.76 2.40 
4 Decision tree  15.4 3.88 2.17 2.48 2.18 2.52 2.42 2.24 2.27 2.40 
5 Monte Carlo  7.7 3.48 1.62 1.74 1.71 1.65 1.84 1.58 1.68 1.67 
  
% always or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Sensitivity  59.6 3.38 3.61 2.91 3.52 3.40 3.35 3.58 3.49 3.36 
2 Scenario  63.5 2.90 3.73 3.45 3.67 3.68 3.75 3.58 3.78 3.27 
3 Risk adjusted 
rate 
25.0 3.65 2.83 2.00 2.67 2.64 2.69 2.62 2.73 2.36 
4 Decision tree  15.4 3.88 2.39 2.00 2.19 2.44 2.23 2.38 2.34 2.18 
5 Monte Carlo  7.7 3.48 1.68 1.64 1.74 1.60 1.54 1.81 1.76 1.36 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
4.3.4 Results Related to Cost of Capital Practices 
The survey also attempted to reveal how Saudi listed firms determine the cost of 
capital and as such the questionnaire investigated the methods that are applied by 
Saudi firms to calculate the cost of debt and equity. In addition, the survey aimed to 
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reveal whether Saudi firms use the CAPM approach to calculate the cost of capital 
and how they estimate the beta factor and risk free rate. In addition, there was a 
question regarding the period which they use for calculating the beta factor and how 
they account for the market risk premium. The last question was about how 
frequently they use the WACC method and what tax rate they apply when 
calculating the after tax cost of debt in the model.    
The participants were asked to reveal which methods they frequently used to 
estimate the discount rate and the cost of equity for their firm. The possible 
responses included dividend yield, earnings yield, Gordon’s model, CAPM model, 
and multi-factor approach. Table 4-5 shows that the most popular method among 
Saudi firms is the earnings yield approach, as 71.2% of Saudi firms almost always 
or always use the earnings yield method when estimating the cost of equity with a 
mean score of 3.65. 67.3% of Saudi listed firms also indicated that they almost 
always or always apply the dividend yield method with a mean score of 3.58. The 
third preference was the CAPM model, as 23.1% of the participating CFOs stated 
that they almost always or always implement the CAPM model to calculate the cost 
of equity with a mean score of 2.27. This survey result reveals that Saudi firms prefer 
different methods than Kuwaiti firms as Kuwaiti firms prefer WACC model (Mutairi 
et al. 2009). Besides, Saudi firms prefer different methods than American, 
European, and Indian firms. The most popular method in those countries is the 
CAPM method (Graham and Harvey 2001; Anand 2002; Brounen et al. 2004). This 
indicates that Saudi firms have different corporate finance practices to American, 
Indian, European, and Kuwaiti companies and confirms the importance of this 
research and its contributions.  
In addition, where the second and third most popular methods used by Saudi 
firms are dividend yield and the CAPM model, the second and third most popular 
approaches in America and Europe are the average returns and multi beta methods. 
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In India, the second and third most commonly used methods are Gordon’s model 
and the earnings yield approach. Analysis of the responses based on firm and CFO 
characteristics showed that there is a weak difference between the practices used 
by CFOs with and without higher levels of education, as CFOs with a higher level of 
education are more likely to use the dividend yield method for estimating the cost of 
equity than CFOs with only an undergraduate degree. However, there was no 
difference observed in the methods for estimating the cost of equity used by firms 
related to whether the firms were large or small, were in the manufacturing or non-
manufacturing sectors, whether they pay or do not pay dividends, whether they have 
or do not have a target debt or whether they have high or low executive ownership, 
or that were related to their CFO’s age and tenure.      
 
 
Table 4-5: Survey responses to the question: How frequently does your firm use the 
following methods to estimate the cost of equity in your firm? 
  
% always 
or almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Dividend Yield  67.3 3.58 3.38 3.83 3.34 3.91 3.32 3.73 3.49 3.80 
2 Earnings Yield  71.2 3.65 3.48 3.87 3.28 4.13 3.42 3.79 3.54 3.93 
3 Gordon’s Model  11.5 1.63 1.62 1.65 1.41 1.91 1.37 1.79 1.65 1.60 
4 CAPM 23.1 2.27 2.31 2.22 2.31 2.22 2.21 2.30 2.35 2.07 
5 Multi-factor  11.5 1.63 1.48 1.83 1.48 1.83 1.63 1.64 1.54 1.87 
  
% always 
or almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Dividend Yield  67.3 3.58 3.59 3.55 3.67 3.48 3.19 3.96* 3.63 3.36 
2 Earnings Yield  71.2 3.65 3.71 3.45 3.89 3.40 3.85 3.46 3.85 2.91 
3 Gordon’s Model  11.5 1.63 1.66 1.55 1.74 1.52 1.54 1.73 1.68 1.45 
4 CAPM 23.1 2.27 2.44 1.64 2.44 2.08 2.38 2.16 2.32 2.09 
5 Multi-factor  11.5 1.63 1.66 1.56 1.59 1.68 1.73 1.54 1.71 1.36 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
The research also asked the participating firms about different concepts related to 
the CAPM model, such as what rate they use for the risk-free rate in the model. 
Table 4-6 shows that the most popular risk-free rates used by Saudi listed firms are 
the SAMA bills rates from 1 to 13 weeks and from 26 to 52 weeks. 9.6% of CFOs 
always or almost always apply the SAMA bills rates in the CAPM model with a mean 
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score of 1.63. The second most popular risk-free rate used is the 10-year Saudi 
government bonds rate. 7.7% of participating firms indicated that they always or 
almost always use the 10-year government bond rate as a risk-free rate with a mean 
of 1.52. In contrast, the most popular risk-free rate used in India is the 10-year 
government treasury bond rate as noted by Anand (2002) and in Kuwait is 90 days 
T-bill as noted by Mutairi et al. (2009). Examination of the responses based on the 
firm and CFO characteristics showed that large firms are more likely to use the 
SAMA bills rate from 1 to 13 weeks than small firms (score 1.96 versus 1.34), 
although this is only of weak significance. In addition, firms which pay dividends are 
more likely to apply the 10-year government bond rate than those which do not pay 
dividends (score 1.7 versus 1.21). Furthermore, firms with a low level of executive 
ownership are more likely to use the SAMA rate from 1 to 13 weeks, and the U.S. 
5- and 10-year treasury rates as risk-free rates than firms with a high level of 
executive ownership. The CFOs were also asked what beta factor they use for the 
CAPM model. It can be seen in table 4-7 that the most popular beta factor used by 
Saudi listed firms is the industry average, where 26.9% of the CFOs stated that their 
firms always or almost always apply the industry average with a mean score of 2.02. 
This practice is in the line with the practice used by Indian firms as determined in 
the study by Anand (2002) while is contrary with the practice used by Kuwaiti firms 
as they prefer the published source as determined in the study by Mutairi et al. 
(2009). The second most popular beta factor used by Saudi listed firms is their 
CFO’s best estimate, where 21.2% of firms always or almost always use their CFO’s 
estimate. 
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Table 4-6: Survey responses to the question: What do you use for risk-free rate in a 
CAPM Model?  
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 SAMA 1-13 W 9.6 1.63 1.34 1.96* 1.48 1.78 1.37 1.76 1.49 1.93 
2 SAMA 26-52 W 9.6 1.63 1.45 1.87 1.45 1.91 1.58 1.67 1.51 1.93 
3 10 Year Gov. Bonds 7.7 1.52 1.38 1.71 1.31 1.78 1.21 1.70** 1.49 1.60 
4 U.S. 5 Y Treasury  5.8 1.29 1.24 1.35 1.14 1.48 1.32 1.27 1.22 1.47 
5 U.S. 10 Year 
Treasury  
3.8 1.25 1.28 1.22 1.17 1.35 1.37 1.18 1.16 1.47 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 SAMA 1-13 W 9.6 1.63 1.61 1.64 1.44 1.80 1.69 1.54 1.73 1.18** 
2 SAMA 26-52 W 9.6 1.63 1.63 1.64 1.44 1.84 1.69 1.58 1.68 1.45 
3 10 Year Gov. Bonds 7.7 1.52 1.56 1.36 1.48 1.56 1.58 1.46 1.59 1.27 
4 U.S. 5 Y Treasury  5.8 1.29 1.29 1.27 1.33 1.24 1.31 1.27 1.37 1.00*** 
5 U.S. 10 Year 
Treasury  
3.8 1.25 1.24 1.27 1.26 1.24 1.15 1.35 1.32 1.00** 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
Table 4-7: Survey responses to the question: What do you use as your volatility or beta 
factor in a CAPM Model? 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
    Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Published Source  23.1 1.92 1.69 2.22 1.69 2.22 1.79 2.00 1.83 2.13 
2 CFO’s Estimate  21.2 1.92 1.93 1.91 1.83 2.04 1.89 1.94 1.81 2.20 
3 Industry Average  26.9 2.02 1.76 2.35 1.79 2.30 2.05 2.00 1.97 2.13 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
    ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Published Source  23.1 1.92 1.98 1.73*** 1.81 2.04 1.85 2.00 1.98 1.73 
2 CFO’s Estimate  21.2 1.92 2.10 1.27 1.81 2.04 2.23 1.62 1.98 1.73 
3 Industry Average  26.9 2.02 2.05 1.91 1.85 2.20 2.15 1.88 2.17 1.45* 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
The CFOs were also asked what period they use when calculating the value of beta 
for the CAPM model. The most popular period for beta calculation is monthly. In 
table 4-8, 23.1% of CFOs stated that their firms always or almost always use 
monthly share prices when calculating beta for the CAPM model with a mean score 
of 2.06. Similarly, the most popular period among Indian and Kuwaiti firms is also 
monthly as revealed in the study by Anand (2002) and Mutairi et al. (2009). In 
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addition, the CFOs were asked which rate was used by their firms for the market 
risk premium rate and it was found that the most commonly used rate employed by 
Saudi firms is the CFO’s best estimate. In table 4-9, it is shown that 23.1% of Saudi 
firms always or almost always use the CFO’s estimate for the market risk premium 
rate in the CAPM model with a mean score of 1.92. This practice is contrary to 
common practice in India and Kuwait, where the most popular rate used is a fixed 
rate of 9% to 10% and 6% to 8% respectively. The second most popular rate used 
by Saudi firms is the historical average, as 21.2% of firms always or almost always 
apply this rate with a mean score of 1.90. Table 4-9 also shows that large firms are 
more likely to use the historical average for the market risk premium rate than small 
firms (mean score 1.61 versus 1.17).   
Table 4-8: Survey responses to the question: What period do you study to calculate beta 
of your firm in a CAPM Model?  
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
    Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 M share Prices 23.1 2.06 2.03 2.09 1.97 2.17 1.68 2.27 1.97 2.27 
2 W share Price 13.5 1.73 1.69 1.78 1.59 1.91 1.68 1.76 1.70 1.80 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
    ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 M share Prices 23.1 2.06 2.20 1.55 2.00 2.12 2.27 1.85 2.00 2.27 
2 W share Price 13.5 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.52 1.96 1.92 1.54 1.73 1.73 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
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Table 4-9: Survey responses to the question: What accounts for market risk premium in a 
CAPM Model? 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Fixed Rate 6- 8%  11.5 1.65 1.55 1.78 1.69 1.61 1.37 1.82 1.59 1.80 
2 Fixed Rate 8-9 %  1.9 1.37 1.17 1.61** 1.24 1.52 1.16 1.48* 1.35 1.40 
3 Fixed Rate 9-10 %  5.8 1.40 1.21 1.65* 1.24 1.61 1.26 1.48 1.30 1.67 
4 Historical average 21.2 1.90 1.97 1.83 1.59 2.30* 1.79 1.97 1.73 2.33 
5 CFO’s Estimate  23.1 1.92 2.14 1.65 1.72 2.17 1.79 2.00 1.73 2.40 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Fixed Rate 6- 8%  11.5 1.65 1.71 1.45 1.63 1.68 1.38 1.92* 1.63 1.73 
2 Fixed Rate 8-9 %  1.9 1.37 1.37 1.36 1.30 1.44 1.38 1.35 1.41 1.18 
3 Fixed Rate 9-10 %  5.8 1.40 1.44 1.27 1.19 1.64* 1.50 1.31 1.46 1.18 
4 Historical average 21.2 1.90 1.93 1.82 1.78 2.04 1.92 1.88 1.90 1.91 
5 CFO’s Estimate  23.1 1.92 2.07 1.36** 1.85 2.00 2.27 1.58* 1.88 2.09 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
Participating firms were asked how frequently they use the WACC method for 
estimating the cost of capital; the WACC model takes into consideration the 
proportional weight of each kind of capital structure. 42% of CFOs stated that their 
firms always or almost always apply the WACC model when calculating the cost of 
capital with a mean score of 3.06. Evaluating the responses based on 
demographics, table 4-10 shows that large Saudi firms are significantly more likely 
to implement the WACC model when estimating the cost of capital than small firms 
with mean scores of 3.48 and 2.72, respectively. However, there is no difference in 
the frequency of implementation of the WACC model between firms that are in the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, those which pay or do not pay 
dividends, have or do not have a target debt, have CFOs of different ages, education 
levels, and tenure, and have high or low executive ownership.  
In addition, CFOs were questioned about what tax rate they apply, especially 
when calculating the after tax cost of debt, and the weights they use in their WACC 
calculations. Table 4-11 shows that the most popular tax rate used by Saudi listed 
firms is the Zakat rate which is an Islamic assessment at 2.5%. 94.2% of Saudi firms 
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always or almost always use the Zakat rate with a mean score of 4.61. This practice 
is in the line the Kuwaiti firm practices as noted by Mutairi et al. (2009). The second 
most popular tax rate is the statutory tax rate with 21.1% of participating firms using 
that rate, giving a mean score of 2.08. Saudi practices are different from the 
practices employed in most countries in America, Europe and Asia because they 
are based on Islamic law. For example, the most popular tax rates used in India are 
the statutory tax rate and minimum alternative tax rate (Anand 2002). For the 
weights used in the WACC model, the most popular values used in Saudi listed 
companies are book value weights. 21.1% of the participating firms always or almost 
always apply book value weights in their WACC computations with a mean score of 
1.90. This practice is in line with corporate finance practices in India (Anand 2002) 
and is different from the corporate finance practice in Kuwait, as the market weights 
is widely used (Mutairi et al. 2009). Examining the results as they relate to CFO and 
firm characteristics highlights some interesting findings. There is a weakly significant 
link that firms in the manufacturing sector are more likely to use the Zakat rate than 
non-manufacturing firms (score of 4.78 versus 4.45) and this can be explained by 
the fact that Saudi firms in the services and tourism sectors usually have branches 
overseas so they deal with multiple and different types of tax rates. In addition, large 
firms are likely to use the statutory tax rate and minimum alternative tax rate more 
than small firms (mean scores 2.91 versus 1.38, and 1.48 versus 1, respectively). 
Manufacturing firms are also more likely to apply book value weights and market 
weights in the WACC model than non-manufacturing firms (mean scores 2.57 
versus 1.38, and 2.26 versus 1.48, respectively), and large firms are more likely to 
use market weights than small firms (score 2.17 versus 1.55). Moreover, CFOs with 
a higher level of education are more likely to employ market weights than CFOs with 
only an undergraduate degree. There is no link between the choices for tax rates 
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and weights with whether the company pays dividends or has a target debt, with the 
CFOs age and tenure, or with the level of executive ownership.    
Table 4-10: Survey responses to the question: How frequently does your firm use 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) in estimating the cost of capital?  
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Using WACC 42.3 3.06 2.72 3.48** 2.59 3.65 2.32 3.48 2.97 3.27 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Using WACC 42.3 3.06 3.07 3.00 3.00 3.12 3.12 3.00 3.07 3.00 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
Table 4-11: Survey responses to the question: What is the tax rate used to calculate after 
tax cost of debt and the weights you use in the computation of WACC of the firm?  
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Islamic Rate (Zakat) 94.2 4.61 4.66 4.52 4.45 4.78* 4.58 4.61 4.62 4.53 
2 Statutory Tax Rate 21.2 2.08 1.38 2.91*** 1.97 2.17 2.00 2.09 1.92 2.40 
3 Minimum Alternative  1.9 1.21 1.00 1.48** 1.28 1.13 1.11 1.27 1.27 1.07 
4 Book Value Weights  21.2 1.90 1.72 2.13 1.38 2.57*** 2.00 1.85 1.86 2.00 
5 Market Weights  15.4 1.83 1.55 2.17* 1.48 2.26** 1.95 1.76 1.73 2.07 
  
% 
always 
or 
almost 
always 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Islamic Rate (Zakat) 94.2 4.61 4.66 4.36 4.56 4.64 4.69 4.50 4.63 4.45 
2 Statutory Tax Rate 21.2 2.08 2.05 2.09 2.15 1.96 1.81 2.31 2.12 1.82 
3 Minimum Alternative  1.9 1.21 1.24 1.09 1.26 1.16 1.08 1.35 1.17 1.36 
4 Book Value Weights  21.2 1.90 1.88 2.00 1.59 2.24 1.69 2.12 2.02 1.45 
5 Market Weights  15.4 1.83 1.88 1.64 1.74 1.92 1.35 2.31*** 1.88 1.64 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
4.3.5 Results Related to Capital Structure Practices 
This research also aimed to investigate Saudi corporate finance practices related to 
capital structure and the survey questioned the participating firms over whether they 
employ capital structure policies as predicted by the pecking-order theory. The 
pecking-order theory suggests that when firms want to finance projects they follow 
a hierarchy of financial steps where the first step is using retained earnings and 
internal resources, the second step is receiving a loan from a financial institution 
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and the final step is releasing new shares to the market. In the survey, CFOs were 
given three sources of funding for projects to choose from which were loans from 
financial institutions, retained earnings, and the issue of new shares. CFOs were 
asked to rank these sources based on their relative importance in terms of their use 
in the CFO’s firm. 46.2% of the CFOs indicated that their first preference for a source 
of financing was a loan from a financial institution and their second preference was 
retained earnings. Their least favoured option was issuing new shares to the market. 
This result shows that the pecking-order theory is not applied in the Saudi market. 
Moreover, 19.2% of the CFOs stated that when their firm wants to finance a project, 
their first preference is to issue new shares, their second is to use retained earnings 
and their least favoured option is to take out a loan from a financial institution. The 
pecking-order theory is followed by only 17.3% of the participating Saudi listed firms 
where they use retained earnings first followed by loans from financial institutions.  
Table 4-12 also relates to a question about the pecking-order theory. In this 
table, the responses are presented for a Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means not 
important and 4 and 5 mean important and very important, respectively. The results 
in table 4-12 agree with the responses to the previous question, as the most popular 
financing method noted is obtaining loans from financial institutions. 69.2% of Saudi 
firms reported that loans from financial institutions are important or very important 
for financing their projects with a mean score of 3.71 while 65.4% of firms indicated 
that retained earnings are important or very important for financing projects with a 
mean score of 3.73. These results do not agree with the pecking-order theory and 
the practices of Indian, Kuwaiti, and Latin American firms whose corporate finance 
practices are generally in line with that theory(Anand 2002; Mutairi et al. 2009; 
Maquieira et al. 2012). The Saudi financing practices are instead more in line with 
American and European practices which only give weak support to the pecking-
order theory (Graham and Harvey 2001; Brounen et al. 2004). Analysing the results 
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as they relate to the demographic information available shows that large, 
manufacturing, dividend-paying firms are more likely to use loans from financial 
institutions than small, non-manufacturing, and non-dividend paying firms (mean 
scores 4.26 versus 3.28, 4.52 versus 3.07, and 4.15 versus 2.95, respectively). In 
addition, there is a weakly significant difference between large and small firms with 
regards using retained earnings for financing projects whereby large firms are more 
likely to use retained earnings than small firms (mean score 4.04 versus 3.48).         
Table 4-12: Survey responses to the question: How important is the use of the financing 
pattern followed for the projects in your firm?  
  
% 
important 
or very 
important 
Mean Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
    Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Loans  69.2 3.71 3.28 4.26** 3.07 4.52*** 2.95 4.15** 3.65 3.87 
2 Retained 
Earnings 
65.4 3.73 3.48 4.04* 3.79 3.65 3.53 3.85 3.89 3.33 
3 Issue of New 
Shares  
30.8 2.92 2.97 2.87 3.07 2.74 3.16 2.79 3.22 2.20 
  
% 
important 
or very 
important 
Mean CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
    ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Loans   69.2 3.71 3.66 3.91 3.44 4.00 3.69 3.73 3.80 3.36 
2 Retained 
Earnings 
65.4 3.73 3.83 3.36 3.70 3.76 3.50 3.96 3.63 4.09 
3 Issue of New 
Shares  
30.8 2.92 2.90 3.00 3.30 2.52 2.62 3.23 2.98 2.73 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
 
The results of the survey presented in table 4-13 relate to the added questions 
regarding factors that may affect or determine the amount of debt that is used by 
companies; these questions were similar to the questions employed in the 
pioneering study by Graham and Harvey (2001). The questions were added 
because the questions regarding capital structure used by Anand (2002) are limited 
and focus only on the pecking-order theory while the questions used by Graham 
and Harvey (2001) cover a number of concepts related to capital structure. CFOs 
were asked about a number of factors and whether they are considered important 
when deciding and setting specific amounts of debt for their firms. The responses 
were in the form of a Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant not important and 4 and 
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5 meant important and very important, respectively. Based on the Saudi listed firms’ 
responses, the most important factor that influences a firm’s debt decisions is 
whether the executives are willing to allow a degree of financial flexibility. 71.2% of 
the participating CFOs stated that financial flexibility is important or very important 
when deciding on a suitable amount of debt for their firms with a mean score of 3.58. 
This is similar to American practices as highlighted in the study by Graham and 
Harvey (2001) and also to European practices as determined in the study by 
Brounen et al. (2004). Brounen et al. (2004) indicated that financial flexibility is linked 
with the pecking-order model as flexibility increases the opportunities for firms to 
select from a variety of financing methods, but other research has found that 
flexibility may be significant for other theories as well.  
Table 4-13 shows that large, manufacturing, and dividend-paying firms are 
more likely to be affected by financial flexibility when determining their suitable 
amount of debt than small, non-manufacturing, dividend-paying firms (mean scores 
4.17 versus 3.07, 4.30 versus 2.97, and 4.06 versus 2.68, respectively). Fischer et 
al. (1989) have proposed a reason for why capital structures and debt/equity ratios 
change over time even for firms with a target debt/equity ratio. They suggested that 
when the transaction cost of issuing debt is fixed, a firm rearranges its debt balance 
only when it faces an upper or lower obstacle. In this survey, the CFOs were asked 
if transaction costs and/or fees for issuing debt are considered important when 
choosing a suitable amount of debt. Table 4-13 shows that transaction costs and 
fees are the second most important factor that affects the setting of debt levels by 
Saudi firms. 55.8% of participating firms indicated that transaction costs and fees 
are important or very important when determining the appropriate amount of debt 
for their firms with a mean score of 3.31. This result gives strong support to the idea 
that firms are concerned about transaction costs when they decide to issue debt. 
The result is contrary to the results of the studies by Graham and Harvey (2001) in 
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the U.S. and Maquieira et al. (2012) in Latin America, as these studies do not give 
any evidence to indicate that transaction costs are important. The results also 
suggest that manufacturing and dividend-paying firms are more likely to be 
concerned about transaction costs when setting debt levels than non-manufacturing 
and non-dividend-paying firms. Bradley et al. (1984) noted that debt levels are 
clearly different across sectors and industries and Graham and Harvey (2001) 
stated that the reason for this difference may be because of the nature of the 
products and the degree of competition in different sectors and industries. Titman 
(1984) also pointed out that buyers are less likely to buy a product if they know that 
the firm who produced the product may go out of business, especially if the product 
is unique.  
The survey investigated these concepts by asking CFOs if the levels of debt 
set by firms in the same sector and industry have an effect on their decisions over 
their own debt levels, and also whether their firms limit their debt levels because 
they do not want to send negative signals to their customers which suggest that the 
firm has a high risk of going out of business. 46.2% of CFOs, with a mean score of 
3.08, agreed that the debt level in their company is limited so that customers and 
suppliers are not worried that the firm will go out of business. This result supports 
the argument of Titman (1984) that customers are less likely to buy products from 
firms that are at risk of bankruptcy or in distress. This finding is, however, contrary 
to the results of an American study presented by Graham and Harvey (2001) which 
did not find any support for this idea. CFOs were also asked whether the level of 
debt of other firms in the same sector or industry influences their decisions about 
debt. 21.2% of CFOs, with a mean score of 2.21, indicated that the debt level in 
other firms in their industry is important or very important to them when they set their 
own debt levels. This result gives weak support for the idea that competitors’ debt 
levels and industry debt levels have an effect on firms’ debt levels. Besides, the 
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studies by Graham and Harvey (2001) in the U.S. and Maquieira et al. (2012) in 
Latin America also showed weak support for the idea that the industry has an effect 
on a company’s debt level.  
The survey also examined concepts related to the trade-off theory which 
argues that the optimal capital structure is based on the relationship between the 
cost of debt, e.g. bankruptcy, and the benefits of debt. CFOs were asked if the 
possible costs of bankruptcy and financial distress are important factors which are 
taken into consideration when determining a suitable amount of debt. 44.2% of 
CFOs indicated that the possible cost of bankruptcy is an important or very important 
factor that can influence the appropriate amount of debt for their firms with a mean 
score of 2.81. This result provides support for the trade-off theory, as the cost of 
debt is taken into account by Saudi firms when they set their debt ratio. For 
comparison, the studies by Graham and Harvey (2001) in the U.S., Brounen et al. 
(2004) in Europe, and Maquieira et al. (2012) in Latin America provide weak support 
for the trade-off theory.  
In addition, it has been argued that when firms have a high level of free cash 
flow, managers spend this cash flow on inefficient projects and investments (Jensen 
1986). Therefore, debt can be used by firms to counteract the effects of free cash 
flow to ensure management invests in efficient projects (Graham and Harvey 2001). 
This concept was examined in the survey by asking CFOs if the debt level in their 
company is used as a mechanism to ensure that the management works hard and 
efficiently. 40.4% of the participating firms, with a mean score of 2.75, stated that 
ensuring the management works hard and efficiently is important or very important 
consideration when determining and setting a suitable amount of debt. This outcome 
supports the view that issuing debt is a good mechanism for reducing levels of free 
cash flow to increase the efficiency of management actions. In contrast, the 
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practices of U.S. firms show weak support for the importance of debt for controlling 
management activities (Graham and Harvey 2001).                            
Table 4-13: Survey responses to the question: What factors influence-determine the 
appropriate amount of debt for your firm?  
  
% 
important 
or very 
important 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 Financial flexibility (we 
restrict debt when we 
have enough internal 
funds)  
71.2 3.58 3.07 4.17*** 2.97 4.30*** 2.68 4.06*** 3.49 3.73 
2 The transactions 
costs and fees for 
issuing debt 
55.8 3.31 3.10 3.57 2.86 3.91*** 2.79 3.61** 3.20 3.60 
3 The debt levels of 
other firms in our 
industry 
21.2 2.21 1.91 2.61 2.10 2.35 1.95 2.36 2.24 2.13 
4 The potential costs of 
bankruptcy or 
financial distress  
44.2 2.81 2.72 2.91 2.72 2.91 2.68 2.88 2.86 2.67 
5 Debt is limited so our 
customers/suppliers 
are not worried about 
our firm going out of 
business 
46.2 3.08 2.91 3.30 2.86 3.38 2.63 3.33 3.19 2.80 
6 To ensure that 
management works 
hard and efficiently, 
debt issuance 
ensures a large 
portion of our cash 
flow is committed to 
interest payments  
40.4 2.75 2.62 2.91 2.76 2.74 2.47 2.91 2.83 2.53 
  
% 
important 
or very 
important 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Financial flexibility (we 
restrict debt when we 
have enough internal 
funds)  
71.2 3.58 3.44 4.00 3.26 3.88 3.58 3.54 3.59 3.45 
2 The transactions 
costs and fees for 
issuing debt-  
55.8 3.31 3.20 3.73 2.93 3.72 3.35 3.27 3.29 3.36 
3 The debt levels of 
other firms in our 
industry 
21.2 2.21 2.27 2.00 2.30 2.12 2.27 2.15 2.10 2.64 
4 The potential costs of 
bankruptcy or 
financial distress  
44.2 2.81 2.85 2.64 2.56 3.08 2.92 2.69 2.78 2.90 
5 Debt is limited so our 
customers/suppliers 
are not worried about 
our firm going out of 
business 
46.2 3.08 3.05 3.18 3.26 2.88 3.12 3.04 3.02 3.27 
6 To ensure that 
management works 
hard and efficiently, 
debt issuance 
ensures a large 
portion of our cash 
flow is committed to 
interest payments  
40.4 2.75 2.80 2.55 2.70 2.80 2.73 2.77 2.68 3.00 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
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4.3.6 Results Related to Dividend Practices 
The survey also investigated different concepts related to dividend policies, and 
CFOs were asked to what extent they agreed with different statements and concepts 
based on the practices employed in their firms. The results are summarised in Table 
4-14. The possible responses were based on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 meant 
strongly disagree and 4 and 5 meant agree and strongly agree, respectively. Initially, 
the CFOs were asked if their firm has a long term payout ratio. 75% of CFOs agreed 
or strongly agreed that their firm has a long term payout ratio with a mean score of 
3.96. Lintner )1956) discussed several aspects of a firm’s dividend policy such as 
the setting of long term target payout ratios, the paying of dividends from remaining 
monies after investment, and whether executives focus more on changes in 
dividends than absolute levels (Anand 2002). The survey in this study examined 
these aspects and 75% of the CFOs agreed or strongly agreed that their firms have 
long term target dividend payout ratios, with a mean score of 3.96. Moreover, 50% 
of the CFOs agreed or strongly agreed that their firms focus more on specific levels 
of dividends than on changes in dividends, with a mean score of 3.27, and 59.6% 
of the CFOs agreed or strongly agreed that cash dividends are based on residuals 
after financing desired investments from earnings, with a mean score of 3.62. These 
results and corporate finance practices are in line with Lintner's )1956) suggestions 
and with corporate practices in Indian firms (Anand 2002). In addition, 59.6% of 
CFOs stated that their firms are more likely to cancel dividend increases if there are 
good investments and growth opportunities, with a mean score of 3.44.  
The survey also investigated the relevance of the bird in hand theory to Saudi 
listed firms. With the bird in hand theory, when firms intend to raise their stock prices, 
they set high dividend payout ratios (Baker and Powell, 1999). 80.8% of the 
participating CFOs indicated that they believe that the dividend payout ratio 
influences a firm’s stock price in the market, with a mean score of 4.04, and this 
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finding gives strong support to the bird in hand theory. The signal or asymmetric 
information theory was examined in the survey by asking CFOs whether they 
believe that dividends can be used as a signal to inform investors about the future 
prospects of a firm. 75% of the CFOs, with a mean score of 3.87, considered 
dividends as such a signaling mechanism. This result confirms the strong relevance 
of signaling theory to the Saudi market and shows that Saudi practices are in the 
line with the practices of Indian firms, as stated by Anand (2002), and Kuwaiti firms 
, as stated by Mutairi et al. (2009).  
Based on the bird in hand theory, investors prefer to receive dividends rather 
than earnings being retained by the company, because dividends are of lower risk 
than potential future earnings and capital gains (Graham and Dodd 2009). Only 
13.5% of the CFOs surveyed agree or strongly agree that investors are indifferent 
to receiving dividends or capital gains, with a mean score of 2.5, which gives strong 
support for the bird in hand theory and agrees with the findings from Anand's (2002) 
study in India and Mutairi's et al. (2009) study in Kuwait. 48.1% of the CFOs agreed 
or strongly agreed that their firms set dividend policies based on shareholders’ 
preferences, with a mean score of 3.38. In addition, because of the agency problem 
between management and shareholders, shareholders prefer to set high dividend 
payout ratios to encourage management to take advantage of external financial 
resources such as debt. A third party debtor can work as an external monitor and 
observer of management actions to effectively reduce the agency issue. This 
concept is supported by the results of this survey as 65.4% of Saudi firms, with a 
mean score of 3.73, agreed or strongly agreed that high dividend payout ratios can 
be used as a bounding mechanism to encourage executives to work towards 
shareholders’ interests. This outcome is in the line with the practices in Indian firms 
reported by Anand (2002) and is contrary with the practice in Kuwaiti firms reported 
by Mutairi et al. (2009).  
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Table 4-14: Survey responses to the question: To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements about the dividend policy in your firm? 
  
% 
agree 
or 
strongly 
agree 
Mean 
Size Sector Pay dividends Target debt 
  Small Large Others Manu. No Yes No Yes 
1 
Has Long-term Target 
Dividend Payout Ratio  
75.0 3.96 3.97 3.96 3.79 4.17 3.95 3.97 3.95 4.00 
2 Focus More on Absolute 
Level of Dividends than 
Dividend Changes  
50.0 3.27 3.34 3.17 3.07 3.52 3.21 3.30 3.08 3.73 
3 Willing to Rescind 
Dividend Increase in the 
Event of Growth 
Opportunities  
59.6 3.44 3.66 3.17 3.48 3.39 3.58 3.36 3.49 3.33 
4 Cash Dividends as 
Residual after Financing 
Desired Investments from 
Earnings  
59.6 3.62 3.69 3.52 3.48 3.78 3.74 3.55 3.46 4.00 
5 Dividend Payout Ratio 
Affects the Market Value 
of the Firm  
80.8 4.04 3.93 4.17 3.86 4.26 3.74 4.21 4.14 3.80 
6 Dividends Provide 
Signalling Mechanism of 
the Future Prospects of 
the Firm  
75.0 3.87 3.83 3.91 3.83 3.91 3.95 3.82 3.86 3.87 
7 Investors are Indifferent 
between Receiving 
Dividends and Capital 
Gains  
13.5 2.50 2.24 2.83 2.52 2.48 2.53 2.48 2.49 2.53 
8 Responsive to 
Shareholders’ 
Preferences Regarding 
Dividends  
48.1 3.38 3.31 3.48 3.28 3.52 3.42 3.37 3.41 3.33 
9 Dividend Payments 
Provide a Bonding 
Mechanism to Encourage 
Managers to Act in Best 
Interest of the 
Shareholders  
65.4 3.73 3.69 3.78 3.76 3.71 3.74 3.73 3.81 3.53 
  
% 
agree 
or 
strongly 
agree 
Mean 
CFO age CFO tenure  Education 
Executive 
Ownership 
  ≥ 50 ˂ 50 Short Long Bach. Higher Low High 
1 Has Long-term Target 
Dividend Payout Ratio  
75.0 3.96 4.00 3.82 3.89 4.04 3.96 3.96 4.07 3.55 
2 Focus More on Absolute 
Level of Dividends than 
Dividend Changes  
50.0 3.27 3.34 3.00 3.15 3.40 3.31 3.23 3.27 3.27 
3 Willing to Rescind 
Dividend Increase in the 
Event of Growth 
Opportunities  
59.6 3.44 3.49 3.27 3.52 3.36 3.23 3.65 3.39 3.64 
4 Cash Dividends as 
Residual after Financing 
Desired Investments from 
Earnings  
59.6 3.62 3.54 3.91 3.33 3.92 3.50 3.73 3.61 3.64 
5 Dividend Payout Ratio 
Affects the Market Value 
of the Firm  
80.8 4.04 3.98 4.27 4.04 4.04 4.15 3.92 4.07 3.91 
6 Dividends Provide 
Signalling Mechanism of 
the Future Prospects of 
the Firm  
75.0 3.87 3.85 3.91 3.81 3.92 3.81 3.92 3.85 3.91 
7 Investors are Indifferent 
(Receiving Dividends or 
Capital Gains)  
13.5 2.50 2.51 2.45 2.56 2.44 2.62 2.38 2.46 2.64 
8 Responsive to 
Shareholders’ 
Preferences Regarding 
Dividends  
48.1 3.38 3.37 3.45 3.44 3.32 3.58 3.19 3.46 3.09 
9 Dividend Payments 
Provide a Bonding 
Mechanism to Encourage 
Managers to Act in Best 
Interest of the 
Shareholders  
65.4 3.73 3.78 3.55 3.70 3.76 3.85 3.62 3.83 3.36 
***, **, * denotes the significant difference level  at 1%, 2% and 10% 
139 
 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology that was followed in order to 
reveal existing corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia. The survey of corporate 
finance practices has covered four major areas: cost of capital; capital structure; 
capital budgeting and dividends. The sample included Saudi listed firms, particularly 
the companies’ chief financial officers (CFOs). The survey comprised of four pages, 
with 62 subsections. In order to increase the response rate, three formats of the 
survey were sent to participants: an online version; an electronic copy in Pdf or Word 
format, in addition to a hard copy. 52 completed responses were obtained, providing 
a 31.51% response rate. After explaining this process, the chapter presented an 
analysis of the survey responses, which revealed the nature of corporate finance 
practices in Saudi Arabia. The results showed that IRR and NPV are popular capital 
budgeting techniques, while the earnings yield is a popular approach for assessing 
equity costs. Furthermore, the Zakat rate, which is an Islamic-based rate set at 
2.5%., is the tax rate that is used by 94.2% of Saudi listed firms. The responses to 
the capital structure questions and their analysis, provided clear evidence in relation 
to the pecking-order theory and the trade-off theory. Additionally, the responses 
indicated that Saudi firms have a long-term payout ratio, while strong support is 
apparent for the bird-in-the-hand theory and signalling mechanism. Building on this 
discussion, the following chapter discusses the research methodology for 
determining the relationship between corporate governance components, firm 
performance and information leakage. The research sample is also presented, 
outlining the descriptive statistics relating to the independent and control variables 
for this association.   
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Chapter 5:  
Corporate Governance Effect on Firm Performance and 
Information leakage: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented the research methodology for examining Saudi 
Arabia’s corporate finance practices. It also provided the survey results that focused 
on the major areas of corporate finance, namely capital budgeting, capital 
expenditure, capital structure and dividend. Chapter 3 discussed the research 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between corporate governance 
components, firm performance and information leakage. Returning to this issue, this 
chapter explains the research methodology adopted for investigating this 
relationship. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model and its assumptions are 
discussed, alongside the panel, random and fixed effects model. It was apparent 
that in violation of the OLS assumptions, alongside the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity, the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
and particularly the System GMM model are the most suitable for the analysis, 
because they permit control of these issues. Additionally, the chapter explained the 
research sample and measurement method for each variable. Finally, the chapter 
reported the dispersive statistics relating to the independent and control variables, 
pertaining to the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
and information leakage. Thus, the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 
discussed the research methodology and the appropriate model. Section 5.3 
explains the research sample and the notations and measurement of variables. 
Section 5.4 shows the descriptive of the independent and control variables. 5.5 is 
the conclusion. 
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5.2 Research Methodology 
To investigate the influence of an independent variable on a dependent variable, the 
procedure applied is referred to as a regression model. Regression analysis is 
focused on investigating the relationship between one variable (a dependent or 
explained variable) and another or other variables (independent or explanatory 
variables) (Gujarati 1999: p123). Regression models rely on the structure of the data 
and also on the type of variable. The aim of this section is to discuss the appropriate 
models that could be applied in the empirical examination to find the effect of the 
corporate governance components on information leakage of the firm and also to 
find the effect of the corporate governance components on financial performance of 
the firm. To investigate these relationships, the research uses panel data, as panel 
data has benefits and advantages over time series and cross-sectional data. Panel 
data includes both time series and cross-sectional aspects, and Brooks (2008) and 
Baltagi (2005) reported several advantages in using panel data, such as: 
- Panel data allows researchers to deal with and solve different issues and 
problems more easily than when using pure time series or cross-sectional 
data. 
- Panel data can limit the bias which comes from the individual heterogeneity 
while time series and cross-sectional data cannot, as individuals, companies, 
countries, and regions are assumed to be heterogeneous.  
- “Panel data give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity 
among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi 
2005: p5). 
- It allows researchers to investigate the dynamic changes in variables and 
relationships over time. The strength of the panel is using data on dynamic 
attitude with several entities over the same time. Thus, this type of data can 
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help investigators to control the issue of multicollinearity that may increase with 
using only time series data.  
- It can mitigate the influence of specific forms of bias that arise from the omitted 
variables in the regression outcomes.   
There are two types of panel data: balanced and unbalanced, and this research 
uses balanced panel data. Balanced panel data has “the same number of time-
series observations for each cross-sectional unit (or equivalently but viewed the 
other way around, the same number of cross-sectional units at each point in time), 
whereas an unbalanced panel would have some cross-sectional elements with 
fewer observations or observations at different times to others” (Brooks 2008: p490). 
The same techniques and estimation methods are applied in both cases. There are 
three main techniques and approaches to panel data analysis: pooled regression, 
fixed effects model, and random effects model (Greene 2012). The selected 
regression models need to be tested to examine the presence of autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity in estimates of the data and also to ascertain if the 
independent variables are endogenous variables. The statistical analysis will 
confirm if the research needs to use simple ordinary least squares (OLS) based on 
the random effects model and the fixed effects model or instrumental and dynamic 
panel methods such as the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) to tackle bias 
arising from the heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity. The GMM has become 
widely applied and very popular among researchers in empirical studies because it 
controls for different forms of endogeneity (Baum et al. 2003b). The following deals 
with OLS estimation, fixed effect model, random effect model, and Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM).    
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5.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  
The regression model can be estimated by using the simplest model between 
dependent and independent variables. 
yit =  α +  βxit +  εit 
Where y is the dependent variable and α is the intercept equal to y if x = 0. β is the 
coefficient of the variable x, the independent variable under examination, and ε is 
the error term. As this equation covers only one dependent and independent 
variable, it is not appropriate for the investigation of the effect of multi independent 
variables on a dependent variable; therefore, this equation is extended to include 
multi independent variables. The multi regression is a model that applies to more 
than one independent variable to reveal the attitude of a dependent variable 
(Gujarati 1999). In addition, as the regression line in the regression model cannot 
go through all investigated variables in the sample, there is a need for an appropriate 
method to estimate the parameters in the regression model. The efficient estimator 
in the linear regression model is ordinary least squares (OLS) (Greene 2012). The 
OLS approach “entails taking each vertical distance from the point to the line, 
squaring it and then minimising the total sum of the areas of squares (hence ‘least 
squares’)” which “can be viewed as equivalent to minimising the sum of the areas 
of the squares drawn from the points to the line” (Brooks 2008: p31). Thus, the 
purpose of using the OLS method is to decrease the variance between the original 
and estimated point (the residuals). The OLS estimation requires special features 
and five assumptions that confirm the validity of the hypothesis testing and 
coefficient estimates.  
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5.2.1.1 Assumptions of OLS 
Greene (2012) and Brooks (2008) discussed the assumptions of OLS estimates in 
detail and these assumptions are outlined in the following. 
- The first assumption is that E(ut) = 0 which indicates that the average value of 
the errors = 0. This assumption will be presented when the constant term is 
contained in the regression equation. If the average value of the errors is not 
equal to 0, several unfavourable outcomes will increase and cause biases in the 
estimation.  
- The second is the assumption of homoscedasticity, which states that the variance 
of the errors is constant (var(ut) =  σ
2 <  ∞). If the variance of the errors is not 
constant, it is deemed as a heteroscedastic case. Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with heteroscedasticity will continue providing unbiased coefficient estimates but 
will not still provide the least variance among the unbiased estimators. If the issue 
of  heteroscedasticity is not solved, it makes OLS an inefficient estimator which 
may cause the over-rejection of the null hypothesis, so the inferences from the 
results will be deceptive (Long and Ervin 2000). Fortunately, there are several 
statistical tests that can detect heteroscedasticity. The Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1965) test is one of the simplest tests, in addition to the White (1980) test, for 
heteroscedasticity. In addition,  Baum et al. (2003) states that the statistical tests 
used by Breush and Pagan (1979) and Cook and Weisberg (1983) are the major 
tests for detecting heteroscedasticity in OLS regression and the null hypothesis 
of the test is that the variance is constant. When heteroscedasticity is present, 
different techniques can be used for correction and one of these techniques is 
using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM). Baum et al. (2003) indicates that 
in determining the presence of heteroscedasticity, the GMM estimator is more 
effective than the Instrumental Variable (IV).  
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- The third assumption is that cov(ui, uj) = i ≠ j, which assumes that there is no 
correlation between the errors (uncorrelated) and the covariance between them 
is 0. If there is a correlation between the errors, this indicates the presence of 
autocorrelation or serial correlation. Even though OLS with availability of 
autocorrelation offers unbiased coefficient estimations, these coefficient 
estimations are not efficient. Thus, the estimated standard error may be not be 
correct, which may lead to biased inferences about the determinant of variables. 
For the positive serial correlation of the residuals, the estimation of the standard 
errors would be biased compared to the original standard errors, which may 
cause increased possibility of a type one error that leads to over-rejection of the 
null hypotheses even though they are correct. In addition, it may lead to an 
increase in the value of R2 compared to its corrected value. Therefore, the 
research needs to identify the presence of serial correlation in the model. There 
are different statistical tests which can detect serial correlation in the model, such 
as the Durbin and Watson (1951) test and the Breush-Godfrey test. There is also 
a Wooldridge (2002) test which is used in this research to reveal serial correlation 
in the research models. Drukker (2003) states that the Wooldridge test is to detect 
serial correlation in the panel model and it is the desired test because it is simple 
to apply, requires few assumptions, and can be implemented with the general 
conditions. However, it is argued that serial correlation in the model is the result 
of non-specified dynamics which come from dynamic structures that are not 
included in the model and not identified in the studied value. It shows that the 
dependent variable has more information and richer structure which are not 
captured by the models. Therefore, this dynamic structure and relationship needs 
to be investigated by a dynamic model such as Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) which can allocate the extra structure for the dependent variable.  
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- The fourth assumption is that the distribution should be normal (ut~ N(0, σ
2)). For 
data with a sufficiently large sample, the presence of non-normality is practically 
inconsequential. Regarding the central limit theorem, the statistical test will be 
closely in line with the suitable distribution in spite of the presence of the non-
normality error. 
- Finally, OLS estimation assumes that the independent variables are not 
correlated with each other, so deleting or inserting independent variables in the 
regression model will not modify the coefficient values of the other independent 
variables. In statistical analysis, often the correlation degree between the 
independent variables will not be equal to 0 and if the degree of correlation is 
small, it will not cause the model to violate the accuracy. If the correlation degree 
between the independents is very high, this issue will affect the accuracy of the 
model and this issue is called multicollinearity. There are two types of 
multicollinearity: perfect and near multicollinearity. The presence of a high degree 
of multicollinearity between independent variables in the model causes different 
issues such as causing the R2 to have a higher value and the coefficients to have 
higher standard errors. Also, inserting or deleting any independent variable from 
the model will cause many modifications in the significances and the value of the 
coefficient of the other independent variables. In addition, multicollinearity will 
lead to wide confidence intervals which may cause unsuitable outcomes from the 
significance tests and inaccurate conclusions. There are a few statistical tests 
which can detect the issue of multicollinearity among the independent variables, 
such as Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation test. In addition to these test, there is the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
and its inverse tolerance (TOL) which report how the variance of the a model is 
raised by the availability of the multicollinearity (Gujarati 2004).  
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5.2.1.2 Endogeneity 
The issue of endogeneity is one of the main elements in the analysis that the 
investigators should focus on. Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) indicate that corporate 
governance researchers are most likely to experience the problem of endogeneity. 
If any regressor in the model is endogenous, the OLS estimation of all model 
parameters will be inaccurate and inconsistent which causes biased results 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Endogeneity is defined as being the case when there 
is a correlation between the regressor and the error term u, and if there is no 
correlation with u, it is said to be exogenous (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). In addition, 
endogeneity occurs when there is an adverse causality between the independent 
variable and dependent variable (Wooldridge 2001). For example, the relationship 
between the corporate governance components and performance of the firm, so 
good corporate governance can improve the performance of the firm but it is also 
possible that high performance of the firm may lead to good quality corporate 
governance such as assigning more directors to the board or increasing the number 
of board subcommittees. Endogeneity may emerge as the result of different sources 
such as omitted variables, measurement error, and simultaneity. The omitted 
variables bias can occur when the researcher intends to add control variables in 
the regression model but because the variables are hard to measure or because the 
data of these variables are not available, the researcher cannot contain these 
control variables in the regression model (Wooldridge 2002). Thus, endogeneity can 
occur when there is a relationship between the omitted variable and the dependent 
variable and also at the same time there is a correlation between the omitted 
variable and the independent variables in the regression model. Therefore, the 
influence of the omitted variables in the regression model which is not included and 
detected will create biased estimations and results.  
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In addition, the endogenous issue can be increased in the independent 
variables when the independent variable in the regression model has a 
measurement error. The measurement error occurs when the variable has a clear 
definition and quantitative concept such as the annual income but the measure for 
this variable used in the research and regression model may include error 
(Wooldridge 2002). The measurement error in the dependent variable can lead to 
OLS estimation bias if there is a systematic relation between the measurement error 
and one or more of the independent variables. If there is no systematic relation 
between the measurement error and the independent variables, the OLS estimation 
is suitable (Wooldridge 2002). Traditionally, the issue of measurement error in the 
independent variable is more significant than measurement error in the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge 2002).  
The third source of endogeneity is simultaneity, which can arise when there 
is one or more independent variables in the regression model which can be 
determined by the dependent variable while these independent variables may have 
an effect on the dependent variable. For example, simultaneity can appear in 
corporate governance studies in relationships between the board composition and 
performance of the firm as the theory indicates that the structure of the board may 
have an influence on the performance of the firm, while it is also possible that the 
performance of the firm has an effect on the board structure, therefore the board 
composition and performance have reverse influence which will cause the OLS and 
fixed effects estimations to be biased (Wintoki et al. 2012). The differences between 
the three sources of endogeneity are not always accurate and in practice the 
regression equation may include more than one source of endogeneity (Wooldridge 
2002). There are several statistical tests to detect endogeneity in the regression 
model. The Durbin (1954), Wu (1973), and Hausman (1978) (DWH) test is one of 
these tests, which is used in this research to reveal the problem of endogeneity. The 
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DWH test has been widely applied to detect endogeneity that relies on the distinction 
between two estimators as one of these estimators is more effective under the null 
(Lee 2013). However, the researcher can use a dynamic method such as the 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) to control for potential endogeneity in the 
regression model (Akbar et al. 2016).  
 
5.2.1.3 Unobservable Heterogeneity 
Unobservable heterogeneity bias is a case when there are some elements which 
are unobservable to the investigator and not contained in the regression model that 
influence the dependent variable and independent variables (Wintoki et al. 2012). 
For example, when considering the influence of the board on the performance of the 
firm, the bias comes from neglecting unobserved heterogeneity as Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) argued that executives with a high standard of ability are observed 
less carefully by stockholders and therefore they have less independent directors 
on the board while they lead their companies to gain high achievement and good 
performance. Thus, as these executives will lead their companies to high financial 
performance, researchers may conclude with biased results that the number of 
independent directors on the board has a negative influence on the performance of 
companies, which comes from unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, as a result of 
the weak monitoring mechanism by shareholders of activities by executives, those 
executives with a high standard of ability may gain power on the board by taking the 
two top positions in the company to represent the CEO duality position and lead 
their companies to high financial performance. This indicates that in the OLS 
estimation model that neglects the unobserved heterogeneity of the executives with 
a high standard of ability may conclude based on biased outcomes that the CEO 
duality position has a positive influence on the performance of companies. 
Therefore, the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the regression 
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model will cause the OLS model to be unsuitable because of the bias and errors in 
the results and outcomes caused by unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
5.2.2 Panel Data Models 
As mentioned previously, the panel data model has been used in this research 
because it includes several advantages which exceed the implementation of the 
OLS estimation. The panel data can recognise the dynamic behaviour, limit the bias 
caused by individual heterogeneity as the individuals are assumed to be 
heterogeneous, and lead to less collinearity because the investigation is conducted 
through individuals and time. Greene (2012: p345) states that panel data models 
can be categorised into three broad models: OLS pooled regression, fixed effects 
model, and random effects model. The general model for the data is: 
yit = α +  xitβ + uit 
Where u is the heterogeneity or individual effect and it comprises a “constant term 
and a set of individual or group-specific variables, which may be observed, such as 
race, sex, location, and so on, or unobserved, such as family specific characteristics, 
individual heterogeneity in skill or preferences, and so on, all of which are taken to 
be constant over time t” (Greene 2012: p345). The panel model can be analysed as 
an OLS model with least squares, if u is recognised for all individuals, but in most 
analyses the complexity is increased because u is unobserved (Greene 2012). The 
pooled regression model offers efficient OLS estimation for the common αi and β, 
if u includes constant terms and the individuals are observed all the time. The 
simplest method to analyse the data is to make the estimation of the pooled 
regression by including the estimation of a single equation for all the data, so the 
data for y is collected together in a single column including all the observations from 
the time series and cross section, and also the observations of the independent 
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variables are collected together in a single column in the matrix of x which can be 
modelled with OLS estimation (Brooks 2008). Greene (2012) stated that the 
assumption of the pooled OLS regression model under the basis of the panel data 
analysis is unlikely to be available. Brooks (2008) indicated that even though pooled 
regression is a simple method, it has a serious limitation which is that it assumes 
the average value of variables and the relationships between variables are constant 
in the time series and cross section over all the data.  
 
5.2.2.1 Fixed Effects Model 
The fixed effects model is applied to investigate the influence of variables that 
change during the time. In the fixed effects model, the disturbance term uit is 
modified to the individual effects μi and disturbance vit which are different during 
the entities and time, so the model becomes (Brooks 2008): 
yit = α + xitβ +  uit + vit 
Where μ is the unobserved effect or heterogeneity and it is assumed that there is a 
correlation between the unobserved effect and the independent variable x. The fixed 
effects approach offers a special intercept term for each entity which is constant 
during the time with the assumption that the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables is the same over the cross-section and time (Brooks 2008). 
Wintoki et al. (2012) indicated that corporate governance studies mostly depend on 
panel data and the fixed effects model for analysis, as the traditional fixed effects 
model can possibly improve the bias caused by the unobserved heterogeneity, but, 
on the other hand, this process occurs at the expense of the strong exogeneity 
assumption which is not clearly known by investigators. The assumption is that, the 
current examination of the independent variables, such as board composition, is 
independent from the past data of the dependent variable such as the performance 
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of the firm, which is not realistic as the financial performance may lead to 
improvement in the board (Wintoki et al. 2012). Furthermore, the fixed effects model 
is not valid when some independent variables are fixed over years as the variable 
would be dropped from the model.   
 
5.2.2.2 Random Effects Model 
The random effects model is (Brooks 2008): 
yit = α +  xitβ + εi +  vit 
It is the same as the fixed effects model with the unobserved effect or heterogeneity 
but it is assumed that there is no correlation between the unobserved effect and the 
independent variable x. Thus, the clear difference between the random and fixed 
effects model is whether the unobserved individual effect or heterogeneity has a 
correlation or not with the regressors in the model (Greene 2012). In the fixed effects 
approach, the random effects offers a special intercept term for each entity that is 
constant over the time but it is with the assumption that the intercept for each unit 
of the cross section would arise from a common intercept α that is the same across 
entities and over time (Brooks 2008). In addition, the random variable εi which is 
different in the cross section but constant during the time scales the random 
variation of each intercept term entity from the intercept term α (Brooks 2008).  
To select the appropriate models for this research, the assumptions of the 
selected models have to be considered and valid to generalise the generated 
outcomes from the models because the violation of the assumptions causes the 
chosen models to be biased which leads to results which are inaccurate and invalid. 
The aims of this research are to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
components on the performance of firms and also to investigate the influence of 
corporate governance components on information leakage. Wintoki et al. (2012) 
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indicates that corporate governance studies usually have serious problems with 
endogeneity because it is hard to find the exogenous elements to recognise the 
investigated relationship. For example, several empirical studies have suggested 
that specific corporate governance mechanisms have a positive influence on  
financial performance but these studies suffered from endogeneity problems and 
therefore, it is not certain if governance and performance have a reverse effect or 
there is an unobserved factor that positively affects governance and performance at 
the same time (Akbar et al. 2016; Wintoki et al. 2012). In addition, the study of Morck 
et al. (1989) argued that the relation between the ownership structure and financial 
performance is possibly endogenous (Reyna et al. 2012).  
Most empirical studies of corporate governance and finance experience two 
sources of endogeneity: unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity (Wintoki et al. 
2012). The source of endogeneity comes from neglecting the potential relation that 
the current quality of governance is the result of the positive effect of past 
performance of firms; therefore, ignoring this potential endogeneity can cause 
biases and issues in terms of the research inferences and outcomes (Wintoki et al. 
2012). Therefore, this research conducts statistical tests to detect the issue of serial 
correlation using the Wooldridge (2002) test, the issue of heteroscedasticity using 
Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Cook and Weisberg (1983) tests, and the issue of 
endogeneity using the two step Durbin (1954), Wu (1973), and Hausman 
(1978)(DWH) test. The results of these tests confirm that the data and models of 
this research face serious potential heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and 
endogeneity. However, with the conclusion that the assumptions of the random 
effects model and fixed effects model which rely on the simple OLS are not valid 
and appropriate, using these models for this research with possible dynamic 
relationships could lead to biased estimation and outcomes. Thus, it is important to 
implement methods that can tackle the issues and offer greater robustness to the 
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estimation. Therefore, this research contributes to the current literature, which often 
applies static models, by using a dynamic method which is the Generalized Methods 
of Moments (GMM) as GMM can offer strong and robust outcomes even with the 
presence of potential endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, simultaneity, autocorrelation 
and unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
5.2.3 Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
A large percentage of recent empirical research in econometrics has implemented 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators, especially in the field of 
finance and macroeconomics (Greene 2012). That is because the researchers 
needed to apply a statistical method that was suitable for their data and GMM is a 
flexible statistical method that can deal with the dynamic nature of the data and 
controls for the statistical issues that may occur with fixed effects and random 
models depending on simple OLS. The GMM approach was presented by Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and was further developed in later 
studies including the study of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). Wintoki et al. (2012) stated that the GMM method has been applied in the 
subjects of economics and finance when the issue of research is related to the 
problem of endogeneity and the potential dynamic relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables.  
The GMM estimator is a statistical approach that integrates investigated 
economic and financial data with the information in the population moment 
conditions to make estimations for the unknown parameters of this economic or 
financial model (Zsohar 2012). Plasmans (2006: p19) indicates that there are two 
main reasons which make the GMM approach a popular method among 
researchers; firstly, because it has the ability to “nest most of the commonly known 
estimators” such as OLS, instrumental variable, or maximum likelihood estimation 
155 
 
and offers a “useful framework for their comparison and evaluation.” The second 
reason is that GMM offers a simple alternative to other estimators and models when 
compared in practical terms with other estimators such as the maximum likelihood 
estimation (Plasmans 2006). Roodman (2006) reports that the GMM estimator is 
designed for cases when there are variables which are dynamic, the independent 
variable is not strictly exogenous so it may correlate with the past or current error, 
there is unobserved heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within 
individuals, and data with short length of period and many individuals. Nickell (1981) 
stated that the fixed and random effects models cause seriously biased coefficients 
in the dynamic model where the period of time is short. The panel data usually has 
a small number of times and large number of individuals and the length of period is 
deemed short if it is below 20 (Nickell 1981).  
This research uses a time period below 20; which is 9 years, so it is considered 
a short period. Akbar et al. (2016) indicates that the GMM method can control for 
endogeneity that may arise from the unobserved heterogeneity and fixed effects, 
simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity. Therefore, the GMM estimator is 
appropriate for this research as the data has a short time period (9 years) and many 
individuals and also the research shows the potential dynamic nature of the data 
and endogeneity and also reports either the pattern of serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity. To apply GMM, there are appropriate estimators which should 
be chosen. These estimators are the Difference GMM estimator introduced by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and also the System 
GMM estimator introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998) which is considered to be 
the most sophisticated estimator of the GMM method, and is used for this research. 
Roodman (2006: p13) stated that the Difference and System GMM estimators are 
structured for panel analysis and include the following assumptions:  
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- There is a possibility that some regressors are endogenous and the fixed 
individual effects are arbitrarily distributed.  
- The relationship and process may be dynamic, so the past value may influence 
the current one.  
- The idiosyncratic disturbances may contain individual-certain models of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation but are uncorrelated across 
individuals.  
- “Some regressors may be predetermined but not strictly exogenous.” 
- The period of time of the research data may be short with a large number of 
individuals. 
- Depending on the lags of the instrumental variables, the only available 
instruments are internal and there is no assumption that the “the good 
instruments are available outside the immediate data set.” “However, the 
estimators do allow inclusion of external instruments.” 
 
5.2.3.1 First Difference GMM Estimator 
The dynamic model of the panel data is recognised by the lagged dependent 
variable in the regressors  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  is (K-1)×1 vector of exogenous regressors, 𝑢𝑖 is the fixed effect, 𝛾 is a 
scalar, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random disturbance (Judson and Owen 1997). Inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable shows the main problems and produces biased 
estimation of the coefficient, especially when T is small. Nickell (1981) provided an 
explanation for the bias of 𝛾 when there are no exogenous regressors, indicating 
that the bias is close to zero as (T) is close to ∞, so the least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) model works well only when the period of time of the panel data is 
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long. Different estimators have been suggested to produce estimation for equation 
(1) when the period of time (T) is small. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest a two 
instrumental variable process so as to eliminate the fixed effect; they take the first 
difference of the lagged variable in previous equation to be  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 −  Yi,t−1 =  γ (Yi,t−1 −  Yi,t−1) + (Xit − Xi,t−2)
′ β +  εit − εi,t−1     
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest another technique which is more efficient than 
the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator. They propose that additional instruments 
can be gained in the GMM panel model if it uses the orthogonality condition that 
occurs between the disturbances εitand the lagged values of the dependent variable 
Yit (Arellano & Bond 1991). However, the First Difference GMM estimator of Arellano 
and Bond (1991) received criticism from Blundell and Bond (1998). They argue that 
the First Difference GMM estimator produces less informative instruments in two 
conditions; first, when the α value rises toward unity, and second, “as the relative 
variance of the fixed effects increases” (Blundell & Bond 1998: p120). As a result, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed development of the First Difference GMM 
estimator by suggesting that efficiency could be obtained by applying a larger set of 
moment conditions.  
 
5.2.3.2 System GMM Estimator 
The System GMM estimator is the most sophisticated estimator, with lower level of 
bias, among the suggested GMM estimators. Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the 
System GMM estimator by developing and extending the estimator of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) by estimating the model both in levels and first differences to increase 
the efficiency, especially in cases where the First Difference estimator is inefficient 
such as when the data has a short period of time. The System GMM estimator 
combines the regression in differences with regression in levels, so “the instruments 
158 
 
for the regression in differences are the lagged levels of the corresponding 
variables” and “the instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged 
differences of the corresponding variables” (Belkhir et al. 2016: p109). The Blundell 
and Bond (1998) System GMM estimator makes a stacked data group with the 
observations, so the observations which are not transformed follow the observations 
which are transformed. They state that all (T-2) models in first differences and (T-2) 
models in levels coincide to time 3,…, and T, for the instruments that are observed 
and the matrix of instruments for this process can be formed as follows (Blundell & 
Bond 1998): 
 
 
 
 
Thus, this produces the equation of the System GMM estimator that contains 
estimating, based on the following system (Wintoki et al. 2012): 
[
Yit
∆Yit
] =  αi + k [
Yit−p
∆Yit−p
] +  β [
Xit
∆Xit
] + [
Zit
ZXit
]  +  εit          (as p = 1,2 … . p)         
This system still contains unobservable heterogeneity and to handle this it can be 
assumed that, while the independent and control variables may have a correlation 
with the unobservable effects, the correlation is still constant over the period of the 
data which is deemed to be small (Wintoki et al. 2012). This assumes further sets 
of orthogonality conditions: 
 
E[∆Xit−s(ηi + εit)] = E[∆Zit−s(ηi + εit)] = E[∆yit−s(ηi + εit)] = 0,    ∀s > p    
 
From this, the System GMM estimator gains efficient estimation and controls for 
simultaneity, time invariant unobservable heterogeneity, and the dynamic relation 
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between the existing value of the independent variable and the past values of the 
dependent variable (Wintoki et al. 2012). Furthermore, Belkhir et al. (2016) indicates 
that the System GMM model leads to consistent estimators because it controls for 
individual heterogeneity such as that which may arise from individual certain effects, 
and controls for endogeneity issues such as those which may arise from the 
correlation between the independent variables and the regression errors because 
of the presence of the lagged dependent variables.  
Therefore, because of the superiority of the System GMM estimator among 
other regression models, especially for dealing with dynamic data and the presence 
of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, this research uses the two-
step System GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995) with one and two lags to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
components on information leakage and also to investigate the effect of corporate 
governance components on the performance of firms. To process this estimator, the 
research uses the Stata 13 program with command xtdpdsys. In addition, there are 
two tests which can be conducted to detect the consistency and validity of the 
System GMM models. The first is the second order serial correlation (Arellano-Bond 
AR (2)) test because the GMM estimator offers consistent estimation if there is no 
second order serial correlation in the error terms (Matemilola et al. 2015). The 
second is the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions to identify the validity of 
the instruments because the consistency of the GMM model assumes that the 
lagged values of the corresponding variables are valid instruments (Belke and Vogel 
2014). Therefore, after conducting the System GMM models, the research performs 
these two tests to reveal the consistency and validity of the System GMM 
estimators, which will confirm and ensure the robustness and validity of the research 
results regarding the effects of corporate governance components on the 
information leakage and performance of firms.         
160 
 
5.3 Research Data and Sample 
The research aims to investigate the effect of corporate governance components on 
information leakage and also the effect of corporate governance components on the 
financial performance of firms. The research focuses on Saudi listed firms, and in 
the 2014 financial year there were 163 Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Exchange 
Market (Tadawul). To increase the robustness and validity of the research results 
and inferences, the research uses two different types of firms and two periods of 
times to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and information 
leakage and performance.  
There is an argument in existing literatures regarding the use of data related to 
financial firms, as the majority of studies that examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance exclude financial firms from the 
sample data, such as the study of Jackling and Johl (2009); Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006); Kyereboah-Coleman (2007); Al-Matari et al. (2012); Mashayekhi and Bazaz 
(2008); Christensen et al. (2015); Dharmadasa et al. (2015); and Zhang (2012). In 
addition, there are several studies that investigate the effect of corporate 
governance on information asymmetries, information leakage, and disclosure 
quality and exclude financial companies from the sample, such as the study of 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007); Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Elbadry et al. (2015); Cai et 
al. (2006); Lakhal (2005); Forker (1992); and (Zhang 2012). These research studies 
exclude financial firms from the data because there are differences between 
financial and non-financial firms in terms of regulatory requirements, disclosure 
requirements, and capital structure (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Elbadry et al. 2015; 
Zhang 2012; and Lakhal 2005).  
However, in Saudi Arabia all listed firms are liable to the same government 
regulations; the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR), Listing Rules, Capital 
Market Law, and the disclosure requirements as set by the Capital Market Authority 
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(CMA 2009; CMA 2004; CMA 2010). However, there are a number of corporate 
governance studies which use data that includes both financial and non-financial 
companies in their analysis, such as the studies of Betzer and Theissen (2009); 
Forker (1992); Beasley et al. (2000); Ammann et al. (2013); and Lin and Chang 
(2011). This research aims to increase the robustness, reliability, and validity of the 
study outcomes and its results; therefore, the research uses two groups of data: the 
first one includes all the Saudi listed financial and non-financial firms, and the 
second data set contains only the Saudi listed non-financial firms by excluding 
banks and insurance companies. Using these two groups of data allows the 
research to reveal the comparison and differences between the data for all firms 
and the data for non-financial firms in relation to investigating the effect of corporate 
governance components on information leakage and performance, which will help 
the research conclude with robust and accurate results and inferences compared 
with other studies that use only one type of data, either for all firms or only non-
financial firms.  
In addition, the research uses two different periods of time: the first period 
covers 2006 to 2014 (9 years), and the second period covers 2009 to 2014 (6 years). 
The research period starts from the year 2006 because in this year the Saudi Capital 
Market Authority released the Corporate Governance Regulations (CGR) as guiding 
principles for all Saudi listed firms. From 2006, all Saudi listed firms have been 
required by the CGR to disclose the provisions that have been applied and the 
provisions that have not been applied, so from 2006 the only requirement was 
disclosing the corporate governance status of each firm. From the year 2009, the 
authority began to demand that Saudi firms implement some important corporate 
governance codes such as setting down rules for the internal control system, making 
independent directors the majority of the board, and forming audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees (CMA 2010). Thus, the period from 2006 until 2014 covers 
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the data of Saudi firms before and after the imposition of some important corporate 
governance codes; therefore, the research will be able to investigate the effect of 
setting the corporate governance codes and, especially, the influence of imposing 
these codes on Saudi firms. The period ends in 2014 because it is the last period 
that the research can cover due to the fact that all the annual financial and board 
reports for 2014 were issued in the first quarter of 2015. Therefore, for these reasons 
the first period is from 2006 until 2014.  
In addition, the research uses another period of time, from 2009 until 2014 
because during this period several new firms were listed in the market, which offers 
more observations than the period between 2006 and 2014, as the observations 
between 2006 and 2014 are 558 and between 2009 and 2014 there are 690. 
Moreover, the new listed firms after 2009 were from different sectors, a factor which 
adds rich information to the investigation regarding the effect of corporate 
governance and allows the research to offer a comparison between the results of 
these two periods which will confirm and ensure the robustness of the research 
outcomes and inferences. The research period ends in 2014 because it is the most 
recent year for which data is available. Because there are two groups of data with 
two different time periods, the research investigates four different groups of data, 
which are: 
- Data (A) All Saudi firms from all sectors listed in the period from 2006 to 2014. 
- Data (B) Non-financial Saudi firms listed in the period from 2006 to 2014.   
- Data (C) All Saudi firms from all sectors listed in the period from 2009 to 2014. 
- Data (D) Non-financial Saudi firms listed in the period from 2009 to 2014.   
By the financial year 2014, there were 163 Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Exchange 
Market (Tadawul) from all sectors and also 117 non-financial firms (excluding all 
banks and insurance firms) listed in the Saudi Exchange Market (Tadawul). Table 
5-1 gives a summary of the selected sample for the four groups of data and its 
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representation of the market. Table 1-1 shows that the sample of firms in all sectors 
between 2009 and 2014 is 115, which accounts for 70.55% of the market; the 
highest representation of the market for firms in all sectors. The sample of the non-
financial firms between 2009 and 2014 is 85 firms accounting for 72.64% of the 
market, which is the highest representation for non-financial firms. Even though the 
samples for the period from 2006 until 2014 have less representation compared with 
the samples for the period between 2009 and 2014, they contain the important 
period that covers the time before and after the enforcement of some of the 
important CGRs on Saudi firms, which allows the research to investigate the effect 
of these reforms on the performance and information leakage of firms.     
 
Table 5-1: Summary of the selected samples for the four groups of data  
Firm type 
firms 
in 
2014 
Period 
No. of 
excluded 
firms 
No. of 
selected 
firms 
% of the 
selected firms 
No. of annual 
observations 
All sectors 163 2006-14 (9 y) 101 62 38.04 558 
Non-finance 117 2006-14 (9 y) 66 51 43.58 459 
All sectors 163 2009-14 (6 y) 48 115 70.55 690 
Non-finance 117 2009-14 (6 y) 32 85 72.64 510 
 
In addition, the research uses three different types of data to generate the variables 
to investigate the effect of corporate governance components on information 
leakage and performance of firms. The three different data types are; first, the date 
related to the corporate governance components; second, the data related to the 
information leakage variables; and third, the data related to the financial and market 
performance variables and control variables. The variables of the corporate 
governance components were collected from the annual reports submitted by the 
board of directors of each firm, which are required by the Capital Market Authority. 
Article 1(c) of the Saudi CGRs states that each firm must disclose annually the 
corporate governance status (CMA 2010). The sources for the reports by the board 
of directors are the official website of the Saudi Exchange Market (Tadawul), the 
official website of each firm, and information agencies that are certified by the 
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Capital Market Authority. The board reports are presented in pdf format, therefore 
the researcher needs to read all the content to find the required information related 
to the variables.  
The second type of data is related to the information leakage variables. The 
information leakage variable is the cumulative abnormal returns of each firm during 
the 25 days before the official earnings announcement date in the window (-25, 0) 
which are already examined in the event study chapter. The source data of the 
information leakage is presented in detail in the event study chapter. The third type 
of data is related to financial performance and control variables. These variables 
were collected from the audited annual financial statements of each firm and this 
kind of statement has to be reviewed by auditing companies. All Saudi listed firms 
are required by Article 43 of the Listing Rules of the stock market to publish their 
audited annual financial statements within 40 days for the annual earnings 
announcement starting from the end of each financial period (CMA 2004). The 
sources for the annual financial statements are the official website (Tadawul) 
(www.tadawul.com.sa), the official website of each company, and certified 
information companies. The financial statements are presented in pdf format; 
therefore the required numbers and variables were collected and calculated 
manually.  
The selected sample for this research is based on all variables of each firm 
being available during the entirety of the covered period; therefore, if there is any 
missing variable or the firm was only listed recently, the firm will be excluded from 
the sample. Table 5-1 shows the number of firms that were excluded because a firm 
had missing data or was listed or delisted recently, and therefore was not included 
for all the covered years. A total of 48 firms were removed from the data for the 
period 2009 to 2014 (all sectors); 32 firms for the non-financial firms between 2009 
and 2014, 101 firms for the period between 2006 and 2014 (all sectors), and 66 
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firms for the non-financial firms in the period 2006 to 2014. Thus, the sample of this 
research is strongly balanced, which brings several advantages to the regression 
analysis and these advantages are presented in detail in the methodology chapter. 
Table 5-1 shows the final sample of the research for the four groups of data with the 
number of annual observations, with the firms of all sectors between 2009 and 2014 
having the largest number of annual observations.  
In addition, table 5-2 presents the selected sample based on sectors for the 
four groups of data. The table shows that most firms in the market are concentrated 
in the financial services, petrochemicals, cement, agriculture and food industries, 
and industrial investment, and building and construction sectors. During the period 
between 2009 and 2014, the market experienced a significant increase in the 
number of listed firms in the sectors of retail, insurance, multi-investment real estate 
development, and transport.  
 
Table 5-2: The final samples for the four groups of data within each sector 
                             The data 
    Sectors 
All sectors 
2006-2014 
Non-financial 
2006-2014 
All sectors 
2009-2014 
Non-
financial 
2009-2014 
Banks & Financial Services 10 0 11 0 
Petrochemical 9 9 14 14 
Cement 7 7 7 7 
Retail 3 3 8 8 
Energy & Utilities 2 2 2 2 
Agriculture & Food  11 11 12 12 
Telecom & Technology 1 1 2 2 
Insurance 1 0 19 0 
Multi-Investment 2 2 6 6 
Industrial Investment 7 7 10 10 
Building & Construction 6 6 10 10 
Real Estate Development 0 0 7 7 
Transport 1 1 4 4 
Media & Publishing 2 2 2 2 
Hotel & Tourism 0 0 1 1 
Total  62 51 115 85 
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Table 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5 show the notations and measurements of the variables that 
are used in this research to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
components on information leakage and financial performance of firms. The 
discussion about these variables and relationships between the dependent 
variables and independent and control variables is presented in detail in the 
research hypotheses section. The sample used in this research is deemed a large 
sample, with panel date for 115 firms and 690 annual observations, compared with 
existing Saudi studies regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
components and performance. Importantly, this research uses a longer time period, 
with 9 years of observations, than other existing Saudi studies. In addition, this 
research is the only Saudi study that covers the period before and after the 
enforcement of several corporate governance codes on listed firms, and the only 
Saudi study that applies two groups of data (all firms and non-financial firms) in the 
same research. For example, the study of Ghabayen (2012) covered 102 non-
financial firms in just one year of observation, 2011. The research of Al-Matari et al. 
(2012) used one year of observation (2010) with 135 non-financial firms. Ezzine 
(2011) in his study examined 96 industrial firms from 2006 to 2008. Furthermore, 
this current research is the first study that examines the relationship between 
corporate governance and information leakage in the Saudi market.    
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 Table 5-3: Notations and measurements of the independent variables  
Independent Variables Notation Measurement 
Board Size BOSI The number of directors on the board  
Board Independence BOIN The percentage of independent directors on the 
board 
Board Meetings BOME The number of board meetings in each year 
CEO Duality CEDU If the CEO and chairman is not the same person 
= 1, 0 otherwise 
Board Subcommittees BOCO If the firm has the three suggested committees 
(audit, nomination, and remuneration) =1, 0 
otherwise 
Audit Committee Size AUSI The number of members in the audit committee 
Audit Committee Meetings AUME The number of audit committee meetings in 
each year 
Ownership Concentration  BLOK The percentage of stock owned by large 
shareholders (own ≥ 5% of issued shares) 
Government Ownership GOV The percentage of stock owned by government 
(own ≥ 5% of issued shares) 
Institutional Ownership INS The percentage of stock owned by institutions 
(owned ≥ 5% of issued shares) 
Directors Ownership DIRE The percentage of stock owned by directors  
Managerial Ownership MANG The percentage of stock owned by managerial 
shareholders  
Market Reform MARE Year dummies so if the year is from 2009 to 
2014 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Table 5-4: Notations and measurements of dependent variables 
Dependent Variables Notation Measurement 
Performance of firm 
Return on Equity ROE The percentage of net profits to equity of 
owners  
Return on Asset ROA The percentage of net profits to the total assets  
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q ((Total assets – book value of equity) + market 
value of equity) / total assets 
Information Leakage 
CAR - Constant Mean 
Model 
CMRM Cumulative abnormal returns (Constant mean 
model) at window (-25,0) 
CAR - Market Adjusted 
Model 
MARM Cumulative abnormal returns (market adjusted 
model) at window (-25,0) 
CAR - Market Model MRM Cumulative abnormal returns (market model) at 
window (-25,0) 
 
Table 5-5: Notations and measurements of control variables 
Control Variables Notation Measurement 
Size of firm SIZE The natural log of assets of the firm 
Firm Growth SAGR ((sales for year – sales for previous year)/sales for 
previous year) *100 
Leverage  LVRG The percentage of total debt to total assets  
Year Dummy Year Each year = 1, 0 otherwise 
Industry Dummy Industry Each industry (primary, manufacturing, and services 
=1, 0 otherwise 
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5.4 Descriptive Statistics  
This section reports the descriptive statistics of the models related to the effect of 
corporate governance components on firm performance and information leakage. 
The descriptive statistics contains the mean, median, standard deviation, the 
maximum and minimum value, and the count number of the years’ observation. 
Besides, it presents the descriptive outlines of the independent variables and control 
variables for the four groups of data that include different types of firms and covers 
different times of periods. Therefore, for each type of variables there are four groups 
of data, which are: 
- Data (A) All Saudi firms from all sectors listed in the period from 2006 to 2014. 
- Data (B) Non-financial Saudi firms listed in the period from 2006 to 2014.   
- Data (C) All Saudi firms from all sectors listed in the period from 2009 to 2014. 
- Data (D) Non-financial Saudi firms listed in the period from 2009 to 2014.   
Section 5.4.1 presents the independent variables that comprise the corporate 
governance mechanisms related to the ownership structure and boards’ aspects. 
Ownership structure components include the ownership concentration or the block-
holders (BLOK), government ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), 
directors’ ownership (DIRE), and managerial ownership (MANAG). The board’s 
aspects contains the board size (BOSI), board independence (BOIN), board 
meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size (AUSI), audit meetings (AUME), 
and board subcommittees (BOCO). In addition, the market reform (MARE) variable 
is to examine the level of firm performance and information leakage before and after 
enforcing the Saudi CGRs to reveal the effect of the market reform. Section 5.4.2 
presents the control variables which comprise the firm growth (SAGR), the leverage 
(LVRG), and firms’ size (SIZE).            
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5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables  
Tables, 5-6 and Appendices 2, 3, 4, and 5 contain the descriptive summaries of the 
independent variables that are applied in relationship between the corporate 
governance and firm performance and information leakage. Each table presents one 
of the four group of data. Table 5-6 (data C) and Appendix (2) show the variables of 
all firms from 2009 to 2014. The first set of the variables is related to the ownership 
structure. The first variable is the ownership concentration or block-holders (BLOK) 
and is identified by the percentage of shares owned by large shareholders who own 
5% or more of the shares that are issued by the firm. The percentage is limited to 
5% or more because based on the Saudi Listing Rules, the shareholder has to 
disclose his stock ownership if he owns 5% or more of the issued shares (CMA 
2004). In the Appendix (2), the BLOK variable shows that the average mean is 
36.8% and there is a downward trend from 2009 with value 38.3% till the year 2014 
with value 34.3%. The maximum percentage of the ownership concentration is 95% 
and that is because some Saudi listed firms are dominated by family, institutions, or 
government ownership.  
The government ownership (GOV) also is measured by the percentage of 
shares that owned by the government which is 5% or more of the issued shares. 
The maximum percentage of the government ownership is 74.3% and the higher 
ownership is available in the energy, petrochemical, mines, and telecom companies. 
Besides, the maximum percentage of the institutions ownership is 63.5% and it 
represents their ownership that equal or above the 5% of the issued shares of the 
firms. The average mean of the board directors ownership (DIRE) is 14.5% and it is 
measured by the percentage of stocks owned by directors. The ownership mean in 
year 2009 is 15.2% while in 2014 is 12.6% as there is a decreasing trend of the 
ownership during years 2012, 2013, 2014. The maximum percentage of director 
ownership 95.8% because I the Saudi market the majority of stocks of several 
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companies owned by families and these directors is the representative of these 
families. Furthermore, some of the family members take managerial and executive 
position in these firms, therefore, the table 5-6 (data C) and Appendix (2) show that 
the maximum percentage of the managerial ownership (MANG) is 45.5% and it is 
identified as the percentage of stocks owned by managerial shareholders.  
The second set of the variables in table 5-6 (data C) and Appendix (2) is 
related to the board of directors and its committees. The board size (BOZI) is 
identified as the number of the directors in the board. The average mean of the 
board size is 8.5 directors which almost also is constant over the year 2009-2014. 
The maximum board size (BOZI) is 12 and the minimum is 4 which is nearly in the 
line with the size between 11 and 3 directors that is recommended by Saudi CGRs 
(CMA 2010). In addition, one third or more of the board’s directors have to be 
independent based on the Saudi CGRs and the table 5-6 (data C) and Appendix (2) 
shows that the average mean of the percentage of the board independence (BOIN) 
is 51.8% but it is notice that the board independence is decreased from 54.2% in 
2009 to 50.9% in 2014. The BOME variable is referred to the number of the board 
meetings. The average mean of the board meetings is 5.3 and the range is between 
18 and 2 meetings. The CEDU is a dummy variable and it is about the CEO duality 
which is measured by if the CEO and chairman is not the same person the variable 
equal 1, 0 otherwise. The ratio of Saudi firms who apply the separation role is high 
in 2009 with .83 and it is increased in 2012 and 2013 with ratio .93 and .91 
respectively. In addition, the mean of audit committee size (AUSI) is in increased 
trend from 2009 till 2014 to start with 3.2 members in 2009 and finished with 3.5 
members in 2014. The range of AUSI is between 5 and 2 members and based on 
the Saudi CGRs, the number of the audit committee have to include at least three 
members (CMA 2010). Besides, the range of the audit committee meetings (AUME) 
171 
 
is between 28 and 0 which shows that some firms do not activate the audit 
committee. The average mean of AUME is 5.3 meetings.    
Table 5-6 (data A) and Appendix (3) includes the independent variables of all 
firms between 2006 and 2014 which can reveal the differences in variables before 
and after 2009. In year 2009, the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia started to 
enforce several important corporate governance codes on the listed firms. During 
2006-2014, the concentration of large holders in the Saudi market is increased from 
2006 with 34.8% till year 2011 with 37 but it is decreased after that to 34.4% in 2014. 
While the government ownership (GOV) is changed gradually in downward trend 
from 7.3% to 7%, the institution ownership is increased in upward trend from 9.3% 
in 2006 to 10.4% in 2010. The directors ownership (DIRE) is increased after 2009 
while the managerial ownership (MANG) is decreased. The average mean of the 
board size (BOZI) is 8.5 members. In addition, the table shows that before 2009 the 
minimum value of the percentage of the board independence is 0% but after 2009 
the minimum value becomes 20% which indicates the positive influence of the 
obligation codes of Saudi CGRs after 2009 which enforces firms to increase the 
independent directors in the board. Besides, the CEDU mean is in upward trend 
from 2006 which indicates influence of CGRs to encourage Saudi firms to separate 
the role between the CEO and chairman. The table also shows that the mean of the 
audit committee size is increased after 2009 and minimum members of audit 
committee changed from 0 before 2009 to 3 after 2009. That is because the Saudi 
CGRs states that the audit committee have to include at least three member and 
this code becomes mandatory after 2009 (CMA 2010). The mandatory code also 
gives the audit committee efficient role and specific responsibilities so the number 
of audit committee meetings in an increasing trend from 2006 and especially after 
2009 as the minimum meetings is changed from 0 before 2009 to 1 after 2009. 
Besides, BOCO is referred to if the firm uses the three recommended committees 
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in the Saudi CGRs (audit, nomination, and remuneration), it will be equal to 1, 0 
otherwise. The table shows that all Saudi listed firms have the three committees 
after 2009 because setting these committees become mandatory after 2009.  
Table 5-6 (data D) and Appendix (4) report the descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables of the non-financial firms during the period 2009-2014. There 
is no big differences between the data of all firms and the data of non-financial firms 
during 2009-2014 except the variable related the institutional ownership. The 
average mean of the percentage of institutional ownership in the non-financial firms 
is 3.9% while the percentage ownership in all data firms is 8.1. In addition, the 
maximum institutional ownership in the non-financial firms is 25.6% while the 
maximum institutional ownership in all firms’ data is 63.5. 
Table 5-6 (data B) and Appendix (5) present the descriptive outlines of the 
independent variables for the non-financial firms from 2006 till 2014. There is no 
major differences in the values of variables of all firms and non-financial firms during 
2006-2014 expect the variable of the institutional ownership. The average mean of 
the percentage of the institutional ownership for all firms’ data during 2006-2014 is 
9.9% while the percentage of the institutional ownership for non-financial firms is 
5%. Besides, the maximum percentage of the institutional ownership in all firms is 
53.6% while the maximum ownership in non-financial firms during 2006-2014 is 
25.6%. 
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Table 5-6: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables of all data 
Variables Data A Data B Data C Data D 
BLOK     
Mean 35.767 31.582 36.820 34.520 
Median 35.400 28.100 35.430 30.735 
SD 23.322 22.900 23.262 24.138 
Maximum 83.690 83.690 95 95 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
GOV     
Mean 7.236 7.828 5.1203 6.246 
Median 0 0 0 0 
SD 17.224 18.407 14.906 16.804 
Maximum 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.3 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
INS     
Mean 9.991 5.008 8.107 3.979 
Median 2.405 0 0 0 
SD 14.799 7.082 14.306 6.419 
Maximum 53.650 25.650 63.500 25.650 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
DIRE     
Mean 13.495 14.262 14.515 16.122 
Median 4.246 5.013 5.239 6.926 
SD 16.814 17.364 19.434 20.708 
Maximum 70 70 95.868 95.868 
Minimum 0 0 0 .001 
MANG     
Mean 1.988 2.391 1.991 2.090 
Median .006 .006 .007 .010 
SD 6.960 7.614 6.116 5.977 
Maximum 67.816 67.816 45.500 35.505 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
BOSI     
Mean 8.547 8.290 8.578 8.392 
Median 9 8 9 9 
SD 1.675 1.678 1.580 1.562 
Maximum 12 12 12 12 
Minimum 4 4 4 4 
BOIN     
Mean 55.810 54.820 51.837 51.355 
Median 57.143 55.555 45.454 44.949 
SD 20.652 20.858 19.140 18.882 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
BOME     
Mean 5.480 5.503 5.328 5.443 
Median 5 5 5 5 
SD 2.276 2.349 2.078 2.232 
Maximum 18 18 18 18 
Minimum 1 1 2 2 
CEDU     
Mean .858 .839 .893 .857 
Median 1 1 1 1 
SD .349 .368 .310 .351 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
AUSI     
Mean 3.370 3.268 3.397 3.367 
Median 3 3 3 3 
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SD .790 .736 .6501 .605 
Maximum 6 6 5 5 
Minimum 0 0 2 2 
AUME     
Mean 4.987 4.815 5.332 5.269 
Median 5 4 5 5 
SD 2.470 2.504 2.504 2.321 
Maximum 20 20 28 20 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
MARE     
Mean .666 .667   
Median 1 1   
SD .479 .472   
Maximum 1 1   
Minimum 0 0   
BOCO     
Mean .733 .730   
Median 1 1   
SD .443 .445   
Maximum 1 1   
Minimum 0 0   
Count 558 459 690 510 
 
 
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics of the control Variables  
Tables 5-7 and Appendices 6, 7, 8 and 9 include the descriptive statistics of the 
control variables which are used in investigating the relationship between the 
corporate governance components and firm performance and information leakage. 
Appendices are presented in four table as each table represent different data. Table 
5-7 (data C) and Appendix (6) report the value of the control variables for all firms 
during the period from 2009 to 2014. The first variable is the sales growth (SAGR) 
and is measured by taking the percentage of dividing the difference between the 
year sales and previous year sales on the previous year sales. The average mean 
of SAGR is 12.8% and the maximum value is 180 while the minimum value is -
179.1%. Besides, the leverage (LVRG) is the percentage of total debt to total assets 
and the average mean is 13.9%. The maximum leverage value is 90.8% and most 
of the high leverage is in the petrochemical firms. The size of firms (SIZE) is 
identified by the natural log of assets of the firm. The average mean of the firms’ 
size is 14.9. 
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Table 5-7 (data A) and Appendix (7) are about the descriptive summaries of 
the control variables for all firms during the period 2006-2014. The average mean 
of the sales growth (SAGR) is 10.7%. Besides, the average mean of the leverage 
(LVRG) is 14.1% and the maximum value is 69.1 compare with the value 90.8% in 
the period 2009-2014. The average mean of the firms’ size (SIZE) is 15.2. The table 
5-7 (data D and B) and Appendix (8) and (9) contain the discriptive statistices of the 
control varaibles for the non-financial firms during the years from 2009 till 2014 and 
from 2006 till 2014. The value of these tables is mosly similar to the value of the 
same variables for the all firms types that are presented in tables 2-9 and 2-10.  
 Table 5-7: Descriptive statistics of the control variables of all data 
Variables Data A Data B Data C Data D 
SAGR     
Mean 10.745 11.009 12.803 10.635 
Median 7.483 7.515 6.742 6.850 
SD 26.690 27.263 38.496 36.544 
Maximum 150 150 180 180 
Minimum -85.705 -85.705 -179.186 -179.186 
LVRG     
Mean 14.112 17.047 13.958 18.824 
Median 5.735 10.134 4.968 12.646 
SD 17.190 17.620 17.909 18.521 
Maximum 69.170 69.170 90.827 90.827 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
SIZE     
Mean 15.238 14.627 14.909 14.735 
Median 14.856 14.624 14.583 14.660 
SD 2.077 1.705 1.960 1.736 
Maximum 19.644 19.645 19.645 19.645 
Minimum 11.345 11.345 10.887 10.887 
Count 558 459 690 510 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the research methodology adopted for examining the 
effect of corporate governance components on firm performance and information 
leakage. The research utilised panel data, due it posing several advantages over 
time series and cross-sectional data. Furthermore, an assessment was provided of 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model and its assumptions, for example 
homoscedasticity, no correlation between the errors, normality, in addition to the 
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independent variables not being in correlation. Endogeneity is one of the issues that 
may violate the OLS assumptions. The sources of endogeneity are the omitted 
variables bias, measurement error and simultaneity. Following this, the panel 
models, random and fixed effects model were all discussed. It was apparent that the 
random and fixed effects model would be invalid when the research data is 
characterized by serious potential heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and 
endogeneity. Resultantly, the GMM was adopted, because it permits control of these 
issues. The GMM offers two estimators, which are the Difference and System GMM 
estimators. System GMM is considered to be the most advanced estimator of the 
GMM method. Furthermore, this chapter presented the research data and sample. 
This included four groups of data, because the research utilised two different types 
of firms and two time periods. Lastly, the dispersive statistics were reported for the 
independent and control variables, with regard to the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance and information leakage. The subsequent chapter 
provides the regression analysis and model selection in relation to the association 
between corporate governance and performance, with a presentation and 
discussion of the obtained empirical results for this relationship. 
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Chapter 6:  
Corporate Governance Effect on Firm Performance:  
Regression Analysis and Results  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the research methodology for analysing the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance and information leakage. 
The chapter reported the sample and data, showing the descriptive statistics for the 
independent and control variables identified for this analysis. Furthermore, the 
dependent proxies and variables used in the regression analysis were indicated, 
namely return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin's Q, while the 
independent variables were ownership concentration (BLOK), government 
ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), directors’ ownership (DIRE), 
managerial ownership (MANAG), board size (BOSI), board independence (BOIN), 
board meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size (AUSI), audit meetings 
(AUME), board subcommittees (BOCO) and market reform (MARE). The control 
variables comprised of firm growth (SAGR), leverage (LVRG), firm size (SIZE), year 
dummy (Year) and industry dummy (Industry). The dependent variables, control 
variables and independent variables have already been discussed and presented in 
chapter 3, as well as tables 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5. This chapter presented the regression 
analysis that was conducted in order to investigate the effect of corporate 
governance components on firm financial performance. Justifications were provided 
for selecting the System GMM model as the most suitable analytical model. Finally, 
the chapter outlined the regression results relating to the effect of each corporate 
governance variable on firm financial performance. Thus, the chapter is organised 
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as follows: Section 6.2 shows the regression analysis and model selection for the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance. Section 6.3 presents 
and discusses empirical results. 6.4 is the conclusion.  
 
6.2 Regression Analysis 
This research applies the multivariate regression model to examine the effect of 
corporate governance components on a firm’s financial performance. Since the 
research utilises four samples of data related to different time periods and types of 
firms, there will be four regression models:   
- Model (A), for all firms from every sector listed during the period between 2006 
and 2014. 
- Model (B), for non-financial firms listed during the period between 2006 and 
2014.   
- Model (C), for all firms from every sector listed during the period between 2009 
and 2014. 
- Model (D), for non-financial firms listed during the period between 2009 and 
2014.   
The models contain dependent, independent, and control variables. The dependent 
variables include the financial performance proxies which are return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin's Q. The independent variables include 
the corporate governance mechanisms related to the ownership structure and 
boards’ aspects. Ownership structure components include the ownership 
concentration or the block-holders (BLOK), government ownership (GOV), 
institutional ownership (INS), directors’ ownership (DIRE), and managerial 
ownership (MANAG). The board’s aspects contain the board size (BOSI), board 
independence (BOIN), board meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size 
(AUSI), audit meetings (AUME), and board subcommittees (BOCO). Moreover, the 
179 
 
research also includes market reform (MARE) as an independent variable in order 
to compare the differences in the firm’s performance before and after requiring listed 
firms to implement corporate governance codes. The control variables which are 
comprised of the firm growth (SAGR), the leverage (LVRG), firm size (SIZE), year 
dummy (Year), and industry dummy (Industry). Every model implements the same 
dependent, independent, and control variables with the exception of models (A) and 
(B) which contain two more independent variables, the board subcommittees 
(BOCO) and market reform (MARE). This is due to the fact that in the period 
following 2009, approximately every Saudi organisation established three obligated 
subcommittees, audit, nomination, and remuneration committees; therefore, there 
are no differences between firms that have incorporated these committees as can 
be seen in models (C) and (D). The measurements of all these variables are 
presented in tables 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5. The research hypotheses of the independent 
variables have been previously discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3.   
 
6.2.1 Dependent Variables  
In order to investigate the effect of corporate governance components on firms’ 
performance, this research will employ three different financial performance 
measures. Lin (2011) stated that the return on assets (ROA), the return on equity 
(ROE) and Tobin's Q proxies are the variables most frequently applied to examine 
firms’ performance. Two of these measures, the ROA and the ROE, are account-
based while the third measure is a market-based measure which is Tobin's Q. These 
measures are extensively applied in the literatures examining the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance; for example, the studies of 
Dharmadasa et al. (2015); Al-Matari et al. (2012); Chang and Leng (2004); Lin 
(2011); Fauzi and Locke (2012); Mehran (1995); Christensen et al. (2015); Amer et 
al. (2014); Ben Barka and Legendre (2016); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); and Perfect 
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and Wiles (1994). Although several studies only evaluate financial performance, 
such as the research of Chang and Leng (2004) and Al-Matari et al. (2012), or 
measure two aspects of a firm’s performance, such as the studies conducted by 
Fauzi and Locke (2012); Mehran (1995); Christensen et al. (2015); Ben Barka and 
Legendre (2016); and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), this research applies three 
measures which aim to increase the validity and accuracy of the research results 
and inferences. Furthermore, utilising three financial performance proxies allows the 
research to make comparisons between the results of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and different performance proxies so as to confirm the strength of the 
relationship between the variables. In addition, applying these measures allows the 
researcher to compare the results to other empirical studies that have applied the 
same measures.  
The ROE is defined as the total profits and earnings of the firms divided by 
total stockholders’ equity (Chang and Leng 2004). In addition, the ROA is identified 
by the earnings and net income of the company to the book value of its total assets 
(Mehran 1995). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) stated that the ROA can be employed to 
assess how effectively management utilises the company’s assets to generate 
wealth for the shareholders and to serve their own interests. In addition, the ROE is 
an indicator for how wisely a firm’s management invests the shareholders’ equity 
and other funds to create profit and increase earnings. A high ROA and ROE 
indicates that the company’s management is effective and takes into consideration 
the interests of the shareholders while working to minimise agency conflict.  
In addition, the third performance proxy is Tobin’s Q which is a market-based 
measurement. Perfect and Wiles (1994) indicate that Tobin’s Q is popular amongst 
researchers due to the fact that it can measure non-tangible assets that cannot be 
assessed by ROA and ROE such as goodwill and growth opportunities. The Tobin’s 
Q measurement was referred to by Tobin and Brainard (1968) and is identified by 
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adding the book value of the liabilities with the market value of the equity which is 
then divided by the book value of the total assets (Mangena et al. 2012; Dahya et 
al. 2008). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argue that the higher the value of the Tobin’s 
Q, the more efficient the management system is while investors have a more 
positive perception of the firm’s performance.  
 
6.2.2 Control Variables  
The research adds control variables to the regression models in order to assess for 
other possible factors that may also have an influence on the firm performance and 
as well as to conduct an accurate investigation into the relationship between the 
corporate governance and performance. Based on the pervious literatures and 
empirical studies, there are different control variables that are frequently applied in 
the empirical studies and are believed to have a significant impact on firm 
performance. These variables are firm size (SIZE), leverage (LVRG), firm growth 
(SAGR), time dummies (Year), and industry dummies (Industry). The 
measurements of these variables are presented in table 5-5.  
 
6.2.2.1 Firm Size 
Firm size is believed to influence both the corporate governance and performance. 
Larger firms have access to internal financial resources for their projects and growth 
while they can also find borrowing channels at a lower cost which will eventually  
help to improve the firm’s performance (Mangena et al. 2012). Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) indicate that the larger firms perform efficiently since they can minimise the 
effect of their risks. In addition, they have the ability to work well and perform more 
efficiently due to the pressure of analysts and observers (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006). 
In addition, the firm’s size has an impact on different governance mechanisms; for 
example, larger firms are likely to contain a greater number of board directors in 
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comparison to small firms (Schultz et al. 2010). Different literatures have applied the 
firm’s size as a control variable when examining the relationship between the 
corporate governance and firm performance; moreover, these literatures discovered 
that firm size has a positive effect on performance, such as the study of Fauzi and 
Locke (2012) in New Zealand, Boussaada and Karmani (2015) in MENA counties, 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in Malaysia, and Mehdi (2007) in Tunisia. On the other 
hand, several empirical researches found that firm size has a negative influence on 
performance; for example, the research conducted by  Mrad and Hallara (2012) in 
France, and Amer et al. (2014) in Egypt. However, the study of  Mueller and Spitz-
Oener (2006) in Germany, and Mura (2007) in the UK reveal insignificant that there 
is no noticeable relationship between these two factors. 
 
6.2.2.2 Firm Leverage  
In regards to the leverage (LVRG) variable, Black et al. (2006) claim that the 
leverage level can influence both firm performance and corporate governance. In 
addition, the corporate governance also can influence the firm’s ability to receive 
funds from financial institutions (Black et al. 2006). Increasing the level of leverage 
will allow further control of the management’s activities since the firm is obligated to 
fulfill the debt agreement (Schultz et al. 2010). In addition, the control of 
management activities is conducted more effectively by debtholders than 
stockholders since financial institutions have more of an incentive to monitor the 
firm’s management so as to ensure that they adhere to the debt agreement; in 
addition, it is important that they perform well in order to avoid bankruptcy and 
liquidation (Mangena et al. 2012). On the other hand, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
state that when a firm accumulates large debts, the shareholders with limited liability 
may result in the management to undertake a risky investment in an attempt to 
increase profits; however, this act may have a negative effect on creditors. Several 
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empirical studies implement the leverage as a control variable in the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanisms and performance. Previous studies 
have discovered a positive relationship between the leverage and performance, 
such as the study of Reyna et al. (2012) in Mexica,  Fauzi and Locke (2012) in New 
Zealand, Mrad and Hallara (2012) in France, and Black et al. (2006) in Korea. 
However, research conducted by Chen et al. (2005) in China found a negative 
relationship while the study of Amer et al. (2014) in Egypt, and Mura (2007) in the 
UK reveal an almost insignificant relationship insignificant between leverage and 
performance.  
 
6.2.2.3 Firm Growth 
Firm growth is measured by the company’s sales growth as was investigated in the 
study of  Black et al. (2006).  Borisova et al. (2012) defines sales growth as the 
difference in the current year’s sales divided by the previous year sales. Black et al. 
(2006) indicates that firm growth has an influence on firm performance while it may 
also have an impact on the corporate governance mechanisms. Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) argue that other studies found a significant relationship between firm growth 
and performance. The increase in an organisation’s sales will provide future growth 
opportunities. Moreover, these growth opportunities are likely to be associated with 
an increase in firm performance (Schultz et al. 2010). Different empirical studies 
utilise firm growth as a control variable in the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance; for example, research conducted by 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in Malaysia,  Black et al. (2006) in Korea, and Vafeas 
(1999b) in the US. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) discovered a positive relationship 
insignificant whereas research conducted by Black et al. (2006) found there to be 
no relationship between the two aspects.  
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6.2.2.4 Year and Industry Dummies 
The industry dummies control any influence that originates from  organisational 
differences that may have an effect on a firm’s performance (Mueller and Spitz-
Oener 2006). The performance may be reliant on the sensitivity of specific industries 
to the development in the macroeconomic aspects, while empirical studies have 
evidently shown that industry has an influence on a firm’s profits (Haniffa and Hudaib 
2006). Black et al. (2006) indicates that the industry factor may have an influence 
on both the corporate governance and performance. Different literatures utilise the 
industry dummy as a control variable when examining the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance, such as the empirical research of  Mrad 
and Hallara (2012) in France, Cheung et al. (2010) in Vietnam, Henry (2008) in 
Australia, Fauzi and Locke (2012) in New Zealand, and Simoneti and Gregoric 
(2004) in Slovenia. Moreover, the literatures applied different categories depending 
on the industry types; for example, Al-Janadi et al. )2013) utilised three categories 
which are finance, manufacturing, and services, while the study of  Samaha et al. 
(2012) implemented two categories which are manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. Cai et al. (2006) applied two categories which are manufacturing 
and retailers, and the research conducted by Mrad and Hallara (2012) used two 
categories which are financial and non-financial firms.  
This research applies three main divisions of industries: primary, which 
includes raw material companies; secondary, including manufacturing companies; 
and tertiary, which consists of service industries.  The year dummies are employed 
in different studies to control the various changes that take effect during the period 
of time which has not been identified (Mueller and Spitz-Oener 2006). Schultz et al. 
(2010) states that the year dummies are designed to provide control for 
contemporary correlation in the errors made by companies. In addition, Roodman 
(2006: p40) states that the time dummies have to be included in the GMM regression 
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model in order to ensure that there is “no correlation across individuals in the 
idiosyncratic disturbances.” There different empirical researches employed the time 
dummies as a control variable when investigating the relationship between 
corporate governance components and performance, such as the research 
conducted by Cheung et al. (2010) in Vietnam, Boussaada and Karmani (2015) in 
MENA countries, and Henry (2008) in Australia.  
 
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
This section illustrates the descriptive statistics of the model on the effect of 
corporate governance components on firm financial performance. The descriptive 
statistics include the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum 
value and the count of years. The disruptive tables outline the dependent variables, 
independent variables and control variables for the four groups of data. Because the 
descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables are already reported 
in section 5.4, this section presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variables related to the firm financial performance proxies. These proxies contain 
ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. 
Table 6-1 and Appendices 10, 11, 12, and 13 show descriptive summaries 
about the three proxies of the firms’ financial performance for the four data. The 
ROA is measured by the percentage of net profits to the total assets and the ROE 
is defined by the percentage of net profits to the owner’s equity while the Tobin's Q 
is calculated by deducting the book value of equity from the total assets and then 
added to the market value of equity which is finally divided by the total assets. Table 
6-1 (data C) and Appendix (10) show the descriptive outline of the financial 
measures for the all firms’ types during the period 2009-2014. The range of the ROA 
in all the sample is between 43% and -67% with mean 4.9% which shows big 
difference between the minimum and maximum value. The yearly information also 
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repots big difference especially in year 2011 as the minimum is -67.8% and the 
maximum is 43.9%. The possible reason for these differences is that during the 
years between 2009 and 2014 several new firms were listed in the Saudi market 
with lower value of ROA as the minimum value of ROA during 2006-2014 based on 
Appendix (11) is -15.2% compare with -67.8 during 2009-2014. The table 6-1 (data 
C) and Appendix (10) show that during 2009-2014 the increase in the value of ROA 
is followed by decreasing in the next year and the highest mean value of ROA is in 
the year 2012. Besides, the highest value in the means of ROE is also in the year 
2012 with value 10.4%. It shows big variance in the all sample of ROE between the 
maximum value with 56.5% and the minimum value with -158.9%. The Tobin's Q 
data states that these is an increasing trend in the ratio of the Tobin's Q from the 
year 2010 till the year 2013 and the highest ratio is in the year 2013 with value 1.9 
while the lowest ration is in the year 2009. 
In addition, the table 6-1 (data A) and Appendix (11) presents the descriptive 
summaries of the performance proxies for the firms from all sectors during the period 
2006-2014. The highest ROA value is 43.9% in the year 2011 and the lowest value 
is -15.2% in the year 2009. There is a downward in the mean value over the sample 
from 2006 to 2009 and the average values of the ROA for the period 2006-2014 is 
6.8% while the highest yearly mean is 9% in the year 2006. For the ROE, the highest 
level is 54.8% in year 2014 and the lowest level is -36% in year 2013. The average 
mean of the period is 11.5% and the highest year value is 2006 with 16.9%. As 
ROA, there is a downward trend from 2006 with value 16.9% till 2009 with value 
9.8%. The average means of the Tobin's Q for the period is 1.7 and the highest 
mean is 2.06 in year 2007. The highest ratio is in year 2013 with 9.1 and lowest ratio 
is in year 2009 with .633.  
Besides, the table 6-1(data D) and Appendix (12) reports the descriptive 
details of the non-financial firms between 2009 and 2014. The ROA mean for the 
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period is 6.4% with big variance between the maximum value with 43.9% and 
minimum value with -67.8% which is the same as the data of all firms with financial 
firms. The yearly mean is high in year 2013 with value 7.5% and low in 2009 with 
value 5.1% which may be the result of the effect of global financial crisis in 2007-
2008. In addition to ROA, the ROE also has the low yearly mean in 2009 with value 
8% and high value in 2013 with value 11.4% while the average mean for the period 
is 10.6%. The maximum value of ROE is 56.5% in year 2011 and the minimum value 
is -59% in year 2010. There is an upward trend in ROE from 2009 till 2013. For the 
Tobin's Q, the mean of the ratio of the period is 1.7 and the highest yearly mean is 
in year 2013 with value 2.1. The maximum ratio is in year 2013 with value 9.1 and 
the minimum ratio is .663 in year 2012. 
The table 6-1 (data B) and Appendix (13) are also showing the data of the 
non-financial firms but in different period which is between 2006 and 2014. The 
mean of ROA of all the sample is 7.8% with downward in the yearly mean value 
starts from 2006 with 9.9% value till the end of 2009 with 6%. The maximum value 
of ROA is 43.9% in year 2011 and the minimum value is -15.2% in year 2009. In 
ROE also, there is a decreasing trend in the yearly mean value from 2006 with value 
14.2% to 2009 with value 9.5%. The aggregated mean of ROE is 11.9% and the 
minimum value is -28.9% in 2014 while the maximum value is 56.5% in 2011. The 
mean of The Tobin's Q ratio for all the sample is 1.8 while the maximum ratio is 9.1 
in year 2013 and the minimum ratio is .633 in year 2009. The ratio of the Tobin's Q 
is dropped by approximately 54% in 2008 to 1.21 to 2.24 but it is followed by upward 
trend till the year 2013 with Tobin's Q ratio 2.23. The dropped in 2008 may be 
occurred because of the financial crisis at that time.  
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Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of all data 
Variables Data A Data B Data C Data D 
ROA     
Mean 6.858 7.817 4.919 6.430 
Median 4.520 6.330 3.320 5.165 
SD 8.817 9.396 8.455 9.110 
Maximum 43.980 43.980 43.980 43.980 
Minimum -15.210 -15.210 -67.810 -67.810 
ROE     
Mean 11.530 11.931 8.003 10.063 
Median 12.580 11.300 8.695 8.935 
SD 12.749 13.054 17.218 13.503 
Maximum 54.810 56.590 56.590 56.590 
Minimum -36.020 -28.930 -158.962 -59.020 
Tobin's Q     
Mean 1.706 1.843 1.674 1.792 
Median 1.326 1.484 1.308 1.369 
SD 1.030 1.086 1.071 1.191 
Maximum 9.151 9.151 9.150 9.151 
Minimum .633 .633 .633 .633 
Count 558 459 690 510 
      
 
6.2.4 Model Selection  
As was previously mentioned in the methodology section, the research utilises 
balanced panel data which allows the research to take advantage of time series and 
cross-sectional data. Many different types of statistical tests have to be conducted 
in order to confirm the presence of the ordinary least square (OLS) assumptions and 
to reveal whether any of these assumptions have been violated. Depending on the 
results of these statistical tests, the research determines the most suitable 
estimation for the research models in relation to the corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. The research examines the multicollinearity in 
the model between the independent variables. The multicollinearity can occur if 
there is a correlation between two of the independent variables. Within the relevant 
literatures, the correlation between the independent variables is not recorded as 
zero while the correlation between these variables will not affect the accuracy or 
reliability of the results if the degree of the correlation is not especially high (Brooks 
2008). This research applies different methods in an attempt to search for the 
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multicollinearity in the model. These methods are: Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient as a non-parametric test, Pearson’s product-moment correlation as a 
parametric test and the variance inflation factor (VIF).  
 Gujarati (2004) states that the VIF test is utilised by researchers to test for 
multicollinearity while the general rule for a variable to be considered as highly 
collinear is to have a VIF degree of more than 10. Furthermore, the recommended 
rule to determine when multicollinearity is an issue is when the pair-wise correlation 
coefficient between two independent variables exceeds 0.8 (Gujarati 2004). The 
results of Spearman and Pearson’s rank correlation test are presented in Appendix 
14, 15, 16, and 17. The Appendices report the Pearson correlation and correlation 
coefficient of the independent and control variables for the models A, B, C, and D in 
regards to the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. The coefficients reveal that the highest correlation degree is .70 
between the MARE and BOCO variables in models A and B and is therefore unlikely 
to create an issue in the suggested models since it does not exceed 0.8 degrees.  
In order to increase the accuracy, table 6-2 reports the VIF levels for all 
independent variables for the four models while the table reveals that the highest 
levels of VIF are 4.12, 2.49, 4.38, and 3.21 for models A, B, C, and D respectively. 
These results indicate that the VIF levels for all models are far below the 
unacceptable range that has been reported by Gujarati (2004) which is more than 
10. Therefore, the result reveals that there is no serious multicollinearity issue 
associated with the models since the degree of correlation in both Spearman and 
Pearson’s correlation tests do not exceed 0.8 while the levels of VIF are far below 
10.  
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Table 6-2: The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
Independent  
Variables 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
VIF  VIF  VIF  VIF  
BLOK     3.37  3.38  2.25  2.49  
GOV     2.07  2.56  1.62  1.98  
INS 2.27  1.27  1.71  1.21  
DIRE     1.54  1.88  1.44  1.63  
MANG     1.47  1.54  1.37  1.48  
BOSI    1.57  1.48  1.35  1.52  
BOIN   1.13  1.23  1.27  1.40  
BOME 1.41  1.40  1.33  1.33  
CEDU    1.29  1.30  1.25  1.34  
AUSI     1.34  1.28  1.38  1.38  
AUME 1.34  1.47  1.17  1.27  
SAGR     1.11  1.09  1.03  1.06  
LVRG     1.31  1.61  1.45  1.70  
SIZE 4.12  4.38  2.49  3.21  
MARE 2.29  2.25      
BOCO  2.17  2.19      
Mean VIF 1.86  1.89  1.51  1.64  
Notes: Where BLOK = the ownership concentration. GOV = the government ownership. 
INS = the institutional ownership. DIRE = the directors ownership. MANG = the 
managerial ownership. BOSI = the board size. BOIN = the board independence. BOME 
= the board meetings. CEDU = the CEO duality. MARE = the market reform. BOCO = the 
board subcommittees. AUSI = the audit committee size. AUME = the audit committee 
meetings. SAGR = the sales growth. LVRG = leverage. SIZE = the firm size. 
 
In addition, as was previously discussed in section 5.2.1 the OLS estimation 
assumes that there is no correlation between the errors while the correlation 
between the errors indicates the presence of autocorrelation and serial correlation 
issues. The serial correlation problem results in the OLS providing insufficient 
coefficient estimations.  Drukker (2003) indicates that  the Wooldridge (2002) test is 
to the most suitable one for detecting the serial correlation in the panel model. The 
Wooldridge test is employed in this research to investigate the presence of 
autocorrelation in the four models. Table 6-3 reports the autocorrelation results with 
a null hypothesis that there is no first order autocorrelation. The table reveals that 
all of the models are affected by the autocorrelation issue and thereby rejects the 
null hypothesis which states that there is no first order autocorrelation with the 
exception of models A and C which measure the ROE performance and models A 
and B which measure Tobin's Q performance.    
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Table 6-3: Wooldridge Test for serial correlation (Ho: No first-order autocorrelation) 
 ROA ROE Tobin's Q 
Model A    
F(  1,      61) 34.61 3.593 3.819 
Prob > F 0.000 0.062 0.055 
Model B    
F(  1,      50) 35.13 36.62 3.452 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.069 
Model C    
F(  1,     114)  46.33 1.518 6.717 
Prob > F     0.000 0.220 0.010 
Model D    
F(  1,      84) 23.15 14.86 6.445 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.013 
 
In addition, as was previously discussed in section 5.2.1, the OLS estimation 
assumes that the variance of the errors of all values is constant, otherwise the model 
has a heteroscedastic issue.  Long and Ervin (2000) state that heteroscedasticity 
has a negative effect on the efficiency of the OLS estimation thereby resulting in it 
rejecting the null hypotheses and produce misleading results. Baum et al. (2003) 
indicate that Breush and Pagan (1979) and Cook and Weisberg’s (1983) statistical 
tests are primarily used for investigating the heteroscedasticity in the OLS 
regression while the null hypothesis of the test is that the variance is constant. 
Therefore, this research utilises the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to detect 
the heteroscedasticity issue in the four models. Table 6-4 reports that the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test along with the table reveals that the null hypothesis of 
the test is strongly rejected in all four models at a significance level of 1%. This result 
indicates that the heteroscedasticity issue is present in the four models while the 
variances of the errors in the four models are not constant.  
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Table 6-4: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity (Ho: Constant 
variance) 
 ROA ROE Tobin's Q 
Model A    
chi2(25) 175.52 149.43 397.53 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model B    
chi2(25) 91.15 105.06 296.61 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model C    
chi2(21)  310.31 532.30 403.51 
Prob > chi2   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model D    
chi2(21)  340.39 120.45 323.83 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
In addition, it is important during the regression analysis to investigate the presence 
of the endogeneity issue in the models. The endogeneity is discussed in the 
previous chapter and occurs when there is a correlation between the error term and 
the regressor; if there is no correlation between them, the case is referred to as 
exogenous. In the model containing endogeneity, the OLS estimation of all 
parameters will be incorrect and inconsistent which will result in biased outcomes 
(Cameron & Trivedi 2005). Therefore, it is significant to conduct a statistical test 
such as the Durbin (1954), Wu (1973), and Hausman (1978) (DWH) test to reveal 
the extent of the endogeneity issue. Lee (2013) indicates that the DWH test has 
been extensively applied in the various literatures in order to investigate the 
endogeneity. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) indicate that the DWH test is 
employed for endogeneity which can be performed by containing the residuals of 
the tested variables in the regression of the main model. Therefore, this research 
applies the DWH test to detect the endogeneity issue. The research conducts the 
DWH test on the four models and the results evidently reveal that all four models 
contain the endogeneity issue.   
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6.2.5 System GMM Model  
After examining all of the previous statistical tests, it can be concluded that the 
research models relating to the effect of corporate governance components on firm 
performance is negatively influenced by the serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, 
and endogeneity issues. Therefore, the results of the random effects model and the 
fixed effects model which depend on the simple OLS are not valid and not suitable 
for this research since it will produce biased and unreliable results. Furthermore, 
these results show that the research models are made up of a dynamic structure 
and therefore require a dynamic model in order to solve the issues of serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity. Brooks (2008) indicates that the 
serial correlation in the data originates from the dynamic structure which is not 
contained in the regression model and therefore has not been identified or reported 
in the study. Moreover, Bhagat and Jefferis (2002), Wintoki et al. (2012), Fauzi and 
Locke (2012), and Boussaada and Karmani (2015) argue that the corporate 
governance researches are more likely to face the issue of endogeneity. Wintoki et 
al. (2012) indicates that potential endogeneity may appear within the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance in various circumstances, such as 
when there is a dynamic relationship, the corporate governance components are 
affected by past performances; for example, an unsatisfactory performance may 
lead to the firm increasing the number of board meetings or assigning a greater 
number of directors to the board.  
In addition, the second source of endogeneity is simultaneity which can 
emerge during the corporate governance in the relationship between the board 
structure and firm performance; according to the theory, the board structure may 
have an effect on the firm’s performance while simultaneously the firm’s 
performance may have an effect on the board structure (Wintoki et al. 2012). In 
addition, the unobserved heterogeneity is another source of endogeneity; for 
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example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) state that managers who possess high-
level skills and  abilities are monitored less carefully by shareholders which may 
result in there being less independent directors on the board; moreover, these 
managers will lead the companies so as to ensure that they perform efficiently  
without controlling the unnoticed heterogeneity. Therefore, the results will reveal that 
less independent directors lead to a more positive performance. Wintoki et al. (2012) 
indicate that empirical studies which fail to take into account the dynamic 
relationship between corporate governance and performance will produce a more 
inconsistent estimation. The dynamic structure and relationship needs to be 
examined by employing a dynamic model such as the Generalised Methods of 
Moments (GMM) which can allocate the extra structure in the dependent variable.  
Baum et al. (2003) argue that in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the GMM 
model is more efficient than the Instrumental Variable (IV) in comparison to other 
estimators such as the maximum likelihood estimation (Plasmans 2006). Roodman 
(2006) indicates that the GMM estimator is designed for data which consists of 
endogeneity variables, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation within individuals. Various literatures applied the GMM estimation 
when examining the relationship between the corporate governance and firm 
performance such as the study of Reyna et al. (2012); Wintoki et al. (2012); Mura 
(2007); Tran et al. (2014); Boussaada and Karmani (2015); Mangena et al. (2012); 
and Al-maskati et al.( 2015). Belkhir et al. (2016) and Wintoki et al. (2012) indicate 
that the System GMM model provides an efficient and consistent estimator. 
Therefore, The research applies the two steps System GMM model of Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) due to the fact that these are the most 
advanced GMM estimators which produce less biased results in comparison to other 
GMM estimators as was previously discussed in section 5.2.3.   
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This research employs the System GMM model and assumes that the 
corporate governance components that include the board and ownership variables 
as well as the control variables and market reform are endogenic variables. 
However, time and industry dummies variables are excluded and are considered to 
be exogenous variables since they were not dependent on either previous or current 
errors (Mangena et al. 2012; Roodman 2009). In addition, Roodman (2009) 
suggests that there is a trade-off between the number of lags that are employed in 
the GMM model to create the internal instruments and the depth of the estimation; 
therefore, the number of instruments should be limited by setting a specific number 
of lags instead of using all of the available ones. Baum et al. (2003) argue that using 
all of the available lags will produce an especially large number of instruments which 
may reduce the overall efficiency. The literatures failed to offer clear guidance on 
how many instruments are considered to be a large number, although it is stated 
that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of observations 
(Roodman 2006 and Roodman 2007). Therefore, since these research models 
contain several independent and control variables and cover a period of many years 
(6 years in model C and D and 9 years in model A and B), this research employs 
one and two lags in the System GMM estimator in order to provide a suitable number 
of observations as well as correct estimations.  
In addition, as was previously discussed in section 5.2.3, this research will 
carry out two specific tests to confirm the consistency and validity of System GMM 
models. The first is the second order serial correlation (Arellano-Bond AR (2)) test 
to detect the second order serial correlation and the second is the Sargan test to 
confirm the validity of the instruments. In addition, Roodman (2006) states that the 
investigator is required to include year time dummies in the GMM model so as to 
prevent the cross-individual correlation and contemporaneous correlation; 
therefore, the time dummies are included in this research in all of the models. Based 
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on the study conducted by Wintoki et al. (2012), the equation for the System GMM 
estimator for the research models is as follows: 
 
[
𝑃𝑖𝑡
∆𝑝𝑖𝑡
] = 𝛼 + 𝜅 [
𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝐿
∆𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝐿
] + 𝛽 [
𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
] + 𝛾 [
𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡
∆EN𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     ( 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;   𝑡 = 1, . . , 𝑇)       
    
Where P is the dependent variables which is firm performance measured by ROA, 
ROE, and Tobin's Q, 𝐿 is the period of lag, ⧍ is the time differencing, 𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 
vector of the independent variables that are assumed to be strictly exogenous, the 
time and industry dummies, and 𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 is the vector of independent variables that are 
assumed to be endogenous which are the ownership concentration (BLOK), 
government ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), directors’ ownership 
(DIRE), managerial ownership (MANAG), the board size (BOSI), board 
independence (BOIN), board meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size 
(AUSI), audit meetings (AUME), board subcommittees (BOCO), the market reform 
(MARE), the firm growth (SAGR), the leverage (LVRG), and the firm size (SIZE).  
 
6.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
6.3.1 Empirical Results 
In order to investigate the relationship between corporate governance components 
and firm performance, the research hypotheses for all variables are discussed in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3 while the notations and measurements for all variables are 
presented in tables 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5. Moreover, based on the statistical tests and 
the discussion shown in previous section, the System GMM estimator is the most 
suitable estimator for the four research models due to the fact that it acts as a control 
for the serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, individual heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity. The analysis results will follow; they are presented in different tables 
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based on the firms’ performance measurements while each table contains the 
results of the four research models. In each model, the coefficient and significant for 
each variable are reported and followed by the number of observations, firms, and 
instruments, including the AR(2) and the Sargan test that were conducted for model 
validity. 
Table 6-5 reports the effect of corporate governance components on firm 
performance as identified by the ROA. Model A illustrates the performance of all the 
firms between 2006 and 2014, revealing a significant and negative relationship 
between the institutional ownership (INS) and the ROA. In contrast, the director 
ownership (DIRE) has a significant and positive influence at level 1% on the ROA. 
The board independence (BOIN) and meetings (BOME) are positively and 
significantly correlated to the firm performance as measured by the ROA. The 
presence of board subcommittees (BOCO) has a negative and significant effect on 
the ROA. In regards to the control variables, the firm growth (SAGR) and (SIZE) 
have a significant influence on the ROA while the leverage (LVRG) has a negative 
significant influence on the ROA. The model B for non-financial firms between 2006 
and 2014 shows that there is a positive significant association between the 
ownership concertation (BLOK) and the ROA as well as between managerial 
ownership (MANG) and the ROA. Furthermore, the director ownership has a 
negative significant effect on ROA. The CEO duality (CEDU) and market reform 
(MARE) are weakly related to the ROA. For the control variables, the firm growth 
(SAGR) and SIZE have a significant positive influence while the leverage (LVRG) 
has a significant negative influence on the ROA.  
Model C presents the firms between 2009 and 2014, illustrating that the 
ownership concentration (BLOK) is significantly and negatively associated with the 
ROA while the managerial ownership (MANG) is significantly and positively 
associated with the ROA. Furthermore, the board size (BOSI) has a positive effect 
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whereas board meetings (BOME) have a negative effect on the ROA at 1% 
significance level. The CEO duality (CEDU) is significantly and negatively related to 
the ROA. The audit committee size (AUSI) and meetings (AUME) appear to have a 
significant positive influence on the ROA. For control variables, the firm growth 
(SAGR) is positively related while the leverage (LVRG) is negatively related to the 
ROA at a significance level of 1%. Model D presents non-financial firms between 
2009 and 2014, revealing that ownership concentration (BLOK) and government 
ownership (GOV) have a significant negative influence on the ROA. In addition, the 
managerial ownership (MANG) has a significant positive effect on the ROA. In 
regards to the board, the size (BOSI) is positivity related to the ROA whereas the 
board meetings are negatively related to the ROA at significance level of 1%. 
Moreover, the audit committee size (AUSI) and meetings (AUME) have a significant 
positive effect on the ROA. Similar to other models, the control variables in this 
particular group reveals that the firm’s growth (SAGR) is positively associated while 
the leverage (LVRG) is negatively associated with the ROA at a significance level 
of 1%. 
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Table 6-5: System GMM Regression Model of the effect of corporate governance 
components on the performance of Saudi listed firms (ROA) 
 
The dependent variable is ROA (the percentage of net profits to the total assets). All coefficients are based 
on the two-step System GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) with one 
and two lags. Where BLOK is the ownership concentration (the percentage of stocks owned by large 
shareholders). GOV is the government ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by government). INS is 
the institutional ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by institutions). DIRE is the directors ownership 
(the percentage of stocks owned by directors). MANG is the managerial ownership (the percentage of stocks 
owned by managerial shareholders). BOSI is the board size (the number of directors in the board). BOIN is 
the board independence (the percentage of independent directors in the board). BOME is the board meetings 
(the number of board’s meetings in each year). CEDU is the CEO duality (If CEO and chairman is not the 
same person = 1, 0 otherwise). MARE is the market reform (If the year from 2009 till 2014 = 1, 0 otherwise). 
BOCO is the board subcommittees (If firm has audit, nomination, and remuneration =1, 0 otherwise). AUSI 
is the audit committee size (the number of members in audit committee). AUME is the audit committee 
meetings (the number of the audit committee’s meetings in each year). SAGR is the sales growth. LVRG is 
leverage (the percentage of total debt to the total assets). SIZE is the firm size (the natural log of firm’s 
assets). Industry (each industry =1, 0 otherwise). Year (each year =1, 0 otherwise). 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
BLOK     -.0507 (-1.3) .4576*** (3.72) -.072*** (-5.62) -.0349** (-2.19) 
GOV     -.0900 (-1.04 -.2767 (-0.96) -.0546* (-1.75) -.163*** (-3.15) 
INS -.2318** (-2.1) -.1147 -0.59) -.0176 (-0.90) .0445 (0.88) 
DIRE     .1109*** (2.58) -.2071** (-2.35) .0220* (1.95) -.0063 (-0.33) 
MANG     .0900 (0.45) .9288*** (2.81) .0685** (2.19) .6189*** (4.02) 
BOSI    .3793 (1.08) .1849 (0.30) 1.009*** (4.95) 1.614*** (7.04) 
BOIN   .0150** (2.54) -.0010 (-0.12) .0043 (0.62) -.0072 (-0.59) 
BOME .4241** (2.41) .2093 (0.69) -.222*** (-6.76) -.397*** (-4.40) 
CEDU    1.065 (0.91) 4.204* (1.74) -3.35*** (-4.51) -1.439 (-1.39) 
MARE -.2565 (-0.8) -1.203* (-1.90)     
BOCO -2.230** (-2.3) -.5383 (-0.27)     
AUSI     .0624 (0.16) .6183 (0.57) 1.872*** (7.98) 1.228** (2.53) 
AUME -.2362 (-1.4) -.1199 (-0.41) .1911*** (2.95) .4290*** (4.09) 
Control Variables         
SAGR     .0275*** (8.01) .0265*** (5.06) .0254*** (21.77) .0409*** (13.29) 
LVRG     -.1602*** (-5.4) -.2758*** (-4.01) -.043*** (-4.91) -.101*** (-7.58) 
SIZE 1.667** (2.14) 3.876** (2.33) .3172 (1.48) .4202 (1.11) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -20.85** (-2.1) -75.54*** (-3.61) -8.95*** (-3.13) -13.95** (-2.47) 
Observations 496  408  575  425  
Number of firms 62  51  115  85  
Number of 
instruments 
472  424  227  223  
AR(2) test  (-1.056)  (-1.446)  (-.7988)  (-.7309)  
Sargan test (chi2) 27.81  9.672  93.16  64.09  
The test statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. AR (2) is the test for the second order serial correlation with H0= no serial 
correlation so the p-value > 0.05 indicates no serial correlation. Sargan test is to test the validity of 
instruments with H0= valid instruments so the p-value > 0.05 indicates the validity of instruments.  
 
Table 6-6 displays the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance measured by the ROE.  Model A illustrates all firms from 2006 until 
2014, evidently showing that the director (DIRE) and managerial ownership (MANG) 
have a positive effect on the ROE and a significance level of 1%. The institution 
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ownership (INS) negatively affects the firm’s ROE and has a significance level of 
5%. In addition, the table states that the board meetings (BOME) are have a 
significant positive relationship with the ROE. In addition, the CEO duality (CEDU) 
also has a significant positive influence on the ROE. The market reform (MARE) has 
a significant negative effect on the ROE. Moreover, the audit committee size (AUSI) 
has a significant positive correlation with the ROE. However, the government 
ownership (GOV) and board subcommittees (BOCO) are weakly related to the ROE. 
For the control variables, firm growth (SAGR) and SIZE have a positive effect while 
the leverage (LVRG) has a negative effect and are all significant at level 1%. Model 
B illustrates non-financial firms from 2006 until 2014, shows that managerial 
ownership (MANG) and firm growth (SAGR) have a significant positive relationship 
on the firm’s performance as identified by the ROE. 
 Model C illustrates all firms from 2009 until 2014, showing that ownership 
concentration (BLOK) and government ownership (GOV) are significantly and 
negatively related to the ROE whereas institution ownership (INS) has a significant 
positive relationship with the ROE. Moreover, the director (DIRE) and managerial 
ownership (MANG) have a significant and positive influence on the ROE. In addition, 
the board size (BOSI) and independence (BOIN) have a significant negative 
relationship with the ROE. The audit committee size (AUSI) has a significant positive 
relationship with the ROE while the audit meetings are weakly related. The control 
variables show that firm growth (SAGR) and SIZE are positively associated with the 
ROE at a significance level of 1%. Model D illustrates non-financial firms from 2009 
till 2014, revealing that ownership concentration (BLOK) and government ownership 
(GOV) have a significant negative influence on the ROE. In addition, the director 
(DIRE) and managerial ownership (MANG) also have a significant positive effect on 
the ROE. The CEO duality (CEDU) is negatively associated with the ROE at a 
significance level of 5%. Furthermore, the audit committee size (AUSI) is positively 
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associated with the ROE at a significance level of 1%. The firm growth (SAGR) and 
SIZE are positively related whereas the leverage (LVRG) is negatively related at a 
significance level of 1%.  
Table 6-6: System GMM Regression Model showing the effect of corporate governance 
components on the performance of Saudi listed firms (ROE) 
 
The dependent variable is ROE (the percentage of net profits to the owner’s equity). All coefficients are based 
on the two-step System GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) with one 
and two lags. Where BLOK is the ownership concentration (the percentage of stocks owned by large 
shareholders). GOV is the government ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by government). INS is 
the institutional ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by institutions). DIRE is the directors ownership 
(the percentage of stocks owned by directors). MANG is the managerial ownership (the percentage of stocks 
owned by managerial shareholders). BOSI is the board size (the number of directors in the board). BOIN is 
the board independence (the percentage of independent directors in the board). BOME is the board meetings 
(the number of board’s meetings in each year). CEDU is the CEO duality (If CEO and chairman is not the 
same person = 1, 0 otherwise). MARE is the market reform (If the year from 2009 till 2014 = 1, 0 otherwise). 
BOCO is the board subcommittees (If firm has audit, nomination, and remuneration =1, 0 otherwise). AUSI 
is the audit committee size (the number of members in audit committee). AUME is the audit committee 
meetings (the number of the audit committee’s meetings in each year). SAGR is the sales growth. LVRG is 
leverage (the percentage of total debt to the total assets). SIZE is the firm size (the natural log of firm’s 
assets). Industry (each industry =1, 0 otherwise). Year (each year =1, 0 otherwise). 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
BLOK     .0709 (0.75) -.1084 (-0.71) -.134*** (-6.43) -.0665** (-2.33) 
GOV     -.4028* (-1.85) 1.078 (1.47) -.273*** (-4.57) -.1179** (-2.08) 
INS -.4673** (-2.37) .1451 (0.51) .1476*** (4.86) .1060 (1.26) 
DIRE     .0847*** (4.18) .0630 (1.40) .0782*** (4.68) .0278** (2.18) 
MANG     1.073*** (2.93) 1.858*** (2.95) .2986*** (7.38) .3563*** (2.69) 
BOSI    .8962 (1.14 ) -.3255 (-0.24) -.780*** (-2.81) .2392 (0.93) 
BOIN   .0110 (1.08) .0239 (1.61) -.049*** (-5.64) .0182 (1.63) 
BOME .4008** (2.01) .1519 (0.47) .0850 (1.20) -.0059 (-0.06) 
CEDU    5.253*** (3.24) -.0506 (-0.01) -.5513 (-0.47) -2.112** (-2.29) 
MARE -1.615*** (-2.60) -.8059 -0.96     
BOCO -2.616* (-1.90) -2.975 (-1.25)     
AUSI     1.867** (2.32) 2.906 (1.55) 2.979*** (5.90) 2.026*** (3.16) 
AUME  .0850 (0.33) .0503 (0.08) -.1270* (-1.83) .0492 (0.39) 
Control Variables         
SAGR     .0479 *** (10.09) .0377*** (4.49) .0063*** (3.84) .0311*** (7.16) 
LVRG     -.1936*** (-3.05) -.1566 (-0.68) -.0190 (-1.04) -.0517*** (-2.67) 
SIZE 3.873*** (2.80) 1.873 (0.53) 2.742*** (8.79) 1.144*** (3.48) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -65.22*** (-4.00) -58.17 (-1.40) -30.7*** (-6.85) -20.56*** (-5.35) 
Observations 496  408  575  340  
Number of firms 62  51  115  85  
Number of 
instruments 
472  424  227  207  
AR(2) test  (-1.201)  (-.9731)  (-.3842)  (-1.179)  
Sargan test (chi2) 31.32  21.24  90.36  61.98  
The test statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. AR (2) is the test for the second order serial correlation with H0= no serial 
correlation so the p-value > 0.05 indicates no serial correlation. Sargan test is to test the validity of 
instruments with H0= valid instruments so the p-value > 0.05 indicates the validity of instruments.  
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Table 6-7 presents the effects of corporate governance components on firm 
performance measured by Tobin's Q. Model A illustrating all firms from 2006 until 
2014 reveals that there is only one significant negative relationship between 
institution ownership and Tobin's Q. The model evidently shows that there is a weak 
relationship between the audit committee size (AUSI) and leverage (LVRG) and 
Tobin's Q. Model B illustrates non-financial firms between 2006 and 2014, revealing 
that there is only a significant negative association between firm growth (SAGR) and 
Tobin's Q. Model C illustrates all firms between 2009 and 2014, showing that 
director ownership (DIRE) and board size (BOSI) have a negative significant 
influence on Tobin's Q whereas board meetings have a significant positive effect on 
Tobin's Q. The audit committee size (AUSI) and meetings (AUME) have a significant 
negative influence on Tobin's Q. In regards to the control variables, the firm’s growth 
(SAGR) and SIZE have a significant negative relationship with Tobin's Q. Model D 
illustrates non-financial firms between 2009 and 2014, indicating that there is a 
positive significant association between the institution ownership (INS) and board 
meetings (BOME) and Tobin's Q. However, the audit committee size (AUSI) and 
meetings (AUME) have a negative association with Tobin's Q with a significance 
level of 1%. In regards to the control variables, firm leverage (LVRG) and SIZE are 
negatively related to Tobin's Q while the firm growth (SAGR) is positively related to 
Tobin's Q all with a significance level of 1%.  
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Table 6-7: System GMM Regression Model showing the effects of corporate governance 
components on the performance of Saudi listed firms (Tobin's Q) 
 
The dependent variable is Tobin's Q (((Total assets – book value of equity) + market value of equity) / total 
assets). All coefficients are based on the two-step System GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995) with one and two lags. Where BLOK is the ownership concentration (the 
percentage of stocks owned by large shareholders). GOV is the government ownership (the percentage of 
stocks owned by government). INS is the institutional ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by 
institutions). DIRE is the directors ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by directors). MANG is the 
managerial ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by managerial shareholders). BOSI is the board size 
(the number of directors in the board). BOIN is the board independence (the percentage of independent 
directors in the board). BOME is the board meetings (the number of board’s meetings in each year). CEDU 
is the CEO duality (If CEO and chairman is not the same person = 1, 0 otherwise). MARE is the market 
reform (If the year from 2009 till 2014 = 1, 0 otherwise). BOCO is the board subcommittees (If firm has audit, 
nomination, and remuneration =1, 0 otherwise). AUSI is the audit committee size (the number of members 
in audit committee). AUME is the audit committee meetings (the number of the audit committee’s meetings 
in each year). SAGR is the sales growth. LVRG is leverage (the percentage of total debt to the total assets). 
SIZE is the firm size (the natural log of firm’s assets). Industry (each industry =1, 0 otherwise). Year (each 
year =1, 0 otherwise). 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
BLOK     .0016 (0.25) -.0004 (-0.03) .0018 (1.24) -.0002 (-0.09) 
GOV     -.0109 (-0.91) .0112 (0.29) .0041 (1.46) .0038 (0.88) 
INS -.0239** (-2.26) -.0182 (-0.53) .0043* (1.93) .0249*** (2.96) 
DIRE     -.0014 (-0.59) -.0049 (-0.51) -.003*** (-3.36) .0002 (0.13) 
MANG     -.0144 (-0.50) .0218 (0.76) .0025 (1.47) .0096 (0.57) 
BOSI    -.0428 (-0.92) -.1014 (-1.40) -.099*** (-6.83) -.0475 (-1.50) 
BOIN   -.0009 (-1.21) -.0000 (-0.06) -.0000 (-0.13) -.0010 (-0.94) 
BOME .0028 (0.12) .0127 (0.39) .0469*** (16.58) .0449*** (3.99) 
CEDU    .0057 (0.03) -.3491 (-0.90) -.0386 (-0.60) .0602 (0.62) 
BOCO .2332 (1.59) -.3158 (-1.05)     
AUSI     -.0829* (-1.68) -.0667 (-0.90) -.098*** (-3.79) -.1148*** (-2.93) 
AUME    -.0164 (-1.17) -.0196 (-0.68) -.006*** (-3.16) -.0294*** (-2.70) 
Control Variables         
SAGR     -.0006 (-1.38) -.0009*** (-3.04) -.001*** (-10.4) .0004*** (2.59) 
LVRG     -.0088* (-1.65) .0081 (1.17) -.0014 (-1.11) -.0064*** (-3.12) 
SIZE .0632 (0.79) -.0822 (-0.32) -.254*** (-11.4) -.3588*** (-8.30) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant .6510 (0.58) 2.385 (0.77) 6.235*** (20.43) 7.358*** (10.55) 
Observations 434  357  575  340  
Number of firms 62  51  115  85  
Number of 
instruments 
454  406  227  207  
AR(2) test  (1.094)  (.6119)  (.0361)  (.7561)  
Sargan test (chi2) 35.64  27.34  96.39  62.86  
The test statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. AR (2) is the test for the second order serial correlation with H0= no serial 
correlation so the p-value > 0.05 indicates no serial correlation. Sargan test is to test the validity of 
instruments with H0= valid instruments so the p-value > 0.05 indicates the validity of instruments.  
 
 
6.3.2 Results Discussion 
In order to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance, this research utilises two main aspects of corporate governance which 
are the ownership structure variables and board of directors’ variables. The 
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ownership structure variables include the ownership concentration (BLOK), 
government ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), directors’ ownership 
(DIRE), and managerial ownership (MANAG). The directors board variables contain 
the board size (BOSI), board independence (BOIN), board meetings (BOME), CEO 
duality (CEDU), audit size (AUSI), audit meetings (AUME), board subcommittees 
(BOCO). In addition, the research includes the market reform (MARE) variable to 
reveal the difference in the firm’s performance before and after the corporate 
governance codes became obligatory for all firms. The following sub-sections 
discuss the results of each variable so as to confirm or reject the research 
hypotheses as well as to provide answers for the research questions. 
 
6.3.2.1 Ownership Concentration  
The corporate governance plays an important role in directing the listed companies 
and seeking to reduce the agency problem so as to ensure that the management’s 
interests match those of the shareholders.’ In addition, the ownership structure is 
generally a significant aspect of the corporate governance mechanisms which can 
influence countries’ governance systems (Darko et al. 2016). One form of the 
ownership structure is the ownership concentration. The research hypothesis for the 
ownership concentration states that the there is a significant negative relationship 
between the ownership concentration and the firm’s financial performance. The 
research results of the sample between 2009 and 2014 supports the research 
hypothesis and indicates that the ownership concentration has a significant negative 
effect on the ROA and ROE. On the other hand, Model B reveals a significant 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and the ROA although this 
model is inefficient as Roodman (2006) and Roodman (2007) have argued that the 
instruments may reduce model efficiency if the number of instruments totals more 
than the number of observations. In addition, Model A evidently shows that there is 
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no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and the ROA and 
ROE. Models C and D results are more efficient since they include larger samples 
of 115 and 85 firms while there is a significant difference between the number of 
observations and instruments in comparison to Models A and B. In addition, the 
results also report that there is no significant relationship between the ownership 
concentration and Tobin’s Q which rejects the research hypothesis of a negative 
relationship.  
The significant negative relationship between the ownership concentration 
and the ROA and ROE indicate that only the accounting-based performance is 
negatively affected, not the -market-based performance. In addition, this negative 
relationship supports the argument put forward by Darko et al. (2016) that large 
shareholders intend to apply their power in the firm with the aim of utilising its 
resources for their own personal gain rather than taking into consideration the 
interests of small shareholders. Moreover, when the firm is dominated by large 
shareholders, it results in the firm’s environment being controlled by one mindset 
which decreases the opportunity for directors who possess high-level abilities and 
skills who have the potential to improve the firm’s performance and encourage 
growth. The negative influence on performance measured is by the ROA and ROE 
and is consistent with the study of Mehdi (2007)  in Tunisia,  Mura (2007) in the UK, 
and Fauzi and Locke (2012) in New Zealand. In addition, the fact that there is no 
association between the ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q is consistent with 
the research conducted by Mangena et al. (2012) in Zimbabwe. The results also 
reveal that there is no difference between the sample of all firms and non-financial 
companies in regards to ownership concentration on the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q.   
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6.3.2.2 Government Ownership 
Government ownership in several Saudi listed firms are considered to be high with 
some ownerships reaching a percentage of 74.3% of the issued shares; this form of 
high government ownership is often seen in energy, petrochemical, mines, and 
telecom companies. Therefore, it is important to investigate the effect of government 
ownership on firm performance. The research hypothesis for government ownership 
states that there is a significant negative relationship between government 
ownership and firms’ financial performances. The research results reveal that 
government ownership has a significant negative influence on the ROA and ROE 
while this result supports the research hypothesis. Despite the fact that Model A in 
table 6-5, Models A and B in table 6-6, and Models C and D are more efficient than 
Models A and B it has been previously acknowledged that they have large sample 
sizes with fewer instruments. The results also show that government ownership has 
no significant relationship with Tobin’s Q. This result indicates that government 
ownership has a negative effect on accounting-based performance while it has no 
influence on the market-based performance of a firm.  
The negative effect of government ownership on the ROA and ROE confirms 
the argument that this type of ownership will not add value to the company. 
Moreover, it may have a negative impact on its progress due to the fact that the 
major objective of governments is to purchase stocks in the listed companies in 
order to increase its power and control in the market (Darko et al. 2016). In addition, 
the government will use its ownership in the listed companies for the benefit of 
politicians while it may also negatively affect the firm’s performance by adding more 
bureaucratic regulations which can impede the company’s operations (Tran et al. 
2014). The negative influence of government ownership emphasises the importance 
of increasing the level of privatisation in the Saudi listed companies by reducing the 
level of government ownership so as to enhance firm performance and allow 
207 
 
companies to focus on growth opportunities rather than benefiting politicians. The 
negative relationship between government ownership and the ROA and ROE is 
consistent with the study conducted by Cheung et al. (2010) in Vietnam, Chen et al. 
(2005) in China, and Boussaada and Karmani (2015) in the banking sector of MENA 
region. The results show that there is no significant relationship between 
government ownership and Tobin’s Q which is compatible with the research 
conducted by Darko et al. (2016) in Ghana and Zhang (2012) in China. The research 
outcomes reveal that the sample size has no effect on the relationship between 
government ownership and firm performance in all of the firms as well as the non-
financial firms.   
 
6.3.2.3 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is another form of the ownership structure while there are 
mixed results concerning the effect of this type of ownership on firm performance. 
The research hypothesis for institutional ownership states that there is a significant 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and a firm’s financial 
performance. The research results report different types of evidence for a 
relationship. Model A illustrating all firms between 2006 and 2014 reveals that 
institutional ownership has a significant negative influence on the ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin’s Q while Models C and D for the period 2009-2014 report that institutional 
ownership is significantly and positively related to the ROE and Tobin’s Q whereas 
it is not significantly related to the ROA. The difference in these results suggest that 
the institution’s practices and activities improved after 2009 which subsequently led 
to the firms performing efficiently. In addition, Models C and D are more efficient as 
has previously been discussed; the models represent the period 2009-2014 which 
is characterised by the increased number of listed firms since several new firms 
entered the market during this period compared with the period 2006-2014. 
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Therefore, Models C and D represent 70.55% and 72.64% of the market 
respectively compared with 38.04% for Model A.  
It can be inferred from that the results produced by of Models C and D are a 
more accurate representation of the Saudi market than Models A and B. Therefore, 
it is concluded that institutional ownership has a significant positive effect on the 
ROE and Tobin’s Q while it has no effect on the ROA. The positive influence of 
institutional ownership supports the research hypothesis and confirms the argument 
that institutional ownerships compared to other types of ownerships have the ability 
to monitor managers’ activities and prevent opportunistic behaviour due to the fact 
that they are more professional and have extensive financial knowledge; as a result, 
they can easily examine the manager’s reports and decisions (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy 2008; Bos and Donker 2004). Institutions which monitor the managers’ 
activities is an effective governance mechanism which can succeed in reducing the 
number of agency issues as well as ensuring that all decisions benefit the 
shareholders. Therefore, one specific suggestion regarding the positive influence 
and effective monitoring role of institutions is to incorporate the current regulations 
and codes along with additional rules that encourage the extensive participation of 
the institutional stockholders in the governance procedure (Henry 2008). The 
positive influence of institutional ownership is compatible with the study of Henry 
(2008) in Australia and  Zhang (2012) in China. Furthermore, the tables reveal that 
there is no big difference between the sample of every firm and the non-financial 
sample regarding the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance.    
 
6.3.2.4 Director Ownership  
The board of directors represent the interests of the shareholders by monitoring 
management activities and improving the firm’s environment so as to solve any 
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agency issues. Previous literatures have discussed the effect of director ownership 
on firm performance. The research hypothesis regarding director ownership states 
that there is a significant positive relationship between director ownership and a 
firm’s financial performances. The table results show that Models A and B reveal a 
significant positive association between director ownership and the ROA while 
Models C and D presents a weak significant relationship. Since Model B is not 
efficient, it is concluded that director ownership had a significant positive effect on 
the ROA during the period 2006-2014 and a nonsignificant effect during the period 
2009-2014. In addition, the results also show that director ownership has a 
significant positive influence on the ROE. However, the outcome of the research 
reveal that there is a significant negative relationship between director ownership 
and Tobin’s Q in the all sample firms while there it has no significant effect on non-
financial firms. This evidently shows that the director ownership has a positive effect 
on ROE and has a mixed results on ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
The positive influence of director ownership supports the research 
hypothesis as well as the incentive theory which highlights the fact that when 
directors own shares in the firm, they have a greater incentive to improve the firm’s 
performance since they will gain personal advantages from the increase in profits 
while they will also be effected by poor decision-making and strategies that 
negatively impacts the firm’s overall value (Mehdi 2007; Hussainey and Al-Najjar 
2012). Based on this, the director’s interest should match that of the shareholders’ 
and aim to increase the shareholders’ wealth which can help to reduce the number 
of agency issues. Other studies have reported a positive influence on companies’ 
performance, such as the research conducted by Amer et al. (2014) in Egypt, and 
the study of Florackis et al. (2009) and Cosh et al. (2006) in the UK. However, the 
negative influence of director ownership on Tobin’s Q can be explained by the 
management entrenchment strategy that was adopted by managers which involved 
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focusing solely on investment and performance; this took place during their time at 
the expense of other long-term growth opportunities (Jackson et al. 2008). The study 
of Reyna et al. (2012) in Mexico also reports a negative influence of director 
ownership. In addition, the non-financial firms in this research displayed no 
significant relationship between director ownership and the ROA and Tobin’s Q 
which indicates that there is a difference between the samples of all firms and non-
financial firms in regards to director ownership. The research conducted by Henry 
(2008) in Australia and Mehdi (2007) in Tunisia also revealed an insignificant 
relationship.   
 
6.3.2.5 Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership is another strategy employed by firms which act as an 
incentive to managers to become involved in the firm’s objectives. The research 
hypothesis for the managerial ownership states that there is a significant positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm financial performance. The 
research results reveal that managerial ownership has a significant positive effect 
on the ROA and ROE and an insignificant effect on the Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the 
results show that managerial ownership has a positive influence on a company’s 
accounting-based performance while it has an insignificant influence on a firm’s 
market-based performance.  
The positive influence of managerial ownership supports the research 
hypothesis as well as the argument that managerial ownership enhances firm 
performance and provides an effective strategy and mechanism for reducing the 
number of agency issues by motivating management to align their interests with the 
shareholders’ objectives. Therefore, the managerial ownership mechanism can be 
implemented in the corporate governance regulations of the Saudi market so as to 
improve the governing practices of listed firms. Various literatures have also 
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reported the positive effect of managerial ownership on firms’ performances, such 
as the research of Mehdi (2007) in Tunisia, Mehran (1995) in the US, Cosh et al. 
(2006) in UK, Daraghma and Alsinawi (2010) in Palestine, Mueller and Spitz-Oener 
(2006) in Germany, Fauzi and Locke (2012) in New Zealand, and Mangena et al. 
(2012) in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the insignificant relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance as identified by Tobin’s Q is consistent with the 
study of Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) in Slovenia. In addition, the research’s results 
evidently show that there is no difference between the sample of all firms and non-
financial firms in regards to the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.   
 
6.3.2.6 Board Size 
The board of directors is the primary factor in the corporate governance system; 
therefore, the board’s characteristics will have a large influence on the firm’s 
performance. For example, the board is discussed and investigated throughout the 
literatures in order to determine its effect on the firm performance. The research 
hypothesis for the board size states that there is a significant negative relationship 
between board size and a firm’s financial performance. The research results provide 
mixed reports about the effect of board size. The results reveal that board size has 
a significant positive influence on the ROA. Moreover, the board size has a 
significant negative influence on the ROE and Tobin’s Q in regards to the sample of 
firms from every sector while it has an insignificant effect on the non-financial firms. 
The negative effect of board size supports the research hypothesis and provides 
evidence to the theory that a smaller board helps to reduce the number of agency 
issues since it can easily monitor management activities compared with a larger 
sized board of directors (Jensen 1993). In addition, the directors in a smaller sized 
212 
 
board can collaborate effectively with each other and thereby quicken the decision-
making process which help to improve firm performance (Dharmadasa et al. 2015).  
In contrast, the results show that board size has a positive influence on the 
ROE and Tobin’s Q while this positive effect is supported in the various literatures. 
It is argued that increasing the size of the board helps the board to assign more 
independent directors; a greater number of directors with unique experience and 
knowledge will enhance the board’s environment and assist them in making 
important decisions  (Elbadry et al. 2015; Ujunwa 2012). Moreover, boards which 
consist of a large number of directors are also able to effectively monitor the various 
processes and create effeienct subcommittes that help to increase firm performance 
(Anderson et al. 2004; Ntim and Soobaroyen 2013). The research results that reveal 
board size has a postive influnce on the ROA and a negative influnce on Tobin’s Q 
is consistent with the study of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in Malaysia. The positive 
effect on firm performance is compatible with the research conducted by Yasser et 
al. (2011) in Pakistan, Coles et al. (2008) in the US, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) in 
Africa. In addition, the negative effect on firm performance is consistent with the 
study of Rodríguez-Fernández (2015) in Europe, Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015) 
in the US, De Andres et al. (2005) in North America and Western Europe, 
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) in Iran. Moreover, the research result is consistent 
with the Saudi study of  Al-Matari et al. (2012) on Tobin’s Q while it contrasts the 
Saudi study of Ghabayen (2012) on ROA. Moreover, the research outcome reveals 
that there are differences between the sample of all firms and non-financial firms in 
regards to the relationship between the board size and the ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
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6.3.2.7 Board Independence 
The primary role of the board directors is to monitor the management and executives 
on the behalf of the shareholders so as to minimise the agency problems and to 
prevent the opportunistic behaviour; therefore, the type of directors may have an 
influence on the board’s performance. The research hypothesis relating to the effect 
of board independence on the firm’s performance states that there is a significant 
positive relationship between board independence and firm financial performance. 
The research outcome reports mixed results as it shows that the board 
independence has a significant positive influence on the ROA according to Model A 
while it has an influence on the ROA according to Models B, C, and D. In addition, 
the results show that there is a significant negative association between the board 
independence and the ROE in Model C while it has no significant influence on the 
remaining models. Since Models C and D are more efficient, it can be concluded 
that the board independence is insignificantly related to the ROA. In addition, it has 
a significant negative effect on the ROE in regards to the sample of all firms and has 
an insignificant effect on the non-financial firms. The results indicate an insignificant 
and negative relationship between the board independence and Tobin’s Q. The 
research results that reveal an insignificant effect is compatible with the pervious 
Saudi studies of  Al-Matari et al. (2012) and Ezzine (2011) as well as with the study 
of  Zabri et al. (2016) in Malaysia, and Zhang (2012) in China. In addition, the 
research results contrast with the Saudi study of Ghabayen (2012) as his study 
reports a negative effect on the ROA.  
The negative influence of independence directors on the ROE is due to the 
fact that independent directors can increase the diversity and disagreement 
between the board members which may reduce the level of cooperation in the 
decision-making process and consequently impact the firm’s performance 
(Goodstein et al. 1994). Moreover, different studies have reported that the board 
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independence has increased the number of agency issues and weaken the minoring 
role of the board  (Fernandes 2008). The research results of the negative effect of 
the independent directors is consistent with the study of Darko et al. (2016) in 
Ghana, Agrawal et al. (1996) in the US. On the other hand, the research result also 
reports positive influences of the board independence on the ROA which is referred 
to in the various literatures; the independent directors will bring new experiences to 
the firm which can improve the board decisions and the company’s activities (Ntim 
and Soobaroyen 2013). The positive effect is compatible with the results of the study 
conducted by Liu et al. (2015) in China and Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) in Africa. 
The result show a difference between the samples of all the firms and non-financial 
firms in the relationship between board independence and the ROE.  
 
6.3.2.8 Board Meetings 
The board meetings have a positive effect on board activities and firm performance 
while there is a disagreement within the empirical studies about the effect of these 
meetings on the firm performance. The research hypothesis for the board meetings 
states that there is a significant positive relationship between the number of board 
meetings and a firm’s financial performance. The empirical results of this research 
report produced mixed results. For the data between 2009 and 2014, the results 
show that the frequency of the board meetings has a significant negative effect on 
the ROA and has a significant positive effect on the Tobin’s Q. In addition, the board 
of directors’ meetings have an insignificant effect on the ROE. In regards to the data 
between 2006 and 2014, the results show that the board meetings have a significant 
positive influence on both the ROA and ROE while they have an insignificant 
influence on Tobin’s Q. The selected sample for the data between 2009 and 2014 
represents around 70% of the Saudi market compare with around 39% for the data 
collected between 2006 and 2014.  
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The result shows that the board meetings have a positive effect on the 
market-based performance and this is justified in the literatures by revealing that an 
increase in the number of board meetings will improve the monitoring role of the 
board as well as communication between the board members and the public which 
gives more confidence to investors and shareholders thereby leading to a high share 
trading volume  (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 2013; Elbadry et al. 2015; Ajina et al. 
2013). In addition, in regards to the agency issues in the firm, an increase in board 
meetings would strengthen the board’s ability to monitor the management’s 
activities which can reduce the agency’s problems. The positive influence is 
consistent with the study of Liang et al. (2013) in China, and Brick and Chidambaran 
(2010) in the US. In addition, the negative influence of board meetings on the ROA 
can be explained by the fact that a large number of board meetings will add more 
expenditure, costs, and compensations to the company which can reduce the 
company profits (Vafeas 1999b). This negative influence is compatible with the 
empirical studies of  Christensen et al. (2015) in Australia, and Vafeas (1999b) in 
the US. Moreover, the insignificant effect on performance is consistent with the 
study of Mehdi (2007)  in Tunisia and Jackling and Johl (2009) in India. The results 
also reveal that there is no difference between the sample of all firms and the non-
financial firms in regards to the relationship between board meetings and 
performance.  
 
6.3.2.9 CEO Duality 
The firm employs a strategy for assigning two different individuals to the position of 
board chairman and CEO in order to more effectively control the management’s 
actions. If the CEO takes the position of board chairman it will have a negative 
impact on the monitoring role of the board since the CEO would be able to dominate 
the board activities such as setting the meeting agenda and assigning new directors 
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which can increase the agency problems (Haniffa and Cooke 2002). The research 
measurements for the CEO duality show that the value is equal to 1 when the CEO 
and board chairman are different people and 0 when the same individual is assigned 
both positions. Therefore, when the coefficient of CEO duality is positive, this will 
have a negative influence on the firm’s performance. The research hypothesis of 
the CEO duality states that there is a significant negative relationship between CEO 
duality and firm financial performance. In regards to firms listed between 2006 and 
2014, the research’s empirical results reveal that the CEO duality has a weak 
significance and a negative influence on the ROA; moreover, it also has a strong 
significance and a negative influence on the ROE. For the firms listed between 2009 
and 2014, the CEO duality has a significant positive effect on the ROA and ROE. In 
addition, the result show that there is no significant relation between the CEO duality 
and Tobin’s Q.  
The result reveals differences in the significance level between the sample 
of all firms and non-financial firms. In addition, the result shows the negative effect 
of CEO duality during the period 2006-2014 while CEO duality had a positive effect 
during the period 2009-2014. The possible explanation for these differences is that 
in 2006, the Saudi CGRs started to recommend the code which states that it is 
forbidden to combine the position of executives and the board chairman (CMA 
2010). Therefore, the firms listed between 2006 and 2014 voluntarily implemented 
the separate roles since they intended to control the management’s action and 
reduce the number of agency problems unlike the firms listed between 2009 and 
2014 which applied the separation role simply because they did not want to violate 
the rules of the CMA; however, in reality the board chairman in their firms was 
controlled by the top executives who are the largest shareholders and family 
owners. As a result, the negative influence of CEO duality continued to exist in 
practices where there were no separate roles. The negative effect of CEO duality 
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on performance is consistent with the study of Tang (2016) and Duru et al. (2016) 
in the US,  Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) in Ghana, and Ezzine (2011) in Saudi 
Arabia. Moreover, the insignificant relationship between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q 
is compatible with the research of Al-Matari et al. (2012) in Saudi Arabia, and Zhang 
(2012) in China. However, the positive influence of CEO duality on performance 
between 2009 and 2014 may support the stewardship theory. The theory assumes 
that the CEOs are trustworthy so there is no need to monitor their activities and the 
CEO duality will provide the CEO with the ability to focus more on managing the 
firms and deal with all of the obstacles  (Donaldson and Davis 1991; Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni 1994). The positive effect of CEO duality is consistent with the study of  
Donaldson and Davis (1991) in the US.  
 
6.3.2.10 Board Subcommittees 
The board subcommittees are the main supporters of the board of directors’ 
activities. The majority of the  board plans and makes decisions by initially 
discussing them at the subcommittees level (Kesner 1988). Based on the corporate 
governance regulations (CGRs) in Saudi Arabia after 2009, the listed firms are 
obligated to establish audit, nomination and remuneration committees (CMA 2010). 
Therefore, approximately all of the firms in the sample of 2009-2014 contain all three 
committees; therefore, the research only uses the sample of 2006-2014 to 
investigate the relationship between board subcommittees and performance. The 
Saudi CGRs indicate that establishing the audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees will enhance the firm’s ability to make effective decisions and improve 
performance (CMA 2010). Therefore, the research hypothesis states that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the presence of board subcommittees and 
firm financial performance. The research results show that the board subcommittees 
of Model A have a significant and negative effect on the ROA, and a weak and 
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significant negative effect on the ROE while they have no significant effect on the 
ROA and ROE for Model B. As Model B is inefficient compare with Model A, it can 
conluded that it has negative effect on ROA and no effect on ROE. Moreover, there 
is no significant relation between the presence of board subcommittees and Tobin’s 
Q. 
 The negative influence of board subcommittees indicates that the Saudi 
listed firms established all three committees to adhere to the capital market 
authority; however, they do not give these committees the power to perform and 
effectively conduct their responsibilities and roles. Therefore, these ineffective board 
subcommittees will add only more costs and expenses to the firm such as travel 
costs and compensation fees whereas the most important and strategic plans and 
decisions are conducted by the board of directors as opposed to the subcommittees 
(Vafeas 1999b; Dalton et al. 1998). The empirical study conducted by Hearn (2011) 
in the West African market reports that it is not important for the firm to have audit 
and remuneration committees in order to improve the firm’s performance; moreover, 
it may negatively impact the information that is released to the public which could 
have a bad influence on the firm’s value. In addition, the research conducted by 
Christensen et al. (2015) discovered that there is no significant relationship between 
the audit committee and firm performance. From this discussion, it can be suggested 
that the Saudi Market Authority should add more codes and regulations to ensure 
that all board subcommittees aim to reach the committee objectives. The result also 
shows that the board subcommittees are significantly and negatively related to the 
accounting-based performance and insignificantly related to the market-based 
performance. 
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6.3.2.11 Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee plays an important role in observing the financial tasks in the 
company. The literatures discuss the effect of the committee on firm performance 
and provide inconclusive results. The research hypothesis regarding the effect of 
the audit committee size states that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the audit committee size and a firm’s financial performance. The empirical 
result shows that the audit committee size has a significant positive influence on the 
ROA and ROE; this result supports the research hypothesis. Moreover, the audit 
committee size has a significant negative effect on the Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the 
result indicates that the audit committee size has a positive effect on the accounting-
based performance and has a negative effect on the market-based performance. 
The results are consistent with the Saudi study of Al-Matari et al. (2012) on Tobin’s 
Q and contrast the Saudi study of Ghabayen (2012) on the ROA as his results 
suggest that there is no significant effect on the ROA. It is believed that a large audit 
committee will have a positive effect on the firm’s performance since there will be a 
greater number of members working on the committee to effectively monitor the 
management’s role; in addition, these new members can provide the necessary 
knowledge and skills in order to enhance the firm’s performance (Kalbers and 
Fogarty 1993 ; Anderson et al. 2004).  
The positive effect is compatible with the empirical research conducted by 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) in Africa, Afza and Nazir (2014) in Pakistan. In addition, 
the negative effect of the audit committee size originates from the argument that the 
large size of the audit committee will slow down the decision-making process as well 
as adding more costs and expenditure to the company’s budget which can decrease 
the profits. The result shows no difference between the sample of all firms and non-
financial firms regarding the relationship between the audit committee size and 
performance.   
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6.3.2.12 Audit Committee Meetings 
The audit committee meetings are regarded as being a determining factor of the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. The literatures that investigate the effect of the 
audit committee meetings are inconclusive. The research hypothesis for the effect 
of audit committee meetings indicates that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the number of audit committee meetings and firm financial performance. 
The research empirical results reveal that the audit committee meetings have a 
significant positive effect on the ROA for the data between 2009 and 2014. 
Moreover, the effect of audit committee meetings on Tobin’s Q is significant and 
negative for the period 2009-2014. The effect of audit committee meetings on the 
ROE is insignificant. The results indicate that the audit committee meetings have a 
positive influence on the accounting-based performance and a negative influence 
on the market-based performance. The result contrasts the Saudi study conducted 
by Al-Matari et al. (2012) which reports an insignificant influence on Tobin’s Q.  
The positive link between the meetings and performance is due to the fact 
that committee meetings increase the effectiveness of communications between the 
committee and the management which can improve the monitoring role and the 
audit tasks of the committee; furthermore, this can decrease the number of agency 
issues and improve the firm’s performance (Lin et al. 2006; Menon and Williams 
1994). The positive effect of the meetings is compatible with the empirical studies 
of Hoque et al. (2013) in Australia, and Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) in Africa. In 
contrast, the negative influence is justified by the notion that the committee meetings 
only represent the number of decisions made by the committee rather than how 
many were actually successful; moreover, the number of meetings are organised by 
firms with the objective of creating a positive image for the public rather than making 
improvements to the firm (Menon and Williams 1994; Bradbury 1990). The negative 
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link between audit committee meetings and performance is consistent with the 
empirical studies of  Ben Barka and Legendre (2016) in France, and Darko et al. 
(2016) in Ghana. Several literatures report that the insignificant audit committee 
meetings have an insignificant influence on firm performance, such as the study of 
Afza and Nazir (2014)  in Pakistan. Moreover, this research reports that there is no 
difference between the sample of all firms and non-financial firms regarding the 
relationship between the audit meetings and performance.   
 
6.3.2.13 Control Variables 
The research empirical results reveal that firm growth identified by the firm sales 
growth is strongly significant at a level of 1% and is positively associated with the 
ROA and ROE for all models. In addition, the sales growth has a strong significance 
and negatively effects Tobin’s Q of the Model C that includes the all firms sample 
during the period between 2009 and 2014. It also has a strong significance and a 
positive effect on the Tobin’s Q of Model D that contains the non-financial firms 
sample during the period between 2009 and 2014. Models A and B reveal that the 
effects on Tobin’s Q are considered inefficient due to the fact that there is a greater 
number of instruments than the number of observations made. The research results 
indicate differences between the firms’ accounting-based performance and market-
based performance in regards to firm growth. In addition, the differences between 
the sample of all firms and non-financial firms concerning the effect on Tobin’s Q 
imply that the banks and insurance companies convert the positive relationship 
between the firm growth and Tobin’s Q to a negative one. The positive influence of 
firm growth on performance is consistent with the study of Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) and it is argued that the firm growth is more likely improve company 
performance. In addition, the research outcomes reveal that the firm leverage has 
a significant and negative influence on the ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q for all models 
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except Model C in regards to the ROE and Tobin’s Q proxy as their relationship is 
negative although insignificant.  
This negative effect of leverage on firm performance rejects the argument 
that the high leverage allows greater control over management actions since their 
actions are observed by the financial institutions which can decrease the number of 
agency issues and improve the firm performance. The result indicates that even the 
leverage can help to control the management although it may add more costs, risks, 
and liabilities to companies as well as external controls on company management 
which does not necessarily lead to high performance. In addition, the negative result 
supports the argument put forward by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that the high level 
of leverage may encourage companies to undergo risky investments in an attempt 
to increase performance. The negative effect of leverage is compatible with the 
study of Chen et al. (2005). In regards to the firm’s size, the research’s empirical 
results reveal that firm size has a significant positive influence on the ROA and ROE 
in Models A and B and on the ROE in Models C and D. Furthermore, it has a 
significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q during the period 2009-2014. Therefore, the 
result shows that the firm’s size has a positive effect on accounting-based 
performance and a negative effect on market-based performance. In addition, there 
is no difference in the results between the sample of all firm and non-financial firms. 
The positive result supports the notion that larger firms have the capability to gain 
financial and non-financial resources for their investments at lower costs and are 
also able to reduce the effect of any type of risks. The positive effect is consistent 
with the research conducted by Fauzi and Locke (2012) in New Zealand, Boussaada 
and Karmani (2015) in MENA counties, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in Malaysia, and 
Mehdi (2007) in Tunisia.         
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6.3.2.14 Market Reform 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) in Saudi Arabia established the corporate 
governance regulations in 2006 to reform the market following the stock market 
crash. The governance regulations were initially implemented only as a set of 
guidelines for listed firms and only became mandatory in 2009. The research adds 
the market reform variable (MARE) to investigate the effect of this reforms on firm 
performance. Due to the effect that the governance regulations become mandatory 
only after 2009, the research utilises year dummies and set a value of 1 for the years 
from 2009 till 2014 and set the value at 0 for the years from 2006 till 2008. The 
research outcome reveals mixed results as the market reform had a non-
significance effect on the ROA while it had a strong significance and a negative 
effect on the ROE. This result indicates that there is no conclusive result for the 
effect of market reform on the firm perofmance. 
Therefore, the market reform which introduced obligatory governance codes 
failed to improve the firms’ performance; there is a different explanation for this 
result. Firstly, as the governance reform is new in the Saudi market, it may require 
a longer period of time in order to be effectively applied in the listed firms. Secondly, 
it may be that the firms incorporate the obligatory codes for public appearance only 
rather than intending to improvement its management. For example, the firm may 
assign more independent directors to the board although in reality these directors 
are controlled by the large shareholders and family owners. In addition, the firm may 
establish board subcommittees although these subcommittees do not have the 
power and authority to effectively carry out their roles and responsibilities. Several 
listed companies in Saudi Arabia are owned by families and these families are the 
larger shareholders who would prefer to assign board chairman and independent 
directors who are under their control since they want to implement and direct 
strategic plans and make important decisions. Therefore, due to the possible effect 
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of these larger shareholders on violating the objectives of the governance 
regulations, the CMA should assess the current regulations and introduce new rules 
and procedures that can prevent firms from manipulating the corporate governance 
practices. 
 
 6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the dependent and control variables used in the 
regression analysis. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE) and Tobin's Q, while the control variables comprised of firm growth 
(SAGR), leverage (LVRG), firm size (SIZE), year dummy (Year) and industry 
dummy (Industry). The chapter also presented the regression analysis that was 
conducted in order to investigate the effect of corporate governance components on 
firm financial performance. A justification was provided for selecting the System 
GMM model as the most appropriate analytical model in this research context. 
Finally, the chapter discussed and explained the regression results in terms of the 
effect of each corporate governance variable on firm financial performance. The 
results indicated that ownership concentration and government ownership have a 
negative influence on ROA and ROE. Government ownership was determined to 
have no significant correlation with Tobin’s Q. Moreover, institutional ownership has 
a significant positive effect on ROE and Tobin’s Q, whereas it has no impact on 
ROA. Moreover, director ownership had a non-significant effect on ROA, a positive 
influence on ROE, as well as a negative impact on Tobin’s Q. In terms of managerial 
ownership, this had a positive influence on a company’s accounting-based 
performance, alongside an insignificant influence on firms’ market-based 
performance. Furthermore, the research results provided a varied picture regarding 
the effect of board size and board independence on firms’ financial performance. 
The results showed that the frequency of board meetings has a negative effect on 
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ROA, a positive effect on Tobin’s Q, as well as an insignificant effect on ROE. 
Concerning CEO duality, this had a positive effect on ROA and ROE, while no 
significant effect on Tobin’s Q was found. Moreover, board subcommittees were 
negatively correlated to ROA, while a weak yet significant negative effect on ROE 
over the entire firm sample, while having no significant effect on ROA and ROE for 
non-financial firms. Additionally, audit committee size was found to be positively 
correlated to ROA and ROE, while having a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q. 
Audit committee meetings was in positive correlation to ROA, had a negative effect 
on Tobin’s Q, alongside an insignificant impact on ROE. Finally, market reform was 
weakly significant in terms of the negative effect on ROA, while it had strongly 
significant, negative impact on ROE. This result suggests that the firm performed 
with greater efficiency between 2006 and 2008 than between 2009 and 2014. The 
subsequent chapter presents the event study methodology adopted to examine the 
extent of information leakage incidents prior to earnings announcements in the 
Saudi market. The chapter will also present the empirical results and discussion 
related to this examination.   
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Chapter 7:  
The extent of Information Leakage before Earnings 
Announcements in the Saudi Stock Exchange 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the regression analysis that was applied in order to 
assess the impact of corporate governance components on firm financial 
performance. The justification was provided for adopting the System GMM model 
as the most suitable analytical method. Furthermore, the regression outcomes 
regarding the impact of corporate governance variables on firm financial 
performance were outlined. One of the main objectives of this research is to 
investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm information 
leakage. Therefore, this chapter investigates the presence and extent of information 
leakage incidents prior to official earnings announcements in the Saudi Stock 
Exchange. The research focused on earnings announcements, because these are 
frequent announcements by all listed firms, thus being a crucial means of all 
investors evaluating a firm’s future and deciding on their investments. The chapter 
provides an in-depth clarification of the event methodology, the event data and 
window, as well as the data and the sample. The research utilised three models for 
calculating the abnormal returns, namely the constant mean return model, the 
market adjusted model and the market model. Additionally, the research applied the 
cross-sectional t test as a means of assessing the hypothesis of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns. Finally, this chapter discusses the results of the 
investigation of the cumulative abnormal returns, as well as information leakage 
prior to the quarterly and annual earnings announcements, across the period 2006-
2014. Thus, the chapter is divided as follows: Section 7.2 described the event study 
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methodology that used in this research. Section 7.3 discussed the empirical results 
and discussion to reveal the presence of information leakage in the Saudi market. 
7.4 is the conclusion.  
 
7.2 Methodology  
To inspect the phenomenon of information leakage before the earnings 
announcements, the research applied the event study methodology which is an 
approach used in finance literature to examine the financial, economic, and political 
events or announcements, such as mergers and acquisitions, earnings 
announcements, dividends, and new laws, and their influence on stock prices or 
volumes. McWilliams and Siegel (1997, p. 626) indicated that the event study 
method is more common in the literature because it avoided the need “to analyse 
accounting-based measures of profit, which have been criticised because they are 
often not very good indicators of the true performance of firms”. Fama et al. (1969) 
stated that the event study methodology is a statistical method that is ordinarily 
applied to reveal how the new companies’ information and announcements can 
influence these companies’ performances. It is a method commonly implemented in 
researches related to the financial, accounting, and economic areas (Binder 1998). 
Arffa (2001) indicated that the assumption of implementing the event study 
methodology originated in the meaning of the ‘efficient market’, which states that all 
information publicly revealed in the market should already be reflected in 
companies’ stock prices. Thus, under the assumption of the efficient market, the 
influence of the new announcements should be available in the stock prices 
however, in some situations, some investors may receive the new announcement 
before it is officially released to the public and the market. This leakage of 
information causes the market to become less efficient and may lead to an increase 
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in corruption through individuals using this information for insider trading activities. 
This can harm weak investors who are not able to gain such inside information.  
The procedures of event studies are generally comparable and have some 
differences depending on both the applied models and the limits of the event window 
and the estimation period (MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Binder, 
1998). The following is a summary for these procedures, followed by details of the 
procedures that were implemented in the research:  
- The first step is to identify both the event date and time, and also the event 
window before and after the event date that needs to be covered by the 
research. Furthermore, the estimation period should also be assigned to 
calculate the appropriate estimation of the parameters and means for the 
expected return models. 
- The second step is to select the sample of companies that would come under 
the research examination and their expected duration for this examination.   
- The third step is to identify the selected models that will estimate the 
expected normal return of stocks in the case of the event not occurring.  
- When the expected return of stocks is identified, the next step is to calculate 
the abnormal returns during the chosen event window and cumulate these 
abnormal returns for specific periods during the event window. 
- The final step is to define the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
and the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
7.2.1 The Event Date 
The first and most important task in the event study is to identify the event type and 
date, which is labelled (0 day), in the event window, and the dispenser between the 
pre- and post-event date. Choosing the appropriate event type and date is important 
in order to generate reliable outcomes regarding the implied information around the 
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event date. Akbar and Baig (2010) stated that the event date is the date when a new 
event or information is issued and announced to the public and all investors - either 
by firms or other types of media. The event dates utilised in this research are the 
quarterly earnings announcements and the annual earnings announcements of the 
firms listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). The announcements and 
events, such as earnings announcements, are significant for all participants in the 
market in order to take important decisions related to their investments. Beaver 
(1968) stated that different types of information, such as earnings and financial 
announcements, as well as analysts’ recommendations, can change the investors’ 
views and decisions regarding their assessment of an equity. The dates of the 
quarterly and annual earnings announcements are unknown to all investors, and 
therefore they are the appropriate events chosen to investigate both the information 
leakage phenomenon and insider trading before the announcement date in the 
Saudi Stock Exchange.  
All Saudi listed firms are obligated by Article 43 of the Listing Rules of the 
stock market to release to the public their quarterly and annual financial reports via 
the official electronic application and website of the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(www.tadawul.com.sa) (CMA 2004). Besides, listed firms are prohibited from 
leaking the announcements to the shareholders or third parties before they have 
been issued publicly on the market’s official website (CMA 2004). Moreover, Article 
43 states that the firms’ financial reports must be released to the public as soon as 
they are approved by the firms, and whilst there is no strict date firms do have to 
declare their earnings within fifteen days for the quarterly earnings and forty days 
for the annual earnings announcements, starting from the end of each financial 
period (CMA 2004).  
This research used two types of earnings announcements - the quarterly and 
the annual - because they have some differences. Firstly, the annual financial and 
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earnings report is required by the Saudi authority to be reviewed and audited by an 
accounting company while the quarterly financial report is only required to be 
approved by the firms so that the annual report is more responsible and creditable. 
Secondly, a study by  Albogami et al. (1997) and Alzahrani (2009) showed that the 
investors’ reactions towards the announcements of Saudi firms are different 
between the quarterly and annual financial reports. Therefore, investigating these 
quarterly and annual announcements will confirm the reliability and generality of the 
event study results regarding the availability of the information leakage and the 
efficiency in Saudi’s stock market. Additionally, because the annual financial 
announcements are more accountable and reliable, and the investors have different 
reactions depending on the nature of the news, the research divides the annual 
announcements into two types - good or bad news - based on the nature of the 
disclosures in order to identify the differences in event study outcomes between the 
good and bad news.  
 
7.2.1 The Data 
The data of the event study utilised in this research covers a long period, which is 
all the earnings announcements of all the Saudi listed firms from the first quarterly 
earnings announcements of 2006 until the last quarterly earnings announcements 
for 2014. In addition, it covers all annual earnings announcements of the listed firms 
from the annual earnings announcements of 2006 until the annual earnings 
announcements for 2014. However, the research excludes any earnings 
announcement associated with missing stock prices during the event window and 
estimation period because without the stock prices of the firm for these periods, the 
event study cannot be performed. All earnings announcements were extracted 
manually from the official website of the market (www.tadawul.com.sa) by 
documenting the announcement date and time. When the earnings announcement 
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is issued during the working hours of the stock market, the announcement date is 
classified as a (0 day) in the event window. If the announcement is published while 
the market is closed, the following working day of the stock market is classified as 
a (0 day).  
For the annual announcement, the announcements are classified based on 
the nature of the news, whether this is good or bad. If the current annual earnings 
are better than the previous year’s, the news is considered as good news, whereas 
if the current earnings are less or equal to the earnings of the previous year, the 
news is deemed as bad. Moreover, the research focused on the period between 
2006 and 2014 because the Saudi corporate governance codes were issued as 
guidance in 2006, and the authority began in 2009 in order to impose some 
important codes such as increasing the non-executives and independent directors, 
establishing audits, numeration and nomination committees, and creating a system 
for insider monitoring and control. Therefore, it is important to investigate this period 
to reveal the effect of issuing and imposing the corporate governance codes on 
market transparency and on the existence of information leakage issues. 
Furthermore, no event study has been conducted concerning the information 
leakage phenomenon in the Saudi market that covers this long period before and 
after imposing the corporate governance codes upon the Saudi listed firms. The 
data related to the daily Saudi market index (TASI) and the daily stock price for each 
firm were downloaded, firm by firm, from an information provider licensed by 
Tadawul. The data of the market index and daily stock prices included the period 
between 2005 and mid-2015 to calculate the parameters and means for the 
expected return models.    
  
7.2.2 Event Window and Estimation Period 
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The main steps in the event study are to identify the type of event and to define the 
period in which the stock prices of firms included in the event will be investigated 
(Campbell et al. 1997).  MacKinlay (1997) stated that the period of interest in the 
event window often includes multiple days and, at the very least, contains the event 
day, but it may also include days before and after the event day. McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997) reviewed several literatures pertaining to event study and they 
showed that the minimum period in the event window was one day before and after 
the event day, and that the maximum period was 90 days before and 100 days after 
the event day. Nobanee et al. (2009) indicated that choosing the limit of the event 
window is subjective, and McWilliams and Siegel (1997) stated that not only should 
the event window be long enough to catch the influence of the event, but also short 
enough to eliminate any disturbing influence - especially whereby a very long 
window may reduce the power of the test statistics. Zhang's study (2012) into the 
earnings announcements and information leakage, as well as the study of Meznar 
et al. (1994), used the length (-30, 10) as an event window. Meanwhile, McWilliams 
and Siegel (1997) argued that the length of the event window should be identified 
depending on the nature of the event, thus, if the event study seeks to explore the 
information leakage, the event window should contain some days before the event 
day so as to catch the abnormal returns connected to the leakage of information. 
Considering the event date is a (0) day, this research applies a medium length event 
window - which is (-30, 10) trading days for the annual earnings announcements 
and (-20, 10) trading days for the quarterly earnings announcements. This length of 
window is deemed sufficient for investigating the presence of information leakage 
before the event date and also for demonstrating the market reaction and 
adjustment to the earnings announcements after the event date.  
In addition to the event window, the estimation period should be defined to 
ascertain the movement and returns of the stock price in the absence of the event. 
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It is used to calculate the parameters and return means for the normal expected 
return models. The estimation period is the days before or after the event window 
as it is assumed that the event doesn’t have an influence on these days and so they 
are deemed the appropriate time to calculate the normal returns. Campbell et al. 
(1997) stated that the most popular and reasonable selection is to apply the 
estimation period before the event window, and when the event study applies the 
daily data, the estimation period could be over 120 days before the event window. 
The longer estimation period is better for minimising the effect of such events on 
stock prices. This research utilises a long estimation period with 200 trading days 
before the event window to enhance the reliability of the results of the expected 
normal return and to minimise any biases. Thus, the estimation period for the 
quarterly earnings announcements is (-220, -21) and the estimation period for the 
annual earnings announcements is (-230, -31). 
 
7.2.3 Abnormal Returns 
The information leakage is investigated through exploring the abnormal returns 
before the earnings announcements. Therefore, the main task in the event study is 
to identify the expected normal returns because the abnormal return is the difference 
between the actual return and the expected normal return (Kothari and Warner, 
2006). Thus, the equation for the abnormal return for firm i at time t is:  
ARit = Rit  +  E(Rit) 
Where ARit, Rit , and E(Rit) are the abnormal, actual and expected normal returns, 
respectively, for firm i at time t. The expected, or normal, return is defined as “the 
expected return without conditioning on the event taking place” (MacKinlay 1997). 
There are several models applied in previous literatures to identify the expected 
normal returns, such as the constant mean return model, the capital assets pricing 
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model (CAPM), the market model, and the market-adjusted model (Brown and 
Warner, 1980; Brown and Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 
1997). It is common in research to use two or more different models to estimate the 
anticipated normal returns.   
 Brown and Warner (1980) indicated that there was a small difference in the 
abnormal performance between the constant mean return model, the market-
adjusted model, and the market model, however, when there was a clustering issue 
the models’ combined data from the market performed better than the constant 
return model. In addition, MacKinlay (1997) stated that the restrictions imposed by 
the CAPM model are doubtful and the issue can be lessened by applying the market 
model, which is considered the common model for estimating the expected return. 
To confirm the reliability and validity of the event study results, this research uses 
three models to estimate the expected normal return- the constant mean return 
model, the market model, and the market-adjusted model, as presented in Brown 
and Warner (1980; 1985),, Campbell et al. (1997), MacKinlay (1997), and Kothari 
and Warner (2006).  
 
7.2.3.1 Constant Mean Return Model 
The constant mean return model assumes the expected return for a specific security 
is constant, but which can be different between securities (Brown and Warner, 
1980). The equation of the expected return in the constant mean return model is: 
E(Rit) = μi + εit 
E (εit) = 0          var (εit) =  σεi
2  
where E(Rit) is the expected return of a given security i at time t, μi is the mean 
return of the security i during the estimation period, and εit  is the time period t 
disturbance term for stock i with an expectation of (0) and variance (σεi
2 ) (MacKinlay, 
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1997; Campbell et al., 1997). Brown and Warner (1980; 1985) indicated that even 
the constant mean return model is considered a simple model but it often provides 
outcomes comparable to the outcomes generated by the advanced models.    
 
7.2.3.2 Market-adjusted Model 
The market-adjusted model assumes that the expected returns are equivalent 
across securities, but this may not be constant for a specific security at different 
times (Brown and Warner, 1980). In the market-adjusted model, the abnormal return 
for security i at time t is: 
ARit = Rit  - Rmt 
where ARit is the abnormal return of security i at time t, Rit is the actual return of 
security i at time t, and Rmt is the market return at time t (Brown and Warner, 1980; 
Brown and Warner, 1985; Kothari and Warner, 1997). Therefore, identifying the 
abnormal returns through the market-adjusted model doesn’t contain the estimation 
period.  
 
7.2.3.3 Market Model 
The market model is a statistical model that links any security return to the market 
portfolio return, with the equation of this model as follows: 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit 
E (εit) = 0          var (εit) =  σεi
2  
where Rit is the expected return of security i at time t, Rmt is the market index return 
at time t, εit is the (0) mean disturbance term, and αi, βi, and  σεi
2  are the parameters 
of the market model (Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997). MacKinlay (1997) 
stated that the market model is more advanced compared with the constant mean 
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return model as it lowers the variance in the abnormal returns by reducing the 
variance in the market return, which can in turn increase the chance of revealing the 
event’s influence. For all three models of the expected returns, the daily stock return 
is calculated using the historical information of firms’ stock by applying the following 
formula: 
Rit = (CSit - CSit−1)/(CSit−1) 
Where Rit is the stock rate of return of firm i at time t, and CSit is the close price of 
stock of firm i at time t. In addition, the market index (TASI) return is calculated by 
utilising the historical information of TASI and implementing the following formula: 
Rmt = (C𝑀t - CMt−1)/(CMt−1) 
Where Rmt is the TASI index rate of return at time t, and CMt is the close value of 
TASI at time t. 
 
7.2.4 Aggregation and Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The research applies the constant mean return mode, the market-adjusted model, 
and the market model to identity the abnormal returns of each stock in order to 
reveal the influence of the event on the stock price during the event window, and to 
therefore investigate the phenomenon of information leakage before the 
announcements in each stock. MacKinlay (1997) stated that the abnormal return 
investigations have to be aggregated to produce an overall conclusion regarding the 
influence of the studied event, whereby the aggregation occurs in two ways - 
through time and across stocks. Thus, the research aggregates the event studies of 
each stock through time, and the research then aggregates the event studies of all 
the quarterly earnings announcements together through both time and stocks. 
Furthermore, the research aggregates the event studies of all the annual earnings 
announcements together through both time and stocks. The aggregation of these 
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events works under the assumption that there is no clustering or overlap in the event 
window of any of the studied stocks, which indicates that the abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns are independent across stocks (MacKinlay, 1997). The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are important in making different periods for the 
event window, and the cumulative abnormal returns are defined as the sum of the 
abnormal returns from 𝑡1  to  𝑡2   which  𝑡1  ≤ 𝑡2 as shown in the following formula 
(Campbell et al., 1997):  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
This formula is for one stock so the abnormal returns can be cumulative stock by 
stock, and then the cumulative abnormal returns of all the stocks would be 
aggregated through time as the following formula (Campbell et al., 1997): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
This research uses different event windows for cumulative abnormal returns to 
investigate the information leakage incident before the earnings announcements, 
but also does so to reveal the market reaction after the earnings announcements. 
The event windows for the quarterly and annual earnings announcements are 
(0,10), (0,5), (-1,0), (-2,0), (-3,0), (-4,0), (-5,0), (-10,0), (-15,0), and (-20,0), while for 
the annual earnings announcements, there are two windows added - (-25, 0) and (-
30, 0).    
 
7.2.5 The Test Statistics 
The test statistics assess the null hypothesis concerning the abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns. The null hypothesis in the event study is that both the 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are equal to (0) in the event window, 
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depending on the efficient market hypothesis. When the test result indicates 
statistical significance with abnormal returns and cumulative returns not equal to (0), 
that means the null hypothesis is rejected. MacKinlay (1997) indicated that using 
the statistical test for one event investigation is not likely to be adequate, and 
therefore the statistical test should focus on the aggregated event studies. 
Additionally, Brown and Warner (1985) stated that the strength of the statistical test 
would be weakened by the returns of one stock as it has high variance, and also the 
Central Limit Theorem confirms that the returns in the cross-section of stocks are 
independent and identically distributed so that the distribution of the sample’s mean 
returns would be close to normal as the number of stocks rise. Therefore, the 
statistical test would be conducted on the events of annual and quarterly earnings 
announcements which are aggregated through both time and stocks, and also on 
the different aggregated windows of the cumulative abnormal returns. This test is to 
generate clear conclusions about the effect of the event on stocks as well as the 
presence of the information leakage in the Saudi market. The literatures argued that 
the parametric test depends on the significant assumption that the abnormal returns 
of one firm are normally distributed (Serra, 2002).  
This research uses a parametric test - the cross-sectional t test - to assess 
the null hypothesis related to the event studies. The cross-sectional test also 
assumes that the abnormal returns of stocks are independent and identically 
distributed (Saens and Sandoval, 2005). The test was first discussed by Brown and 
Warner (1985) as they observed that the traditional t-statistics do not work well when 
examining the abnormal returns on the event date when the variance rises (Higgins 
& Peterson, 1998). The cross-sectional t test was discussed by Brown and Warner 
(1985), Higgins and Peterson (1998), Serra (2002), and Saens and Sandoval 
(2005). The cross-sectional test for testing the null hypothesis of the aggregated 
abnormal returns - which is the average abnormal returns (AAR) at time t - is  
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tAARt =  
AARt
SDAARt
 
Therefore, the average abnormal return is divided by its contemporary standard 
deviation cross-section and the standard deviation is as follows: 
SDAARt =  √
1
N(N − 1)
∑  (ARt − AARt)2
N
i=1
 
Thus, the cross-sectional test is close to the traditional t-statistics but it uses the 
standard deviation over the event window instead of the standard deviation over 
the estimation period (Higgins and Peterson, 1998). For the cumulative returns the 
cross-sectional test for testing the aggregated cumulative abnormal returns - which 
is the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from the interval time t1 to t2 - 
is as follows: 
tCAAR(t1,T2) =  
CAAR(t1,t2)
SDCAAR(t1,t2)
 
Where t1 < t2, and the standard deviation of the cumulative average abnormal 
returns is: 
SDCAAR(t1,t2) =  √
1
N(N − 1)
∑  (CARi(t1,t2) − CAAR(t1,t2))
2
N
i=1
 
Based on the efficient market hypothesis, the average abnormal returns and the 
cumulative average abnormal returns are equal to (0), and therefore the following 
null hypothesis for the cumulative average abnormal returns can be tested: 
H: The expected cumulative average abnormal return before earinings 
announcment is equal to (0). 
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7.3 The Empirical Results and Discussion 
7.3.1 The Empirical Results 
The research sample of the event study includes all the quarterly and annual 
earnings announcements published on the official website of the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul), and covers the period from the 2006 to 2014 financial years. 
The data is divided into all the periods from 2006 to 2014, from 2006 to 2008, and 
from 2009 to 2014. These divisions arose because between 2006 and 2008 the 
Saudi corporate governance regulations were set only as a guidance for all firms, 
but from the beginning of 2009 the authority started to impose several important 
codes. Therefore, the period between 2009 and 2014 is different from the years 
between 2006 and 2008 as all Saudi listed firms were obligated by law from 2009 
to apply several codes such as raising the number of non-executives and 
independents on the board, creating the audit, numeration and nomination 
committees, drafting internal corporate governance codes, laying down specific 
standards for the board membership, and establishing a special system for the firms’ 
insider monitoring and control.  
Therefore, the research aims to investigate the market transparency and the 
presence of the information leakage problem before and after imposing the 
important corporate governance regulations in order to reveal how setting the CGR 
as guidance and imposing its important codes improve the market transparency and 
decrease the issue of the information leakage. However, few earnings 
announcements were excluded because there was no information related to the 
stock prices associated with these announcements to calculate the firms’ abnormal 
returns. Moreover, because the annual financial report is more responsible and 
creditable compared with the quarterly report, the research also divides the annual 
data based on the type of announcements into good and bad news to show how the 
result is different depending on the nature of the announcements.   
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Reporting the number of events during the period between 2006 and 2014, 
Table 7-1 shows the number of the quarterly earnings announcements based on the 
three types of period. There are 4420 quarterly earnings reports from the financial 
years of 2006 until the financial year of 2014.MoreoverFurthermore, the number of 
the quarterly earnings disclosures for the period between 2006 and 2008 is 912. For 
the period between 2009 and 2014, there were 3508 quarterly earnings 
announcements. In contrast, Table 7-2 reports the number of the annual earnings 
disclosures with three different kinds of period and with two types of news - good 
and bad. The number of the annual reports between 2006 and 2014 are 1135 
divided between 663 goods news and 472 bad news. Moreover, the years between 
2006 and 2008 contain 162 annual earnings announcements with 109 goods news 
and 53 bad news, while the years between 2009 and 2014 includes 973 annual 
earnings disclosures with 554 good news and 419 bad news. The results of the 
annual reports show that the announcements containing good news concerning the 
firms’ earnings are more than the announcements with bad news.     
Table 7- 1: Number of quarterly earnings announcements   
2006-2014 2006-2008 2009-2014 
4420 912 3508 
 
Table 7- 2: Number of annual earnings announcements with good and bad news  
2006-2014 2006-2008 2009-2014 
All Good Bad All Good Bad All Good Bad 
1135 663 472 162 109 53 973 554 419 
 
The following tables report the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) before and after 
the quarterly and annual earnings announcements which are calculated via three 
models – the market-adjusted model, the constant mean return model, and the 
market model. The presence of abnormal returns before the earnings disclosures is 
a signal for insider trading based on insider information leaked before the official 
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announcements, and which violates the law of the market and increases the 
information asymmetry issue between the investors. The following table presents 
the event study results based on three periods which are all the samples between 
2006 and 2014, the sample between 2006 and 2008, and the sample between 2009 
and 2014, as all these periods cover the years from issuing the CGR as a guide and 
also cover the data before and after imposing the main codes in the CGR. Moreover, 
as the annual announcements are more credited, the results are presented based 
on the type of the disclosures to reveal the difference in the level of the information 
leakage between the good and bad news.  
Table 7-3 reports the CARs of the quarterly disclosures for all the three 
periods that are calculated by the market-adjusted model. In the CARs between 
2006 and 2014, for the pre-announcement there is a significant CAR at (-20, 0) with 
0.0046 that is decreased to 0.0021 at CAR (-10, 0), and also decreased further to -
0.0024 at CAR (-1, 0), one day before the announcement. In the post-
announcement, the insignificant CAR is increased to -0.0004 at CAR (0, 5) but 
increased significantly to 0.0039 at CAR (0, 10). Thus, the results show significant 
CARs in the pre-announcement. In the period before imposing the CGR between 
2006 and 2008, the pre-announcement CARs shows that the CAR (-20, 0) is 
significant with -.0205, which increased to -0.0076 at CAR (-10, 0) and to -0.0062 at 
(-1, 0). With the post-announcements, the CAR (0, 5) is weakly significant with -
0.0065, which increased to an insignificant value of -0.0002 at CAR (0, 10). In 
contrast, the CARs in the period after imposing the CGR between 2009 and 2014 
report that there is a significant pre-announcement CAR at (-20, 0) with 0.0111, 
which is significantly decreased to 0.0046, and is also decreased to -0.0014 at CAR 
(-1, 0), one day before the announcement. For the post-announcement period, there 
is a non-significant CAR at (0, 5) with 0.0012, which increased to a significant CAR 
at (0, 10) with 0.005.  
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Table 7- 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around 4420 quarterly earnings 
announcements- (Market Adjusted Model). 
Window 
Mean 
2006-2014 
Mean 
2006-2008 
Mean 
2009-2014 
Pro-announcements 
(0, 10) 
0.0039 
2.85*** 
-0.0002 
-0.05 
0.005 
3.73*** 
(0, 5) 
-0.0004 
-0.39 
-0.0065 
-1.92* 
0.0012 
1.13 
Pre-announcements 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0024 
-3.95*** 
-0.0062 
-3.47*** 
-0.0014 
-2.34** 
(-2, 0) 
-0.0024 
-3.31*** 
-0.0099 
-4.39*** 
-0.0004 
-0.63 
(-3, 0) 
-0.0025 
-3.07*** 
-0.0124 
-4.69*** 
0.0001 
0.09 
(-4, 0) 
-0.0029 
-3.315*** 
-0.0154 
-5.26*** 
0.0003 
0.39 
(-5, 0) 
-0.0021 
-2.19** 
-0.014 
-4.36*** 
0.001 
1.16 
(-10, 0) 
0.0021 
1.78* 
-0.0076 
-2.08** 
0.0046 
4.02*** 
(-15, 0) 
0.0034 
2.41** 
-0.0091 
-2.30** 
0.0066 
4.63*** 
(-20, 0) 
0.0046 
2.76*** 
-0.0205 
-4.34*** 
0.0111 
6.64*** 
The cross-sectional t test is used and reported under the CARs value. Significance levels are reported as 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
Additionally, table 7-4 concerns the CARs of the quarterly earnings 
announcements that are calculated by the constant mean return model, within the 
three types of periods. For the sample period between 2006 and 2014, the pre-
announcement CARs shows that the CAR (-20, 0) is significant at -0.0101, which 
changed to -0.0114 at CAR (-10, 0), and to -0,007 at CAR (-1, 0). For the post-
announcement window, the CAR (0, 5) is -0.0026, which increased significantly to 
0.003 at CAR (0, 10). In the period before enforcing the CGR between 2006 and 
2008, the pre-announcement CARs shows that the CAR (-20, 0) is significant at -
0.0205, which decreased to -0.0529 at CAR (-10, 0) and then increased to -0.0226 
at CAR (-1, 0). For the post-announcement window, the CAR (0, 5) is significant at 
-0.0361, which decreased to -0.039 at CAR (0, 10). In comparison, the CARs in the 
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period after enforcing the CGR between 2009 and 2014 show that there is a 
significant CARs in both CAR (-20, 0) and CAR (-15, 0) at 0.0107 and 0.0042, 
respectively, which decreased to a non-significant value of -0.0006 at CAR (-10, 0), 
and also decreased significantly to -0.003 at (-1, 0), one day before the 
announcement. For the post-announcement time, there is significant CARs at (0, 5) 
of 0.0061, which raised to 0.0151 at CAR (0, 10).  
Table 7- 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around 4420 quarterly earnings 
announcements- (Constant Mean Return Model). 
Window 
Mean 
2006-2014 
Mean 
2006-2008 
Mean 
2009-2014 
Pro-announcements 
(0, 10) 
0.0039 
2.28** 
-0.039 
-6.88*** 
0.0151 
9.73*** 
(0, 5) 
-0.0026 
-1.98** 
-0.0361 
-7.88*** 
0.0061 
5.42*** 
Pre-announcements 
(-1, 0) 
-0.007 
-9.59*** 
-0.0226 
-9.26*** 
-0.003 
-4.56*** 
(-2, 0) 
-0.0094 
-10.68*** 
-0.0326 
-10.54*** 
-0.0034 
-4.61*** 
(-3, 0) 
-0.0121 
-11.88*** 
-0.0428 
-11.70*** 
-0.0042 
-5.10*** 
(-4, 0) 
-0.0145 
-12.64*** 
-0.0511 
-12.25*** 
-0.0049 
-5.59*** 
(-5, 0) 
-0.0145 
-11.51*** 
-0.0528 
-11.36*** 
-0.0045 
-4.70*** 
(-10, 0) 
-0.0114 
-7.44*** 
-0.0529 
-10.01*** 
-0.0006 
-0.48 
(-15, 0) 
-0.0096 
-5.30*** 
-0.0623 
-11.25*** 
0.0042 
2.46** 
(-20, 0) 
-0.0101 
-4.56*** 
-0.0205 
-4.34*** 
0.0107 
5.17*** 
The cross-sectional t test is used and reported under the CARs value. Significance levels are reported as 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
Moreover, table 7-5 reports the CARs of the quarterly earnings disclosures 
during the three types of data that are identified by the market model. In the full 
sample period between 2006 and 2014, the pre-announcements CARs demonstrate 
that the CAR (-20, 0) is significant at -0.0042 which is increased to -0.0025 at CAR 
(-10, 0) and to -0.0033 at CAR (-1, 0). For the post-announcement window, the CAR 
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(0, 5) is significant with -0.003. For the period between 2006 and 2008, the pre-
announcement results report that the CAR (-20, 0) is significant with -0.0378 which 
increased significantly to -0.0179 at CAR (-10, 0) and to -0.0073 at CAR (-1, 0). The 
post-announcement CAR is significant at -0.0099 at CAR (0, 5). In contrast, the 
period between 2009 and 2014 shows significant CARs at (-20, 0) at 0.0045, which 
is decreased to 0.0015 at (-10, 0) and also to -0.0022 at (-1, 0). The post-
announcement CAR is non-significant with -0.0012 at CAR (0, 5).  
Table 7- 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around 4420 quarterly earnings 
announcements- (Market Model). 
Window 
Mean 
2006-2014 
Mean 
2006-2008 
Mean 
2009-2014 
Pro-announcements 
(0, 10) 
-0.0019 
-1.37 
-0.0002 
-0.05 
-0.0001 
-0.10 
(0, 5) 
-0.003 
-2.73*** 
-0.0099 
-2.81*** 
-0.0012 
-1.16 
Pre-announcements 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0033 
-5.32*** 
-0.0073 
-4.01*** 
-0.0022 
-3.63*** 
(-2, 0) 
-0.0036 
-4.96*** 
-0.012 
-5.18*** 
-0.0014 
-2.08** 
(-3, 0) 
-0.0042 
-5.06*** 
-0.0159 
-5.81*** 
-0.0011 
-1.51 
(-4, 0) 
-0.0049 
-5.43*** 
-0.0204 
-6.66*** 
-0.0009 
-1.13 
(-5, 0) 
-0.0043 
-4.38*** 
-0.014 
-4.36*** 
-0.0004 
-0.41 
(-10, 0) 
-0.0025 
-2.03** 
-0.0179 
-4.68*** 
0.0015 
1.26 
(-15, 0) 
-0.0038 
-2.59*** 
-0.0227 
-5.44*** 
0.0011 
0.75 
(-20, 0) 
-0.0042 
-2.37** 
-0.0378 
-7.42*** 
0.0045 
2.56** 
The cross-sectional t test is used and reported under the CARs value. Significance levels are reported as 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
In addition, the research of  Albogami et al. (1997) and Alzahrani (2009) 
showed that the investors have different perceptions of the quarterly and annual 
financial disclosures. Therefore, besides the event study of quarterly results, the 
following tables are also concerned with the results of the CARs of the annual 
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earnings announcements within the three kinds of periods, and also, depending on 
the nature of the disclosures, whether they are good or bad news. Thus, from all 
these outcomes, this research would conclude with valid and reliable outcomes 
regarding the insider trading incidents and the presence of the information leakage 
problem in the Saudi market.  
Table 7-6 reports the CARs of annual earnings announcements depending 
on different times and news which are calculated by the market-adjusted model. For 
the full sample between 2006 and 2014, there is a pre-announcement significant 
CAR at (-30, 0) of 0.0129, which increased to a significant value of 0.0168 at CAR 
(-25, 0), and decreased to 0.0068 and 0.0016 at CAR (-15, 0) and (-1, 0), 
respectively. The post-announcement CARs are non-significant with values of -
0.0026 and -0.0038 at CAR (0, 5) and (0, 10), respectively. Depending on the nature 
of the news, there are pre-announcement significant CARs in the good news at CAR 
(-30, 0) of 0.0232, which increased to 0.0234 at CAR (-25, 0), and decreased to 
0.0097 and 0.005 at CAR (-15, 0) and (-1, 0), respectively. The CARs in the post-
announcement good news are non-significant with -0.0024 at CAR (0, 5) and -0.004 
at CAR (0, 10). In contrast, there are no CARs in the pre-announcement bad news 
as the result shows that there is a non-significant CAR at (-30, 0) with a value of -
0.0016, at (-15, 0) with 0.0027 and at (-1, 0) of -0.0031. The post-announcement 
bad news also reports a non-significant CAR at (0, 5) of -0.0029 and at (0, 10) of -
0.0037.  
Moreover, for the period before enforcing the CGR between 2006 and 2008, 
there is a significant CAR in the full sample pre-announcement at CAR (-25, 0) of 
0.0226, which decreased to 0.0074 at CAR (-2, 0) and to 0.005 at CAR (-1, 0). The 
full sample post-announcement shows a significant CAR at (0, 5) of 0.0266, which 
increased significantly to 0.0427 at CAR (0, 10). Relying on the nature of the news, 
the pre-announcement good news shows non-significant CARs at (-30, 0) of 0.0203 
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which decreased to -0.0063 at (-15, 0) and increased to 0.0026 at (-1, 0). The post-
announcement good news reports a significant CAR at (0, 10) of 0.0252. In contrast 
to the bad news, there are non-significant pre-announcement CARs at (-25, 0) of 
0.0252 and at (-15, 0) of 0.02 while there are weak significant CARs at (-3, 0) and 
(-2, 0) of 0.0174 and 0.0131 respectively. In the post-announcement bad news, 
there are significant CARs at CAR (0, 5) of 0.0587 which is increased to 0.0788 at 
(0, 10).  
Comparing to the results of the period between 2006 and 2008, the next is 
the result of the yeas between 2009 and 2014 which is after enforcing the CGR. For 
the full sample, there are significant pre-announcement CARs at (-30, 0) of 0.0128 
which is increased to 0.0158 at CAR (-25, 0) and decreased to 0.0076 at (-15, 0). 
The post-announcement windows show significant CARs at (0, 5) of -0.0075 and at 
(0, 10) of -0.0116. Based on the nature of the announcement, the pre-
announcement good news shows significant CARs at (-30, 0) of 0.0238 which is 
decreased to 0.0129 at CAR (-15, 0), to 0.0089 at (-5, 0) and to 0.0055 at CAR (-1, 
0). The post-announcement good news shows significant CAR at (0, 10) with value 
-0.0097. Moreover, the pre-announcement bad news reports that there are 
significant CARs at CAR (-4, 0) with a value of -0.0057 at CAR (-2, 0), of -0.0041, 
and at CAR (-1, 0) of -0.0048. In the post-announcement windows, there are 
significant CARs at (0, 5) with value -0.0107 and at (0, 10) of -0.0141.  
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Table 7- 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around 1135 annual earnings 
announcements- (Market Adjusted Model). 
Window 
Mean 
2006-2014 
Mean 
2006-2008 
Mean 
2009-2014 
All Good Bad All Good Bad All Good Bad 
Pro-announcements 
(0, 10) 
-0.0038 
-1.50 
-0.004 
-1.19 
-0.0037 
-0.91 
0.0427 
4.84*** 
0.0252 
3.08*** 
0.0788 
3.87*** 
-0.0116 
-4.61*** 
-0.0097 
-2.72*** 
-0.0141 
-4.09*** 
(0, 5) 
-0.0026 
-1.29 
-0.0024 
-0.85 
-0.0029 
-1.0 
0.0266 
3.98*** 
0.0111 
1.56 
0.0587 
4.40*** 
-0.0075 
-3.68*** 
-0.005 
-1.67* 
-0.0107 
-4.19*** 
Pre-announcements 
(-1, 0) 
0.0016 
1.39 
0.005 
3.03*** 
-0.0031 
-2.01** 
0.005 
1.35 
0.0026 
0.59 
0.0099 
1.44 
0.0011 
0.88 
0.0055 
3.06*** 
-0.0048 
-3.16*** 
(-2, 0) 
0.0024 
1.86* 
0.0056 
3.20*** 
-0.0022 
-1.23 
0.0074 
1.87* 
0.0046 
0.98 
0.0131 
1.83* 
0.0015 
1.16 
0.0058 
3.08*** 
-0.0041 
-2.31** 
(-3, 0) 
0.0025 
1.68* 
0.0064 
3.17*** 
-0.0029 
-1.33 
0.0069 
1.45 
0.0018 
0.00 
0.0174 
1.84* 
0.0018 
1.14 
0.0073 
3.36*** 
-0.0055 
-2.58** 
(-4, 0) 
0.0024 
1.38 
0.0064 
2.98*** 
-0.0033 
-1.16 
0.0057 
1.03 
0.0007 
0.11 
0.016 
1.49 
0.0018 
1.02 
0.0076 
3.34*** 
-0.0057 
-2.01** 
(-5, 0) 
0.0034 
1.82* 
0.0069 
2.95*** 
-0.0016 
-0.55 
0.0026 
0.44 
-0.003 
-0.44 
0.0145 
1.30 
0.0035 
1.83* 
0.0089 
3.66*** 
-0.0037 
-1.22 
(-10, 0) 
0.0039 
1.57 
0.0082 
2.39** 
-0.0021 
-0.58 
-0.000 
-0.01 
-0.004 
-0.27 
0.0073 
0.57 
0.0046 
1.89* 
0.0106 
3.33*** 
-0.0033 
-0.88 
(-15, 0) 
0.0068 
2.39** 
0.0097 
2.55** 
0.0027 
0.64 
0.0023 
0.21 
-0.006 
-0.47 
0.02 
1.14 
0.0076 
2.70*** 
0.0129 
3.47*** 
0.0005 
0.13 
(-20, 0) 
0.0114 
3.26*** 
0.0143 
3.46*** 
0.0073 
1.20 
0.0043 
0.35 
-0.002 
-0.16 
0.018 
0.76 
0.0126 
3.57*** 
0.0176 
4.34*** 
0.006 
0.96 
(-25, 0) 
0.0168 
4.37*** 
0.0234 
5.14*** 
0.0074 
1.12 
0.0226 
1.81* 
0.0213 
1.53 
0.0252 
0.99 
0.0158 
3.98*** 
0.0238 
5.05*** 
0.0052 
0.77 
(-30, 0) 
0.0129 
3.19*** 
0.0232 
4.81*** 
-0.0016 
-0.23 
0.0135 
1.25 
0.0203 
1.54 
-0.0005 
-0.02 
0.0128 
2.93*** 
0.0238 
4.60*** 
-0.0017 
-0.23 
The cross-sectional t test is used and reported under the CARs value. Significance levels are reported as 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
In addition, table 7-7 concerns the CARs of the annual earnings disclosures 
that are identified by the constant mean return model, and which are presented 
depending on different times and on the nature of the announcements. For the full 
sample between 2006 and 2014, there are significant CARs in the pre-
announcement windows at (-30, 0) of 0.0224, which increased to 0.0316 at CAR (-
25, 0) and to 0.033 at (-20, 0). The post-announcement windows show that the CAR 
(0, 5) is significant with a value of -0.0095. Based on the nature of the news, the 
pre-announcement good news reports significant CARs at (-30, 0) of 0.0269, which 
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increased to 0.0288 at CAR (-25, 0) and also increased to 0.032 at CAR (-20, 0) 
before decreasing to 0.0033 at CAR (-1, 0) - one day before the official 
announcement. In the post-announcement good news, the CAR (0, 5) is significant 
with a value of -0.0111. In contrast, there are significant CARs in the pre-
announcement bad news at (-25, 0) of 0.0354, which decreased to 0.0201 at CAR 
(-15, 0), and also decreased to -0.0061 at CAR (-1, 0). The post-announcement bad 
news window reports as weakly significant at CAR (0, 5), with a value of -0.0071.  
To compare between the CARs before and after enforcing the CGG, the full 
sample between 2006 and 2008 shows significant CARs in the pre-announcement 
windows at CAR (-25, 0) of 0.0354, which increased to 0.0673 at CAR (-20, 0), and 
decreased to 0.0186 at CAR (-3, 0). The full sample post-announcement reports 
CARs at (0, 5) of 0.0315, and was raised to 0.0504 at CAR (0, 10). For the good 
news between 2006 and 2008, the pre-announcement windows show significant 
CARs at (-20, 0) of 0.0442, which decreased to 0.0398 at CAR (-10, 0) and to 
0.0181. Moreover, there is a significant CAR in the post-announcement good news 
at CAR (0, 10) of 0.0346. For the bad news between 2006 and 2008, the pre-
announcement windows state a significant CAR at (-20, 0) of 0.1148, which is 
decreased to 0.0958 at CAR (-15, 0), but also decreased to 0.0714 at CAR (-10, 0).  
In the period between 2009 and 2014, the full sample shows significant CARs 
in the pre-announcement windows at (-30, 0) of 0.0234 which increased to 0.0309 
at CAR (-25, 0) and decreased to 0.0154 at CAR (-15, 0). For the full sample post-
announcement, the CAR (0, 5) and (0, 10) are significant with a value of -0.0163 
and -0.0081, respectively. Focusing on the nature of the news, the pre-
announcement windows in the good news report significant CARs at (-30, 0) of 
0.032 which were raised to 0.0324 at CAR (-25, 0) and decreased to 0.019 and 
0.0082 at (-15, 0) and (-10, 0), respectively. The post-announcement in the good 
news shows that the CAR (0, 5) is significant with a value of -0.0167. The bad news 
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windows report that in the pre-announcement there is a significant CAR at -20, 0) of 
0.0243 which decreased to -0.0097 at CAR (-4, 0), but also decreased to -0.0075 at 
CAR (-1, 0). The post-announcement window in the bad news states that the CAR 
(0, 5) is significant with a value of -0.0157.   
Table 7- 7: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around 1135 annual earnings 
announcements- (Constant Mean Return Model). 
Window 
Mean 
2006-2014 
Mean 
2006-2008 
Mean 
2009-2014 
All Good Bad All Good Bad All Good Bad 
Pro-announcements 
(0, 10) 
0.0002 
0.08 
-0.0021 
-0.54 
0.0035 
0.75 
0.0504 
4.48*** 
0.0346 
3.08*** 
0.0827 
3.31*** 
-0.0081 
-2.92*** 
-0.0093 
-2.37** 
-0.0066 
-1.71* 
(0, 5) 
-0.0095 
-3.75*** 
-0.0111 
-3.28*** 
-0.0071 
-1.90* 
0.0315 
3.52*** 
0.0173 
1.80* 
0.0609 
3.30*** 
-0.0163 
-6.60*** 
-0.0167 
-4.71*** 
-0.0157 
-4.76*** 
Pre-announcements 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0006 
-0.44 
0.0033 
1.86* 
-0.0061 
-3.21*** 
0.0071 
1.72* 
0.008 
1.81* 
0.0052 
0.59 
-0.0019 
-1.36 
0.0024 
1.23 
-0.0075 
-4.11*** 
(-2, 0) 
-0.0003 
-0.22 
0.0039 
2.00** 
-0.0064 
-2.81*** 
0.0121 
2.41** 
0.0141 
2.58** 
0.0081 
0.76 
-0.0024 
-1.59 
0.0019 
0.93 
-0.0082 
-3.79*** 
(-3, 0) 
0.0003 
0.15 
0.0045 
1.99** 
-0.0057 
-2.13** 
0.0186 
3.06*** 
0.0181 
2.83*** 
0.0195 
1.48 
-0.0028 
-1.61 
0.0018 
0.77 
-0.0089 
-3.60*** 
(-4, 0) 
0.0005 
0.25 
0.0046 
1.85* 
-0.0052 
-1.57 
0.0257 
3.55*** 
0.0236 
3.02*** 
0.0299 
1.95* 
0.0018 
1.02 
0.0009 
0.35 
-0.0097 
-3.06*** 
(-5, 0) 
0.0026 
1.19 
0.0064 
2.33** 
-0.0027 
-0.75 
0.0316 
3.96*** 
0.0298 
3.40*** 
0.0355 
2.13** 
-0.0022 
-1.04 
0.0018 
0.65 
-0.0075 
-2.23** 
(-10, 0) 
0.0103 
3.56*** 
0.0134 
3.63*** 
0.0059 
1.28 
0.0501 
4.56*** 
0.0398 
3.12*** 
0.0714 
3.42*** 
0.0037 
1.32 
0.0082 
2.28** 
-0.0024 
-0.55 
(-15, 0) 
0.021 
6.37*** 
0.0217 
5.23*** 
0.0201 
3.72*** 
0.055 
4.24*** 
0.0351 
2.56** 
0.0958 
3.53*** 
0.0154 
4.86*** 
0.019 
4.57*** 
0.0105 
2.16** 
(-20, 0) 
0.033 
7.97*** 
0.032 
6.58*** 
0.0344 
4.74*** 
0.0673 
4.41*** 
0.0442 
2.85*** 
0.1148 
3.44*** 
0.0126 
3.57*** 
0.0295 
5.97*** 
0.0243 
3.53*** 
(-25, 0) 
0.0316 
6.68*** 
0.0288 
5.03*** 
0.0354 
4.41*** 
0.0354 
2.08** 
0.0107 
0.58 
0.0861 
2.45** 
0.0309 
6.54*** 
0.0324 
5.56*** 
0.029 
3.69*** 
(-30, 0) 
0.0224 
4.61*** 
0.0269 
4.55*** 
0.0161 
1.95* 
0.0163 
1.08 
0.0012 
0.06 
0.0476 
1.59 
0.0234 
4.61*** 
0.032 
5.15*** 
0.0121 
1.42 
The cross-sectional t test is used and reported under the CARs value. Significance levels are reported as *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
Moreover, table 7-8 reports the CARs of the annual earnings that are 
calculated the market model which they are presented with three types of data 
times. In the full sample between 2006 and 2014, there is no significant CARs in the 
pre-announcement windows as the CAR (-30, 0) is non-significant with value -
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0.0024 and the CAR (-1, 0) of 0.0002. In the post-announcement windows, there 
are significant CARs at (0, 5) and (0, 10) with value -0.0067 and -0.0102. The good 
news shows significant CARs in the pre-announcement windows at CAR (-3, 0) of 
0.0034 which is increased to 0.0035 at CAR (-2, 0) and increased to 0.0036 at CAR 
(-1, 0), one day before the announcement. The post-announcement good news 
windows report significant CARs with value -0.0065 and -0.0109 at CAR (0, 5) and 
(0, 10). The bad news states CARs in the pre-announcement windows at CAR (-10, 
0) of -0.009, at CAR (-4, 0) of -0.007, and at CAR (-1, 0) of -0.0046. In the post-
announcement windows also there is CAR at (0, 5) of -0.0069 and at (0, 10) of -
0.0092.    
For comparison between 2006-2008 and 2009-2014, the full sample of the 
period 2006-2008 shows that there are significant CARs in the pre-announcement 
windows at CAR (-20, 0) of -0.028 and at CAR (-10, 0) of -0.0212. In the post-
announcement windows, there is significant CAR at (0, 5) of 0.0193 which is 
increased to 0.0336 at CAR (0, 10). The good news shows significant CAR in the 
pre-announcement windows merely at (-15, 0) of -0.0266. The post-announcement 
windows in the good news report significant CAR at (0, 10) of 0.0204. Moreover, 
pre-announcement windows in the bad news show significant CAR just at CAR (-
30, 0) of -0.0402 and at CAR (-10, 0) of -0.0289. The post-announcement windows 
in the bad news states significant CARs at (0, 5) of 0.0445 which increased to 0.0608 
at CAR (0, 10). 
For the period between 2009 and 2014, the pre-announcement windows in 
all news show no significant CARs as the CAR (-25, 0) is non-significant at 0.0033 
and the CAR (-1, 0) is non-significant at 0.0043. The post-announcement windows 
in all news report significant CARs at (0, 5) and (0, 10) with values of -0.011 and -
0.0175, respectively. In addition, the good news windows show significant CARs at 
(-5, 0) of 0.0055, which decreased to 0.0045 at CAR (-4, 0) and decreased to 0.0041 
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at CAR (-1, 0). The post-announcement windows show significant CARs at (0, 5) 
and (0, 10) with values of -0.0092 and -0.0171. In contrast, the pre-announcement 
windows in the bad news report significant CARs at CAR (-10, 0) of -0.0065, at CAR 
(-4, 0) of -0.0077, and at CAR (-1, 0) of -0.0058. The post-announcement windows 
in the bad news report significant CARs at (0, 5) and (0, 10) with values of -0.0107 
and -0.0181, respectively.  
 
Table 7- 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around 1135 annual earnings 
announcements- (Market Model). 
Window 
Mean 
2006-2014 
Mean 
2006-2008 
Mean 
2009-2014 
All Good Bad All Good Bad All Good Bad 
Pro-announcements 
(0, 10) 
-0.0102 
-4.03*** 
-0.011 
-3.3*** 
-0.0092 
-2.32** 
0.0336 
4.14*** 
0.0204 
2.59** 
0.0608 
3.31*** 
-0.0175 
-6.85*** 
-0.0171 
-4.79*** 
-0.0181 
-4.99*** 
(0, 5) 
-0.0067 
-3.32*** 
-0.006 
-2.33** 
-0.0069 
-2.43** 
0.0193 
2.96*** 
0.007 
0.98 
0.0445 
3.45*** 
-0.011 
-5.36 
-0.0092 
-3.04*** 
-0.0107 
-4.18*** 
Pre-announcements 
(-1, 0) 
0.0002 
0.12 
0.0036 
2.09** 
-0.0046 
-2.92*** 
0.0021 
0.54 
0.001 
0.21 
0.0043 
0.62 
-0.0002 
-0.13 
0.0041 
2.22** 
-0.0058 
-3.74*** 
(-2, 0) 
0.0002 
0.11 
0.0035 
1.93* 
-0.0045 
-2.48** 
0.0027 
0.65 
0.0018 
0.34 
0.0047 
0.65 
-0.0003 
-0.20 
0.0038 
2.00** 
-0.0057 
-3.09*** 
(-3, 0) 
-0.0005 
-0.32 
0.0034 
1.67* 
-0.006 
-2.70*** 
-0.0002 
-0.03 
-0.002 
-0.39 
0.0041 
0.43 
-0.0005 
-0.34 
0.0045 
2.08** 
-0.0073 
-3.30*** 
(-4, 0) 
-0.0012 
-0.66 
0.003 
1.37 
-0.007 
-2.46** 
-0.0037 
-0.64 
-0.005 
-0.70 
-0.0015 
-0.14 
-0.0007 
-0.40 
0.0045 
1.99** 
-0.0077 
-2.63*** 
(-5, 0) 
-0.0008 
-0.44 
0.0029 
1.18 
-0.006 
-1.99** 
-0.0093 
-1.49 
-0.011 
-1.38 
-0.0068 
-0.62 
0.0006 
0.29 
0.0055 
2.23** 
-0.0059 
-1.90* 
(-10, 0) 
-0.0035 
-1.34 
0.0004 
0.122 
-0.009 
-2.40** 
-0.0212 
-2.06** 
-0.017 
-1.25 
-0.0289 
-2.23** 
-0.0005 
-0.20 
0.004 
1.23 
-0.0065 
-1.67* 
(-15, 0) 
-0.0035 
-1.19 
-0.002 
-0.52 
-0.0056 
-1.24 
-0.0257 
-2.35** 
-0.026 
-1.92** 
-0.0241 
-1.34 
0.0002 
0.05 
0.0028 
0.72 
-0.0033 
-0.72 
(-20, 0) 
-0.0023 
-0.62 
-0.001 
-0.27 
-0.0038 
-0.59 
-0.028 
-2.21** 
-0.025 
-1.65 
-0.0338 
-1.48 
0.002 
0.54 
0.0035 
0.84 
-0.0001 
-0.00 
(-25, 0) 
0.0023 
0.57 
0.0066 
1.39 
-0.0037 
-0.53 
-0.0036 
-0.29 
0.0038 
0.25 
-0.0187 
-0.82 
0.0033 
0.78 
0.0071 
1.46 
-0.0018 
-0.24 
(-30, 0) 
-0.0024 
-0.53 
0.0046 
0.88 
-0.0121 
-1.57 
-0.0118 
-0.91 
0.002 
0.13 
-0.0402 
-1.67* 
-0.0008 
-0.17 
0.0051 
0.93 
-0.0086 
-1.05 
The cross-sectional t test is used and reported under the CARs value. Significance levels are reported as 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
 
 
253 
 
7.3.2 Discussion 
All investors in the efficient market would simultaneously receive all the financial 
information and announcements related to the stocks, however, some market 
analysts and investors can obtain leaked new and important information about the 
stocks before it is officially released to the public (Brunnermeier 2005). Therefore, 
the transparency of firm disclosures is the primary aspects of the efficient corporate 
governance regulations as investors anticipate receiving accurate and complete 
disclosures to conduct appropriate decisions on assessment of the firm (Heggen 
and Gannon 2008; Tsai 2014). Thus, effective corporate governance should 
increase the level of transparency and the credibility of the firms’ activities as this 
would create an efficient system to control the acts of directors and managers and 
monitor their decisions. The important goals of corporate governance include 
protecting financial disclosures and encouraging firms to create a transparent 
environment by controlling and observing systems (Koh et al. 2007). Therefore, 
protecting financial announcements will support minimising the information 
asymmetry between managements, stockholders and other investors, as the 
financial disclosure is one of the significant channels of information that is obtained 
by investors in order to evaluate the success of both firms’ managers and the firm 
itself. The OECD (2004) indicates that efficient corporate governance codes should 
lead to reliability and transparency in firms’ disclosures for the confirmation of 
stockholders’ interests. 
The Saudi corporate governance regulations (CGR), which were legislated 
for in 2006, aim to organise the market and support the role of the firm’s boards 
which controls and observes the managers’ activities so as to secure the 
advantages focused on shareholders’ interests. Additionally, the SCG aims to 
enhance the responsibility and transparency of both Saudi firms and the market. 
The Saudi Capital Market Law indicated that leaking inside information for insider 
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trading is prohibited and is also deemed as an illegal act (CMA 2009). As minimising 
insider trading and information leakage are significant steps, the authority needs 
continued evaluation in order to monitor the presence of the leakage of information 
in the market and to assess the efficiency of the current CGR and market systems 
so as to minimise the information leakage. Therefore, this research offers a valuable 
contribution as it is the first study that covers the years after the establishment of 
the Saudi CGR, and covers the years before and after enforcing several Saudi 
corporate governance codes. This helps to reveal to the researchers and the Saudi 
authorities the presence of the information leakage and insider trading, and how the 
CGR and enforcing its codes enhance the accountability and transparency of such 
a market. In the stock market, even though it is impossible to prevent all information 
leakage incidents and insider trading transactions, the effect of these transactions 
can be monitored by examining stock price activities prior to the official firms’ 
disclosure dates (Keown and Pinkerton 1981).  
The previous tables from 7-3 to 7-5 report the CARs before and after the 
quarterly earnings announcements. The tables show significant cumulative 
abnormal returns prior to the quarterly earnings announcement based on the market 
adjusted model, the constant mean return model, and the market model. Thus, all 
the models on all types of periods indicate the appearance of information leakage 
and insider trading in the Saudi market prior to the official date of the quarterly 
earnings disclosures. The market-adjusted model and the market model report that 
the significant CARs prior to the announcements in the period 2006-2008 are 
greater than the significant CARs in the period 2009-2014, which may indicate the 
positive influence of enforcing some of the important Saudi CGRs - which began in 
the year 2009 - on the accountability and transparency of Saudi firms. All models 
show negative significant CARs in the period 2006-2014, except for the positive 
significant CARs 20, 15, and 10 days prior to the announcement in the market-
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adjusted model. Moreover, the results show different signs in the CARs of the pre-
announcements in all models because the period 2006-2008 reports negative CARs 
while the period 2009-2014 reports positive CARs 20, 15, and 10 days before the 
announcement. For the post-announcement, the results suggest differences in the 
CARs between models as the constant mean return model shows significant 
CARsin 5 and 10 days, while the market-adjusted model reports CARs in the 10 
days while the market models report CARs across 5 days. 
Additionally, the prior tables from 7-6 through to 7-8 show the CARs before 
and after the annual earnings announcements. The tables show significant 
cumulative abnormal returns prior to the annual earnings announcement as 
calculated by the market-adjusted model, the constant mean return model, and the 
market model in both the good and bad news, and in all the periods except for the 
good news in the market-adjusted model. Therefore, this result depends on the 
annual disclosures confirming the previous outcomes of the quarterly disclosures, 
whereby insider trading incidents in the Saudi market based on information leaked 
to some investors and shareholders prior to the official date of announcement. This 
allowed them to use this special information for their benefit at the expense of other 
investors and shareholders who were not able to access the confidential 
information. For example, in the CARs of the good news calculated by the market-
adjusted model between 2009 and 2014, there was a difference in the CARs prior 
to and after the announcement day, while table 7-6 shows that there is a significant 
CAR in (-5, 0) with a positive value of 0.0089, and in (-1, 0) also containing a positive 
value of 0.0055. Meanwhile, the CAR (5, 0) is significant with a negative value of -
0.005 and the CAR (10, 0) is significant with a negative value of -0.0097. In addition, 
the result of the market model in table 7-8 concerns the good news between 2009 
and 2014 and shows the pre-announcement CARs are significant at CAR (-5, 0) 
and CAR (-1, 0) of positive values of 0.0055 and 0.0041, respectively, while the 
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post-announcement CARs are significant at (0, 5) and (0, 10) with negative values 
of -0.0092 and -0.0171, respectively. These examples and results clearly show how 
investors can gain from the leaked information’s positive CARs in one and five days 
before the official announcement date of the good news, and also how the CARs 
changed to negative CARs during the 5 days after this announcement.  
Moreover, the pre-announcements’ significant CARs in the good and bad 
news, in the market adjusted model in the period 2006-2008, are less than the 
significant CARs in the period 2009-2014, which goes against the results of the 
quarterly announcements and disproves the positive effect of enforcing the Saudi 
CGRs and their effectiveness in improving the firms and the market. Moreover, 
these significant CARs are concentrated in 2006-2008 at 30, 25, and 20 days before 
the announcement, while the CARs in 2009-2014 were concentrated on 10 and 5 
days before the announcements. In addition, the tables show that the pre-
announcement CARs - especially at 5 and 10 days prior to the announcements - 
are mostly associated with significant positive CARs in the good news, and with 
significant negative CARs in the bad news. The explanation for this result is that it 
is an indicator of the leaked information and insider trading incidents in the market 
because investors who gain leaked information with good news intend to buy more 
stocks before the stock price is further raised after the public announcement. In 
contrast, investors who obtain leaked information with bad news intend to sell their 
stocks before the stock price has fallen further after the public announcement.  
For the post-announcement, the outcomes report that the market model 
shows more significant CARs in the post-announcement window compared with the 
market-adjusted model and the constant mean return model. Moreover, compared 
between the quarterly and annual disclosures in the market reaction, the tables 
show that the market reaction to all news of the annual disclosures was greater than 
the market reaction to all news of the quarterly disclosures, especially in the market 
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model and market-adjusted model during the 5 days after the official announcement 
date. This supports the results of the research of Albogami et al. (1997) and 
Alzahrani (2009) in that the market reaction towards the disclosures of Saudi firms 
is different between the quarterly and annual financial announcements because 
investors react more highly to the annual disclosures than the quarterly disclosures. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the presence and extent of information leakage 
incidents, prior to the official quarterly and annual earnings announcements in the 
Saudi Stock Exchange across the period 2006-2014. The chapter related the event 
methodology in detail, the event data, window and the sample. The event dates 
were the quarterly and annual earnings announcements of the firms listed in the 
Saudi Stock Exchange. The dates are unknown to all investors, therefore they are 
suitable events selected to investigate the information leakage phenomenon prior 
to the announcement date. The research applied a medium length event window, 
which is (-30, 10) trading days for the annual earnings announcements, as well as 
(-20, 10) trading days for quarterly earnings announcements. The estimation period 
for the quarterly earnings announcements was (-220, -21), while the estimation 
period for annual earnings announcements was (-230, -31). The analysis relied on 
three models to count abnormal returns, namely the constant mean return model, 
the market adjusted model and the market model. The cross-sectional t test was 
applied as a means of evaluating the hypothesis of the cumulative average 
abnormal returns. Additionally, this chapter discussed the results from investigating 
the cumulative abnormal returns and information leakage prior to the quarterly and 
annual earnings announcements, during the period 2006-2014. The results 
illustrated that all of the models across all of the periods, evidenced the availability 
of information leakage and insider trading in the Saudi market prior to the official 
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disclosure of quarterly earnings. Furthermore, significant cumulative abnormal 
returns prior to the annual earnings announcement were evidenced, by the market-
adjusted model, the constant mean return model and the market model.  This was 
the case for both good and bad news, as well as across all of the periods apart from 
good news in the market-adjusted model. Moreover, the market reaction towards 
Saudi firms’ announcements was different between the quarterly and annual 
financial disclosures, because investors reacted more strongly to annual disclosures 
than they did quarterly disclosures. The subsequent chapter will explain the 
research methodology and selected model for investigating the effect of corporate 
governance on information leakage. There will also be a description of the 
dependent variables and control variables utilised in this model. Finally, the 
regression results and outcomes will be considered.   
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Chapter 8:  
Corporate Governance Effect on Information Leakage:  
Regression Analysis and Results  
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the methodology relating to the event study, 
examining the existence of information leakage activities prior to the official quarterly 
and annual earnings announcements in the Saudi Stock Exchange, during the 
period 2006-2014. The research applied three models for calculating abnormal 
returns, namely the constant mean return model, the market adjusted model and 
the market model. The analysis also utilised the cross-sectional t test, as a means 
of evaluating the hypothesis of the cumulative average abnormal returns. 
Additionally, the previous chapter discussed the results of the investigation into 
cumulative abnormal returns and information leakage, prior to quarterly and annual 
earnings announcements. In this chapter, the discussion turns to the effect of 
corporate governance components on information leakage. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative abnormal returns and information leakage prior to 
official annual earnings announcements, which are calculated via the constant mean 
return model (CMRM), market adjusted model (MARM) and market model (MRM). 
The independent variables include ownership concentration (BLOK), government 
ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), directors’ ownership (DIRE), 
managerial ownership (MANAG), board size (BOSI), board independence (BOIN), 
board meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size (AUSI), audit meetings 
(AUME), board subcommittees (BOCO) and market reform (MARE). The control 
variables comprise of firm growth (SAGR), leverage (LVRG), firm size (SIZE), year 
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dummy (Year) and industry dummy (Industry). The discussion will focus on the 
dependent and control variables, because the independent variables have already 
been reported in chapter 3 and tables 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5. Furthermore, there will be 
an outline of the regression analysis that was performed, in order to examine the 
effect of corporate governance components on information leakage. A justification 
is provided for selecting the System GMM model as the most suitable analytical 
model. Finally, the chapter presented and explains the regression results. Thus, the 
chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.2 discusses the regression analysis and 
model chosen for the relationship between corporate governance components and 
information leakage. Section 8.3 reports and discusses empirical results. 8.4 is the 
conclusion.  
 
8.2 Regression Analysis 
This research uses a regression analysis to investigate the effect of corporate 
governance components on firm information leakage and cumulative abnormal 
returns before the official annual earnings announcements. Because the research 
investigates four different types of samples, it uses four regression models, each of 
which represents a type of sample, as follows:  
 
- Model (A), for all firms from every sector listed during the period between 2006 
and 2014. 
- Model (B), for non-financial firms listed during the period between 2006 and 
2014.   
- Model (C), for all firms from every sector listed during the period between 2009 
and 2014. 
- Model (D), for non-financial firms listed during the period between 2009 and 
2014.   
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The regression model includes the dependent, independent, and control variables.  
The dependent variables include the cumulative abnormal returns CARs before the 
official annual earnings announcements. Three models are used to calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns, which are the constant mean return model (CMRM), 
market adjusted model (MARM) and market model (MRM). This research 
implements the event window (-25, 0) to capture more CARs in this wider window 
and also applies the estimation period (-230, -31), as the longer period is effective 
to reduce the influence of such events on share prices. The event study 
methodology and calculating the abnormal returns CARs are already discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter. The independent variables include the corporate 
governance components, which are the ownership structures and board’s features. 
Ownership structure components include the ownership concentration or the block-
holders (BLOK), government ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), 
directors’ ownership (DIRE) and managerial ownership (MANAG). The board’s 
features include the board size (BOSI), board independence (BOIN), board 
meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size (AUSI), audit meetings (AUME) 
and board subcommittees (BOCO). 
 In addition, the research adds the market reform (MARE) as an independent 
variable to discover the level of information leakage before and after the corporate 
governance codes became obligatory. All models apply the same dependent, 
independent and control variables, with the exception of models (A) and (B), which 
include two more independent variables; the board subcommittees (BOCO) and 
market reform (MARE). This is because after 2009 almost all Saudi firms 
established board subcommittees, therefore in model (C) and (D) there are no 
differences between these firms with regards to having these committees. The 
measurements of the independent and control variables are presented in tables 5-
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3, 5-4, and 5-5. In addition, the research hypotheses of the independent variables 
were discussed previously, in sections 3-2 and 3-3   
 
8.2.1 Control Variables 
To produce an accurate regression analysis and result regarding the effect of 
corporate governance components on firm information leakage, this research 
employs different control variables to control for other elements that may have an 
influence on information asymmetry, firm transparency, insider trading activities and 
information leakage and these elements are not accounted for and identified in the 
independent variables. According to a literature review, the most common control 
variables used in the study of the relationship between corporate governance and 
information asymmetry and information leakage are firm size (SIZE), leverage 
(LVRG), firm growth (SAGR) and time and industry dummies.  
Firm size (SIZE) is anticipated to have an effect on corporate governance 
and information leakage and abnormal returns before announcements. Larger firms 
are expected to have more information and news to disclose than smaller firms 
(Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, et al. 2012). Therefore, these larger firms are expected to 
have incidents of leaked inside information more frequently than smaller firms. 
Heggen and Gannon (2008) state that it is argued that the amount of information 
leaked before the official announcement is associated with the size of companies. 
There are different empirical studies that apply size as a control variable in the 
relationship between corporate governance components and the phenomenon of 
information leakage and insider trading. For example, He and Rui's (2014) study in 
China found a positive relationship between the firm size and insider trading, while 
Heggen and Gannon's (2008) study also revealed a positive association between 
the size of a firm and abnormal returns before the announcements. In addition, other 
literature implicates firm size in the relationship between corporate governance and 
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information asymmetry, voluntary disclosures and firm transparency. This includes 
studies such as that of Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) in Ireland, Lakhal (2005) in 
France, Samaha et al. (2012) in Egypt and Leung and Horwitz (2004) in Hong Kong.  
Firm leverage may also have an influence on corporate governance 
practices, information leakage and information asymmetry. The firms with high 
leverage are expected to disclose more information to convince their creditors of the 
good condition of their firm (Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, et al. 2012). Heggen and Gannon 
(2008) found a negative relationship between the firm leverage and the amount of 
abnormal returns before the announcement. He and Rui (2014) further implicate this 
leverage in the relationship between ownership structures and cumulative abnormal 
returns. Other studies use leverage variables in the relationship between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosures and information asymmetry. These include 
studies such as that of Baek et al. (2009) in the US, Lakhal (2005) in France, 
Samaha et al. (2012) in Egypt and Leung and Horwitz (2004) in Hong Kong. 
In addition, firm growth is measured by the sakes growth and is expected to 
affect the corporate governance and information leakage incidents. Han et al. (2014) 
state that it is argued that investment and firm growth could become the source of 
information asymmetry. As the larger firms, those with high growth would have 
access to more insider news and improvements, so they are anticipated to have 
more leaked information and insider trading. 
Finally, as discussed in section &&, the year and industry dummies variables 
are included in the research regression model in order to control for any factors that 
may influence the information leakage, insider trading and information asymmetry 
that may come from the industry or year effect and differences. There are several 
studies that apply the year and industry dummies as control variables to study their 
effect on information asymmetry, information leakage and firm transparency, 
including the studies of Byun et al. (2011), He and Rui (2014), Heggen and Gannon 
264 
 
(2008), Al-Janadi et al. )2013), Cai et al. (2006) and Samaha et al. (2012), all of 
which implement the industry dummies. 
 
8.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the model of the effect of corporate 
governance components on firm information leakage. The descriptive statistics 
include the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum value and 
the count number of the years’ observation. The disruptive tables outline the 
dependent variables, independent variables and control variables for the four groups 
of data. The descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables are 
already presented in section 5-4. Therefore, this section reports the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent variables related to the cumulative abnormal returns 
models as information leakage proxies.  
The following table 8-1 and Appendices 18, 19, 20, and 21 show the 
descriptive outlines of the cumulative abnormal returns and information leakage 
before the official annual earnings announcements for the four types of sample. The 
previous chapter discusses in detail the cumulative abnormal returns and 
information leakage in the Saudi market in different event windows. The research 
uses the event window (-25, 0) to investigate the relationship between the corporate 
governance and cumulative abnormal returns and information leakage. The models 
used to calculate the abnormal returns are CMRM, MARM and MRM. 
Table 8-1 (data A) and Appendix (18) report the descriptive statistics for the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the three models for the sample of all firms between 
2006 and 2014. The mean value of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the model 
CMRM is .103 and the maximum and minimum value are .591 and .001, 
respectively. The maximum mean value was recorded in the year 2006 and the 
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minimum mean value in the year 2013. In addition, the model MARM reports the 
mean value of CAR as being .070 and the maximum and minimum mean value as 
being .390 and .000, respectively. As is the case with the CMRM model, the 
maximum mean value of the MARM model is from the year 2006 and the minimum 
value from the year 2013.  The MRM model reports the mean value of CAR as .076 
and the maximum and the minimum mean values as being .462 and .000, 
respectively. All models show that there was a high level of CAR in the year 2006, 
which was the first year of issuance of the corporate governance regulations, while 
the level of CAR also decreased after 2006, which may imply that this market reform 
had a positive effect. Table 8-1 (data B) and Appendix (19) reveal the disruptive 
statistics for the sample of the non-financial firms between 2006 and 2014. The 
mean value of the CMRM model is .110 and the maximum and minimum mean 
values are .591 and .011, respectively. Besides, the mean value of the MARM model 
is .073 and MRM model is .081. As in data A, the highest mean value of CAR in 
data B is seen in the year 2006 and the lowest value in the year 2013. 
Table 8-1 (data C) and Appendix (20) report the disruptive statistics for the 
sample of all of the firms between 2009 and 2014. The mean value of the CAR of 
CMRM model is .091 and the maximum and minimum values are 1.535 and .000, 
respectively. The mean values for the MARM and MRM models are 0.68 and .072, 
respectively. Table 8-1 (data D) and Appendix (21) show the disruptive outlines for 
the sample of the non-financial firms between 2009 and 2014. The mean value of 
the CMRM model is .048 and the maximum and minimum mean values are .922 
and .000, respectively. The mean value of the CAR for MARM model is .062 and 
the mean value for the MRM model is .068. The highest CAR value for the three 
models can be seen in the year 2014. Table 8-1 shows that the mean value for the 
sample data between 2006 and 2014 is larger than the mean value of the sample 
between 2009 and 2014.   
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Table 8-1: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of all data 
Variables Data A Data B Data C Data D 
CMRM     
Mean .103 .110 .091 .084 
Median .071 .079 .063 .061 
SD .100 .105 .110 .085 
Maximum .591 .591 1.535 .922 
Minimum .001 .001 .000 .000 
MARM     
Mean .070 .073 .068 .062 
Median .047 .051 .044 .042 
SD .071 .073 .100 .068 
Maximum .390 .390 1.631 .771 
Minimum .000 .000 .000 .000 
MRM     
Mean .076 .081 .072 .068 
Median .055 .060 .047 .047 
SD .076 .080 .103 .075 
Maximum .462 .462 1.716 .806 
Minimum .000 .000 .000 .000 
Count 558 459 690 510 
 
 
8.2.3 Model Selection  
The research uses strongly balanced panel data, which has advantages over time 
series and cross sectional data. The research implements different statistical tests 
in order to evaluate the assumptions of the OLS and to reveal the appropriate 
regression estimation for the relationship between the corporate governance and 
firm information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns before the official 
earnings announcements. The first statistical test is the multicollinearity test to 
assess the level of correlation between the independent variables. As discussed in 
section 5.2.1 and 6.2.4, practically, the level of correlation in the regression model 
should be more than zero and the multicollinearity will be an issue if the level of 
correlation is very high.  
To test for multicollinearity, the research applies Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient as a non-parametric test, Pearson’s product-moment correlation as a 
parametric test and the variance inflation factor (VIF) with its inverse tolerance 
(TOL). Gujarati (2004) indicates that the rule of thumb for the highly correlated 
variable in the VIF test is that the level of the VIF test will be more than 10 and also 
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that the rule of thumb for the pair-wise correlation coefficient is when the level of 
correlation exceeds 0.8. Appendix 14, 15, 16, and 17 report Spearman’s rank 
correlation test and the Pearson correlation test results and show that the highest 
correlation level is .70 between the MARE and BOCO variables in models A and B, 
which is deemed to be unlikely to create a serious issue in the proposed models 
because it does not exceed the level of 0.8. In addition, table 6-2 reports that the 
highest levels of VIF are far below the rejected range, which is more than 10. Thus, 
the result shows that there is no series multicollinearity issue in the models. 
In addition, as discussed in section 5.2, the assumption of the OLS model is 
that there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation issue between the errors. The 
serial correlation issue leads the OLS to produce insufficient coefficient estimations.  
As discussed in section 6.2.4, the Wooldridge (2002) test is used to discover the 
serial correlation in the model. Table 8-2 shows that the autocorrelation results in a 
null hypothesis; that is, there is no first order autocorrelation. From the table, models 
A and B in MRM have an autocorrelation issue, as they strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation.    
 
Table 8-2: Wooldridge Test for serial correlation (Ho: No first-order autocorrelation) 
 CMRM MARM MRM 
Model A    
F(  1,      61) 2.651 0.001 5.290 
Prob > F 0.108 0.971 0.024 
Model B    
F(  1,     50 ) 2.097 0.009 5.331 
Prob > F 0.153 0.925 0.025 
Model C    
F(  1,     114)  2.427 1.814 1.756 
Prob > F     0.122 0.180 0.187 
Model D    
F(  1,      84) 0.545 0.007 1.140 
Prob > F 0.462 0.933 0.288 
 
In addition, as discussed previously in section 5.2, the assumption of the OLS model 
is that the variance of the errors is constant and if it is not constant that means that 
the model has a heteroscedastic issue, which leads to inefficient OLS estimation 
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with over rejection of the null hypotheses. The research implements the Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test to detect the heteroscedasticity problem. Table 8-3 
shows that the null hypothesis of the test is strongly rejected in the four models, with 
a significance level of 1%. This outcome indicates that the heteroscedasticity issue 
is present in the four models and the variances of the errors are not constant.  
 
Table 8-3: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for heteroskedasticity (Ho: Constant 
variance) 
 CMRM MARM MRM 
Model A    
chi2(25) 201.11 222.85 214.99 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model B    
chi2(25) 163.18 173.68 166.68 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model C    
chi2(21) 767.49 871.18 810.46 
Prob > chi2   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Model D    
chi2(21) 289.34 309.69 257.17 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Further to the above, as discussed in sections 5.2 and 6.2.4, the researcher has to 
investigate the presence of an endogeneity issue in the regression model, as the 
assumption of OLS estimator is based on the exogenous, so if there is a correlation 
between the error term, the regressor will have an endogeneity problem. The 
research uses the Durbin (1954), Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978) (DWH) test to 
detect the presence of an endogeneity issue. The results of the DWH test indicate 
that all the four models suffer from an endogeneity issue.   
 
8.2.4 System GMM Model 
The prior statistical tests report that the research models on the effect of corporate 
governance components on information leakage experience serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeneity issues. Therefore, simple OLS estimators such 
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as the random effects model and fixed effects model are not suitable because the 
assumptions are violated, which will lead to biased estimation and results. Bhagat 
and Jefferis (2002) and Boussaada and Karmani (2015) indicate that corporate 
governance research projects are more likely to face the issue of endogeneity. In 
addition, Rozanov (2008) indicates that the common issue in corporate governance 
studies is endogeneity and furthermore that this issue is potentially present in the 
results studies on the relationship between the corporate governance and insider 
trading because of the possible uncertainty related to the direction of causality, 
which may cause inconsistent estimation. One example of potential reverse 
causality is that the firm executives, who aim to conduct insider trading, may have 
an effect on selecting the directors to weaken the board monitoring role, so the 
hypothesis that states that the board structure has an influence on insider trading 
can be explained in terms of reverse causality by stating that insider trading 
incidents have influence on the board structure (Rozanov 2008). Another example 
of reverse causality is that some institutions invest only in firms with a good 
transparency environment and less illegal insider trading activities. Thus, in the first 
instant the result would be interpreted as that the institutional ownership has a 
negative effect on insider trading but an analysis of the real causality shows that 
incidents of insider trading and information leakage have a negative effect on 
institutional ownership (Rozanov 2008). 
Thus, the research models consist of a dynamic structure, meaning that the 
dynamic model is therefore more appropriate to deal with the problems of serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. Brooks (2008) argues that the 
serial correlation in the data come from a dynamic structure that is not involved in 
the regression model and not identified nor captured in the study. A number of 
studies use the instrumental variable technique in investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and insider trading, information leakage and 
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information asymmetry. These include studies by Dai et al. (2012), Jackson et al. 
(2008), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), Byun et al. (2011) and Zhang (2012). The GMM 
method is one of the instrumental variable techniques and Roodman (2006) 
indicates that the GMM method is structured for a model that has endogeneity 
variables, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within 
individuals. 
Therefore, this research uses the same methodology discussed in section 
5.2 and applied in section 6.2.5, which is the two-step System GMM model of 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995). It is assumed that 
variables related to the corporate governance components, the control variables and 
the market reform are endogenic, except for the year and industry dummies 
variables, which are deemed to be exogenous because they do not depend on the 
past or the recent error term (Mangena et al. 2012; Roodman 2009). The research 
uses many independent variables and covers 9 and 6 years of observations, which 
means that it therefore implements one and two lags, as discussed in detail in 
section 6.2.5. The rule of thumb for the number of instruments is that it should not 
exceed the number of observations (Roodman 2006 and Roodman 2007). 
Furthermore, there are two specific tests that are used in the research to ensure the 
consistency and validity of System GMM models, which are the second order serial 
correlation (Arellano-Bond AR (2)) test used to assess the second order serial 
correlation and the Sargan test to ensure the validity of instruments. In addition, the 
year dummies are added to the GMM model to prevent cross-individual and 
contemporaneous correlation. Referring to the study of Wintoki et al. (2012), it can 
be seen that the equation for the System GMM estimator for the research models 
is: 
[
INit
∆INit
] = α + κ [
INit−L
∆INit−L
] + β [
EXit
∆EXit
] + γ [
ENit
∆ENit
] + εit      (i = 1, … , N;   t = 1, . . , T)       
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Where IN is the dependent variable, which is firm information leakage measured by 
CMRM, MARM and MRM, L is the period of lag, ⧍ is the time differencing, EXit is 
the vector of the independent variables that are assumed to be strictly exogenous, 
the time and industry dummies and ENit is the vector of independent variables that 
are assumed to be endogenous, which are the ownership concentration (BLOK), 
government ownership (GOV), institutional ownership (INS), directors’ ownership 
(DIRE), managerial ownership (MANAG), board size (BOSI), board independence 
(BOIN), board meetings (BOME), CEO duality (CEDU), audit size (AUSI), audit 
meetings (AUME), board subcommittees (BOCO), the market reform (MARE), the 
firm growth (SAGR), the leverage (LVRG) and the firm size (SIZE).  
 
8.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
8.3.1 Empirical Results 
As discussed in the prior section, the System GMM method is the most suitable 
estimator to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, information 
leakage and cumulative abnormal returns before the official date of the earnings 
announcements. This is due to the fact that the System GMM model can control for 
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, individual heterogeneity and endogeneity. The 
expected relationship and research hypothesis between each variable and 
information leakage is discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The following tables report 
the regression results based on the different models and the measurements of 
cumulative abnormal returns. Under each model there are the validity tests, which 
are the AR (2) and Sargan test. 
Table 8-4 shows the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns, identified by the constant 
mean return model (CMRM). Model A, for all firms from each sector listed between 
2006 and 2014, reports that board independence has a positive effect on information 
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leakage, at the significant level of 5%. Market reform (MARE) and the presence of 
a subcommittee (BOCO) have a negative effect on information leakage, at the 
significant levels of 1% and 5%, respectively. The audit committee (AUSI) size also 
has a negative but weak significant influence on information leakage. The level of 
leverage (LVRG) is positively and significantly related to information leakage. Model 
B, for the non-financial firms listed between 2006 and 2014, indicates that the 
institutional ownership (INS) and board independence (BOIN) is positively 
associated with information leakage, with a weak significance. In addition, market 
reform (MARE) has a significant and positive effect while the presence of 
subcommittees (BOCO) has a significant and negative effect on information 
leakage. Model C, for all firms from each sector listed between 2009 and 2014, 
shows that the ownership concentration (BLOK) has a positive influence on 
information leakage at the significant level of 1%. Besides this, the institutional (INS) 
and managerial ownership (MANG) has a negative effect on information leakage at 
the significant levels of 1% and 5%, respectively. In addition, board independence 
(BOIN) and size (BOSI) is very significant and positively related to information 
leakage.  
Board meetings (BOME) appeared to have a positive and significant impact 
on information leakage. Furthermore, CEO duality (CEDU) is also shown to have a 
positive and significant influence and the audit committee size (AUSI) is shown to 
have a negative and significant influence on information leakage. For the control 
variables, the level of leverage (LVRG) is positively associated and firm size (SIZE) 
is negatively associated with information leakage, all at the significant level of 1%. 
Model D, for the non-financial firms listed between 2009 and 2014, shows that 
ownership concentration (BLOK) has a significant and positive effect on information 
leakage. In addition, the managerial ownership (MANG) and audit committee size 
(AUSI) are negatively related to information leakage at the significant levels of 1% 
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and 5%, respectively. For the control variables, leverage (LVRG) has a positive 
effect, while the firm size (SIZE) has a negative effect, all significant at a level of 1%.      
 
Table 8-4: System GMM Regression Model of the effect of corporate governance 
components on the information leakage of Saudi listed firms (Constant Mean Return Model) 
 
The dependent variable is CMRM (cumulative abnormal returns, constant mean return model, at window (-
25, 0)). All coefficients are based on the two-step System GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995) with one and two lags. Where BLOK is the ownership concentration (the 
percentage of stocks owned by large shareholders). GOV is the government ownership (the percentage of 
stocks owned by government). INS is the institutional ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by 
institutions). DIRE is the directors ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by directors). MANG is the 
managerial ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by managerial shareholders). BOSI is the board size 
(the number of directors in the board). BOIN is the board independence (the percentage of independent 
directors in the board). BOME is the board meetings (the number of board’s meetings in each year). CEDU 
is the CEO duality (If CEO and chairman is not the same person = 1, 0 otherwise). MARE is the market 
reform (If the year from 2009 till 2014 = 1, 0 otherwise). BOCO is the board subcommittees (If firm has audit, 
nomination, and remuneration =1, 0 otherwise). AUSI is the audit committee size (the number of members 
in audit committee). AUME is the audit committee meetings (the number of the audit committee’s meetings 
in each year). SAGR is the sales growth. LVRG is leverage (the percentage of total debt to the total assets). 
SIZE is the firm size (the natural log of firm’s assets). Industry (each industry =1, 0 otherwise). Year (each 
year =1, 0 otherwise). 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
BLOK     -.0016 (-0.97) .0001 (0.05) .0013*** (6.88) .0019*** (6.40) 
GOV     .0010 (0.21) -.0080 (-0.99) -.0001 (-0.20) .0004 (0.52) 
INS .0052 (1.09) .0109* (1.74) -.001*** (-3.40) -.0013 (-1.13) 
DIRE     -.0001 (-0.32) -.0005 (-0.99) .0001 (0.83) -.0002 (-1.02) 
MANG     -.0018 (-0.22) -.0064 (-0.63) -.0005** (-1.64) -.0063*** (-3.33) 
BOSI    .0160 (1.06) .0208 (1.23) .0146*** (4.56) .0006 (0.15) 
BOIN   .0003** (2.32) .0006* (1.80) .0012*** (6.00) .0000 (0.18) 
BOME -.0013 (-0.39) -.0042 (-0.87) .0015** (2.03) -.0006 (-0.63) 
CEDU    -.0721 (-1.12) -.0056 (-0.04) .0266*** (2.76) .0190 (1.16) 
MARE -.0358*** (-3.48) .0899** (1.97)     
BOCO -.0542** (-2.17) -.0972** (-2.20)     
AUSI     -.0395* (-1.68) -.0583 (-1.47) -.038*** (-5.07) -.0197** (-2.29) 
AUME    -.0030 (-0.93) -.0026 (-0.49) -.0008 (-1.26) -.0009 (-0.69) 
Control Variables         
SAGR     -.0000 (-1.07) -.0000 (-0.29) .0000 (0.42) .0000 (1.51) 
LVRG     .0022*** (3.62) .0002 (0.22) .0013*** (8.50) .0010*** (3.62) 
SIZE -.0381 (-0.94) -.0134 (-0.22) -.010*** (-2.68) -.0248*** (-3.41) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant .7749** (1.63) .4378 (0.58) .1332** (1.97) .3713*** (3.42) 
Observations 496  408  575  425  
Number of firms 62  51  115  85  
Number of 
instruments 
472  424  227  223  
AR(2) test  (-.1020)  (-.3409)  (-.3627)  (-.1939)  
Sargan test  42.90  25.11  102.08  66.09  
The test statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. AR (2) is the test for the second order serial correlation with H0= no serial 
correlation so the p-value > 0.05 indicates no serial correlation. Sargan test is to test the validity of 
instruments with H0= valid instruments so the p-value > 0.05 indicates the validity of instruments.  
 
Table 8-5 reports the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on information 
leakage and cumulative abnormal returns measured by the market adjusted model 
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(MARM). Model A shows that there is a weak significant positive relationship 
between ownership concentration (BLOK) and information leakage. In addition, 
director ownership (DIRE) and audit committee meetings (AUME) have a negative 
influence on information leakage at significant levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Model C shows that the director ownership (DIRE) is weakly significant and 
negatively related to information leakage while the audit committee size (AUSI) is 
strongly significant and negatively related to information leakage. Besides the 
above, model C shows that the ownership concentration (BLOK) and government 
ownership have a significant and positive effect on information leakage. Moreover, 
the institutional (INS) and director ownership (DIRE) have a significant and positive 
effect on information leakage at the significant level of 1%.  
In addition, the managerial ownership (MANG) and the board size (BOSI) 
and meetings (BOME) are significantly and positively associated with information 
leakage. However, audit size (AUSI) is significantly and negatively related to 
information leakage. For the control variables, firm growth (SAGR) and leverage 
(LVRG) have a positive influence on information leakage while the firm size (SIZE) 
has a negative influence on information leakage, all at the significant level of 1%. In 
addition, model D reports that the ownership concentration (BLOK) is positively 
related to information leakage at the significant level of 1%, while the institutional 
(INS) and director ownership (DIRE) are negatively related to information leakage, 
at the significant levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. For the control variables, 
leverage (LVRG) has a significant positive effect and firm size (SIZE) have a 
significant negative effect on information leakage.   
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Table 8-5: System GMM Regression Model of the effect of corporate governance 
components on the information leakage of Saudi listed firms (Market Adjusted Model) 
 
The dependent variable is MARM (cumulative abnormal returns, market adjusted model, at window (-25, 0)). 
All coefficients are based on the two-step System GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995) with one and two lags. Where BLOK is the ownership concentration (the percentage of stocks 
owned by large shareholders). GOV is the government ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by 
government). INS is the institutional ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by institutions). DIRE is the 
directors ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by directors). MANG is the managerial ownership (the 
percentage of stocks owned by managerial shareholders). BOSI is the board size (the number of directors in 
the board). BOIN is the board independence (the percentage of independent directors in the board). BOME 
is the board meetings (the number of board’s meetings in each year). CEDU is the CEO duality (If CEO and 
chairman is not the same person = 1, 0 otherwise). MARE is the market reform (If the year from 2009 till 2014 
= 1, 0 otherwise). BOCO is the board subcommittees (If firm has audit, nomination, and remuneration =1, 0 
otherwise). AUSI is the audit committee size (the number of members in audit committee). AUME is the audit 
committee meetings (the number of the audit committee’s meetings in each year). SAGR is the sales growth. 
LVRG is leverage (the percentage of total debt to the total assets). SIZE is the firm size (the natural log of 
firm’s assets). Industry (each industry =1, 0 otherwise). Year (each year =1, 0 otherwise). 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
BLOK     .0018* (1.66) .0023 (0.83) .0021*** (10.56) .0007** (2.48) 
GOV     -.0004 (-0.08) -.0097 (-1.15) .0009*** (2.75) -.0002 (-0.43) 
INS -.0054 (-1.50) .0044 (0.99) -.002*** (-8.57) -.0020** (-2.54) 
DIRE     -.0010** (-2.39) -.0008* (-1.68) -.001*** (-9.64) -.001*** (-5.20) 
MANG     .0004 (0.09 ) -.0075 (-0.49) .0020*** (7.76) .0000 (0.01) 
BOSI    .0010 (-0.12) -.0068 (-0.62) .0078*** (3.25) .0032 (0.86) 
BOIN   -.0000 (-0.44) .0002 (1.03) -.0001 (-1.16) -.0001 (-0.72) 
BOME .0017 (0.53) .0008 (0.19) .0040*** (5.92) -.0003 (-0.38) 
CEDU    .0187 (0.58) -.0318 (-0.68) .0128 (1.11) -.0181 (-1.22) 
MARE -.0105 -1.41 -.0222 -0.57     
BOCO .0114 (0.38) .0342 (1.00)     
AUSI     -.0121 (-0.94) -.0750*** (-2.82) -.0064** (-1.97) -.0004 (-0.07) 
AUME    -.0070*** (-2.65) -.0012 (-0.34) .0004 (0.81) -.0007 (-0.76) 
Control Variables         
SAGR     .0000 (1.39) -.0000 (-0.84) .0001*** (4.32) -.0000 (-0.98) 
LVRG     -.0002 (-0.53) -.0006 (-0.62) .0007*** (5.82) .0010*** (5.02) 
SIZE -.0009 (-0.04) .0050 (0.09) -.024*** (-9.37) -.0115** (-2.18) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant .0620 (0.27) .3117 (0.36) .3009*** (5.82) .2374*** (3.27) 
Observations 496  408  575  425  
Number of firms 62  51  115  85  
Number of 
instruments 
472  424  227  223  
AR(2) test  (.1455)  (-.75698)  (-1.034)  (-.0780)  
Sargan test  35.54  27.00  92.77  66.50  
The test statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. AR (2) is the test for the second order serial correlation with H0= no serial 
correlation so the p-value > 0.05 indicates no serial correlation. Sargan test is to test the validity of 
instruments with H0= valid instruments so the p-value > 0.05 indicates the validity of instruments.  
 
Table 8-6 shows the effect of corporate governance components on information 
leakage and cumulative abnormal returns measured by the market model (MRM). 
Model A reports that board meetings (BOME) have a significant and positive 
influence while market reform (MARE) has a weakly significant and negative 
influence on information leakage. For the control variables, leverage (LVRG) is 
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positively and significantly related to information leakage. Model C states that 
ownership concentration (BLOK) and managerial ownership (MANG) have a 
significant and positive effect on information leakage while the institutional (INS) and 
director ownership (DIRE) have a significant and negative effect on information 
leakage. Board meetings (BOME) and CEO duality (CEDU) are significantly and 
positively associated with information leakage. However, audit committee size 
(AUSI) is significantly and negatively related to the level of information leakage. For 
the control variables, leverage (LVRG) has a significant and positive effect while firm 
size (SIZE) has a significant and negative effect on information leakage. 
Additionally, model D indicates that the ownership concentration (BLOK) and board 
meetings (BOME) are significantly and positively related to information leakage, 
while audit committee meetings (AUME) are significantly and negatively related to 
information leakage. For the control variables, firm growth (SAGR) and size (SIZE) 
have a negative and significant influence and leverage (LVRG) has a positive and 
significant influence on information leakage.    
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Table 8-6: System GMM Regression Model of the effect of corporate governance 
components on the information leakage of Saudi listed firms (Market Model) 
 
The dependent variable is MRM (cumulative abnormal returns, market model, at window (-25, 0)). All 
coefficients are based on the two-step System GMM model of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995) with one and two lags. Where BLOK is the ownership concentration (the percentage of stocks 
owned by large shareholders). GOV is the government ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by 
government). INS is the institutional ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by institutions). DIRE is the 
directors ownership (the percentage of stocks owned by directors). MANG is the managerial ownership (the 
percentage of stocks owned by managerial shareholders). BOSI is the board size (the number of directors in 
the board). BOIN is the board independence (the percentage of independent directors in the board). BOME 
is the board meetings (the number of board’s meetings in each year). CEDU is the CEO duality (If CEO and 
chairman is not the same person = 1, 0 otherwise). MARE is the market reform (If the year from 2009 till 2014 
= 1, 0 otherwise). BOCO is the board subcommittees (If firm has audit, nomination, and remuneration =1, 0 
otherwise). AUSI is the audit committee size (the number of members in audit committee). AUME is the audit 
committee meetings (the number of the audit committee’s meetings in each year). SAGR is the sales growth. 
LVRG is leverage (the percentage of total debt to the total assets). SIZE is the firm size (the natural log of 
firm’s assets). Industry (each industry =1, 0 otherwise). Year (each year =1, 0 otherwise). 
Independent 
Variables 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
BLOK     -.0001 (-0.18) -.0008 (-0.37) .0012*** (4.59) .0008** (2.37) 
GOV     .0012 (0.25) .0025 (0.32) -.0001 (-0.28) -.0011* (-1.72) 
INS .0031 (0.89) .0003 (0.08) -.0014*** (-3.62) -.0010 (-1.05) 
DIRE     -.0006 (-1.61) .0007 (0.41) -.0008*** (-3.33) -.0004* (-1.78) 
MANG     -.0072 (-1.04) -.0038 (-0.54) .0010*** (4.09) -.0011 (-0.52) 
BOSI    .0151 (1.32) -.0016 (-0.15) .0012 (0.57) -.0039 (-1.05) 
BOIN   .0002 (1.21) -.0000 (-0.31) -.0000 (-0.21) -.0003 (-1.59) 
BOME .0083** (2.19) .0054 (1.20) .0072*** (7.87) .0033** (2.48) 
CEDU    .0538 (1.38) -.0734 (-0.85) .0344** (2.37) -.0073 (-0.38) 
MARE -.0165* (-1.85) -.0187 -0.53     
BOCO -.0052 (-0.22) .0117 (0.44)     
AUSI     -.0128 (-0.96) -.0291 (-1.33) -.0134*** (-2.76) .0069 (0.90) 
AUME    -.0017 (-0.51) -.0067 (-1.16) -.0008* (-1.93) -.0027** (-2.44) 
Control Variables         
SAGR     .0000 (0.77) .0000 (0.74) .0000 (1.35) -.000*** (-4.02) 
LVRG     .0010** (1.99) .0009 (0.97) .0006*** (7.01) .0004** (2.07) 
SIZE -.0420* (-1.77) -.0234 (-0.39) -.0241*** (-6.75) -.013*** (-2.76) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant .4949* (1.81) .5928 (0.79) .4121*** (7.22) .2730*** (4.37) 
Observations 496  408  460  425  
Number of firms 62  51  115  85  
Number of 
instruments 
472  424  211  223  
AR(2) test  (.0123)  (-.3574)  (1.763)  (-1.177)  
Sargan test  31.96  31.26  90.75  62.87  
The test statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to the statistical significance at level 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. AR (2) is the test for the second order serial correlation with H0= no serial 
correlation so the p-value > 0.05 indicates no serial correlation. Sargan test is to test the validity of 
instruments with H0= valid instruments so the p-value > 0.05 indicates the validity of instruments.  
 
 
8.3.2 Result Discussion 
The following sub-sections are the results and discussion for every variable in the 
models related to the effect of corporate governance components on information 
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leakage, to confirm or reject the research hypotheses and also to give answers for 
the research questions. 
 
8.3.2.1 Ownership Concentration  
Reyna et al. )2012) indicate that ownership concentration can be a good control 
mechanism for monitoring of management activities. On the other hand, large 
shareholders intend to dominate the main decisions and gain control in the firm, 
which can increase their opportunistic behaviour at the expense of small 
shareholders. The research hypothesis for the ownership concentration and 
information leakage is that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm information leakage. The research’s empirical 
results for the data between 2009 and 2014 show that ownership concentration 
(BLOK) has a strong significant and positive effect on the level of information 
leakage and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) before the official earnings 
announcements that are measured by the constant mean return, market adjusted 
and market models. The data from between 2006 and 2014 shows a non-significant 
relationship between ownership concentration and information leakage. The 
positive effect of ownership concentration (BLOK) supports the research 
hypothesis. Zhuang (1999) indicates that the large shareholders cause a poor 
transparency environment in the firm that leads to an increase in the information 
asymmetry between firms and investors. This is because large shareholders are not 
likely to improve the firm transparency and disclosures because this will reduce their 
power and control of the firm system (Zhuang 1999). Byun et al. (2011) argue that 
firms with a high level of concentration are more likely to enable large shareholders 
to use firm resources at the expense of small shareholders and therefore that these 
firms are less likely to disclose more information to facilitate opportunistic 
behaviours. One example of an opportunistic behaviour is the use of insider 
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information for shares trading by the management and large shareholders before it 
becomes public.  
There are different empirical studies showing that ownership concentration 
has a negative influence on the level of firm disclosures, including those of Lakhal 
(2005) in France, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) in South Africa and Samaha et al. 
(2012) in Egypt. Byun et al.'s (2011) study reports that the ownership concentration 
has a positive relationship with the level of information asymmetry and informed 
trading. The research results showing a positive effect of ownership concentration 
indicate the importance of new rules and regulations that the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) in Saudi Arabia should work on to mitigate the negative effect of 
large shareholders on firm transparency that leads to information leakage and 
insider trading incidents. The research result shows no differences between the 
firms from each sector and non-financial firms in the relationship between the 
ownership concentration and information leakage.        
 
8.3.2.2 Government Ownership 
There are several firms in the Saudi market that have a high percentage of 
government ownership, especially in the energy, petrochemical, mining and telecom 
sectors. Therefore, it is important to assess the effect of government ownership on 
firms’ transparency, information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns before 
the public announcements. The research hypothesis for government ownership 
predicts that there is a significant and positive relationship between government 
ownership and firm information leakage. The research outcomes report mixed 
results, as all models show a non-significant relationship between government 
ownership (GOV) and firm information leakage, except for model C for the market 
adjusted model, which shows that government ownership (GOV) has a significant 
and positive influence on the level of information leakage and cumulative abnormal 
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returns. The positive effect of government ownership on information leakage is 
supported by the empirical study of Al-Janadi et al. (2013), which shows that the 
level of government ownership has a negative influence on the quality of firm 
disclosures, which can increase the information asymmetry between the 
management and investors. The mixed results of the research do not back the 
research hypothesis so it cannot give a robust verdict on the real effect of 
government ownership on information leakage. The research results are contrary to 
those of the studies of  Zhang (2012) and He and Rui (2014), which reported that 
government ownership has a negative influence on information leakage and 
cumulative abnormal returns. In addition, the research results show that there is no 
difference in outcomes between the firms from each sector and the non-financial 
firms, except for those of model C in the market adjusted model, which shows that 
the data of firms from each sector has a positive significant effect while the data of 
non-financial firms has no significant effect.  
 
8.3.2.3 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is another type of ownership that may have some influence 
on firm transparency and information asymmetry. The literature reports contrastive 
results and the research hypothesis for the effect of institutional ownership on 
information leakage is that there is a significant and negative relationship between 
the two. The research’s empirical outcomes show that the data between 2006 and 
2014 indicates a non-significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
information leakage. The data between 2009 and 2014 shows that the sample of 
firms from every sector indicates negative and significant association between 
institutional ownership and the level of information leakage and cumulative 
abnormal returns before the public earnings announcements. The data for non-
financial firms between 2009 and 2014 shows a non-significant relationship, except 
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for the results of the market adjusted model, which show a significant and negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and information leakage. The negative 
influence of institutional ownership supports the research hypothesis and arguments 
that institutional ownership provides a strong monitoring mechanism that can reduce 
the agency problem and opportunistic behaviours. When institutions own a high 
percentage of shares in the firm, they have  strong incentives to monitor the 
management activities and their monitoring role is more effective in comparison to 
other types of shareholders, as they are more professional and have financial know-
how, so they can effectively assess management actions, reports and decisions 
(Bos and Donker 2004; Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008). Therefore, firms are efficiently 
monitored by institutions and those that are experience less incidents of information 
leakage and insider trading.  
The empirical study conducted by Lakhal (2005) shows that firms with high 
levels of institutional ownership are more likely to issue more information and 
voluntary disclosures, so they have less information asymmetry. In addition, Tsai's 
(2014) research indicates that trading depending on insider information is likely to 
be limited in firms with high foreign institutional ownership and this is explained as 
being either due to the fact that foreign institutions reduce the agency issue and 
information asymmetry, or the fact that foreign institutions select only the firms that 
have a good transparency environment. This research’s outcomes show differing 
results for the firms from all sectors and non-financial firms, as the non-financial 
firms report a non-significant relationship. This indicates that institutional ownership 
has a weak effect on banks and insurance companies with regards to information 
leakage incidents. Because of the positive effect of institutional ownership on firm 
transparency, the Saudi authority is recommended to encourage institutions to take 
effective roles in the management of firms.               
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8.3.2.4 Director Ownership  
Director ownership is believed to be a good mechanism and incentive for firms to 
minimise the agency problem and encourage directors to work for the best interests 
of shareholders (Mehdi 2007). Empirical studies report mixed results on the 
relationship between director ownership and firm transparency and information 
leakage. The research hypothesis for this relationship is that there is a significant 
and positive relationship between director ownership and firm information leakage. 
The research’s empirical results show that director ownership has a significant and 
negative effect on the level of information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns 
before the public earnings announcements measured by the market adjusted model. 
The cumulative abnormal returns measured by the constant mean return model 
show no significant relationship between director ownership and information 
leakage. The market model shows significant and negative association between 
director ownership and information leakage for the data from between 2009 and 
2014. The negative influence of director ownership on information leakage and 
information asymmetry is constant with the findings of Rose et al.'s (2013) study, 
which indicated the importance of director ownership on improving a firm’s 
transparency and lowering the number of incidents of manipulation of earnings 
reports.  
These findings are also in line with those of the empirical studies conducted 
by Vafeas (1999b) and  Ju and Zhao (2014), which show that firms with a high level 
of director ownership have more board activities and their directors inhabit effective 
monitoring roles. As the market adjusted and market models are more sophisticated 
than the constant mean return model, the result showing a negative influence of 
director ownership on information leakage is more robust than the non-significant 
relationship between director ownership and information leakage. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the Saudi authority encourage listed firms, through new guidelines 
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and regulations, to make efforts to give directors greater involvement in the firm’s 
future and objectives by increasing their shares of ownership. However, a number 
of studies also report a non-significant relationship, such as that of  Cai et al. (2006), 
which reveals that there is no significant relationship between director ownership 
and the trading of shares based on insider information. The research shows no 
difference in the results between the firms from all sectors and the non-financial 
firms.   
 
8.3.2.5 Managerial Ownership 
Firms may use managerial ownership as incentives and rewards to ensure that the 
management’s interests and objective are the same as those of shareholders. 
Therefore, it is expected that managerial ownership can reduce the agency problem 
and opportunistic behaviours and improve the firm’s transparency. On the other 
hand, this mechanism may give shareholders more confidence, which will lead them 
to reduce their monitoring activities (Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008). This weak 
monitoring environment may thus result in incidents of information leakage and 
insider trading. The research hypothesis for managerial ownership states that there 
is a significant and positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
information leakage. The research’s empirical outcomes show mixed signs and 
results with regards to this relationship. The constant mean return model for the 
sample data, from between 2009 and 2014, shows a significant and negative 
association between managerial ownership and information leakage while the 
market adjusted and market model for the firms from every sector between 2009 
and 2014 show a significant and positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and information leakage. These mixed results provide weak support for 
the research hypothesis. Further to this, the results show that there is no significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and information leakage in the data 
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between 2006 and 2014 and also for the non-financial firms’ data in the market 
adjusted and market models. This result is constant with the results of the empirical 
studies of Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) in the Irish market and Baek et al. (2009) in 
the US market, which show that managerial ownership has no influence on firm 
transparency and information asymmetry. The research outcomes show differences 
in the results between the firms from all sectors and non-financial firms in the market 
adjusted and market models.  
 
8.3.2.6 Board Size 
The board of directors plays an important role in the corporate governance 
mechanism and has a large responsibility for monitoring the management’s actions 
and leading the firm to pursue objectives in the shareholders’ interests. Therefore, 
board size is expected to have a strong influence on firm transparency and 
information asymmetry.  The research hypothesis for the relationship between board 
size and information leakage is thus that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between board size and firm information leakage. The research’s 
empirical outcomes display mixed results. The sample of firms from every sector 
between 2009 and 2014 shows a significant and positive association between the 
board size and information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns measured by 
the constant mean return model and market adjusted model. Other models report a 
non-significant relationship between the firm size and information leakage. The non-
significant effect doesn’t support the research hypothesis, while the positive 
relationship between board size and information leakage does support the research 
hypothesis, which is backed by the argument that a reduction in board size has a 
positive effect on its monitoring role. It is indicated that a smaller sized board will 
have improved communication and cooperation between directors, which helps the 
board to extensively monitor management actions, which will in turn improve the 
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quality of firm disclosures and  transparency and decrease the level of information 
asymmetry (Ajina et al. 2013; Lakhal 2005). 
In addition, the research results from between 2009 and 2014 show that there 
are differences in the results between the firm data from all sectors and that from 
the non-financial firms, as the latter reports a non-significant relationship between 
board size and information leakage, which indicates that the size of the board has 
a greater influence in banks and insurance companies. This result is constant with 
that of of Zhang's (2012) study, which states that there is no significant association 
between the board size of Chinese non-financial listed firms and information 
leakage. Aside from this, it is constant with the empirical study of Huang et al. 
(2012), which reports that board size is not significantly related to illegal insider 
trading. Moreover, the study of Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) shows that there is 
no significant association between the board size and the level of information 
asymmetry.  
 
8.3.2.7 Board Independence 
A board of independent directors within a board is an effective mechanism for the 
monitoring and control of the actions of management in order to prevent 
opportunistic behaviours and safeguard the interests of shareholders (Elbadry et al. 
2015; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn 2010). The research hypothesis for the 
relationship between board independence and information leakage is that there is a 
significant and negative relationship between the two. The research tables report 
inconclusive results for this relationship. The empirical outcomes show that board 
independence has a significant and positive influence on firm information leakage 
and cumulative abnormal returns measured by the constant mean return model, 
except for the sample of non-financial firms between 2009 and 2014, which reports 
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that board independence has no significant influence on information leakage. The 
tables also show that there is no significant association between independent 
directors and information leakage identified by the market adjusted and market 
models. This research’s results do not support the research hypothesis that 
assumed there is a negative relationship between board independence and 
information leakage.  
This result of a non-significant relationship is constant with the study of  
Zhang (2012) in China, which indicated that there is no relationship between board 
size and information leakage. Further to this, it is in the line the empirical study of 
Huang et al. (2012) in Taiwan, which reports that there is no significant association 
between board size and illegal insider trading. The research results are contrary to 
the findings of the empirical studies conducted by Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) in the 
U.S. and Elbadry et al. (2015) in the UK, which report that board independence has 
a significant and negative effect on firm information asymmetry. The research tables 
show no difference between the sample of firms from all sectors and the non-
financial firms in the relationship between board independence and information 
leakage, except for the data between 2009 and 2014, which is measured using the 
constant mean return model.   
 
8.3.2.8 Board Meetings 
Brick and Chidambaran )2010) indicate that the board meeting is an indicator of the 
level of board activities and there is an argument in the literature regarding the effect 
of the frequency of board meetings on the board’s monitoring roles and also on firm 
transparency and information leakage. The research hypothesis for the relationship 
between board meetings and information leakage states that there is a significant 
and negative relationship between the number of board meetings and firm 
information leakage. The research’s empirical results are mixed. The results show 
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that the frequency of board meetings has a significant and positive effect on 
information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns, identified by the market 
model for all samples and which is also identified by the constant mean return and 
market adjusted models for the sample of firms from every sector between 2009 and 
2014. The remaining samples report a non-significant relationship between the 
number of board meetings and the level of information leakage. The research 
outcomes do not support the research hypothesis completely, as the result is mixed 
with positive and non-significant effects, while the research hypothesis assumes a 
negative relationship.  
These results may support the stewardship theory, which argues that firm 
executives are trustworthy and work for the best interests of shareholders 
(Donaldson and Davis 1991). Therefore, there is no need to increase the number of 
board meetings in order to enhance the monitoring role of the board, so these high 
volumes of meetings will add more costs to the firm and may also lead to leakage 
of insider information, as the subjects will be discussed more than is necessary. The 
research results contradict those of the empirical studies of Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2007), Elbadry et al. (2015), Ajina et al. (2013) and Xie et al. (2003), as these 
studies indicate that the frequency of board meetings has a significant and negative 
influence on information asymmetry. The research tables show that there are 
differences in the results between the sample of firms from every sector and non-
financial firms in the constant mean return and market adjusted models between 
2009 and 2014.  
 
8.3.2.9 CEO Duality 
The separation of roles between the CEO and board chairman is done in order to 
minimise the agency problem and to enhance the monitoring role of the board on 
the actions of management  (Rechner and Dalton 1991). The effect of the CEO 
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duality or the separation of roles on firm information asymmetry, transparency and 
information leakage is inconclusive in the literature. The research hypothesis for this 
is that that there is a significant and positive relationship between CEO duality and 
firm information leakage. CEO duality is identified in the research by a value of 1 
when the CEO and chairman are not the same individual and a value of 0 otherwise. 
The research’s empirical outcomes show a mixed result for the relationship between 
CEO duality and information leakage. The tables show that the sample of firms from 
every sector between 2009 and 2014 indicate that CEO duality has a significant and 
negative influence on information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns 
measured by the constant mean return and market models. Further to this, all of the 
remaining samples report a non-significant association between CEO duality and 
information leakage. The empirical results do not support the research hypothesis, 
as this assumes that CEO duality has a positive influence on information leakage, 
but the research results indicate a negative and non-significant association between 
the CEO duality and information leakage. This outcome supports the stewardship 
theory, which assumes that the management is trustworthy and capable of 
simultaneously leading the management and board (Donaldson and Davis 1991). 
Therefore, the firm would be managed by one individual in both positions, which can 
give strong control to the CEO to monitor the firm and its valuable information from 
leaking to the market before it is published officially.  
The negative influence of CEO duality is consonant with the empirical study 
of  Huang et al. (2012) in Taiwan, which indicates that companies with CEO duality 
are less likely to see illegal insider trading activities. In addition, it is also in line with 
the studies of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Al-Janadi et al. (2013), which report 
that CEO duality has a significant and negative effect on information asymmetry. In 
addition, the non-significant relationship between CEO duality and information 
leakage is consonant in agreement with Zhang's (2012) empirical study in China. It 
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is also in line with the research of Ajina et al. (2013), which found that CEO duality 
has no significant effect on adverse selection and information asymmetry. However, 
the tables show differences in the results between the samples of firms from all 
sectors and the non-financial firms for the constant mean return and market models 
for the period between 2009 and 2014.      
 
8.3.2.10 Board Subcommittees 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013) indicate that board subcommittees are an important 
mechanism in the corporate governance system and that one of their main roles is 
to monitor the firm activities and confirm the transparency and accuracy of the firm 
reports and disclosures. Therefore, board subcommittees are expected to have an 
influence on firm information leakage. The research hypothesis for the relationship 
between the presence, or lack thereof, of board subcommittees is that there is a 
significant and negative relationship between the presence of board subcommittees 
and firm information leakage. The research’s empirical outcomes show that the 
existence of board committees has a significant and negative influence on 
information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns measured by the constant 
mean return model. Besides this, there is no significant relationship between the 
presence of board committees and information leakage and cumulative abnormal 
returns identified by the market adjusted and market models. The results of the 
constant mean return model support the research hypothesis, while the results of 
the market adjusted and market models reject this hypothesis.  
The negative effect of board subcommittees on information leakage and 
cumulative abnormal returns before the official announcement is consonant with the 
findings of Zhang's (2012) study in China. It is also consonant with the research of 
McMullen (1996), which reports that the audit committee has a postive effect on the 
quality and acuracy of a firm’s reports and disclouseres. The studies of  Anderson 
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and Bizjak (2003) and Vafeas (1999c) indicate that board committees have a 
positive influence on board effectiveness and the corporate governance system. 
Board subcommittees are important in corporate governance mechanisms because 
most decisions are first discussed in these committees and they also have a 
monitoring role, to ensure the accuracy of firm reports and disclosures (Al-Janadi et 
al. 2013; ). The research results of no significant effect of board subcommittees are 
in line with the empirical study of Forker (1992), which shows that there is no 
significant relation between subcommittees and firm information asymmetry and 
transparency. The tables show that there are no differences in the results between 
the sample of firms from every sector and the non-financial firms.   
 
8.3.2.11 Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee plays a significant role in the firm, especially in aspects related 
to the financial process. Therefore, the size of the audit committee is expected to 
have an influence on firm transparency and information leakage. The research 
hypothesis for the audit committee size and information leakage states that there is 
a significant and negative relationship between the two. The research tables show 
that the size of the audit committee has a significant and negative effect on 
information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns before the public earnings 
announcements identified by the constant mean return model. Further to this, it has 
a significant and negative influence on information leakage for the market adjusted 
and market models for the sample of the firms from every sector between 2009 and 
2014. The remaining samples report a non-significant relationship between the audit 
committee size and information leakage. The negative effect of audit committee size 
supports the research hypothesis and is justified by the argument of Anderson et al. 
(2004), which indicates that the audit committee that is large in size would be able 
to effectively monitor the firm’s financial processes and operations, which would 
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enhance the firm’s accuracy with regards to financial reports and disclosures, as 
well as improving the firm’s transparency. This result is consonant with the empirical 
studies of  Xie et al. (2003), Bryce et al. (2015), Al-abbas (2009) and Inaam and 
Khamoussi (2016), all of which report that audit committee size has a negative 
influence on firm information asymmetry. This results indicate the important role of 
audit committees in improving firm transparency, therefore the Saudi authority 
should ensure that each audit committee contains a large number of members and 
works independently, without any pressure from large shareholders. The tables 
show differences in the results between the sample of firms from every sector and 
the non-financial firms in the market adjusted and market models.  
 
8.3.2.12 Audit Committee Meetings 
The number of audit committee meetings may be deemed a sign of a committee’s 
activities and effectiveness (Menon and Williams 1994). Therefore, audit committee 
meetings may have some effects on firm information asymmetry and transparency. 
The research hypothesis for the link between audit committee size and information 
leakage is that there is a significant and negative relationship between the number 
of audit committee meetings and firm information leakage. The research’s empirical 
results display mixed results. Audit committee meetings have a significant and 
negative effect on information leakage and cumulative normal returns before the 
official earnings announcement identified by the market model. There is also no 
significant association between audit committee meetings and information leakage 
for the market adjusted and constant mean return models, except for the sample of 
firms from every sector between 2006 and 2014, which shows audit committee 
meetings to have a significant and negative effect on information leakage. This 
result showing a negative effect backs the research hypothesis and is supported by 
the argument put forward by  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), which holds that an 
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audit committee with more frequency meetings will be more able and have more 
time to observe and monitor the financial aspects in the firm so that it can play an 
important role in improving the transparency, accuracy and quality of financial 
information and disclosures. These results are consonant with those of the studies 
of Hamdan et al. (2013), Beasley et al. (2000), Farber (2005), Xie et al. (2003), 
Bryce et al. (2015), Elbadry et al. (2015) and Inaam and Khamoussi (2016), as these 
also indicate that audit committee meetings have a negative influence on firm 
information asymmetry. In addition, the tables show no differences in the results 
between the sample of firms from all sectors and the sample of only non-financial 
firms with regards to the relationship between audit committee meetings and 
information leakage.  
 
8.3.2.13 Control Variables 
The research applied control variables in order to study the relationship between 
corporate governance and information asymmetry and information leakage and 
these variables are firm growth (SAGR), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LVRG) and time 
and industry dummies. The empirical results report mixed outcomes for the 
relationship between firm growth (SAGR) and information leakage. The tables show 
that there is no significant relationship between firm growth and information leakage, 
which is the expected result from the market adjusted and the market models. The 
market adjusted model table shows a positive relationship between firm growth and 
information leakage in the sample of firms from every sector between 2009 and 
2014, while the market model table shows a negative association between firm 
growth and information leakage in the sample of non-financial firms between 2009 
and 2014. In addition, the empirical results show that a firm’s level of leverage has 
a significant and positive influence on the level of information leakage and 
cumulative abnormal returns before the annual public earnings announcements. It 
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is argued that companies with a high level of leverage are anticipated to have more 
announcements to convince investors and creditors of their stable financial condition 
(Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, et al. 2012). Therefore, these companies are expected to 
have more incidents of leaked information than other companies.  
This research result is contrary to that of Heggen and Gannon (2008), which 
indicates a negative association between firm leverage and abnormal returns before 
announcements. This empirical study also reports that firm size has a significant 
and negative effect on information leakage and cumulative abnormal returns before 
the annual official announcements. Thus large firms are less likely to have 
information leakage incidents. These results can be explained by the fact that large 
firms usually have a stronger control system in comparison to smaller firms, which 
means that they can prevent any opportunistic behaviour and illegal trading. This 
study’s results go against the idea that larger firms have more leaked information 
due to a large number of events and announcements. In addition, they are contrary 
to the results of  He and Rui (2014) and Heggen and Gannon's (2008) studies, which 
report a positive relationship between firm size and information leakage.     
 
8.3.2.14 Market Reform 
As the Saudi corporate governance regulations became mandatory for all listed 
firms in 2009, the research utilises year dummies in order to compare information 
leakage before and after 2009. This is in order to investigate how market reform 
(MARE) improves firm and the market transparency. The year dummies are 
reflected by a value of 1 for the years from 2009 till 2014 and the value of 0 for the 
years from 2006 till 2008. As the Model A is more effecint than Model B, the 
research’s empirical results showed that the constant mean return and market 
models reported a significant and negative relationship between market reform and 
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information leakage, while the market adjusted model reports non-significant and 
negative association between market reform and information leakage. This result 
indicates that the market reform and making the CGRs obligatory for all Saudi listed 
firm improve the market transparency and reduce the information leakage and 
insider trading incidents as the information leakage incidents after 2009 are less 
than the information leakage incidents before 2009. However, even though the 
result confirms some evidence about the effect of new reform, there are different 
governance regulations show non-significant influence on the firm information 
leakage. Therefore, there new reforms should conducted in the Saudi market to 
improve the current corporate governance regulations. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the dependent and control variables utilised during the 
regression analysis. A discussed was also provided concerning the regression 
analysis, which was conducted in order to investigate the influence of corporate 
governance components on firms’ financial performance. A justification was made 
for identifying the System GMM model as the most appropriate during this analysis. 
Finally, the chapter provided and explained the regression results, concerning the 
effect of each corporate governance variable on firm financial performance. The 
results showed that for the data between 2009- 2014, ownership concentration 
(BLOK) had a positive effect on the degree of information leakage, which was 
measured according to the constant mean return, market adjusted and market 
models. Moreover, variable results were reported in terms of government ownership 
and institutional ownership. It was apparent that director ownership has a negative 
impact on the extent of information leakage, calculated using the market adjusted 
model and market model, while the constant mean return model showed no 
significant relationship. The research’s empirical results showed mixed indicators 
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and results in terms of managerial ownership, board size, board independence, 
frequency of board meetings, size of the audit committee, audit committee meetings 
and CEO duality. For example, the tables indicated that the firm sample across each 
sector between 2009 and 2014 indicated that CEO duality has a negative influence 
on information leakage, measured through the constant mean return and market 
models, while the remaining samples indicated a non-significant correlation 
between CEO duality and information leakage. Additionally, the results evidenced 
that the existence of board committees has a negative impact on information 
leakage, measured through the constant mean return model, while no significant 
relationship was identified between the presence of board committees and 
information leakage, determined through the market adjusted and market models. 
Finally, the empirical results produced inconclusive outcomes based on the constant 
mean return and market models, which indicated a significant and negative 
correlation between market reform and information leakage. Nevertheless, the 
market adjusted model reported no significant correlation between market reform 
and information leakage. 
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Chapter 9:  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
9.1 Summary of the findings  
This section summarises the results and findings that were reported in chapters 4, 
6, 7, and 8. The aim of this research is to reveal corporate finance practices and to 
examine the effect of corporate governance components on firm performance and 
information leakage in Saudi Arabia. In order to conduct these examinations and 
answer the main research questions, this study comprehensively reviewed existing 
literatures and empirical studies as well as employing different methodologies, data, 
variables, statistical tests, and analyses. The primary research questions are:   
- What are the corporate finance practices of Saudi firms? 
- To what extent do CGRs affect firms’ performances in Saudi Arabia? 
- To what degree is information leakage extant within the Saudi Stock Exchange? 
- To what degree does corporate governance impact upon information leakage in 
Saudi Arabia? 
The following sub-sections present a summary of the findings as well as providing 
a response to the questions. 
 
9.1.1 Corporate Finance Practices  
This sub-section is related to the research question: What are the corporate finance 
practices of Saudi firms? In order to answer this research question, the a draft 
survey has been created which shares similarities with the survey of Graham and 
Harvey (2001) and Anand (2002); the necessary modifications have been made so 
as to ensure that the survey was appropriate for the economy and financial 
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environment in Saudi Arabia. The survey covered the main areas of corporate 
finance which include capital budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure, and 
dividend. The survey consisted of 62 subparts and the majority of questions applied 
the Likert scale from 1 to 5. The sample focused on the CFO of all Saudi listed firms 
by the end of May 2015 while there were 165 firms listed on Tadawul. 52 completed 
responses were collected with a response rate of 31.51. The findings of this sub-
section are presented in detail in chapter 4, revealing in which ways Saudi practices 
are either similar to or different from the practices adopted in America, Europe, India 
and Kuwait. In addition, it also reveals whether Saudi’s firm practices support the 
corporate finance theories and arguments that have been developed in western 
countries and taught in business schools. The findings evidently show that the most 
popular techniques employed for capital budgeting in Saudi firms are IRR and NPV 
which are similar to the practices in America, India, and Kuwait. Moreover, the most 
preferred analysis for assessing the project risks in Saudi firms is the scenario 
analysis which differs from the method adopted in Indian and Kuwaiti firms as their 
most preferred analysis is the sensitivity analysis. In regard to the findings relating 
to the cost of capital practices, the results indicated that the most popular method 
for estimating the cost of capital in Saudi firms are earnings and dividend yield which 
is different from the practices which have been implemented in American, European, 
and Indian firms as they all prefer the CAPM model; furthermore, it also differs from 
the practices adopted in Kuwait as the Kuwaiti firms expressed a preference for the 
WACC model. In addition, the Saudi firms prefer to utilise SAMA bills from 1 to 13 
weeks at a rate for risk free rate of the CAPM model which is different from Indian 
firms as they appear to prefer the 10 years government Treasury bond rate; 
moreover, it is also different from the Kuwaiti firms as they prefer the 90 days T-bill. 
In regard to the beta factor, Saudi firms tend to favour the industry average which is 
a similar practice adopted by Indian firms although it differs from the method 
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implemented by Kuwaiti firms as they prefer the published source. In regard to the 
period that was used in calculating the beta factor, the Saudi firms prioritised the 
monthly share prices while this practice was the same one employed by both Indian 
and Kuwaiti firms. In addition, Saudi firms select the CFO’s most effective estimate 
method for the market risk premium rate of the CAPM model which is a different 
practice than the one adopted by Indian and Kuwaiti firms as they apply the fixed 
rate of 9% to 10% and 6% to 8% respectively. In regard to the WACC model, the 
Saudi firms indicated that the tax rate that is widely applied is the Islamic 
assessment, Zakat, which is the same practice employed by Kuwaiti firms although 
it differs from the practice implemented in America, Europe, and India. However, 
Saudi firms utilise book value weights in the WACC model which is the same as 
Indian firms although different from the practices adopted by Kuwaiti firms since they 
adopt the market weights. In addition, the research results tested the various 
theories and concepts related to the capital structure. The results evidently showed 
a lack of support for the pecking-order theory. In contrast, the corporate practices 
adopted in in India, Latin America, and Kuwait generally provide support for the 
pecking-order theory. The Saudi firms indicated that financial flexibility is an 
important factor in determining the amount of debt; this is a similar practice to the 
one employed by American and European firms. Moreover, Saudi firms confirmed 
the importance of the transaction costs of issuing debt in making the capital structure 
which is considered to be a different practice from the one adopted by U.S. and 
Latin American firms. The Saudi practice fails to attach a great deal of importance 
to its competitors; furthermore, the industry level of debt in determining the firm’s 
level of debt is a similar practice to the one implemented by U.S., European, Latin 
American firms. In addition, while the U.S., European, Latin American firms show a 
lack of awareness of the importance of transaction costs in relation to capital 
structure, the Saudi firms’ practices provide adequate support for this factor which 
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confirms the trade-off theory. Saudi firms maintain that issuing a debt is an effective 
controlling mechanism for management actions whereas the U.S. firms did not 
support this concept. Moreover, in regard to the dividend theories and policy, Saudi 
firms prefer to establish a long-term target dividend pay-out ratio in order to focus 
on specific levels of dividends rather than to introduce changes and pay the 
dividends from the residuals from earnings following the desired investments. This 
practice is similar to the one employed by Indian firms. The firm also prefers to 
cancel dividends if there are good investments. The practices upheld by Saudi firms 
support the bird in relation to both the hand theory and signalling theory which is a 
similar practice as the one employed by Indian and Kuwaiti firms. In addition, they 
maintain that shareholders’ preference is an important factor which should be taken 
into consideration when establishing the dividends policy. They also emphasise that 
establishing high level of dividends is an effective controlling mechanism on 
management actions; this practice is different from the practice adopted by Kuwaiti’s 
firms. In addition, the research results reveal that the corporate finance practices of 
Saudi firms vary depending upon the firm and CFO’s characteristics. Table 9-1 
provides a comparison between the practices of corporate finance theories and 
models in Saudi Arabia and other countries based on the research findings.        
 
9.1.2 Corporate Governance Effect on Firm Performance 
This sub-section is related to the following research question: To what extent do 
CGRs affect firms’ performances in Saudi Arabia? In order to answer this question, 
the research explored the various literatures and prior empirical studies and built the 
hypothesis for the expected relationship between the governance variables and firm 
performance. Next, the research applied a multivariate regression analysis to 
evaluate the hypotheses; the System GMM estimator was selected due to the fact 
that the regression models violated the OLS assumptions and experienced the 
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endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation 
issues. The System GMM model is able to control all of these issues. The sample 
contained all of Saudi’s listed firms at the end of 2014. In order to increase the 
validity, accuracy, and robustness of the research results, the study adopted two 
types of firms as well as two periods of times. Moreover, it adopts three different 
methods to determine the dependent variable and firm performance, which are 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’ Q. Chapter 6 presents 
in greater detail the regression analysis and the research results showing the effect 
which corporate governance components have on firm financial performance. The 
findings reveal that the ownership concentrations have a significant negative effect 
on ROA and ROE; however, it has no significant effect on Tobin’s Q therefore 
indicating that the negative effect of ownership concentration is related only to 
accounting-based performance rather than market–based performance. High level 
of ownership concentration and large shareholders also have a negative influence 
due to the fact that large shareholders would utilise firm resources for their own 
benefit over the expense and rights of small shareholders. In addition, the results 
evidently show that government ownership has a significant negative influence on 
ROA and ROE although it has no significant influence on Tobin’s Q; therefore, it 
influences the accounting-based performance rather than the market-based 
performance. This result supports the argument that government ownership does 
not add value to a firm as the primary objective of purchasing shares is to establish 
a significant amount of power and influence over firms rather than to improve the 
firm growth and profits. Furthermore, government ownership helps to further 
establish a bureaucratic environment in a firm and allows its resources to benefit 
politicians. In regard to institutional ownership, the findings reveal that there is a 
significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q while there is no significant relationship between institutional ownership 
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and ROA. The positive influence of institutional ownership supports the argument 
that the institutions would add value to firms since they are more professional and 
they have extensive financial knowledge. In addition, the research findings report 
that the director ownership has a significant positive influence on ROE while it 
produces mixed results in regard to the effect which director ownership has upon 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. The director ownership would encourage directors to improve 
firm performance since they will gain benefits from profits while they will also be 
affected by poor investment and plans that negatively influence the firm’s value. 
Moreover, the findings show that there is a significant and positive relationship 
existing between the managerial ownership and ROA and ROE although there is no 
significant relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, 
the positive effect which managerial ownership has upon accosting-based 
performance as opposed to market-based performance. The managerial ownership 
would enhance management performance and encourage their objectives and 
interests to coincide with the shareholders’ interests. Therefore, it will reduce the 
number of agency problems and improve firm performance. In regard to board size, 
the research findings suggest that the board size has a significant and positive effect 
on ROA. The results also show mixed results for ROE and Tobin’s Q proxies as 
board size has a significant and negative effect on ROE and Tobin’s Q according to 
the sample of firms from every sector while it has no significant effect on ROE and 
Tobin’s Q according to the sample of non-financial firms. These mixed results 
neither supports nor rejects the arguments regarding the effect of board size. In 
addition, the board independence reported inconclusive results as it has both a 
significant and negative effect on the ROE for the sample of firms from every sector 
while it has a non-significant effect on ROE for the sample of non-financial firms. It 
also has a non-significant influence on the ROA and Tobin’s Q. The inconclusive 
results of the board independence did not provide a decisive conclusion regarding 
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its effect on firm performance. In addition, the board meetings’ variable displayed 
mixed results in regard to its influence on firm performance. It showed that board 
meetings have both a significant and negative influence on ROA whereas it had a 
non-significant influence on ROE. It also revealed that this factor has a significant 
and positive influence on Tobin’s Q. In regard to the CEO duality, the research’s 
empirical results did not deliver a decisive conclusion in relation to CEO duality and 
the effect it has on ROA and ROE; furthermore, the results suggest that there is a 
non-significant relationship between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q. In addition, the 
presence of board subcommittees’ variable reveal that it has a strong significant and 
negative effect on ROA and has weak significant and negative effect on ROE. 
Moreover, it has no significant influence on the Tobin’s Q. It therefore has a negative 
effect on the accounting–based performance whereas it has no influence on the 
market-based performance. In fact, the negative effect of board subcommittees 
indicates that Saudi’s listed firms established all three committees in an attempt to 
adhere to the capital market authority; however, they do not provide these 
committees with the power to effectively perform and conduct their responsibilities. 
Therefore, these ineffective board subcommittees will only add further costs to the 
firm, such as travel costs and compensation fees, while most important and strategic 
plans and decisions are supervised by the board. In regard to the audit committee 
size, the findings indicate that there is a significant and positive association between 
the audit committee size and ROA and ROE. There is also a significant and negative 
association between the audit committee size and Tobin’s Q. It therefore has a 
positive effect on the accounting-based performance while it has a negative effect 
on the market-based performance. The positive effect on firm performance supports 
the argument that an increase in members of the audit committee would enable it to 
effectively monitor the management’s actions; in addition, these members would 
bring the necessary knowledge and skills to the committee in order to improve firm 
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performance. Moreover, the empirical results reveal that the audit committee 
meetings are significantly and positively related to the ROA and significantly and 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q. In addition, they have no significant effect on ROE. 
Committee meetings are considered to have a positive effect on firms’ performance 
due to the fact that an increase in the number of meetings can help to improve 
communications and coordination between the committee and the managers. 
Finally, the research results show inconclusive results in regard to the influence of 
market reform on firm performance as the results show a negative relationship 
between market reform and ROE as well as a non-significant relationship existing 
between market reform and ROA. The weak effect of market reform suggests that 
Saudi firms may require a longer period of time in order to effectively adjust 
governance practice and it may be that the firm incorporates the obligatory codes 
for public appearance rather than in an effort to improve performance. For example, 
the firm may assign a greater number of independent directors to the board although 
in reality these directors are controlled by the large shareholders and family owners. 
In addition, the firm may establish board subcommittees although these 
subcommittees lack both the power and authority to effectively carry out their roles 
and responsibilities. Several listed companies in Saudi Arabia are owned by families 
which are the larger shareholders who would prefer to assign the roles of board 
chairman and independent directors to those who are under their control since they 
wish to implement and direct strategic plans and make important decisions. (MORE) 
 
9.1.3 The extent of Information Leakage  
This sub-section is linked to the following research question: To what degree is 
information leakage extant within the Saudi Stock Exchange? In order to provide an 
answer to this question, the research utilises the event study methodology to 
investigate the presence of the information leakage phenomena prior to earnings 
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announcements in Saudi Arabia. The event date is the quarterly and annual 
earnings announcements made by the listed firms on Saudi’s Stock Exchange 
between 2006 and 2014. For the event window, the research utilised an event 
window (-30, 10) trading days for the annual earnings announcements and (-20, 10) 
trading days for the quarterly earnings announcements. The estimation period is (-
220, -21) for the quarterly earnings announcements and (-230, -31) for the annual 
earnings announcements. In order to calculate the abnormal returns, the research 
employed three models which are the constant mean return model, the market 
adjusted model, and the market model; moreover, the study applied the cross-
sectional t test to assess the hypothesis of the cumulative average abnormal returns 
prior to the earnings announcements. The research hypothesis for the expected 
cumulative average abnormal return before the earnings announcement is equal to 
zero. The findings on the event study are presented in greater detail in chapter 7. 
The research results for the quarterly earnings announcements reveal significant 
cumulative abnormal returns prior to the quarterly earnings announcement based 
on all of the three models which confirms the appearance of information leakage 
and insider trading in the Saudi market prior to the official date of the quarterly 
earnings disclosures. The market-adjusted model and the market model both reveal 
that the significant CARs prior to the announcements during the period 2006-2008 
are greater than the significant CARs in the period 2009-2014, which may indicate 
the positive influence of enforcing several of the important Saudi CGRs - which 
began in the year 2009 - on the accountability and transparency of Saudi firms. In 
addition, the results reveal that there are differences in the CARs for the post-
announcement between models. In regard to the annual earnings announcements, 
the results show significant cumulative abnormal returns prior to the annual earnings 
announcement as calculated by the three models in both the positive and negative 
news, as well as in all the periods except for the positive news in the market-adjusted 
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model. Therefore, this result verified the theory of the quarterly disclosures which 
states that insider trading incidents occur in the Saudi market based on information 
which has been leaked to several investors and shareholders prior to the official 
date of announcement. Moreover, the pre-announcements’ significant CARs 
relating to both positive and negative news in the market-adjusted mode and the 
market during the period 2006-2008 are less than the significant CARs in the period 
2009-2014, thereby failing to support the results of the quarterly announcements; 
moreover, it disproves the positive effect of enforcing CGRs in Saudi and their 
overall effectiveness in improving the firms’ performance as well as the market. 
Moreover, the significant CARs are concentrated in 2006-2008 at 30, 25, and 20 
days prior to the announcement, whereas the CARs in 2009-2014 were 
concentrated within 10 and 5 days before the announcements were made. In regard 
to the post-announcement of annual earnings, the results suggest that the market 
model reveals more significant CARs in the post-announcement window compared 
with the market-adjusted model and the constant mean return model. In addition, in 
comparison to the quarterly and annual disclosures in the market reaction, the 
results show that the market’s reaction to all of the news relating to the annual 
disclosures was greater than the market’s reaction to all of the news of the quarterly 
disclosures, especially in the market model and market-adjusted model within the 
five days following the official announcement date. 
 
9.1.4 Corporate Governance Effect on Firm Information Leakage 
This sub-section is related to the research question: To what degree does corporate 
governance impact upon information leakage in Saudi Arabia? In order to answer 
this question, the research explored various literatures and empirical studies in order 
to present a review for the concept of the market transparency and information 
leakage and the role played by corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
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information leakage. Next, the research established a hypothesis for the relationship 
that exists between each governance component and information leakage. The 
research then conducted a regression analysis and applied the System GMM model 
to test the research hypotheses since the research model violated the OLS 
estimation. The research utilised the same sample of the regression analysis that 
examined the relationship between governance and firm performance. In regard to 
the dependent variables, the research implemented three methods of analysing 
cumulative abnormal return and information leakage to increase the level of 
accuracy, validity, and robustness of the results: constant mean return model, 
market adjusted model, and market model. In addition, the research used the event 
window (-25, 0) and the estimation period (-230, -31). The regression analysis and 
results discussion are presented in greater detail in chapter 8. The findings of the 
effect of corporate governance on information leakage reveal that ownership 
concentration has a significant and positive effect on information leakage and 
cumulative abnormal returns prior to the annual earnings announcements. This is 
due to the fact that large shareholders may create a firm environment that is lacking 
transparency since they wish to increase their ability to control managerial decisions 
as well as take advantage of firm resources. Furthermore, the results are fairly mixed 
in regard to the relationship that exists between government ownership and 
information leakage as all models suggest there is a non-significant relationship with 
the exception of the market adjusted model for the sample of firms from every sector 
which reported significant and positive relationship. In addition, in regard to 
institutional ownership, the results indicate a significant and negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm information leakage for all models except 
the constant mean return model and market model of the sample of non-financial 
firms which reported non-significant relationship. Institutional shareholders are more 
likely to improve firm transparency and disclosures in comparison to other 
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shareholders since they are professional and possess the necessary financial 
knowledge which enables them to effectively monitor the management’s actions and 
disclosures. The findings of director ownership reveal mixed results as it has both a 
significant and negative influence on information leakage for the market adjusted 
models as well as for the market model of the sample of firms from every sector. In 
addition, it has a non-significant influence on the constant mean return model as 
well as on the market model of the sample relating to non-financial firms. In addition, 
the findings of managerial ownership show mixed results as it has a significant and 
negative effect on information leakage for the constant mean return model. 
Moreover, it has a significant and positive effect on information leakage for the 
market adjusted model and market model of the sample of firms from every sector 
while it has a non-significant effect on the sample of non-financial firms. The board 
size results were inconclusive as it has a significant and positive influence on the 
constant mean return model and market adjusted model of the sample of firms taken 
from every sector while it has a non-significant influence on the market model as 
well as on the constant mean return model and market adjusted model of the sample 
of non-financial firms. Moreover, the board independence also produced mixed 
results as it reported a non-significant relationship between board independence 
and information leakage for all models with the exception of the constant return 
model of the sample of firms taken from every sector which showed a significant 
and positive relationship. The frequency of board meetings suggest that there is a 
significant and positive relationship between the number of board meetings and 
information leakage for all models and samples with the exception of the sample of 
non-financial firms of the constant mean return model and market adjusted model, 
thereby revealing a non-significant relationship. In addition, the empirical results 
produced mixed outcomes for the relationship between the CEO duality and 
information leakage. In addition, the findings report mixed outcomes for the board 
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subcommittees since the presence of board subcommittees has both a significant 
and negative influence on information leakage for the constant mean return model, 
while it has a non-significant influence on information leakage for both the market 
adjusted model and market model. In addition, the audit committee size results 
reveal that there is a significant and negative association existing between the audit 
committee size for all models and samples except the sample of non-financial firms 
for the market adjusted model and market model. The large size of audit committees 
can effectively monitor the financial aspects of firm which would help to improve the 
firm’s disclosures and enhance transparency. Moreover, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings produced mixed results as the number of audit committee 
meetings has a non-significant relationship with information leakage for all models 
and samples except the sample of non-financial firms for the market model which 
revealed a negative relationship. The results also showed inconclusive outcomes 
relating to the effect of market reforms and implementation of governance codes on 
Saudi’s listed firms on firm information leakage. The results suggest that market 
reform has no significant effect on information leakage for all models and samples 
except the sample of firms taken from every sector for the constant mean return 
model.     
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 Table 9-1: A comparison between the practices of corporate finance theories and 
models in Saudi Arabia and other countries based on the research findings 
Corporate 
Finance 
topics 
Theories and 
models 
Corporate finance practices 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Other countries 
Capital 
budgeting 
Popular model  used 
in capital budgeting 
IRR then 
NPV 
IRR then NPV (US, India, and 
Kuwait) 
Popular method used 
in assessing the 
project risk 
Scenario 
analyses 
Sensitivity analyses (India and 
Kuwait) 
Cost of 
capital 
Popular model used 
in estimating the cost 
of capital  
Earnings 
yield 
CAPM model (US, Europe, India) 
WACC model (Kuwait) 
The risk free rate 
used in CAPM model 
SAMA 
bill 
10 year government treasury 
bond (India) 
90 day T-bill (Kuwait) 
Volatility factor used 
in CAPM model 
Industry 
average  
Industry average (India) 
Publishes source (Kuwait) 
Market risk premium 
used in CAPM model 
CFO’s 
estimate 
Fixed rate 9%-10% and 6%-8% 
(India and Kuwait) 
Tax rate used to 
count after tax cost of 
debt 
Zakat 
rate 
Statutory tax rate (India) 
Zakat rate (Kuwait) 
Capital 
structure 
The evidence support 
for pecking-order 
theory 
Weak 
support  
Weak support (US and Europe) 
Support (India and Kuwait) 
The evidence support 
for trade-off theory 
Support Weak support (US and Europe) 
Dividend 
The evidence support 
for bird in hand theory 
Support Support (India and Kuwait) 
The evidence support 
for signaling theory 
Support Support (India and Kuwait) 
The evidence support 
for considering the 
dividend policy as a 
controller on 
managers’ activities 
Support Support (India) 
Weak support (Kuwait)  
**For other countries, the following literatures are used which implemented comprehensive 
survey for investigating the corporate finance practices:  
Graham and Harvey's (2001) for US, Anand (2002) for India, Brounen et al. (2004) for 
Europe, and Mutairi et al. (2009) for Kuwait.  
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9.2 Implications and suggestions  
This section describes the suggestions and implications which the research results 
and analysis depend upon. The section is divided into four sub-sections, which each 
sub-section presenting the suggested implications of the different chapters.  
9.2.1 Implications of the Corporate Finance Practices Findings 
The results of corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia provide important 
implications for researchers, practitioners, and business schools. Graham and 
Harvey (2001: p 188) explain the significant implications of revealing the corporate 
finance practices by stating that “we hope that researchers will use our results to 
develop new theories and potentially modify or abandon existing views. We also 
hope that practitioners will learn from our analysis by noting how other firms operate 
and by identifying areas where academic recommendations have not been fully 
implemented.” The research results have revealed to both researchers and 
academicians the overall effectiveness of corporate finance practices in Saudi 
Arabia, in the context of distinct businesses and financial environments, in 
comparison to other countries. The research provides important information on how 
the theories and concepts of corporate finance, which are developed in western 
countries, work in the context of the major economy in Islamic and Middle Eastern 
countries as well as how they differ from the business and financial environment in 
western countries. The research findings reveal that there are several differences 
between the corporate finance practices adopted by Saudi Arabia and western 
countries such as the U.S and Europe, including developing countries such as India. 
Moreover, the results revel differences between the practices implemented by Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait despite the fact that they are both located in the Gulf region, 
thereby indicating that although countries share similarities, they may adopt different 
corporate finance practices. Therefore, the researchers can refer to the various 
differences existing between corporate finance practices employed in countries with 
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special environments (such as Saudi Arabia) in order to review, assess, or modify 
the current theories and concepts of corporate finance. In addition, the result would 
have important implications for researchers by showing them the gap that exists 
between the corporate finance theories and concepts and firm practices in 
developing and Islamic countries, especially since knowledge in this particular field 
is fairly limited.  
In addition, the findings would allow practitioners in developed countries to 
determine how practices in other countries that are faced with a different 
environment which can expose them to new concepts which may help to improve 
their practices. Moreover, the findings would allow the practitioners in Saudi Arabia 
to find the limitations in their practices and corporate finance theories as well as 
enabling them to compare their practices with those adopted in other western and 
developing countries which may ultimately help them to develop and advance their 
own practices. Moreover, according to the findings, every Saudi firm can compare 
its practices with the popular practices adopted in other Saudi firms which may lead 
them to discover more effective techniques and methods compared to the ones they 
currently use, especially the findings and results which are obtained from similar 
Saudi firms.  
In addition, the research findings provide important implications for academicians 
and business schools. The majority of Saudi business schools that teach corporate 
finance refer to textbooks that have been published in western countries, especially 
the United States. One of the major complaints of Saudi students in these schools 
is that the corporate finance textbooks offer information, models, examples, and 
solving problems which are only related to American firms while there is no 
information concerning the real practices of Saudi firms and whether they utilise the 
same models and theories presented in these textbooks or if they apply unique 
models and theories. As this research is the first study which to investigate the 
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practices of Saudi firms, the research findings would provide a solution to this issue 
and may offer a significant amount of information about popular theories, models, 
techniques, and methods relating to corporate finance that are utilised in Saudi 
firms. 
Finally, the research results would offer important information relevant to the Saudi 
authority. Therefore, the Saudi authority would determine the existing gap between 
the practices implemented in advanced countries and the practices of Saudi Arabia, 
enabling them to set new strategies, plans, and processes in an attempt to improve 
the Saudi practices until they become as efficient as those which are applied in 
advanced countries. 
          
9.2.2 Implications of Corporate Governance and Performance Findings 
The findings of the effect of corporate governance components on firm performance 
have important implications for researchers as well as for Saudi firms and Capital 
Market Authority (CMA). The findings will provide further information to researchers 
regarding the relationship between corporate governance and performance which 
is analysed by applying the dynamic System GMM model along with two types of 
data which consist of firms from every sector and non-financial firms. In addition, 
firms can benefit from the findings by understanding which governance components 
may increase accounting and market performance and which aspects may reduce 
accounting and market performance.  In addition, the findings would enable the 
CMA to conduct a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of governance 
regulations in improving firm performance; this will enable the CMA to review, 
modify, and develop the regulations based on the research findings, especially since 
thisresearch is the first study that investigates the relationship between governance 
and performance once governance regulations had become mandatory for all listed 
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firms. The findings reveal that the ownership concentration has a significant 
negative influence on the accounting-based performance while it also has on 
significant influence on Tobin’s Q. This result emphasises the importance for the 
CMA to reduce the negative effects which large shareholders on firm performance. 
Large shareholders can conduct opportunistic behaviour and utilise firm resources 
for their own benefit at the expense of small shareholders. Furthermore, large 
shareholders have a negative influence on the firm environment as they can take 
advantage of their power to control the firm and reduce the positive influence of 
highly skilled managers. Therefore, the CMA should seek to establish new 
legislations in order to further delegate ownership in the firms as well as to reduce 
the negative influence of large shareholders by protecting the rights of small 
shareholders. In addition, the findings show that government ownership has a 
negative influence on the accounting-based performance. This is due to the fact that 
the aim of government ownership is to maintain control over the firms and the market 
which may result in more bureaucratic processes and lead to firms being managed 
for the benefit of politicians. Several Saudi firms have a high level of government 
ownership while this ownership may reach 74.3% of the issued shares. Therefore, 
the CMA should increase privatisation in the Saudi market as well as increase the 
level of free float shares. Moreover, the research outcomes reported that the 
institutional ownership has a positive effect on the accounting-based and market-
based performance. This is due to the fact that institutions are more professional 
and have more knowledge of the financial aspects; therefore, they can easily 
monitor the management’s actions and decisions so as to improve firm 
performance. The average institutional ownership in the Saudi market is estimated 
to be at 9% which is considered relatively small. Therefore, the CMA should 
introduce new regulations to encourage institutions to invest in the market as well 
as to encourage listed firms to attract valuable institutions to increase their level of 
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ownership as it has a positive influence on firms’ environment by improving firm 
activities and decisions. In addition, the results suggest that the director and 
managerial ownership are positively related to the accounting-based performance. 
The ownership would provide greater incentives to directors and managers to 
increase the firm performance since they will have the same interests as the 
shareholder; therefore, ownership is an effective technique to reduce the agency 
problem. According to the results, the CMA in Saudi Arabia should establish new 
rules and regulations to increase the level of director and managerial ownership as 
the current capital market regulations only require the directors of the board to keep 
at least one thousand shares. A new regulation should be introduced which requires 
directors and senior managers to possess more control over shares in order to 
encourage them to improve firm performance. Moreover, the results reveal that 
board size has a positive influence on the accounting-based performance. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that the size of the audit committee is positively 
associated with the accounting-based performance. The large size improves firm 
performance since a greater number of members belonging to the board and audit 
committee would enable them to effectively monitor the firm’s management as well 
as bring more knowledge and skills which can enhance their decisions and overall 
performance. The current Saudi CGRs only require the listed firms to have 
somewhere between three and eleven members on the board and to have at least 
three members in the audit committee while there are currently no regulations which 
encourage firms to add more members. Therefore, since the size of the board and 
committee have a positive effect on firm performance, the CMA should increase the 
minimum number of members in the board and audit committee as well as provide 
greater incentives and regulations to encourage firms to increase the number of 
members. However, the results illustrate that the presence of board subcommittees 
has a negative influence on firm performance. This result contrasts with the initial 
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prediction that the board subcommittees would have a positive influence on firm 
performance. The reason for this can be explained by the fact that Saudi firms 
establish these committees in order to adhere to the obligatory governance 
regulations rather than to enhance the performance of their board and firm. 
Moreover, these committees are controlled by large and family shareholders and so 
they do not work as effectively with the authorities in order to carry out their roles 
and responsibilities. Therefore, these ineffective committees would only add further 
costs and expenses to the firm’s budget without gaining any benefits. Therefore, the 
Saudi CMA should monitor the firm implications of board subcommittees as well as 
establish new regulations to ensure that the board subcommittees work without any 
intervention or pressure from other parties that may weaken their role. In addition, 
board independence and CEO duality revealed mixed and inconclusive results 
which confirms the weak effect of independent board members and the separate 
roles of the chairman and CEO. This can be explained by the fact that firms assign 
independent members and divide the roles between chairman and CEO, whereas 
the independent members and chairman are selected and controlled by large and 
family shareholders and are therefore unable to work independently to perform their 
role. Therefore, the CMA should establish new rules and regulations to ensure a 
transparent process when selecting the independent members and chairman. In 
addition, the results reveal that several governance variables have either a non-
significant or inconclusive effect on Tobin’s Q and marker–based performance. 
These results indicate that the CMA needs to improve and develop the external 
corporate governance mechanisms so as to increase market efficiency. Finally, the 
findings report that the market reform and the enforcement of CGRs in the year 2009 
failed to improve firm performance. Therefore, it is necessary for the CMA to conduct 
a comprehensive assessment and produce a review for the current corporate 
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governance codes and the firm practices so as to determine the weakness that need 
to be reformed.      
 
9.2.3 Implications of the Extent of Information Leakage Findings 
Both researchers and the Saudi authority can benefit from the research findings in 
that they examine the presence and extent of information leakage and cumulative 
abnormal returns prior to the official earnings announcements. The findings offer 
new evidence for the researchers relating to market transparency and information 
leakage in developing countries, especially those located in the Middle East region. 
Moreover, the research results clearly illustrates that there are various incidents 
involving the leakage of information and cumulative abnormal returns in the period 
before the quarterly and annual earnings announcements. These findings indicate 
that the CMA needs to improve the market and firm transparency in order to reduce 
the information from being leaked to protect the rights of investors and to ensure 
that all investors receive firm announcements and any information at the same time. 
In addition, from 2009, several Saudi CGRs became obligatory for all listed firms 
while the findings of quarterly earnings announcements reported that the level of 
information leakage before 2009 was greater than the level of information leakage 
in the period following 2009. These findings indicate that the market reform in 2009 
had a negative effect on the level of information leakage; however, this market 
reform has not yet been completed as the results also showed information leakage 
incidents following 2009. In addition, according to the findings relating to annual 
announcements, the market adjusted model confirms that the market reform has a 
positive effect on information leakage. Therefore, as these results indicate that the 
market reform in 2009 is inadequate to prevent or reduce insider trading prior to 
earnings announcements, it is necessary for the CMA to review, assess, and 
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improve the current corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia so as to ensure 
market transparency and prevent future insider trading incidents.  
   
9.2.4 Implications of Corporate Governance and Information Leakage 
Findings    
The research results which determine the relationship between the corporate 
governance mechanisms and information leakage have important implications for 
researchers as well as for Saudi firms and CMA. Since study of the relationship 
between governance and information leakage is limited, these results would provide 
researchers with new evidence associated with the relationship that are generated 
by applying the dynamic System GMM model along with two types of data which 
include firms from every sector and the non-financial firms. Furthermore, the results 
would allow Saudi firms to gain a better understanding of which governance 
mechanisms can reduce information leakage and asymmetry as well as increase 
firm transparency. Moreover, as this research is the first study to conduct an 
investigation into the relationship between governance mechanisms and information 
leakage in the Saudi market, the findings have important implications for the CMA 
as the findings provide a deep insight into governance components. Therefore, the 
CMA can refer to these findings to assess, review, and improve the current 
governance mechanisms so as to reduce information leakage and enhance market 
transparency. The findings reported that the ownership concentration has a positive 
effect on information leakage. This is due to the fact that large shareholders are less 
likely to improve the firm’s transparency since it may have a negative effect on the 
power and control they entertain over the firm’s system while an environment that is 
weak in transparency would enable large shareholders to utilise the firm’s resources 
for their own benefit; moreover, it may encourage them to act in an opportunistic 
manner, for example leaking valuable information for their own benefit. Therefore, 
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as was previously suggested, the CMA should establish new rules and regulations 
so as to increase the widespread distribution of ownership in the market and reduce 
the negative influence of large shareholders on firm transparency. In addition, the 
findings evidently show that the institutional ownership has a negative influence on 
the firm information leakage. This is due to the fact that the institutions are managed 
by professionals that have knowledge of the financial system; therefore, they are 
better equipped than other shareholders to effectively monitor the management’s 
actions and decision to reduce the agency problem, opportunistic behaviour, 
information leakage and increase firm’s transparency. Therefore, as was previously 
suggested, the CMA should establish new legislations to increase the influence of 
institutions in the market as this would work towards improving market transparency 
as well as increasing efficiency. In addition, the governance ownership has a 
positive effect on information leakage as measured by the market adjusted model. 
This can be explained by the fact that government ownership would add more 
bureaucratic processes and systems which may reduce transparency in the system 
which would subsequently lead to more information asymmetry and information 
leakage incidents. Therefore, the CMA can reduce this negative influence on the 
firm information system by increasing the privatisation activities in the Saudi market. 
Furthermore, the findings report a negative relationship between the director 
ownership and information leakage. The study conducted by Vafeas (1999b) and Ju 
and Zhao (2014) reveals that firms with a high level of director ownership conduct 
more board activities while their directors effectively carry out their monitoring roles. 
Effectively monitoring the firm’s management can help to reduce opportunistic 
behaviours and information leakage incidents. Therefore, it is recommended that 
the CMA should establish new guidelines and regulations to encourage firms to give 
their directors more involvement in the firm’s activities by increasing the amount of 
shares they own since this can increase their monitoring roles and reduce the 
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number of information leakage incidents. Moreover, the research results suggest 
that they presence of board subcommittees has a negative influence on information 
leakage. The board subcommittees play important roles in supporting the board 
decisions as the majority of board decisions are initially put forward and discussed 
at the subcommittees’ level. The subcommittees conduct important monitoring roles 
on the management’s actions, especially in regard to the financial aspects; 
therefore, their role helps to reduce opportunistic behaviours and information 
leakage. Therefore, the CMA should establish new rules and legislations to provide 
the board subcommittees with greater responsibilities as well as to ensure that they 
can work without any interventions or pressure from the large shareholders. In 
addition, the findings indicate that there is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee size and information leakage. That is due to the fact that a greater 
number of members would provide more knowledge and skills to the committee 
while they would also help to oversee management’s actions. As a result, more 
members can potentially reduce opportunistic behaviours, insider trading, and 
information leakage. Therefore, as Saudi’ listed firms are required to have at least 
three members in the audit committee, the CMA should increase the required 
minimum number of members in the committee and set incentives to firms to 
increase the size of their audit committees. In addition, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings is reported to be negatively related to the information leakage 
as measured by the market model. Audit committees that meet more frequently are 
able monitor the activities of management more effectively so as to ensure the 
accuracy and transparency of the firm disclosures and information and prevent 
insider trading and information leakage. The CGRs has not established a specific 
number of audit committee meetings; therefore, the CMA should set guidelines and 
rules to encourage firms instruct audit committees to frequently meet. However, the 
findings reveal that board independence and the divided roles of the CEO and 
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chairman increase the level of the firm information leakage. These unexpected 
results indicate the strong influence of large and family shareholders as most of the 
chairman and independent members are selected and controlled by them. 
Therefore, as large shareholders reduce the independency of board members, the 
CMA should establish new regulations to reduce the influence they have over the 
firm at the expense of small shareholders. Finally, the findings reveal that the market 
reform and the enforcement of CGRs on Saudi firms in 2009 has had a negative 
effect on information leakage; therefore, the information leakage level prior to 2009 
was greater than the information leakage following 2009, thereby indicating that the 
market reform has improved market transparency. However, despite the fact that 
this result provides evidence relating to the effect of market reform, there are 
different governance regulations which reveal that it has a non-significant influence 
on the firm’s information leakage. Therefore, to the CMA should undertake an 
important action in order to help develop the current corporate governance 
regulations. The fact that various governance mechanisms fail to significantly 
improve market transparency could be due to many reasons. First, as these 
governance codes were recently applied in the Saudi market, firms may require time 
to adjust to these codes as well as to gain a comprehensive understanding of their 
objectives and benefits. Secondly, although these codes have been implemented 
by Saudi firms, the majority of these firms adhere to the codes only to comply with 
market regulations rather than to develop and improve firm performance; therefore, 
these governance codes do not achieve the initial objectives. Many firms in the 
Saudi market are dominated by large shareholders and families and so when they 
increase firm transparency and reduce information asymmetry, it may result in them 
losing control of their firms. The CMA should establish new rules to confirm and 
ensure the accurate implementation of governance codes. In addition, the CMA may 
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require more rules to help reduce the influence of larger shareholders, with a view 
to improving firm transparency as well as protect the rights of small shareholders.    
 
9.3 Research Contributions 
Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, MENA, and Arab region. 
Moreover, it is a major country in the Islamic world, the sole Arab country in the G20, 
and one of the largest oil producer countries in the world. Moreover, it has a different 
financial system and business environment compared to the west and other 
developing countries. Therefore, the research outcomes and findings of this 
research will offer valuable contributions to the worldwide market, including 
researchers, practitioners, and participants, especially in the developing markets. 
The research contributions to the various literatures and academicians, 
practitioners, and firms can be summarised as follows: 
- As far as I am aware, this research is the first study that conducts a 
comprehensive investigation into the corporate financial practices that includes 
capital budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure, and dividend practices in 
Saudi firms. Therefore, this research offers a valuable contribution to the 
literatures by adding new findings relating to corporate financial practices in a 
country which plays a major role in the developing, Islamic, Middle Eastern, and 
MENA region while it also greatly differs from western and developing countries. 
Moreover, the research explores the financial practices adopted by developing 
countries which are considered to be fairly limited.  
- Saudi Arabia is the largest existing economy that has a unique institutional 
environment characterised by the absence of tax systems, an undeveloped bond 
market, and intensive Islamic financial products and services. Therefore, the 
research significantly contributes towards knowledge in this field by revealing the 
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effect of the environment on corporate financial practices as well as in 
discovering whether corporate financial theories developed in western markets 
can also be applied to the Saudi market. 
- The research reveals the gap existing between the corporate finance theories 
and models and the practices adopted by Saudi firms. This contribution is 
important for the Saudi authorities, firms and academicians. The Saudi authority 
would understand the gap between the suggested theories and practices as well 
as the differences between the practices of Saudi firms and developed countries 
which can lead to the introduction of new legalisations or guidelines with the goal 
of developing the financial practices in the Saudi market so that they are more 
in line to those adopted in more advanced countries. In addition, revealing the 
findings and gap can enable firms to compare their practices with other firms and 
to improve or change their current practices. Finally, the majority of Saudi’s 
business schools utilise textbooks that are published in western countries such 
as the U.S and UK. These textbooks explain the corporate finance examples and 
information as well as practices that are related to the western firms. Therefore, 
this research is the first study that reveals to the Saudi business schools how 
Saudi firms utilise and practice the corporate finance theories and models.  
- From 2009, the CMA started to make several governance codes obligatory for 
all Saudi listed firms in an attempt to improve the firm and the market. As far as 
I am aware, this research is the first study that examines the effect of Saudi 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in the period before and 
after the year 2009. In addition, according to my current knowledge, it is the first 
study that investigates the effect of institutional ownership, government 
ownership, and managerial ownership on firm performance in the Saudi market.    
- The findings relating to the effect of corporate governance on firm performance 
significantly contribute towards the various literatures, including Saudi CMA, and 
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firms. This study will provide to researchers and literatures new findings and 
results determining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance which were analysed by applying the dynamic model, the 
System GMM model, three measures of firm performance, two types of data, 
and the context of Saudi Arabia that consists of several differences in 
comparison to other developed and developing countries. In addition, as this 
research covers the period before and after the year 2009, it also covers the 
period before and after governance codes became obligatory for Saudi’s listed 
firms. Therefore, the findings would help the CMA to evaluate their market 
reforms, especially in regard to imposing governance codes in the period 
following 2009 on all firms while the findings relating to the governance 
mechanism would enable the Saudi CMA to assess, review, and improve the 
current governance mechanisms as the findings reveal that different governance 
regulations have a non-significant effect on firm performance. Moreover, the 
research findings offer valuable information to allow the firms to improve their 
performance and practices as the results reveal to firms what types of corporate 
governance mechanisms can help them to increase their performance and which 
corporate governance mechanisms has a negative impact on performance. 
- As far as I am aware, this research is the first study that investigates the extent 
and presence of information leakage incidents and cumulative abnormal returns 
prior to the quarterly and annual earnings announcements during the period 
before and after 2009. The findings related to this investigation have an 
important implication for the Saudi CMA. The CMA established the CGRs in 
2006 only as a guideline to improve the performance of Saudi firms as well as 
market transparency and efficiency; from 2009 the CMA started to make the 
CGRs obligatory and enforce the market reform on listed firms. Therefore, the 
findings of this research would provide the Saudi CMA with the necessary 
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evidence and proof of the effect of their market reform and the application of 
CGRs on the market and firm transparency as well as the level of information 
leakage before and after 2009. By referring to the research results, the CMA can 
conduct reviews with the aim of improving and introducing changes to the current 
corporate governance regulations.   
- As far as I am aware, this research is the first study that examines the influence 
of corporate governance components on information leakage in the Saudi 
market. The findings of this examination would provide valuable continuations to 
the literatures, firms, and the Saudi CMA. 
- The discussion that was presented in the research hypothesis chapter reveals 
that examining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm information leakage and insider trading is considered to be fairly limited in 
the literatures; therefore, this research would significantly contribute to 
researchers’ knowledge in this field and to the various literatures that explore 
this relationship, especially since this research adopted two types of data to 
compare the results and applied the System GMM model to control 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, heterogeneity, and endogeneity. This 
enabled the research to provide valid and accurate results.  
- The findings detailing the relationship existing between the governance and 
information leakage provide important guidelines of practice to the firm on how 
they can improve the transparency of their environments and to reduce the level 
of information leakage and insider trading. The findings provided the firms with 
a greater understanding of which corporate governance mechanisms are likely 
to reduce the level of information leakage and which ones have a positive 
influence on the level of information leakage.  
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- The Saudi CMA would be able to locate significant and valuable information in 
the findings of the relationship between the governance and information leakage. 
The Saudi CMA established and imposed the corporate governance regulation 
and codes on all listed firms in an attempt to reform the Saudi market and to 
make it more efficient and transparent in an effort to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the management and shareholders. As the presence of 
information leakage violates the market transparency, it is important for the CMA 
to assess the effect of the current governance codes on firms’ information 
leakage. The research findings provide a beneficial assessment for the CMA 
since it reveals to the CMA the relationship between each governance code and 
information leakage. This information will enable the CMA to reform, change, or 
improve the current codes which show a positive or non-significant influence on 
the firm information leakage and information asymmetry.   
 
9.4 Limitations and Future Research  
Despite the research providing a significant and comprehensive investigation, 
utilising valid and relevant methods and analysis, the research has certain 
limitations which is typical during scientific research. For example, a limitation was 
seen with the survey method that was adopted to examine corporate finance 
practices, which is that the CFO respondents may have represented their personal 
perspectives, rather than the actual practice of their firms. In addition, there is the 
prospect that certain CFOs may not have clearly comprehended the questions, 
resulting in them providing incorrect answers. Moreover, it is expected in some firms 
that the main corporate finance decisions are generated at the CEO not CFO level 
so the CEO would have more knowledge than CFO about what theories and models 
used in his firms. Due to this limitation, it is proposed that in future research 
concerning the Saudi market, the researcher could utilise an in-depth interview 
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method with CEO, CFO, and top management in each firm, in order to attain a rich 
understanding of corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, such an 
interview method enables the researcher to ask additional questions, clarify the 
participants’ responses and obtain deeper information, while also asking open-
ended questions.  
Additionally, the research chapter concerning the investigation of the degree 
of information leakage in the Saudi market has limited variables, only applying 
cumulative abnormal returns as a measure and indicator of leaked information. 
Consequently, it is recommended that potential future research applies further 
varied proxies and measures in relation to information leakage, for example 
abnormal trading volume and the price run-up index. Moreover, certain limitations 
were apparent relating to examination of corporate governance mechanisms’ impact 
on firm performance and information leakage. The research investigates the effect 
of board independence and CEO duality on firm performance and information 
leakage, which is concerned with independent directors who are not large 
shareholders or executives, or related to individuals who are. Indeed, large and 
family shareholders in the Saudi market have considerable influence on firms’ 
activity, given that several firms established by family owners and their families own 
a large percentage of their respective firm’s shares. Subsequently, even if 
independent directors are not significant shareholders or related to those who are, 
it is the case that certain independent directors may be assigned and controlled by 
such large and family shareholders, resulting in their decisions not being genuinely 
independent. Moreover, irrespective of whether the CEO is the same individual as 
the chairman, the CEO and chairman are both influenced and controlled by large 
shareholders. The strong impact of large shareholders results in the independent 
directors and CEO working for the advantage of large shareholders, as opposed to 
the majority of shareholders. Therefore, it is proposed that future studies should 
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neutralise the influence of large shareholders, during the investigation of the impact 
of independent directors and CEO duality on firm performance and information 
leakage. Additionally, it is recommended that an examination be conducted into the 
effect of family ownership on the extent of information leakage, because such a 
study has not been conducted in the Saudi market context. 
 A further limitation concerns the study’s investigation of the relationship 
between the number of board members, audit committee size, firm performance and 
information leakage. Despite the number potentially having a degree of influence, 
the research has not incorporated the members’ backgrounds, although their 
qualifications and backgrounds may have greater influence than the simple number. 
Therefore, it is necessary for future research to incorporate a consideration of these 
members’ characteristics, examining how they potentially effect firm performance 
and information leakage. Additionally, the research utilised two kinds of data on all 
firms from each sector and financial companies. The financial firms have certain 
financial discrepancies compared with the other firms. Therefore, it is recommended 
that this examination could be replicated, yet with a narrower focus on firms in the 
financial sector, for example banks and insurance companies. Another area of future 
research relates to the study’s implementation of several independent variables, 
representing the governance mechanisms in the relationship between governance, 
performance and information leakage. However, there are certain governance 
aspects that are not incorporated in this study. It is proposed that for future research, 
examination of other governance variables and their correlation to firm performance 
and information leakage could be investigated. For example, research could 
investigate the impact on firm performance and information leakage by board 
compensation, nomination and remuneration committee size, frequency of meetings 
of the nomination and remuneration committee, the board members’ political 
relationships, as well as family ownership.      
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     Appendix (1) 
Survey 
 Corporate Finance Practices in Saudi Arabia 
 
(For multiple choice questions, please write (x) for your selected answer) 
 
 
*** Please, add your email address below, if you want to receive a summary result of the survey about the 
corporate finance practices of Saudi listed companies.  
Email:  
 
Section 1: 
 
A) What is your age group?  
 
 
B) What is your highest qualification (e.g. undergraduate/Master etc.)?  
 
 
C) How long have you been in your current position/ role?  
 
 
D) What is the percentage of your firm’s stocks owned by the firms’ executives? 
 Less than 5%; 
 5% to less than 10%; 
 10% to 20%; 
 More than 20% 
 
E) What kind of target debt ratios does your firm set?  
 None;  
 Flexible;  
 Somewhat tight;  
 Strict.  
 
F) How frequently does your firm pay dividends to stockholders?  
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Almost always  Always  
     
 
Section 2: 
 
1) How frequently does your firm use the following project choice criteria in your firm?  
  Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Almost 
always  
Always  
Payback Period       
Accounting Rate of Return (ARR)       
Net Present Value (NPV)       
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)       
Profitability Index (PI)       
Break-even Analysis       
 
2) How frequently does your firm use the following methodology to assess the project risk in your firm?  
  Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Almost 
always  
Always  
Sensitivity analysis       
Scenario analysis       
Risk adjusted discount rate       
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Decision tree analysis       
Monte Carlo simulation       
 
3) How frequently does your firm use the following methods to estimate the cost of equity in your firm? 
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Almost 
always  
Always  
Dividend Yield (DPS/MPS)       
Earnings Yield (EPS/MPS)       
Gordon’s Dividend Discount Model       
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)       
Multi-factor Model       
 
4) Did you use a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in estimating your cost of equity capital?  
 No 
 Yes  
(If Yes, please answer questions 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D) (If No, please skip to question 5) 
 
4A) What do you use for risk-free rate in a CAPM Model? 
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  
Almost 
always  
Always  
1 to 13 Weeks SAMA Bills Rate       
26 to 52 Weeks SAMA Bills Rate       
10 Year Government Development Bonds 
Rate  
     
U.S.A. 5 Year Treasury Constant Maturity       
U.S.A. 10 Year Treasury Constant Maturity      
 
4B) What do you use as your volatility or beta factor in a CAPM Model?  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  
Almost 
always  
Always  
Published Source       
CFO’s Estimate       
Industry Average       
 
4C) What period do you study to calculate beta of your company in a CAPM Model?  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  
Almost 
always  
Always  
Monthly Share Prices (5 years)       
Weekly Share Price (5 years)       
 
4D) What accounts for market risk premium in a CAPM Model?  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  
Almost 
always  
Always  
Fixed Rate 6% to 8%       
Fixed Rate 8% to 9 %       
Fixed Rate 9% to 10 %       
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 Never  Rarely  Sometimes  
Almost 
always  
Always  
Average of Historical and Implied       
CFO’s Estimate      
 
5) How frequently does your firm use Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) in estimating the cost of 
capital?  
Never  Rarely  Sometimes  Almost always  Always  
     
 
6) What is the tax rate used to calculate after tax cost of debt and the weights you use in the computation of 
WACC of the firm?  
 Never Rarely  Sometimes  
Almost 
always  
Always  
Current Statutory Tax Rate      
Minimum Alternative Tax      
Book Value Weights       
Market Value Weights       
Zakat Rate         
 
7A) Rank in order from 1 to 3 the financing pattern followed for the projects based on their relative 
importance in terms of their use in your firm.  
 
 
7B) How important is the use of the financing pattern followed for the projects in your firm?   
Not 
important  
Of little 
importance  
Moderately 
important  
Important  Very 
important  
Loans from Financial Institutions         
Retained Earnings       
Issue of New Shares       
 
8) What factors influence-determine the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?  
 Not 
important  
Of little 
importance  
Moderately 
important  
Important  
Very 
important  
Financial flexibility (we restrict debt when 
we have enough internal funds) -  
     
The transactions costs and fees for issuing 
debt-  
     
The debt levels of other firms in our 
industry-  
     
The potential costs of bankruptcy or 
financial distress-  
     
Debt is limited so our customers/suppliers 
are not worried about our firm going out of 
business-  
     
To ensure that management works hard and 
efficiently, debt issuance ensures a large 
portion of our cash flow is committed to 
interest payments  
     
Loans from Financial Institutions   
Retained Earnings   
Issue of New Shares   
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9) To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the dividend policy in your firm?  
 Strongly 
disagree  
Disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Agree  
Strongly 
agree  
Has Long-term Target Dividend Payout Ratio       
Focus More on Absolute Level of Dividends than 
Dividend Changes  
     
Willing to Rescind Dividend Increase in the Event 
of Growth Opportunities  
     
Cash Dividends as Residual after Financing Desired 
Investments from Earnings  
     
Dividend Payout Ratio Affects the Market Value of 
the Firm  
     
Dividends Provide Signalling Mechanism of the 
Future Prospects of the Firm  
     
Investors are Indifferent between Receiving 
Dividends and Capital Gains  
     
Responsive to Shareholders’ Preferences Regarding 
Dividends  
     
Dividend Payments Provide a Bonding Mechanism 
to Encourage Managers to Act in Best Interest of the 
Shareholders  
     
*** If there are any other comments pertinent to corporate finance practices in Saudi Arabia, that you would 
like to share, please add them in the space provided below.  
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Appendix (2) 
  Descriptive statistics of the independent variables of data C 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
BLOK        
Mean 38.323 38.467 37.817 36.371 35.546 34.395 36.820 
Median 40 40 37.500 35 32.500 31.570 35.430 
SD 23.119 23.319 22.947 23.429 23.252 23.710 23.262 
Maximum 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOV        
Mean 5.177 5.177 5.177 5.077 5.079 5.034 5.1203 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 15.006 15.006 15.006 14.937 14.935 14.874 14.906 
Maximum 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INS        
Mean 7.937 8.117 8.335 8.211 8.087 7.957 8.107 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 14.133 14.075 14.281 14.515 14.532 14.601 14.306 
Maximum 63.500 63.500 63.500 63.500 63.500 63.500 63.500 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIRE        
Mean 15.225 15.572 15.578 14.619 13.399 12.694 14.515 
Median 5.757 5.310 5.239 5.264 4.877 4.461 5.239 
SD 20.248 20.305 20.163 19.557 18.392 18.043 19.434 
Maximum 95.857 95.846 95.868 95.689 95.442 95.352 95.868 
Minimum 0 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001 0 
MANG        
Mean 2.340 1.955 2.368 2.099 1.638 1.545 1.991 
Median .009 .0098 .006 .008 .005 .006 .007 
SD 6.366 5.808 7.060 6.856 5.282 5.141 6.116 
Maximum 35.505 35.505 45.500 45.500 35.484 35.484 45.500 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BOSI        
Mean 8.574 8.600 8.522 8.591 8.583 8.600 8.578 
Median 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
SD 1.639 1.711 1.518 1.504 1.567 1.566 1.580 
Maximum 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Minimum 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 
BOIN        
Mean 54.202 52.740 50.201 50.768 52.171 50.942 51.837 
Median 50 45.454 44.444 44.444 44.444 42.857 45.454 
SD 22.672 19.770 17.760 18.097 18.325 17.869 19.140 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0 20 20 20 22.222 22.222 0 
BOME        
Mean 5.009 5.226 5.417 5.417 5.539 5.478 5.328 
Median 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 1.823 2.161 2.358 2.358 2.190 1.979 2.078 
Maximum 15 14 18 18 16 13 18 
Minimum 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CEDU        
Mean .835 .887 .896 .931 .913 .896 .893 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD .373 .318 .307 .255 .283 .307 .310 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AUSI        
Mean 3.287 3.365 3.339 3.443 3.435 3.513 3.397 
Median 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SD .604 .597 .620 .665 .690 .705 .6501 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Minimum 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 
AUME        
Mean 5.017 5.043 5.287 5.357 5.661 5.626 5.332 
Median 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 3.266 2.984 2.474 2.0270 2.081 1.842 2.504 
Maximum 28 25 20 12 15 13 28 
Minimum 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 
Count 115 115 115 115 115 115 690 
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Appendix (3) 
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables of data A 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
BLOK           
Mean 34.805 35.034 36.101 36.555 37.354 37.058 35.488 35.060 34.447 35.767 
Median 35.050 37.085 37.875 39.570 37.430 37.030 34.750 29.790 31.110 35.400 
SD 23.853 23.960 23.656 22.957 23.157 22.846 23.665 23.425 23.689 23.322 
Maximum 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 83.690 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOV           
Mean 7.317 7.317 7.316 7.261 7.261 7.261 7.156 7.160 7.074 7.236 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 17.374 17.374 17.465 17.392 17.392 17.392 17.282 17.277 17.186 17.224 
Maximum 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 74.300 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INS           
Mean 9.375 9.463 9.734 10.235 10.438 10.440 10.135 10.070 10.028 9.991 
Median 0 0 0 2.500 5.150 5.250 5 5 2.5 2.405 
SD 14.782 14.894 14.859 14.916 14.813 14.733 15.012 15.021 15.088 14.799 
Maximum 53.620 53.620 53.620 53.620 53.620 53.620 53.620 53.620 53.650 53.650 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIRE           
Mean 12.432 11.955 12.496 14.245 14.412 14.435 14.396 13.559 13.521 13.495 
Median 2.192 2.196 4.663 7.902 5.637 4.001 4.547 5.291 4.299 4.246 
SD 17.432 16.553 16.051 17.687 17.239 17.388 17.412 16.053 16.281 16.814 
Maximum 70 60.257 60.257 62.872 61.524 60.260 60.257 58.360 58.456 70 
Minimum 0 0 0 .004 .004 .004 .005 .001 .001 0 
MANG           
Mean 3.092 2.021 1.944 2.102 1.866 1.864 1.836 1.593 1.577 1.988 
Median .006 .005 .007 .008 .0072 .006 .006 .006 .006 .006 
SD 10.719 6.851 6.089 6.533 6.565 6.522 6.482 5.979 5.975 6.960 
Maximum 67.816 44.388 35.510 35.505 35.505 35.505 35.484 35.484 35.484 67.816 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BOSI           
Mean 8.516 8.532 8.468 8.500 8.629 8.548 8.548 8.548 8.629 8.547 
Median 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
SD 1.762 1.753 1.715 1.734 1.822 1.575 1.544 1.646 1.602 1.675 
Maximum 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Minimum 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 
BOIN           
Mean 59.086 58.730 59.524 60.734 55.855 50.763 52.518 53.467 51.612 55.810 
Median 60 60 60 58.571 56.349 50 55.555 50 47.222 57.143 
SD 23.250 23.164 23.837 22.561 19.266 16.718 18.293 17.670 18.004 20.652 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 88.889 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 22.222 22.222 0 
BOME           
Mean 5.177 5.177 5.274 5.274 5.468 5.774 5.565 5.919 5.694 5.480 
Median 4 4.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 2.315 1.971 2.121 2.105 2.468 2.737 2.013 2.438 2.222 2.276 
Maximum 14 10 11 15 14 18 12 16 13 18 
Minimum 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
CEDU           
Mean .806 .806 .822 .839 .887 .887 .919 .887 .871 .858 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD .398 .398 .385 .371 .319 .319 .275 .319 .338 .349 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AUSI           
Mean 3.113 3.065 3.242 3.339 3.403 3.452 3.532 3.516 3.661 3.370 
Median 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SD 1.103 .990 .592 .599 .613 .670 .718 .741 .767 .790 
Maximum 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 
Minimum 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 
AUME           
Mean 3.581 3.935 4.323 4.984 5.0484 5.597 5.645 5.855 5.919 4.987 
Median 3 4 4 4.5 4 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 2.287 2.394 2.373 2.466 2.385 2.866 2.120 2.126 2.019 2.470 
Maximum 11 10 12 12 12 20 11 12 13 20 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 0 
MARE           
Mean 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 .666 
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Median 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .479 
Maximum 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
BOCO           
Mean .065 .258 .548 .774 .952 1 1 1 1 .733 
Median 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD .248 .441 .502 .422 .216 0 0 0 0 .443 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Count 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 558 
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Appendix (4) 
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables of data D 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
BLOK        
Mean 36.055 36.154 35.404 34.204 33.260 32.043 34.520 
Median 33.900 34 32.400 30.600 28.980 29.020 30.735 
SD 24.358 24.539 23.877 24.339 23.960 24.180 24.138 
Maximum 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOV        
Mean 6.285 6.285 6.285 6.226 6.229 6.167 6.246 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 16.893 16.893 16.893 16.906 16.903 16.834 16.804 
Maximum 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 74.3 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INS        
Mean 3.886 4.131 4.3164 3.996 3.863 3.682 3.979 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 6.591 6.585 6.563 6.437 6.218 6.282 6.419 
Maximum 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.3 25.4 25.65 25.650 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIRE        
Mean 16.675 17.214 16.720 16.131 15.323 14.672 16.122 
Median 7.665 7.426 6.210 6.227 6.119 5.706 6.926 
SD 21.797 21.687 21.218 20.703 19.791 19.441 20.708 
Maximum 95.857 95.846 95.868 95.689 95.442 95.352 95.868 
Minimum .002 .002 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
MANAG        
Mean 2.568 2.249 2.235 1.933 1.845 1.710 2.090 
Median .010 .011 .006 .009 .008 .011 .010 
SD 6.571 6.245 6.215 5.879246 5.591 5.416 5.977 
Maximum 35.505 35.505 35.505 35.48449 35.484 35.484 35.505 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BOSI        
Mean 8.365 8.376 8.306 8.412 8.424 8.471 8.392 
Median 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 
SD 1.595 1.725 1.448 1.482 1.591 1.555 1.562 
Maximum 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Minimum 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 
BOIN        
Mean 53.971 51.841 49.383 49.815 51.847 51.271 51.355 
Median 55.555 45.454 44.444 42.857 42.857 44.444 44.949 
SD 22.459 19.358 17.852 18.124 17.472 17.748 18.882 
Maximum 100 100 88.889 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0 20 20 20 30 28.571 0 
BOME        
Mean 5.106 5.282 5.576 5.482 5.670 5.541 5.443 
Median 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 1.982 2.292 2.588 2.033 2.331 2.124 2.232 
Maximum 15 14 18 12 16 13 18 
Minimum 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CEDU        
Mean .788 .847 .859 .906 .882 .859 .857 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD .411 .362 .350 .294 .324 .350 .351 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AUSI        
Mean 3.259 3.353 3.318 3.412 3.388 3.471 3.367 
Median 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SD .580 .571 .582 .623 .619 .647 .605 
Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Minimum 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 
AUME        
Mean 4.694 4.906 5.247 5.306 5.741 5.718 5.269 
Median 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 2.564 2.398 2.734 2.104 2.111 1.750 2.321 
Maximum 15 12 20 12 15 13 20 
Minimum 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 
Count 85 85 85 85 85 85 510 
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Appendix (5) 
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables of data B 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
BLOK           
Mean 30.25 30.47 31.66 32.44 33.35 32.97 31.78 30.95 30.330 31.58 
Median 28.10 28.10 28.10 28.60 30.30 28.10 25 26.20 26.300 28.10 
SD 23.50 23.61 23.33 22.88 23.09 22.62 23.12 22.69 22.797 22.90 
Maximum 83.69 83.69 83.69 83.69 83.69 83.69 83.69 83.69 83.690 83.69 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GOV           
Mean 7.891 7.891 7.824 7.824 7.824 7.824 7.824 7.829 7.724 7.828 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 18.56 18.56 18.58 18.58 18.58 18.58 18.58 18.58 18.483 18.40 
Maximum 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.30 74.300 74.30 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
INS           
Mean 4.411 4.475 4.785 5.278 5.526 5.527 5.120 5.004 4.943 5.008 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SD 6.956 7.035 7.186 7.488 7.424 7.226 7.089 6.844 6.934 7.082 
Maximum 25.30 25.30 25.30 25.30 25.30 25.30 25.30 25.40 25.650 25.65 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DIRE           
Mean 13.21 12.66 13.34 14.89 15.45 15.04 14.98 14.32 14.407 14.26 
Median 2.016 2.016 5.046 9.211 8.865 5.648 6.026 5.706 5.077 5.013 
SD 18.53 17.67 17.08 18.44 17.88 17.42 17.45 16.25 16.549 17.36 
Maximum 70 60.25 60.25 62.87 61.52 60.26 60.25 58.36 58.456 70 
Minimum 0 0 0 .005 .004 .004 .004 .001 .001 0 
MANG           
Mean 3.731 2.439 2.346 2.505 2.220 2.217 2.222 1.928 1.910 2.391 
Median .006 .006 .008 .007 .008 .004 .006 .006 .009 .006 
SD 11.73 7.499 6.656 7.146 7.197 7.149 7.100 6.555 6.551 7.614 
Maximum 67.81 44.38 35.51 35.50 35.50 35.50 35.48 35.48 35.484 67.81 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BOSI           
Mean 8.255 8.275 8.196 8.235 8.392 8.294 8.294 8.294 8.373 8.290 
Median 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 8 9 8 
SD 1.765 1.767 1.709 1.739 1.866 1.553 1.527 1.653 1.612 1.678 
Maximum 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Minimum 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 
BOIN           
Mean 57.54 57.12 57.30 57.77 54.51 49.69 51.72 54.17 53.513 54.82 
Median 60 60 57.14 57.14 55.55 45.45 55.55 55.55 50 55.55 
SD 24.259 24.134 24.664 22.483 19.604 16.412 18.328 17.240 18.615 20.85 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 88.889 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 30 28.57143 0 
BOME           
Mean 5.137 5.255 5.333 5.314 5.373 5.804 5.608 5.941 5.765 5.503 
Median 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
SD 2.383 1.978 2.206 2.232 2.482 2.871 2.069 2.517 2.337 2.349 
Maximum 14 10 11 15 14 18 12 16 13 18 
Minimum 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
CEDU           
Mean .784 .804 .804 .824 .863 .863 .902 .863 .843 .839 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD .415 .401 .401 .385 .347 .347 .300 .347 .367 .368 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AUSI           
Mean 3.059 2.980 3.176 3.255 3.314 3.314 3.412 3.373 3.529 3.268 
Median 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
SD 1.139 1.029 .555 .5232 .509 .547 .638 .599 .674 .736 
Maximum 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 
Minimum 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 
AUME           
Mean 3.098 3.608 4.059 4.784 4.980 5.588 5.549 5.765 5.902 4.815 
Median 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 
SD 2.100 2.350 2.370 2.468 2.429 3.047 2.052 2.045 1.952 2.504 
Maximum 11 10 12 12 12 20 11 11 13 20 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 0 
MARE           
Mean 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 .667 
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Median 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .472 
Maximum 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
BOCO           
Mean .078 .255 .529 .765 .941 1 1 1 1 .730 
Median 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SD .272 .440 .504 .428 .238 0 0 0 0 .445 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Count 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 459 
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Appendix (6) 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables of data C 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
SAGR        
Mean 7.424 19.486 15.172 13.207 7.997 13.534 12.803 
Median 0 7.892 12.650 9.652 4.422 7.1921 6.742 
SD 57.141 46.138 30.605 30.777 23.215 32.188 38.496 
Maximum 180 180 160 160 170 180 180 
Minimum -179.186 -65.099 -83.966 -80.834 -43.634 -68.108 -179.186 
LVRG        
Mean 14.348 13.339 13.321 14.093 14.264 14.384 13.958 
Median 4.983 2.922 4.969 5.432 4.408 6.760 4.968 
SD 19.452 18.006 17.430 17.788 17.750 17.299 17.909 
Maximum 90.828 71.810 68.607 64.871 61.728 66.274 90.827 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIZE        
Mean 14.720 14.797 14.881 14.939 15.021 15.094 14.909 
Median 14.391 14.451 14.569 14.584 14.735 14.745 14.583 
SD 1.965 1.947 1.949 1.973 1.968 1.977 1.960 
Maximum 19.509 19.572 19.623 19.637 19.636 19.645 19.645 
Minimum 11.212 10.989 11.087 10.887 11.268 11.345 10.887 
Count 115 115 115 115 115 115 690 
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Appendix (7) 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables of data A 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
SAGR           
Mean 19.677 17.881 18.697 -5.034 13.271 8.207 5.515 5.515 7.079 10.745 
Median 12.686 14.259 14.666 -4.236 11.968 6.958 2.659 2.659 4.399 7.483 
SD 26.818 24.729 28.552 27.672 23.188 26.234 22.868 22.868 17.571 26.690 
Maximum 150 122.964 150 104.622 114.437 147.531 150 150 77.126 150 
Minimum -12.39 -46.157 -70.86 -85.705 -40.724 -80.834 -43.63 -43.63 -23.96 -85.705 
LVRG           
Mean 9.328 12.207 15.872 15.877 14.631 14.962 15.183 14.267 14.683 14.112 
Median 2.705 4.448 7.814 6.905 4.798 5.879 5.735 5.442 8.877 5.735 
SD 11.950 15.628 18.522 19.061 18.559 17.879 18.140 17.356 16.572 17.190 
Maximum 46.042 58.668 65.761 69.170 62.429 57.591 55.709 57.638 50.910 69.170 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIZE           
Mean 14.832 15.036 15.156 15.220 15.257 15.336 15.389 15.438 15.481 15.238 
Median 14.510 14.743 14.760 14.831 14.938 14.969 15.037 15.047 15.119 14.856 
SD 1.930 2.002 2.073 2.085 2.096 2.096 2.123 2.154 2.181 2.077 
Maximum 18.931 19.352 19.420 19.509 19.572 19.623 19.637 19.636 19.645 19.644 
Minimum 11.694 11.708 11.687 11.654 11.573 11.484 11.426 11.398 11.345 11.345 
Count 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 558 
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Appendix (8) 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables of data D 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
SAGR        
Mean -1.725 19.232 16.300 13.842 5.493 10.672 10.635 
Median -.308 8.858 13.727 9.652 2.427 5.814 6.850 
SD 47.059 43.696 31.995 33.690 23.497 30.964 36.544 
Maximum 170 180 160 160 170 180 180 
Minimum -179.186 -65.099 -83.966 -80.834 -43.634 -68.108 -179.186 
LVRG        
Mean 19.283 17.994 17.961 19.008 19.264 19.432 18.824 
Median 10.227 11.627 12.904 14.967 15.949 18.337 12.646 
SD 20.457 18.865 18.129 18.319 18.181 17.528 18.521 
Maximum 90.827 71.810 68.607 64.871 61.728 66.274 90.827 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIZE        
Mean 14.608 14.642 14.715 14.761 14.822 14.865 14.735 
Median 14.546 14.520 14.614 14.745 14.742 14.764 14.660 
SD 1.717 1.738 1.744 1.755 1.742 1.755 1.736 
Maximum 19.509 19.572 19.623 19.637 19.636 19.645 19.645 
Minimum 11.212 10.989 11.087 10.887 11.268 11.345 10.887 
Count 85 85 85 85 85 85 510 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
341 
 
Appendix (9) 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables of data B 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
SAGR           
Mean 13.945 17.243 20.845 -3.408 16.062 16.012 7.346 4.373 6.660 11.009 
Median 8.821 14.087 16.445 -.055 8.472 13.73 5.822 .826 2.732 7.515 
SD 20.936 25.085 30.625 28.514 33.195 24.542 28.564 24.766 19.172 27.263 
Maximum 110.325 122.964 150 104.622 150 114.437 147.531 150 77.126 150 
Minimum -12.398 -46.157 -70.864 -85.705 -41.73 -40.724 -80.834 -43.634 -23.967 -85.70 
LVRG           
Mean 11.103 14.642 19.182 19.198 17.725 18.106 18.368 17.294 17.808 17.047 
Median 5.267 9.9604 10.709 10.227 8.392 11.055 9.375 11.359 12.078 10.134 
SD 12.479 16.233 18.847 19.481 19.107 18.248 18.518 17.740 16.699 17.620 
Maximum 46.042 58.668 65.761 69.170 62.429 57.591 55.709 57.638 50.910 69.170 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIZE           
Mean 14.242 14.442 14.548 14.619 14.656 14.733 14.770 14.802 14.830 14.627 
Median 14.055 14.376 14.522 14.655 14.646 14.664 14.749 14.847 14.774 14.624 
SD 1.519 1.624 1.690 1.732 1.752 1.747 1.756 1.773 1.784 1.705 
Maximum 18.931 19.352 19.420 19.509 19.572 19.623 19.637 19.636 19.645 19.645 
Minimum 11.694 11.708 11.687 11.654 11.573 11.484 11.426 11.398 11.345 11.345 
Count 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 459 
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Appendix (10) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data C 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
ROA        
Mean 3.716 4.814 4.483 5.721 5.294 5.483 4.919 
Median 2.240 4.050 3.990 3.660 3.340 3.130 3.320 
SD 7.693 8.052 10.425 7.426 8.728 8.076 8.455 
Maximum 29.910 38.610 43.980 38.540 33.410 35.560 43.980 
Minimum -17.010 -32.260 -67.810 -8.430 -16.820 -12.150 -67.810 
ROE        
Mean 5.944 8.284 8.597 10.476 4.976 9.741 8.003 
Median 5.645 8.700 8.590 9.720 9.540 9.210 8.695 
SD 15.719 14.350 14.583 12.225 27.489 14.062 17.218 
Maximum 51.740 50.240 56.590 55.520 55.710 54.810 56.590 
Minimum -60.672 -59.020 -49.540 -45.116 -158.962 -52.339 -158.962 
Tobin's Q        
Mean 1.557 1.396 1.596 1.724 1.912 1.860 1.674 
Median 1.332 1.247 1.233 1.289 1.421 1.455 1.308 
SD .765 .595 .943 1.184 1.372 1.276 1.071 
Maximum 4.797 4.159 6.585 8.231 9.150 9.004 9.150 
Minimum .633 .678 .689 .663 .737 .667 .633 
Count 115 115 115 115 115 115 690 
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Appendix (11) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data A 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
ROA           
Mean 9.088 8.076 6.849 5.280 6.651 6.325 6.771 6.351 6.330 6.858 
Median 7.335 5.315 5.320 2.670 4.645 5.135 3.765 3.440 3.840 4.520 
SD 8.780 8.305 9.441 8.204 8.272 9.413 8.728 9.199 8.914 8.817 
Maximum 29.100 27.330 43.450 29.910 38.610 43.980 38.540 33.410 35.560 43.980 
.Minimum -11.07 -13.54 -13.11 -15.21 -13.67 -11.01 -8.430 -15.07 -12.15 -15.21 
ROE           
Mean 16.993 14.969 12.698 9.876 12.127 11.847 12.475 10.863 11.530 11.530 
Median 17.270 13.235 13.525 7.570 11.440 10.460 13.020 11.535 12.580 12.580 
SD 13.234 11.925 13.391 12.351 11.581 12.786 11.336 13.792 12.749 12.749 
Maximum 47.070 45.350 53.270 51.740 50.240 56.590 55.520 55.710 54.810 54.810 
Minimum -13.40 -16.13 -18.77 -21.14 -24.72 -17.84 -11.38 -36.02 -28.93 -36.02 
Tobin's 
Q 
          
Mean 1.872 2.065 1.1844 1.438 1.415 1.687 1.738 2.025 1.928 1.706 
Median 1.72 1.907 1.115 1.232 1.171 1.196 1.254 1.360 1.336 1.326 
SD .834 .919 .350 .618 .600 1.051 1.137 1.521 1.352 1.030 
Maximum 4.246 4.727 2.515 3.469 3.149 6.585 5.950 9.151 7.499 9.151 
Minimum .873 .756 .644 .633 .678 .702 .783 .884 .949 .633 
Count 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 558 
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Appendix (12) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data D 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
ROA        
Mean 5.179 6.060 5.624 7.116 7.512 7.089 6.430 
Median 3.21 5.880 5.800 4.830 6.090 4.8 5.165 
SD 7.919 8.929 11.822 8.053 8.725 8.675 9.110 
Maximum 29.910 38.610 43.980 38.540 33.410 35.560 43.980 
Minimum -15.210 -32.260 -67.810 -8.430 -15.070 -12.150 -67.810 
ROE        
Mean 8.005 9.266 9.653 11.216 11.422 10.815 10.063 
Median 6.520 9.450 8.830 8.950 9.850 9.210 8.935 
SD 12.769 15.001 15.076 11.727 12.932 13.258 13.503 
Maximum 51.740 50.240 56.590 55.520 55.710 54.810 56.590 
Minimum -35.950 -59.020 -49.540 -20.700 -28.660 -28.930 -59.020 
Tobin's Q        
Mean 1.540 1.464 1.731 1.849 2.101 2.066 1.792 
Median 1.333 1.291 1.276 1.308 1.484 1.551 1.369 
SD .758 .656 1.051 1.327 1.532 1.424 1.191 
Maximum 4.797 4.158 6.585 8.231 9.151 9.004 9.151 
Minimum .633 .678 .689 .663 .737 .667 .633 
Count 85 85 85 85 85 85 510 
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Appendix (13) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data B 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
ROA           
Mean 9.925 9.123 7.927 6.068 7.647 7.211 7.758 7.470 7.220 7.817 
Median 8.780 8.360 7.610 3.570 6.150 5.910 4.830 5.860 4.800 6.330 
SD 9.353 8.748 10.094 8.832 8.784 10.158 9.337 9.741 9.597 9.396 
Maximum 29.100 27.330 43.450 29.910 38.610 43.980 38.540 33.410 35.560 43.980 
Minimum -11.07 -13.54 -13.11 -15.21 -13.67 -11.01 -8.430 -15.07 -12.15 -15.21 
ROE           
Mean 14.273 13.896 12.188 9.568 12.025 11.420 12.025 11.203 10.780 11.931 
Median 14.690 12.330 12.610 7.110 10.450 9.250 8.950 9.850 9.970 11.300 
SD 12.253 12.344 14.253 12.865 12.276 13.905 12.343 13.597 13.817 13.054 
Maximum 38.440 45.350 53.270 51.740 50.240 56.590 55.520 55.710 54.810 56.590 
Minimum -13.40 -16.13 -18.77 -21.14 -24.72 -17.84 -11.38 -28.66 -28.93 -28.93 
Tobin's Q           
Mean 2.037 2.246 1.219 1.522 1.494 1.831 1.895 2.234 2.109 1.843 
Median 1.879 2.004 1.144 1.346 1.296 1.330 1.416 1.581 1.501 1.484 
SD .829 .909 .374 .649 .631 1.108 1.198 1.603 1.429 1.086 
Maximum 4.246 4.727 2.515 3.469 3.149 6.585 5.950 9.151 7.499 9.151 
Minimum .873 .756 .644 .633 .678 .702 .783 .884 .966 .633 
Count 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
346 
 
Appendix (14) 
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Appendix (15) 
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Appendix (16) 
 
 
349 
 
Appendix (17) 
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Appendix (18) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data A 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
CMRM           
Mean .198 .141 .127 .075 .080 .092 .055 .047 .114 .103 
Median .174 .124 .111 .076 .048 .073 .039 .041 .091 .071 
SD .140 .105 .107 .057 .085 .075 .064 .037 .096 .100 
Maximum .591 .492 .485 .234 .407 .395 .438 .189 .389 .591 
Minimum .015 .015 .002 .001 .001 .002 .002 .001 .004 .001 
MARM           
Mean .112 .088 .089 .058 .059 .063 .047 .045 .066 .070 
Median .095 .061 .072 .046 .037 .040 .037 .037 .042 .047 
SD .095 .080 .076 .041 .075 .066 .053 .039 .070 .071 
Maximum .361 .390 .339 .191 .373 .354 .324 .202 .362 .390 
Minimum .001 .002 .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .000 
MRM           
Mean .121 .095 .101 .061 .064 .079 .049 .050 .061 .076 
Median .099 .075 .083 .046 .045 .058 .031 .048 .038 .055 
SD .101 .076 .080 .048 .079 .084 .065 .038 .066 .076 
Maximum .456 .325 .316 .234 .428 .462 .458 .188 .272 .462 
Minimum .009 .003 .001 .003 .001 .002 .000 .001 .002 .000 
Count 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 558 
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Appendix (19) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data B 
Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
CMRM           
Mean .223 .141 .138 .079 .084 .100 .057 .046 .124 .110 
Median .192 .124 .121 .082 .046 .084 .041 .042 .096 .079 
SD .141 .109 .110 .058 .092 .079 .068 .034 .093 .105 
Maximum .591 .492 .485 .234 .407 .395 .438 .140 .389 .591 
Minimum .015 .015 .002 .001 .001 .002 .002 .001 .006 .001 
MARM           
Mean .120 .092 .096 .055 .067 .069 .050 .044 .065 .073 
Median .106 .063 .078 .041 .040 .046 .040 .038 .043 .051 
SD .099 .083 .078 .041 .081 .070 .056 .035 .062 .073 
Maximum .361 .390 .339 .191 .373 .354 .324 .143 .254 .390 
Minimum .000 .003 .003 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .004 .000 
MRM           
Mean .130 .097 .111 .062 .069 .088 .054 .051 .064 .081 
Median .100 .076 .095 .043 .045 .066 .032 .053 .039 .060 
SD .105 .076 .082 .051 .086 .090 .070 .035 .064 .080 
Maximum .456 .325 .316 .234 .428 .462 .458 .133 .248 .462 
Minimum .011 .003 .001 .003 .000 .002 .000 .001 .002 .000 
Count 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 459 
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Appendix (20) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data C 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
CMRM        
Mean .083 .083 .122 .055 .054 .147 .091 
Median .071 .059 .087 .037 .046 .109 .063 
SD .069 .076 .133 .066 .046 .177 .110 
Maximum .448 .406 1.124 .438 .222 1.535 1.535 
Minimum .000 .001 .002 .000 .001 .001 .000 
MARM        
Mean .056 .061 .098 .045 .068 .081 .068 
Median .045 .042 .059 .027 .047 .053 .044 
SD .041 .063 .133 .054 .154 .095 .100 
Maximum .230 .373 1.109 .324 1.631 .771 1.631 
Minimum .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
MRM        
Mean .066 .062 .101 .051 .069 .082 .072 
Median .048 .047 .066 .032 .047 .049 .047 
SD .059 .067 .122 .060 .161 .098 .103 
Maximum .431 .428 .968 .458 1.716 .806 1.716 
Minimum .003 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Count 115 115 115 115 115 115 690 
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Appendix (21) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables of data D 
Variables 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 All 
CMRM        
Mean .075 .078 .103 .055 .053 .143 .084 
Median .068 .046 .084 .037 .046 .112 .061 
SD .054 .079 .081 .065 .043 .127 .085 
Maximum .234 .407 .445 .438 .178 .922 .922 
Minimum .000 .001 .002 .000 .001 .006 .000 
MARM        
Mean .053 .060 .074 .047 .054 .086 .062 
Median .041 .038 .051 .030 .047 .057 .042 
SD .037 .066 .078 .058 .044 .100 .068 
Maximum .191 .373 .455 .324 .200 .771 .771 
Minimum .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
MRM        
Mean .060 .063 .091 .053 .054 .087 .068 
Median .048 .045 .060 .032 .050 .049 .047 
SD .046 .073 .092 .064 .043 .105 .075 
Maximum .234 .428 .462 .458 .174 .806 .806 
Minimum .003 .000 .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 
Count 85 85 85 85 85 85 510 
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